The First Gulf War as a Successful Joint Operation

Introduction

In this paper it is argued that the First Gulf War was a successful joint operation, and that the “jointness” was organized according to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. To justify this thesis, the historical events that lead to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act are explained, and the Act itself is described. Next, the history of the First Gulf War is briefly recounted. The war is examined through the lens of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and we see that it was executed in the manner prescribed by the Act. Finally, the connection between successful execution and successful joint operation is examined, and the thesis is thus supported.

USAF photo of F-16A, F-15C, F-15E war planes flying over burning oil wells during Desert Storm, 1991

Background

The concept of joint operations has been present in US military thought since at least 1905¹, but it came to the fore with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and eventually became part of doctrine². The Act streamlined the military hierarchy while allowing different branches to work better together. There were two small military operations during the Carter Administration whose outcomes led to the passage of the Act.

The first was the attempt to rescue the hostages taken from the US Embassy in Tehran by followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The operation, called Operation Eagle Claw³, began on 24 April 1980 with eight helicopters. The helicopters encountered severe dust storms which disabled two of them. After refueling, one of the remaining helicopters was found to be faulty. This brought the number of helicopters to five, below the minimum viable number needed to complete the rescue and so the mission was aborted. As the helicopters were refueling for departure, one of them crashed into a C-130 tanker, killing eight servicemen.

An analysis of this incident, the “Holloway Report”, found twenty-three issues⁴, which included problems with command and control, coordination of joint training, and a lack of weather reconnaissance. From these recommendations, the Joint Special Operations Command was established in December of 1980.

The second military operation was the liberation of Grenada in October 1983. On 13 March 1979, the Marxist New Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation Movement, also called the New JEWEL Movement, or the NJM, seized control of Grenada, and formed the People’s Revolutionary Government. This happened when Eric Gairy, the prime minister, was out of the country.

The United States recognized the new government on 22 March 1979. The American ambassador promised aid projects, but a US-backed coup d’état led by Gairy seemed imminent. Grenada broke-off relations with the United States and formed relations with the Soviet Union, Nicaragua, and Cuba.

Reagan won election in 1980, and in response to the growing relation between Grenada and Fidel Castro as well as concerns for the safety of 600 American medical students on the island, an invasion of Grenada, called Operation Urgent Fury, was planned. The operation began on 25 October 1983. The People’s Revolutionary Government was toppled, Soviet and Cuban forces were expelled, the students were rescued, and a new government was installed. The operation ended after 8 days, on 2 November 1983.

The operation, while a military success, exposed problems that would later be addressed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Intelligence was lacking. In particular, the 600 medical students were located at two different campuses, and American forces took 30 hours to reach the second campus. The maps used were not topographic maps but rather tourist maps with hand drawn MGRS lines⁵. Communication systems used by the US forces were incompatible between the branches and this hindered the coordination of operations⁶.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act

The Goldwater-Nichols Act had made several changes to military structure, and therefore operations and planning⁷, the most relevant being:

First, it created the position of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This position is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. This arrangement allowed the chairman to choose overall strategies while giving command authority to joint combatant commanders. However, the chairman “may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces.”^{8 9}

Second, the various branches were to use combined procurement to not only share the latest technology but also to ensure communication interoperability.

Finally, the service chiefs no longer had any operational control of their forces. This role was taken over by combatant commanders, and those commanders were responsible for either geographic regions or specific functions. Since multiple branches were involved in all the regions or all the functions, combatant commanders are inherently joint commanders.

The First Gulf War

The first major test of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was the First Gulf War of 1991. The issues prompting that war were the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait starting on 2 August 1990 and fears that Iraq would next invade Saudi Arabia.

This invasion prompted immediate and universal condemnation. Included in the reaction was UN Security Council Resolution 660 which demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Iraq forces from Kuwait, and Resolution 661 which imposed international sanctions against Iraq.

