The First Gulf War as a Successful Joint Operation

Introduction

In this paper it is argued that the First Gulf War was a successful joint operation, and that the “jointness” was organized according to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. To justify this thesis, the historical events that lead to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act are explained, and the Act itself is described. Next, the history of the First Gulf War is briefly recounted. The war is examined through the lens of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and we see that it was executed in the manner prescribed by the Act. Finally, the connection between successful execution and successful joint operation is examined, and the thesis is thus supported.

USAF photo of F-16A, F-15C, F-15E war planes flying over burning oil wells during Desert Storm, 1991

Background

The concept of joint operations has been present in US military thought since at least 1905¹, but it came to the fore with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and eventually became part of doctrine². The Act streamlined the military hierarchy while allowing different branches to work better together. There were two small military operations during the Carter Administration whose outcomes led to the passage of the Act.

The first was the attempt to rescue the hostages taken from the US Embassy in Tehran by followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The operation, called Operation Eagle Claw³, began on 24 April 1980 with eight helicopters. The helicopters encountered severe dust storms which disabled two of them. After refueling, one of the remaining helicopters was found to be faulty. This brought the number of helicopters to five, below the minimum viable number needed to complete the rescue and so the mission was aborted. As the helicopters were refueling for departure, one of them crashed into a C-130 tanker, killing eight servicemen.

An analysis of this incident, the “Holloway Report”, found twenty-three issues⁴, which included problems with command and control, coordination of joint training, and a lack of weather reconnaissance. From these recommendations, the Joint Special Operations Command was established in December of 1980.

The second military operation was the liberation of Grenada in October 1983. On 13 March 1979, the Marxist New Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation Movement, also called the New JEWEL Movement, or the NJM, seized control of Grenada, and formed the People’s Revolutionary Government. This happened when Eric Gairy, the prime minister, was out of the country.

The United States recognized the new government on 22 March 1979. The American ambassador promised aid projects, but a US-backed coup d’état led by Gairy seemed imminent. Grenada broke-off relations with the United States and formed relations with the Soviet Union, Nicaragua, and Cuba.

Reagan won election in 1980, and in response to the growing relation between Grenada and Fidel Castro as well as concerns for the safety of 600 American medical students on the island, an invasion of Grenada, called Operation Urgent Fury, was planned. The operation began on 25 October 1983. The People’s Revolutionary Government was toppled, Soviet and Cuban forces were expelled, the students were rescued, and a new government was installed. The operation ended after 8 days, on 2 November 1983.

The operation, while a military success, exposed problems that would later be addressed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Intelligence was lacking. In particular, the 600 medical students were located at two different campuses, and American forces took 30 hours to reach the second campus. The maps used were not topographic maps but rather tourist maps with hand drawn MGRS lines⁵. Communication systems used by the US forces were incompatible between the branches and this hindered the coordination of operations⁶.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act

The Goldwater-Nichols Act had made several changes to military structure, and therefore operations and planning⁷, the most relevant being:

First, it created the position of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This position is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. This arrangement allowed the chairman to choose overall strategies while giving command authority to joint combatant commanders. However, the chairman “may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces.”^{8 9}

Second, the various branches were to use combined procurement to not only share the latest technology but also to ensure communication interoperability.

Finally, the service chiefs no longer had any operational control of their forces. This role was taken over by combatant commanders, and those commanders were responsible for either geographic regions or specific functions. Since multiple branches were involved in all the regions or all the functions, combatant commanders are inherently joint commanders.

The First Gulf War

The first major test of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was the First Gulf War of 1991. The issues prompting that war were the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait starting on 2 August 1990 and fears that Iraq would next invade Saudi Arabia.

This invasion prompted immediate and universal condemnation. Included in the reaction was UN Security Council Resolution 660 which demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Iraq forces from Kuwait, and Resolution 661 which imposed international sanctions against Iraq.

The US and UK deployed forces into Saudi Arabia to deter Iraq movement into Saudi Arabia as well as to force Saddam Hussein to follow Resolution 660. Meanwhile, President George H. W. Bush began building a large coalition of nations, encouraging them to either contribute their own forces or provide support.

Among the nations to join the coalition were many Arab/Muslim nations including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kuwait government in exile. Of those, Saudi Arabia and Egypt provided considerable support to the coalition - Egypt would commit 35K to the operation, while the Saudis not only hosted coalition forces but provided troops and air support.

The final ultimatum, Resolution 678, came from the United Nations, giving Iraq until 15 January 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait. They didn’t withdraw, and Operation Desert Storm started the next day.

