The Mexican War and World War I on the Conflict Continuum

Introduction

Joint Publications 3-0 Joint Operations includes a framework¹ for understanding both the varieties of miliary and military/civil operations as well as the phases of such operations. The foundation of this framework is the “conflict continuum”, the realization that peace and war aren’t the only two possible relations that can exist between nation-states, that other relations are possible, such as crisis response, security cooperation, etc. The purpose of this paper is to look at the Mexican-American War and World War I through this framework.

We begin with an explanation of manifest destiny, and how this policy drove the United States and Mexico into conflict. For purposes of evaluating the Mexican-American War along the conflict continuum, a history of that war is supplied.

A similar approach is taken with World War I: the history of WWI prior to our declaration of war is given, the reasons for our involvement are explained, and a brief description of the way we worked with the Allies is explained.

Next, the conflict continuum itself is described, including the phases a military operation moves through from beginning to end, and some of the examples of not-strictly combat operations are given. The Mexican-American War and World War I are then evaluated using this knowledge of the conflict continuum to classify the two wars and the phases they went through.

The concluding section recaps how these two wars demonstrate some of the finer points of JP 3-0, as well as a certain “slipperiness” in the shaping phase.

The Mexican-American War

In the mid 19^th century, a belief called “manifest destiny” became an informal American foreign policy². Advocated by various journalists and newspaper editors and adopted by certain politicians, manifest destiny called for the spread of freedom and American ideals westward through various means, including territorial acquisition. This is the context underlying US-Mexican diplomatic relations at the time and in part lead to the Mexican-American War.

Mexican territorial claims relinquished in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the Gadsden Purchase

The Mexican War started³ over a dispute about the location of Texas’s border, and by extension the southern American border. The Republic of Texas declared its independence from Mexico in 1836 and joined the United States on 29 December 1845, becoming the 28^th state. Mexico did not recognize Texas’ succession, and so when it became a member of the Union, we inherited the ongoing border dispute.

Again, where was Texas’ southern border? Mexico claimed the border should be the Nueces River, whereas America believed the border should be south of that, at the Rio Grande.

President James Polk offered to purchase⁴ the land north of the Rio Grande and west of Texas all the way to the Pacific Ocean for $25 million, but Mexico refused – Mexico was undergoing internal rebellions at the time, so it may not have been possible to accept payment.

To pressure Mexico to accept the purchase, Polk dispatched Pacific Squadron ships to blockade Mexico along the California coast and the Home Squadron to blockade Mexico’s Gulf coast. He also sent troops into the disputed Texas territory under the command of General Zachary Taylor.

On 25 April 1846, Mexican cavalry attacked Taylor’s troops. The Mexicans then attacked American forts on the Rio Grande. Taylor called for reinforcements and were able to defeat the Mexicans in the Battle of Palo Alto and the Battle of Resaca de la Palma. Polk lost all patience with Mexico at that point, and on 13 May of that year, Congress declared war.

While Taylor worked south, General Stephen Watts Kearny entered what would later be called New Mexico and captured Santa Fe without encountering any Mexican military forces. On 25 September 1846, Kearny left New Mexico under civilian government (with military support) and set out for California.

As this was happening, the Pacific Squadron received orders to blockade San Francisco Bay. Command of the squadron was transferred to Commodore Robert F. Stockton, and continuing south, his land forces entered Los Angeles without encountering opposing forces.

Kearny’s march continued. He crossed the Colorado River and engaged Mexican forces at the Battle of San Pasqual in modern-day California on 6 December 1846. He was trapped in a defensive position until American relief forces arrived. Kearny was then able to complete his march to Los Angeles.

On 8 January 1847, Kearny’s and Stockton’s forces engaged the Mexicans at the Battle of Rio San Gabriel. The Mexicans retreated and the next day they fought again at the Battle of La Mesa. The Mexicans were defeated, and this led to the Treaty of Cahuenga. This treaty ended the conflict in California but fighting continued south of Texas.

Zachary Taylor’s army continued into Mexico which led to Battle of Rio Monterrey on 21-24 September 1846. This was an urban battle (our first urban warfare experience since the Revolutionary War⁵), and we were defeated. An armistice was declared, but under orders from Washington, Taylor broke the armistice and continued marching south. He encountered General Antonio López de Santa Anna at Puerto de la Angostura. The resulting battle, the Battle of Buena Vista, lasted for two days, from 22-23 February 1847. Santa Anna retreated to Mexico City to put down an insurrection in Mexico City.