The US and UK deployed forces into Saudi Arabia to deter Iraq movement into Saudi Arabia as well as to force Saddam Hussein to follow Resolution 660. Meanwhile, President George H. W. Bush began building a large coalition of nations, encouraging them to either contribute their own forces or provide support.

Among the nations to join the coalition were many Arab/Muslim nations including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kuwait government in exile. Of those, Saudi Arabia and Egypt provided considerable support to the coalition - Egypt would commit 35K to the operation, while the Saudis not only hosted coalition forces but provided troops and air support.

The final ultimatum, Resolution 678, came from the United Nations, giving Iraq until 15 January 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait. They didn’t withdraw, and Operation Desert Storm started the next day.

In an attempt to fracture the coalition, Iraq launched missile strikes on Israel starting on 17 January 1991, hoping that an Israeli response would alienate the Arab nations and cause them to drop out. At the urging of the Americans, Israel did not retaliate, and the coalition mostly held throughout the war.

The Gulf War was fought according to the AirLand Battle doctrine¹⁰. In this, land and air forces collaborate with the air forces depriving the enemy of air and logistical support. Ground forces then performed rapid and aggressive maneuver warfare to dominate enemy targets. To do this, a large amount of materiel must be pre-positioned, say in Saudi Arabia.

The air campaign lasted from 17 January 1991 to 23 February 1991 - 42 consecutive days and nights. It consisted of over 100,000 sorties, performed primarily by the US Air Force, with the Navy and Marine Corps also contributing. The other coalition partners, even Middle Eastern countries (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE), also supplied aircraft.

Immediately prior to the start of the ground campaign, an artillery barrage was used to weaken or defeat any Iraqi defensive positions that survived the air assault. Performed by the Army’s 1st Infantry Division Artillery, 90,000 artillery rounds were fired in a period of 2.5 hours.

The ground campaign involved infantry and armored divisions from the US Army, the USMC, and the British 1st Armoured Division. Four of the largest tank battles in America’s history were fought during this phase of the Gulf War.

American and British forces crossed from Kuwait into Iraq on 24 February 1991. Saddam Hussain ordered that his remaining forces in Kuwait to withdraw on 27 February. Iraqi troops stationed at Kuwait International Airport didn’t get the memo, and their defeat was the end of combat operations within Kuwait. The next day, Iraq’s foreign minister announced that Iraq would accept the UN Security Council resolutions against it.

The First Gulf War as a Joint Operation

The above recounting of the history of the First Gulf War illustrates the influence the Goldwater-Nichols Act had on military operations. Operation Desert Storm was not only a multinational operation, it was a joint operation: the US military branches had to collaborate with partner nations, but more importantly the US military branches had to work in a coordinated manner¹¹.

This was possible primarily because the Joint Chiefs of Staff were given a Chairman. This position, then held by General Colin Powell, is purely advisory but it ensures that the separate combat commanders have a central point of contact. This allowed the branches to operate in a coordinated fashion.

The combined procurement required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act ensured that communication breakdowns seen during Operation Eagle Claw and Operation Urgent Fury would not happen again.

Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols Act encouraged interactions between the services in that combatant commanders were joint commanders that had operational control over their forces, not service chiefs. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr, the combatant commander of the First Gulf War thus had control over multiple military branches.

Success Factors

The First Gulf War was indeed a military success, and it was indeed a joint operation executed in a manner prescribed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, as argued in the previous sentence. Was that success due to it being a joint operation?

It may be attempting to attribute the victory to the fact that it was a multinational operation, but other multinational operations were failures.

It is more reasonable to attribute success to the use of the AirLand Battle doctrine under a brilliant and experienced combat commander in pursuance of finite and delineated goals. This theory is ruled out because AirLand Battle doctrine explicitly requires control of the air and land dimensions of the battlespace. While this doesn’t necessarily imply that multiple branches of the military must be involved, the combined air and land capabilities of a single branch may not have been sufficient alone.