In an attempt to fracture the coalition, Iraq launched missile strikes on Israel starting on 17 January 1991, hoping that an Israeli response would alienate the Arab nations and cause them to drop out. At the urging of the Americans, Israel did not retaliate, and the coalition mostly held throughout the war.

The Gulf War was fought according to the AirLand Battle doctrine¹⁰. In this, land and air forces collaborate with the air forces depriving the enemy of air and logistical support. Ground forces then performed rapid and aggressive maneuver warfare to dominate enemy targets. To do this, a large amount of materiel must be pre-positioned, say in Saudi Arabia.

The air campaign lasted from 17 January 1991 to 23 February 1991 - 42 consecutive days and nights. It consisted of over 100,000 sorties, performed primarily by the US Air Force, with the Navy and Marine Corps also contributing. The other coalition partners, even Middle Eastern countries (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE), also supplied aircraft.

Immediately prior to the start of the ground campaign, an artillery barrage was used to weaken or defeat any Iraqi defensive positions that survived the air assault. Performed by the Army’s 1st Infantry Division Artillery, 90,000 artillery rounds were fired in a period of 2.5 hours.

The ground campaign involved infantry and armored divisions from the US Army, the USMC, and the British 1st Armoured Division. Four of the largest tank battles in America’s history were fought during this phase of the Gulf War.

American and British forces crossed from Kuwait into Iraq on 24 February 1991. Saddam Hussain ordered that his remaining forces in Kuwait to withdraw on 27 February. Iraqi troops stationed at Kuwait International Airport didn’t get the memo, and their defeat was the end of combat operations within Kuwait. The next day, Iraq’s foreign minister announced that Iraq would accept the UN Security Council resolutions against it.

The First Gulf War as a Joint Operation

The above recounting of the history of the First Gulf War illustrates the influence the Goldwater-Nichols Act had on military operations. Operation Desert Storm was not only a multinational operation, it was a joint operation: the US military branches had to collaborate with partner nations, but more importantly the US military branches had to work in a coordinated manner¹¹.

This was possible primarily because the Joint Chiefs of Staff were given a Chairman. This position, then held by General Colin Powell, is purely advisory but it ensures that the separate combat commanders have a central point of contact. This allowed the branches to operate in a coordinated fashion.

The combined procurement required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act ensured that communication breakdowns seen during Operation Eagle Claw and Operation Urgent Fury would not happen again.

Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols Act encouraged interactions between the services in that combatant commanders were joint commanders that had operational control over their forces, not service chiefs. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr, the combatant commander of the First Gulf War thus had control over multiple military branches.

Success Factors

The First Gulf War was indeed a military success, and it was indeed a joint operation executed in a manner prescribed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, as argued in the previous sentence. Was that success due to it being a joint operation?

It may be attempting to attribute the victory to the fact that it was a multinational operation, but other multinational operations were failures.

It is more reasonable to attribute success to the use of the AirLand Battle doctrine under a brilliant and experienced combat commander in pursuance of finite and delineated goals. This theory is ruled out because AirLand Battle doctrine explicitly requires control of the air and land dimensions of the battlespace. While this doesn’t necessarily imply that multiple branches of the military must be involved, the combined air and land capabilities of a single branch may not have been sufficient alone.

Conclusion

The First Gulf War was thus a successful joint operation, but there is one problem…

The only point of fault of this joint operation was the lengthy time needed to form a coalition. The people of Kuwait were living under the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party for almost 7 months, from 2 August 1990 to 27 February 1991, and socialists can do considerable damage in that period of time. The presence of Middle Eastern nations in the coalition may have prevented the war from expanding should the United States acted alone, however.

Barring this, the First Gulf War must be classified as a tremendous success for modern joint strategic planning and warfare. It demonstrated that while individual military branches are themselves powerful, they are even more powerful when they are used in a collaborative manner.

Footnotes

[1] Crosbie, “Getting the Joint Functions Right”
[2] JP 3-0: Joint Operations.
[3] Morrow, “Operation Eagle Claw remembered 40 years later.”
[4] Holloway, Final Report of the Special Operations Review Group.
[5] Bolger, “Operation Urgent Fury and its Critics.”
[6] Nightingale, “How Grenada Changed How America Goes to War.”
[7] Cook, “The Importance of Joint Concepts for the Planner.”
[8] PUBLIC LAW 99-433-OCT. 1, 1986, 10 USC 152c.
[9] Here’s looking at you, General Milley.
[10] King & Boykin IV, “Distinctly Different Doctrine: Why Multi-Domain Operations isn’t AirLand Battle 2.0.”
[11] Marquis et al. “The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf War: A 25-Year Retrospective.”