By this time, President Polk realized that occupying northern Mexico was insufficient to get Mexico agree to the purchase. An invasion of the Mexican interior was necessary. To this end, General Winfield Scott arrived off Veracruz by sea to begin the invasion on 9 March 1847. Scott performs first major amphibious landing in US history⁶ as part of the Siege of Veracruz. Mexican forces surrendered.

Scott then marched westward towards Mexico City. Santa Anna set up a defensive line close to Veracruz, but Scott sent cavalry ahead. The two forces met on 18 April 1847, and the Battle of Cerro Gordo ensued. Santa Anna again retreated to Mexico City with Scott laying chase.

Scott arrived at Mexico City and after defeating Mexican forces at the Battle of Contreras and the Battle of Churubusco (both ending on 20 August 1847), peace negotiations began. Negotiations broke down on 6 September 1947, however. In response, Scott fought additional battles (the Battle of Molino del Rey and Battle of Chapultepec) which led to the storming of the city gates and the capture of Mexico City.

The war ended on 2 February 1848 with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. This treaty gave us control not only over Texas to the Rio Grande, most of New Mexico, and all of California and Utah, but also parts of Arizona, Colorado, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Wyoming. In return, Mexico received $15 million, approximately half of Polk’s original offer⁷.

The remainder of Arizona and New Mexico were purchased in 1854 from Mexico for $10 million. With this purchase, called the Gadsden Purchase, the current position of the US southern border was established.

World War I

Nothing as grandiose as manifest destiny drove us into World War I. Rather our involvement was the result of an accumulation of events that included threats to maritime traffic, possible collusion between Mexico and the Central Powers, as well as ensuring the repayment of loans made to France, Britain, and Italy⁸.

The “Great War” was preceded by the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the throne of Austria-Hungary, and his wife on 28 June 1914 by a Serbian political activist while they were in Sarajevo. This led to the July Crisis, a series of military escalations and diplomatic incidents among the major European powers, which led to Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, marking the start of World War I. By August of that year, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Serbia, Great Britain, France, and Russia as well as Japan were at war. The Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the Central Powers on 31 October 1914, and Italy joined the Allied Powers on 23 May 1915.

Before Italy joined, war spread to European colonies, with Britain invading German East Africa on 3-5 November 1914. This battle, The Battle of Tanga (also called “The Battle of the Bees”) marked the beginning of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck’s African campaign⁹.

The United States attempted to stay militarily neutral while continuing economic trade with France, Britain, and Italy. In addition, American bankers made loans those nations. Early events in the war, especially the sinking of the RMS Lusitania by a German U-boat on 7 May 1915 resulting in the loss of 128 American lives, foretold that the United States would not be able to maintain neutrality¹⁰.

There were three events that lead America to enter the war on the side of the Entente: Germany’s breaking of the Sussex Pledge, the increasing likelihood that the Central Powers would be victorious, and the Zimmerman Telegram.

Following the sinking of several civilian vessels by German naval vessels early in the war, Germany issued the Sussex Pledge to the US on 4 May 1916. In this pledge, Germany made the following changes to its rules of naval engagement: passenger ships would not be targeted; merchant vessels would not be attacked unless inspection showed the presence of weapons; and merchant vessels would not be targeted unless those aboard could be rescued.

Eight months later, over the objections of the German Chancellor, the German navy convinced military leaders and Kaiser Wilhelm II that unrestricted submarine warfare could be used to defeat the Entente before the US entered the war¹¹. The Pledge was thus rescinded in January 1917.

The February 1917 Revolution in Russia indicated that due to political instability, Russia’s continued participation in the war could not be guaranteed. Russia was wavering, and the odds of the Central Powers winning increased. If they won, then the European Allies would (presumably) be unable to repay the loans that American bankers made to them.

Indeed, the October 1917 Revolution and the subsequent Civil War led to the Bolsheviks obtaining power. Vladimir Lenin signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, on 3 March 1918. With Russia no longer involved, Germany turned its attention to France and Great Britian.

In January 1917, Britain intercepted and decoded a telegram sent from the German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann to the German Minister to Mexico, offering US territory to Mexico should the enter war on the side of the Central Powers. The British then sent the telegram to the United States on 24 February. It was made available to the American public on 1 March¹².

On 6 April 1917, two years and eight months following the outbreak of war, the United States entered World War I on the side of the Allies. The first parts of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) arrived in June 1917 and continued to arrive over the next four months.

At this point in the war, the Allies and Central Powers were at a stalemate: 430 miles of trenches were dug between France and Germany, running from the North Sea and the Swiss border, and those trenches mostly remained fixed for over two years. This was well illustrated by the Battle of Verdun, lasting from 21 February to 18 December 1916, making it the longest battle of the war, and by the end there was little change in positions of the lines. Despite the use of chemical weapons, tanks, and aerial bombings, the Western Front remained in a deadlock, with neither side able to gain and hold territory.