Conclusion

The First Gulf War was thus a successful joint operation, but there is one problem…

The only point of fault of this joint operation was the lengthy time needed to form a coalition. The people of Kuwait were living under the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party for almost 7 months, from 2 August 1990 to 27 February 1991, and socialists can do considerable damage in that period of time. The presence of Middle Eastern nations in the coalition may have prevented the war from expanding should the United States acted alone, however.

Barring this, the First Gulf War must be classified as a tremendous success for modern joint strategic planning and warfare. It demonstrated that while individual military branches are themselves powerful, they are even more powerful when they are used in a collaborative manner.

Footnotes

[1] Crosbie, “Getting the Joint Functions Right”
[2] JP 3-0: Joint Operations.
[3] Morrow, “Operation Eagle Claw remembered 40 years later.”
[4] Holloway, Final Report of the Special Operations Review Group.
[5] Bolger, “Operation Urgent Fury and its Critics.”
[6] Nightingale, “How Grenada Changed How America Goes to War.”
[7] Cook, “The Importance of Joint Concepts for the Planner.”
[8] PUBLIC LAW 99-433-OCT. 1, 1986, 10 USC 152c.
[9] Here’s looking at you, General Milley.
[10] King & Boykin IV, “Distinctly Different Doctrine: Why Multi-Domain Operations isn’t AirLand Battle 2.0.”
[11] Marquis et al. “The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf War: A 25-Year Retrospective.”

Bibliography

Bolger, D. “Operation Urgent Fury and its Critics.” Military Review, July 1986. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Directors-Select-Articles/Operation-Urgent-Fury/

Cook, J. “The Importance of Joint Concepts for the Planner.” Joint Force Quarterly 99. National Defense University Press. 19 November 2020. Retrieved 4 October 2024 from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2421455/the-importance-of-joint-concepts-for-the-planner/

Crosbie, T. “Getting the Joint Functions Right.” Joint Forces Quarterly 94, 25 July 2019. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1913080/getting-the-joint-functions-right

Holloway, J. Final Report of the Special Operations Review Group. July 1980. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/19709-national-security-archive-doc-10-final-report

Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0: Joint Operations. 11 August 2011. Retrieved 6 October 2024 from https://www.moore.army.mil/mssp/security%20topics/Potential%20Adversaries/content/pdf/JP%203-0.pdf

King, S. & Boykin IV, D. “Distinctly Different Doctrine: Why Multi-Domain Operations isn’t AirLand Battle 2.0.” Association of the United Stares Army. 20 February 2019. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://www.ausa.org/articles/distinctly-different-doctrine-why-multi-domain-operations-isn%E2%80%99t-airland-battle-20

Marquis, G., Dye, D., & Kinkead, R. “The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf War: A 25-Year Retrospective.” Joint Force Quarterly 85. National Defense University Press. 1 April 2017. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1130670/the-advent-of-jointness-during-the-gulf-war-a-25-year-retrospective/

Morrow, K. “Operation Eagle Claw remembered 40 years later.” U.S. Army, 24 April 2020. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/235436/operation_eagle_claw_remembered_40_years_later

Nightingale, K. “How Grenada Changed How America Goes to War.” Small Wars Journal, 23 October 2013. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how-grenada-changed-how-america-goes-to-war

PUBLIC LAW 99-433-OCT. 1, 1986. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. https://history.defense.gov/portals/70/documents/dod_reforms/goldwater-nicholsdodreordact1986.pdf

Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa: Decomposition of Data Analysis

Introduction

The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa[1] was a 2009 novella authored by Michael L. Burgoyne and Albert "Jim" Marckwardt explaining one way to conduct successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq. Its narrative style was based on Ernest Swinton’s The Defense of Duffer’s Drift[2]: in both, the protagonist repeats the same scenario repeatedly, each time learning from the last. Through each evolution, the protagonist learns from his (sometimes) deadly mistakes, and by the end he succeeds in his mission.

The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa was later converted into six computer animated videos by TRADOC. The goal of this paper is to perform a decomposition of data analysis of the events in the fifth video[3] of that series. The major actors will be described, as well as the actions they take. Then, the targets, objectives, and effects (results or consequences) will be analyzed. The implications of these actions for intelligence analysis are described. Finally, the lessons the protagonist learned in this evolution will be described.