Bibliography

Bolger, D. “Operation Urgent Fury and its Critics.” Military Review, July 1986. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Directors-Select-Articles/Operation-Urgent-Fury/

Cook, J. “The Importance of Joint Concepts for the Planner.” Joint Force Quarterly 99. National Defense University Press. 19 November 2020. Retrieved 4 October 2024 from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2421455/the-importance-of-joint-concepts-for-the-planner/

Crosbie, T. “Getting the Joint Functions Right.” Joint Forces Quarterly 94, 25 July 2019. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1913080/getting-the-joint-functions-right

Holloway, J. Final Report of the Special Operations Review Group. July 1980. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/19709-national-security-archive-doc-10-final-report

Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0: Joint Operations. 11 August 2011. Retrieved 6 October 2024 from https://www.moore.army.mil/mssp/security%20topics/Potential%20Adversaries/content/pdf/JP%203-0.pdf

King, S. & Boykin IV, D. “Distinctly Different Doctrine: Why Multi-Domain Operations isn’t AirLand Battle 2.0.” Association of the United Stares Army. 20 February 2019. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://www.ausa.org/articles/distinctly-different-doctrine-why-multi-domain-operations-isn%E2%80%99t-airland-battle-20

Marquis, G., Dye, D., & Kinkead, R. “The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf War: A 25-Year Retrospective.” Joint Force Quarterly 85. National Defense University Press. 1 April 2017. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1130670/the-advent-of-jointness-during-the-gulf-war-a-25-year-retrospective/

Morrow, K. “Operation Eagle Claw remembered 40 years later.” U.S. Army, 24 April 2020. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/235436/operation_eagle_claw_remembered_40_years_later

Nightingale, K. “How Grenada Changed How America Goes to War.” Small Wars Journal, 23 October 2013. Retrieved 5 October 2024 from https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how-grenada-changed-how-america-goes-to-war

PUBLIC LAW 99-433-OCT. 1, 1986. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. https://history.defense.gov/portals/70/documents/dod_reforms/goldwater-nicholsdodreordact1986.pdf

JPP Applied to Rising Military Suicide Rates

Introduction

This paper uses the Joint Planning Process (JPP)[1] to address a hypothetical situation related to rising suicide rates of military personnel. The situation is described in the following problem:

You are the Commanding Officer of a squadron/battalion/destroyer who has experienced a significant increase in suicides over the past two years. Your immediate superior asks you to utilize the model of the Joint Planning Process with your leadership team to develop a course(s) of action to address the problem. How would you approach the issue? How would you define the problem? What courses of action would you propose? What criteria would you establish to grade your courses of action? How would you measure success?

For this paper, the recommendations are for a USMC or Army battalion. Unfortunately, the described course of action won’t transfer to squadrons or destroyers.

Marine Corps Community Services: How to Talk Openly About Suicide

Each of the seven steps of the JPP will be used. As specified in JP 5-0[2], the steps are:

1. Planning Initiation
2. Mission Analysis
3. COA Development
4. COA Analysis and Wargaming
5. COA Comparison
6. COA Approval
7. Plan or Order Development

Overall, this paper makes minimal assumptions about the causes of military suicides. It is assumed that such suicides are related to harrowing missions or rapid operational tempo. The choice for these factors was motivated by the observation that “the average warrior saw 40 days of combat during World War II and 240 days during the Vietnam War” and that “something changes inside a warrior the first time they take another's life or watch a comrade fall on the battlefield… Warriors feel rage and anger and want payback; but they also feel a sense of loneliness they have never experienced before.”[3]

All courses of action (COA) presented here propose collecting information on family history of mental health issues, prior symptoms of PTSD, etc. Focusing on family history is nothing new, as some research has performed statistical analyses only on demographic factors[4].

Research has compared suicide rates amongst the warfighters in different wars, and it is generally assumed that the suicide rates for World War II are lower than all wars from the Korean War to the GWOT[5] [6]. Additional studies have specialized in suicides only from the GWOT[7]. The study by Smith et al seemed to show that “War does not historically appear to increase suicide rates in active-duty U.S. Army soldiers or U.S. civilians.”[8] If this is true, veteran suicides are more common than active-duty suicides.

Step 1: Planning Initiation

Planning begins when the order to investigate the sudden increase in suicide rate of a particular battalion, and to use the JPP to devise a course of action that addresses this problem.

Step 2: Mission Analysis

Staff estimates: The battalion commander will have the following personnel available:

• The executive officer (XO) (a major)
• 4 company commanders, including HQ company (captains)
• 4 company XOs (first lieutenants)
• 1 battalion sergeant major
• 4 first sergeants, the company-level senior NCOs
• 1 or 2 medical specialists.