Note: in an earlier post[4], the COIN operarions at al-Doreaa was examined using RAFT (Relationships, Actors, Functions, and Tensions) Analysis.

Actors and Initial Actions

2LT Phil Connors

The main actor is 2LT Phil Connors. He establishes a combat outpost (COP) in the Iraqi town called al-Doreaa with the goal of providing a base of operations for his men as well as providing security and other aid to the town. He obtains humanitarian aid (HA) packages for the townsfolk. He is aware of local customs and follows them, including greeting rituals, eating with the right hand, and not objecting to women wearing burkas.

Mayor Hussein

The town’s mayor, Mayor Hussein, describes the condition of al-Doreaa to 2LT Connors. He has three children: two daughters and one son. He tells Connors about his town's needs which includes medical services, stable electricity, and clean water. He is of the opinion that America’s promises have exceeded the results.

Mohammed the Interpreter

Mohammed, Connors’ interpreter, works with the American forces and interacts with the townsfolk. This puts him in potential danger, so Connors reviews steps he must take to maintain his safety.

Bill White from USAID

Bill White, who works for the USAID, travels with his team to the town to work on the water system. His team carries only rifles. He meets with Connors, but Connors did not know that USAID would be there. Connors believes the USAID team's defensives are insufficient for the town.

Insurgent Groups

There are insurgent groups in the area. For reasons explained below, they will be called Insurgents #1, #2, and #3.

Actions

During the initial meeting with Mayor Hussein, Connors provides some personal info about his life to build rapport. The mayor tells him of some of the town’s problems (no water, intermittent electricity, and no medical clinic). He also lets Connors know about his son’s health. Connors has a medic treat his son, stating that frequent follow-up care will be needed.

On the way back to the COP, Conners meets with Bill White and his USAID team. Connors asks if he has security. He says he has rifles but asks if Connors can provide security while he works on the town’s water system. Throwing shade (Connors thinks of them as “yahoos” and “cowboys or morons”), Connors says he cannot provide security, even though Mayor Hussein expressed the need for water. White protests, stating that he won’t be able to return for another month. Connors again refuses to provide security, and White and the rest of the USAID team drives off.

At the base, Connors believes that the meeting with the mayor went well, and one of his troops stated that the HA packages were popular with the townsfolk, who reciprocated with a little info on the insurgents. Mohammed alerts Connors to the mayor: if the mayor really is in charge, he can’t be trusted since he knows local insurgents. One of Connors’ soldiers, Specialist Wilson, reports that the south side of town is dangerous at night. He says this while sweeping the Americans and Muhammed with his rifle.

At this point, the COP comes under mortar attack from Insurgents #1. They request rotary wing support, and one of Connors’ soldiers is killed. Realizing that if his troops struck out blindly at the population, that would get the townsfolk to side with the insurgents. Connors meets with his sergeants and encourages them to act with restraint.

Connors pays a visit to the mayor the next morning. The mayor heard about the attack but didn’t know of the fatality. Connors asks if he knew who committed the attack. The mayor doesn’t know, but he states that some unemployed young men in town can be persuaded by outsiders. The mayor also provides info about the outsiders’ approximate location (house with a blue gate). He will not help Connors find the exact location because it will put him in danger.

On the way back to the COP, Connors confirms what the mayor says, but cannot narrow down the exact location, as there are three houses with blue gates. At the COP, Connors combines info from his other soldiers to determine the exact house from which Insurgents #2 operates.

Connors establishes an observation post (OP) close to that house to monitor activity. The OP reports five males are transferring items out of a car but cannot confirm that they are weapons. Connors and team raid the house. They kill at least two of the insurgents and capture at least two others. They also capture a weapons cache that includes a mortar.

For several weeks after the raid, no further attacks occurred. Connors arranged for a medical team to work at the town, and he provided the town with cases of bottled water. He also had weekly dinner with Mayor Hussein to plan future improvements.

Because there were no other attacks in al-Doreaa, Conners’ team was repositioned north. He met with the mayor to let him know they were leaving. Connors thought everything would be OK – he believed the insurgency had come to an end in that area.

Several days later, Connors saw a news report stating that al-Doreaa was seized by Insurgents #3. He didn’t believe this happened – the town had been free of insurgents when he departed. Insurgents #3 posted a video online showing them executing several individuals, including the mayor and (maybe) Mohammed the interpreter.

Connors thus arrives at the following lessons:

1. Counterinsurgency requires unity of effort between the military, NGOs, the host nation, and other elements of national power.
2. Established informants must be protected after Coalition forces leave.
3. Operations must be transferred to local security forces and local government officials.

Finis.

Targets, Objectives, and Effects (Consequences) of the Acts

In dismissing the USAID personnel, Conners prevented the town from receiving reliable clean water for at least a month. He did this even though the mayor explicitly stated that this was something the town needed. Supplying the town with cases of bottled water was thus only a stop-gap measure. This also reinforces the mayor’s opinion that American forces were promising more than they were delivering.

By reminding his men not to take broad action in response to his man’s death, Connors avoided creating animosity with the townsfolk. This goodwill allowed him to pinpoint the location of Insurgents #2, and to capture or kill them and their weapons cache, rendering Insurgents #2 inoperative. Since several insurgents were captured alive, this would be an intelligence source that can be used. Finally, it alerted other insurgents that the town was secure, and that they should delay their actions until the Americans leave.

Insurgents #3 captured the town and executed several people including Mayor Hussein and (maybe) Mohammed the Interpreter. This instilled fear into the rest of the town – the lesson being that cooperation with Americans would lead to death. Insurgents #3 also posted video of these executions online. The effects of this were to instill fear in American sympathizers throughout Iraq, to act as a morale booster for other insurgents, and to recruit new insurgents from across the globe. Finally, it led to the demoralization of one 2LT Phil Connors.

Intelligence Implications

The insurgents appeared three times in this story: first, when the COP came under attack; second, when insurgents occupied a house and used it as a weapons cache; third, when the insurgents reentered the town and executed townsfolk who acted as informants or cooperated with the Americans.

It cannot be assumed that these were all the same insurgents. The mayor explicitly stated that outsiders were recruiting locals to work for them. Further, the weapons house insurgents (Insurgents #2) cannot be the same as the ones who executed townsfolk (Insurgents #3), since they were either captured or killed in the raid. Finally, the insurgents who attacked the COP (Insurgents #1) may or may not be the same as the ones captured at the weapons house (Insurgents #2). A mortar was found at the house, along with several shells, so they may have been the same. Only information gathered from the captured insurgents as well as forensic examination of the weapons can determine if the weapons house insurgents (Insurgents #2) were the same ones who attacked the COP (Insurgents #1).

Conclusion

The fifth evolution of The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa demonstrated the need for cooperation between the military, NGOs, and local government to successfully fight insurgents – and that one reason for a lack of cooperation is inter-agency rivalry. It also showed that when American forces leave an area, control must be transferred to local security and local government. In this fictitious example, local security apparently didn’t exist, and the mayor was truly not in charge, as demonstrated by his fear of helping the Americans. Thus, if local security or competent government don’t exist, they must be established before Americans leave the area. If not, then not only are the locals who work for Americans in danger, but also any progress the Americans make will be destroyed.

Footnotes

[1] Burgoyne & Marckwardt, The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa.
[2] Swinton, The Defense of Duffer’s Drift.
[3] TRADOC, “The Defense of Jisr Al Doreaa – Dream 5.”
[4] Klepper, “Jasr Al Doreaa: RAFT Analysis.”