The enlisted personnel would be best at gathering information on those who committed suicide. Both officers and enlisted personnel should be involved in determining what changed two years ago. Finally, the XO will be charged with organizing the information that was collected.

Mission statement: The battalion experienced a substantial increase in the rate of suicides over the past two years. The mission is to reduce that rate to where it stood prior to two years ago, at least. These rates will be measured in terms of the percentage of the battalion lost in a single month.

Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR): To determine the success of the mission, we must know the suicide rates prior to two years ago. It would be worth reviewing records as far back as possible, at least from five years ago.

The fundamental question that must be answered is: what changed approximately 2 years ago? Rates of suicide increased significantly starting two years ago, and that change must be understood. This is one part of the CCIR.

Another CCIR that can be collected prior to the implementation of the chosen COA are profiles of the troops who committed suicide over the previous two years. Information collected should include family life, family history of mental health issues, prior symptoms of PTSD, CPTSD, or TBI[9].

Information on suicides must be collected while the chosen COA is ongoing. This will allow the effectiveness of the COA to be measured. The implementation plan for the COA can be continually adjusted as needed.

Impact on other operations: The impact on other operations, either ongoing or future will depend on the chosen COA. At bare minimum, there would be minor personnel additions that should not change ongoing or future operations. Another COA could require significant changes to both ongoing and future operations.

Step 3 COA Development

COA 1: Reproduce techniques that were used in historical situations to reduce rates of suicide. For example, during the Battle of Verdun[10], Marshal Philippe Pétain rotated French troops after two weeks on the front lines. This was called the “noria system,” and the Germans practiced something similar. One consequence of this was that a larger number of troops gained combat experience. It is not clear what effect this system had on troop suicide, if any.

It may be worthwhile to examine historical techniques that resulted in increased suicide rates – and for us to do the opposite.

COA 2: Move psychological support closer to the battalion. This would allow troops to get help in a timely manner and can be done either permanently or on an as-needed basis.

COA 3: Determine what changed starting two years ago that could cause the increased suicide rates – and reverse it. Likely causes can include personnel changes, change in mission, and change in operational tempo. Retraining or reassigning personnel can fix the first cause. Changes in mission or operational tempo will require more substantial changes, say by using Pétain’s noria system.

Step 4 COA Analysis

COA 1: The initial stage of this COA is primarily historical research. It must be conducted by historians, and so by someone external to the battalion. If the pace of research is slow, this will delay implementation. If historical methods to reduce suicides are found, the implementation of the methods could involve major operational changes.

COA 2: This COA requires either that a psychiatrist or a medic with some appropriate training be added to the battalion. Psychiatrists are usually located at the division level or higher and are in short supply.

The assignment need not be permanent: it may make sense to assign a psychiatrist temporarily to the battalion depending on recent or upcoming harrowing activities. This can provide an immediate solution, at least in some cases.

COA 3: The goal of this COA is to make changes to the battalion based on the answer(s) to the “what changed” question. If the relevant difference was a personnel change, it will be necessary to investigate whether increased suicide rates happened at the previous locations where the personnel were assigned, then retrain or reassign the personnel.

If the increased suicide rate was caused by either a change in mission or a change in operation tempo, these hypotheses should be verified by examining other battalions in similar situations. Either of these two causes may significantly impact current or future operations.

Changes in personnel, mission, or operational tempo are not the only potential causes of the increase in suicide rates. Other potential causes include an interruption in family communications, or various changes that could be described as code of conduct or HR actions, etc. For those changes, it should be simple to reverse them with no impact on current or future operations.

Step 5 COA Comparison

COA 1 will require some research, and the required data may not be available. For example, the noria system was implemented to ensure fresh troops were available for the battle, not to minimize suicide rates, and there is a lack of data regarding such rates.

It may not be possible to execute COA 1 as historical data may not be available. If multiple historical methods are found, then they must be evaluated and compared, and the one(s) that show the most promise should then be implemented.

COA 2 may not be a practical solution depending on the level of hostility to those that have thoughts of suicide within the battalion. If the level is high, a troop experiencing suicidal thoughts may be too ashamed to seek help.

COA 3 is the most practical plan of action, in part because the scope of action is so limited in comparison to COA 1 and COA 2. Even if it is found that a change in mission or a change in battle tempo was the underlying cause, these can be corrected.

Both COA 3 and COA 1 can involve operational changes, and COA 1 might require the most such changes, depending on the historical approach used.

For COA 3, the staff size and their assigned roles will be the same as described in Step 2.