Bibliography

Burgoyne, M. & Marckwardt, A. The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa. University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Klepper, M. "Jasr Al Doreaa: RAFT Analysis." The Other Side of History, 19 April 2024. Retrieved 13 July 2024 from https://the-other-side-of-history.blogspot.com/2024/04/jasr-al-doreaa-raft-analysis.html

Swinton, E. The Defense of Duffer’s Drift. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Originally published 1906. Retrieved 13 July 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/swinton.pdf

TRADOC. “The Defense of Jisr Al Doreaa – Dream 5.” YouTube Video, 17:49. 9 May 2013. Retrieved 13 July 2024 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYFB0zAcZl4

Coalition Building in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars

Introduction

Wars are frequently multinational operations, extremely complex operations involving standardizing communication systems, hiring translators, establishing both national and international chains of commands¹, and so on. Fundamental to this is the diplomatic work to build coalitions. The coalition President George H. W. Bush assembled to liberate Kuwait came together relatively easy during the buildup to the Gulf War. President George W. Bush was able to rapidly assemble a multinational operation for prosecution of the Afghanistan War, but he encountered difficulties in forming what would be called the Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I), popularly called the "Coalition of the Willing." This paper compares the assembly of the coalitions for both the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars and attempts to identify the ways the younger Bush was able to overcome the difficulties in forming the MNF-I.

The history of our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq are extremely relevant to explaining the difference in effort needed to build the two MNFs, perhaps as important as the jus ad bellum (reasons for declaring war) for both conflicts. For this reason, the historical context for both wars is provided. Following this, the usual factors that a potential member of an MNF must consider before committing are examined. Finally, the ways that the Bush Administration used to grow MNF-I are described, along with the embarrassments they generated.

Colin Powell at the UN.

Historical Background of the Afghanistan War

During Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (24 December 1979 - 15 February 1989), the United States via the Central Intelligence Agency supported the Afghan Mujahideen resistance fighters, as did Pakistan, Iran, the UK, and the Arab Gulf States. The Soviets withdrew following the signing of the US-brokered 1988 Geneva Accords, but they left in place a Soviet-backed regime led by Mohammad Najibullah. Thus, the war to rid Afghanistan of communism continued, but now it was a civil war.

Najibullah was ousted in 1992 and was replaced by the Mujahideen. This lasted until September 1996 when the Mujahideen were in turn replaced by the Taliban, an Islamic group primarily composed of Pashtun Afghans, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan.

A new civil war then started between the Pashtun (represented by the Taliban) and the other ethnic groups (represented by the Northern Alliance). While this war raged, foreign fighters entered the country, most importantly Al Qaida led by Osama Bin Laden, and they began using Afghanistan as a base of operations.

Al Qaeda bombed two US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 April 1998, and on 12 October 2000 they attacked the USS Cole while docked in a Yemeni port. Bin Laden was now considered an international terrorist threat, and the US demands his extradition. The Taliban refused, and the UN imposed economic sanctions in response.

Shortly following the September 11^th terrorist attacks, Bin Laden was determined to be the culprit and again America demand extradition. The Taliban again refused to hand him over. This meant that Afghanistan was not only harboring known terrorists, but the Taliban became an impediment to the capture or destruction of Al Qaeda members.

The political objectives of the US-led forces were the capture or destruction of Al Qaeda and the destruction of the Taliban. While the latter was not necessary to achieve the former, it was felt that ousting the Taliban from power would allow US-led forces to gain support of the Northern Alliance, prevent Al Qaeda from reconstituting itself, and serve as an object lesson to other nations of the price of harboring or supporting terrorists.

The ultimate strategy for the War in Afghanistan was to use high tech weapons (UAVs and guided missiles) together with Special Forces to defeat the Taliban², and to use a small number of conventional forces to search for Al Qaeda. This plan overcame two problems with the location and geography of Afghanistan: the "tyranny of political geography" and the "tyranny of topography," which made Afghanistan into "a logistics nightmare."³

On 7 October 2001, the US and the UK begin bombing operations, less than one month after the 9/11 attacks. Because of this short time interval, insufficient post-combat planning was performed.

Historical Context of the Iraq War

Prior to the start of the Afghanistan War, the US had little interaction with Afghanistan beyond support of the Mujahideen during the Soviet Occupation. In contrast, there was considerable history between the US and Iraq: the Gulf War.

While the Gulf War saw the eviction of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Saddam Hussein remained in power. When George W. Bush became president, he brought along policy experts who believed that leaving Saddam in power was a mistake. This was the first reason that war with Iraq was seen as inevitable.

The second reason that war seemed inevitable was the Bush Administration's overall policy in response to 9/11. Bush not only declared war against Afghanistan, but he also declared a Global War on Terror (GWOT). Few people at the time wondered just how it was possible to declare war on a tactic (terrorism).

The connection between Iraq and the GWOT was tenuous: Saddam was not known to harbor terrorists, nor was he a sponsor of terrorism (or at least international terrorists). What tipped the scale was Saddam's unwillingness to allow UN Weapons Inspectors to examine certain weapon facilities. This led to suspicions that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the means to deliver said WMD, and that he had used WMD against the Iraqi Kurds. The political objectives of the US-led forces were to eliminate Saddam and the Ba'athist regime, locate and destroy the WMDs and the facilities to manufacture them, as well as to protect the Kurds.

Just like in Afghanistan, there was little post-combat planning, but the difference was that Iraq shared a 994-mile-long border with a hostile enemy: Iran.

Joining a Multinational Operation

The countries involved in multinational operations share a common desired political outcome from the military operations, that much is clear. Assembling a coalition is thus an act of diplomacy, and the decision for a country to become a partner nation (PN) in a multinational task force (MNTF) depends on the purpose of the MNTF, the lead nation, as well as domestic concerns.

There are numerous domestic concerns a potential PN must consider: domestic politics, national interest, the defense budget, and threats from other nations that may seek to use the diversion of the PN's military to the MNTF to their advantage⁴.

Once the PN decides to join, there is the question of the range of support (the type and level of commitment) the PN would provide to the MNTF. According to JP 3-16, the range of support is a spectrum⁵. On one end of this spectrum is combat support in the form of troops, aircraft, ships, equipment, etc. At the other end there are commitments that do not require troops or equipment, such as financial assistance, overflight and basing rights, and use of existing facilities. In the middle, noncombatant forces can be committed to provide forms of support such as logistics, infrastructure, air and sea lift, intra-theater lift, etc.

There is also the question of when the PN's forces engage: combat, post-combat, or both. During the Iraq war, several nations agreed to become involved only after combat operations ended, at which point humanitarian assistance and reconstruction came to the fore.⁶

How the Iraq War Differed from the Afghanistan War

There were two differences between the Iraq War and Afghanistan War that were of importance to potential PNs. First, there was the fresh and raw memory of the 9/11 attacks and the very real possibility that Al Qaeda would attack them (whether they became a PN or not). Second was the differing expected post-combat outcomes.

With the shock of the 9/11 attacks, not much consideration was given to how Afghanistan would look after the completion of military operations. The elimination of Al Qaida was seen as doable, and preventing the return of the Taliban was an important goal, but what form would the new Afghan government take? America promised a representative democracy, but Afghanistan is composed of a number of ethnic and tribal groups and would require a strong central government in order to keep them those groups at peace. The inherent contradiction was lost on the military planners. Add to this was the fact that the Taliban were primarily Pashtun, which were 40% of the population. If the Pashtun were excluded, then the new Afghan government wouldn't be representative; if they were included then a strong central government would be needed to keep them from taking control, so the new Afghan government wouldn't be democratic. The participants in Operation Enduring Freedom would have to prop-up the new Afghan government instead.

In comparison, the reasons for invading Iraq were suspect from the start: there was no evidence for the existence of Saddam's WMDs⁷. Further, the Bush Administration provided a plethora of reasons for going into Iraq, and if WMDs turned out to be a wash, the US could always fall back on Saddam's history of human rights violations.

Further, the goal of eliminating the Ba'athist government did not come with a plan to replace it. The need for a replacement was immediately obvious due to the presence of Iran: if no de-Ba'athized government was formed, Iraq would invade, and so an extended foreign presence would be required. The realpolitik Pottery Barn Rule would apply: "If you break it, you bought it."