Using the “Course of Action Comparison” found in JP 5-0, a plus/minus/neutral comparison would be most appropriate[11].

Criteria	COA 1	COA 2	COA 3
Time to Implement	-	+	+
Personnel Changes	+	-	0
Mission Changes	-	+	+
Operational Tempo Changes	-	+	+

Step 6 COA Approval

The plan of action will be sent to the division commander for review and approval.

Step 7 Plan or Order Development

The steps needed to execute COA 3 are as follows:

1. Obtain records going back at least 3 - 5 years.
2. Look for changes in personnel, mission, and/or battle tempo immediately prior to the period of increased suicide.
3. For any of the changes, selectively examine similar changes in other battalions.
4. Once the change has been identified, reverse it when possible – see notes below on how to accomplish this.
5. Gather statistics.
6. Compare new state (post COA 2 implementation) with prior state (pre-COA 2). Was there a difference in suicide rate?
7. Repeat as needed, adjusting plans when desired results are not achieved.

Each of the three changes listed above (personnel, mission, and tempo) can be addressed.

1. One example of personnel change is as follows: suppose LT X transferred into the battalion prior to the increase in suicide rate. Was LT X’s prior assignment marked with increased suicide rate, and did that rate plummet after his departure? If so, LT X should be sent for additional leadership training.
2. Another situation is when LT X is good, but the LT he replaced was much better. Again, additional training and mentorship should fix this problem.
3. Suppose there was a change in mission, say from building roads to participating in a humanitarian rescue following a tsunami. The two-week rotation plan used by Marshal Pétain mentioned above should be effective in reducing stress levels and so result in a lower suicide rate.
4. Finally, a change in operational tempo can also be addressed by the two-week rotation plan.
Note: experimentation usually involves a control group. Depending on the comparison being made, it may be unethical to require a control group.

Conclusion

The goal of this planning document was to apply the Joint Planning Process to correct an increase in suicide rates for a battalion. The goal is to reduce the suicide rates in the battalion to the rate from two years ago. The COA proposed here can be implemented with minimal effect on mission or operational tempo, and results are measurable. The success or failure of the COA can be accessed, and it can be modified as needed. The COA (either in original or modified form) can be considered a success if suicide rates were reduced to the level prior to the increase, at least.

Footnotes

[1] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0
[2] Ibid, Ch V.
[3] Fisher, “Vietnam vet shares coping skills with combat warriors.”
[4] Ramchand, The War Within, pp. 19-25.
[5] Smith, “A historical comparison of U.S. Army & U.S. civilian suicide rates, 1900–2020.”
[6] This hypothesis is debated in Pollock, “Estimating the number of suicides among Vietnam veterans.”
[7] Suitt, “High Suicide Rates among United States Service Members and Veterans of the Post9/11 Wars.”
[8] Smith, “A historical comparison of U.S. Army & U.S. civilian suicide rates, 1900–2020.”
[9] Ramchand, The War Within.
[10] Wikart, “Memories of Verdun.”
[11] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Appendix G.

Bibliography

Fisher, D. “Vietnam vet shares coping skills with combat warriors.” U.S. Army. 15 May 2009. Retrieved 13 September 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/21185/vietnam_vet_shares_coping_skills_with_combat_warriors

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning. 16 June 2017. Retrieved 15 September 2024 from https://www.airforcespecialtactics.af.mil/Portals/80/prototype/assets/joint-pub-jpub-5-0-joint-planning.pdf

Pollock, D., Rhodes, P., Boyle, C., Decoufle, P., & McGee, D. “Estimating the number of suicides among Vietnam veterans.” Am J Psychiatry 147, no. 6 (June 1990). https://doi:10.1176/ajp.147.6.772

Ramchand, R., Acosta, J., Burns, R., Jaycox, L., & Pernin, C. The War Within: Preventing Suicide in the U.S. Military. RAND Corporation (2011). Retrieved 9 September 2024 from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG953.pdf

Smith, J., Doidge, M., Hanoa, R., & Frueh. “A historical comparison of U.S. Army & U.S. civilian suicide rates, 1900–2020.” Psychiatry Research 323 (May 2023). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2023.115182

Suitt, T. “High Suicide Rates among United States Service Members and Veterans of the Post9/11 Wars.” Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (21 June 2021). Retrieved 15 September 2024 from https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Suitt_Suicides_Costs%20of%20War_June%2021%202021.pdf

Wikart, F. “Memories of Verdun.” Western Front Association. (2020). Retrieved 15 September 2024 from https://www.westernfrontassociation.com/world-war-i-articles/memories-of-verdun-by-francois-wikart/