So, both wars would require an extended presence in both countries, but the problems for post-combat Iraq were much more obvious.

Building a multinational force was considerably more difficult for Iraq than for Afghanistan for all these reasons⁸. In addition, the US was unable to get UN agreement on invading Iraq. To compensate for all this, the Bush Administration had to get... creative.

Getting to ‘Yes’: Persuading Potential PNs to Join MNF-I

For whatever reason, the primary metric that the Bush Administration used for determining the robustness of the Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) was the number of partner nations. This quickly led to issues.

The Bush Administration initially released only the number of PNs, not the names of the PNs. When the list of names was released⁹, several problems became clear: first, several listed countries (the Solomon Islands, Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands) not only lacked name recognition, they also lacked standing armies. Second, two of the counties on the list (Eritrea and Ethiopia) had recently completed a major war against each other (the Badme War, 6 May 1998 - 18 June 2000). Third, at least one country on the list (Costa Rica, also a nation without a standing army) denied agreeing to be a PN.

To pad these numbers, the State Department claimed that 15 nations were "covert" PNs. The existence of at least one covert nation (Canada) was proven in the WikiLeaks US diplomatic cable leak¹⁰.

The Bush Administration also used financial pressure to grow the number of PNs. Several of the countries were already receiving US aid. Georgia was believed to have become a PN and commit 2,000 soldiers to Iraq as repayment for American training of Georgian forces that could be used to stabilize break-away regions. In 2003, Turkey was offered $8.5 billion in loans for sending 10,000 troops. They refused the loans but did allow medical airlifts into and out of the country.

Thus the Coalition of the Willing came into being.

Conclusion

Prior to the Iraq War, participation of states in a multinational operation depended on domestic consent, decisions about the range of support, as well as decisions about the stage of the operation (conflict-phase, post-conflict, or both). The Bush Administration added two additional factors: whether to participate publicly, and the amount of quid pro quo necessary.

Regardless, the MNF-I was established. As combat operations concluded, the existence of WMD came into serious doubt and the Iraq War became more and more a quagmire, PNs began leaving the Coalition of the Willing.

Footnotes

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations, II-1 to II-19.
2. Howard, C. “To Baghdad and Beyond: ARSOF in Operation Iraqi Freedom.”
3. Snow, D. & Drew, D. From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond.
4. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations. III-1 to III-4
5. Ibid. III-3 to III-5.
6. Rayburn, J. & Sobchak, F. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1
7. Younge, G., Norton-Taylor, R. & Wintour, P. “Blix attacks ‘shaky’ intelligence on weapons.”
8. NATO, “NATO and Afghanistan.”
9. Schifferes, S. “US names ‘coalition of the willing’”.
10. Weston, G. “Canada offered to aid Iraq invasion: WikiLeaks”

Bibliography

Howard, C. “To Baghdad and Beyond: ARSOF in Operation Iraqi Freedom.” USASOC History Office, 20 March 2023. Retrieved 10 June 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/264978/to_baghdad_and_beyond_arsof_in_operation_iraqi_freedom

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations, 12 February 2021.

NATO. “NATO and Afghanistan.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 31 August 2022. Retrieved 9 June 2024 from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm

Rayburn, J. & Sobchak, F. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War – Volume 1: Invasion – Insurgency – Civil War, 2003-2006. USAWC Press, 17 January 2019. Retrieved 9 June 2024 from https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1385&context=monographs

Schifferes, S. “US names ‘coalition of the willing’” BBC News, 18 March 2003. Retrieved 9 June 2024 from https://web.archive.org/web/20080226195556/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm

Snow, D. & Drew, D. From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond: War and Politics in the American Experience. Routledge, 2009.

Younge, G., Norton-Taylor, R. & Wintour, P. “Blix attacks ‘shaky’ intelligence on weapons.” The Guardian, 23 April 2003. Retrieved 10 June 2024 from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/23/iraq.iraq