The question then became how the US military would break this stalemate.

French and British military leaders initially wanted American forces to supplement the Allied ranks in a policy called “amalgamation”, essentially turning them into cannon fodder. General John J. Pershing, commander of the AEF, objected, refusing to allow his troops to be under the command of non-Americans¹³. Further, he rejected trench warfare and insisted on using “open warfare” which would capitalize on American mobility, aggressiveness, and marksmanship. Pershing did permit AEF troops to train with the French, however, before going into combat.

General John J. Pershing

Pershing’s requirement that American warriors operate under a completely American chain of command became a staple of future joint operations: Americans would fight alongside foreign troops, not under them.

As the AEF continued to arrive, larger and larger military operations were executed, culminating in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. This was the largest operation of the war, the goal of which was to evict German troops from France by attacking them along the entire Western Front. The battle began on 26 September 1918 and continued for 47 days. Pershing rotated his troops not only to maintain their strength but also so they could train incoming troops. In November, Americans advanced as fast as logistics allowed, at one point even advancing off the AEF headquarters’ maps.

The Meuse-Argonne Offensive ended when news of the Armistice arrived on 11 November 1918. This marked the end of World War I.

Fitting Those Wars into the Conflict Continuum

JP 3-0 explains that military conflict occurs on a “spectrum” or “continuum” with peace at one side and war at the other. This is of fundamental importance, as the authors of JP 3-0 are rejecting the idea that peace and war are the only two conditions that can exist between nations and other actors¹⁴. This idea is expanded in two ways: first, a joint operations model - an analysis of the progression of events as nations move about this continuum; second, a listing of some types of military operations that can include conflict but can also include military operations other than war (MOOTW).

The joint operation model¹⁵ describes how the United States and Partner Nations (PN) can prepare for conflict, conduct conflict, then end a conflict. There are six phases in the model:

Shape – activities to set the conditions for successful in-theater operations; shaping activities are primarily political (e.g. coalition building, securing overfly and navigation rights) but can also include multinational training exercises, intelligence sharing, etc.

Deter - Prevents adversaries (traditional, non-state actors, etc.) from either creating or capitalizing on a crisis.

Seize Initiative - Utilize all capabilities as early as possible to delay, impede, or halt enemy's initial aggression and prevent him from achieving his initial objectives. Ideas is to expand freedom of action of friendly forces (by, e.g. accessing and controlling infrastructure in theater) as well as degrading enemy's capabilities with the goal of resolving the crisis as soon as possible.

Dominate - Break enemy's will to resist by overmatching enemy's capabilities at critical times and places.

Stabilize - (Re)establish a secure environment, which can include (re)building infrastructure.

Enable Civil Authority - Support legitimate governance following conflict.

This six-stage model can be applied to other types of operations, including humanitarian assistance operations. Additional phases may be added depending on the type of operation, and it is the JFC that sets criteria for the transition between phases¹⁶.

The conflict continuum can also include MOOTW, and JP 3-0 provides examples of these types, including noncombatant evacuation, foreign internal defense, counterdrug operations, and so on¹⁷. It is possible for an operation to move between these types: for example, the Afghanistan War began as a military engagement, then transformed to a combination of counterinsurgency and defense support of civil authorities.

Of the examples of military operations and activities listed in JP 3-0, the Mexican-American War would count as a military engagement. The shaping phase included Polk’s initial offer to purchase the territory is described above. The blockade established along Mexico’s Gulf and California coasts as well as the placement of troops south of the Nueces River constituted the deter phase. Seizing initiative and domination phases are the parts where Taylor moved south of the Nueces River, Kearny’s march into California, and Winfield Scott’s amphibious landing and march to Mexico City.

Kearny’s activities in New Mexico demonstrate both stabilization (his initial establishment of a military government in Santa Fa) and the enabling of civil authority (leaving a civilian government in place along with military support).

With the capture of Mexico City, Scott “imposed martial law, maintaining order through an even-handed policy that treated U.S. troops and the Mexican populace equally.¹⁸” This would count as stabilization. It isn’t clear how the Unites States enabled civilian authority, though perhaps the final payment of $15 million helped in that regard.

World War I was different in that we were not involved in the conflict until 32 months after it started. Although for us it was certainly a large-scale combat operation, we initially played a supporting role until AEF arrived in full and found its stride. So, while we were not present at the beginning, the Allies (PNs) were. Thus, the shape and deter phases were performed (or, rather, not performed) by the Allies. Our entrance was at the dominate phase. Following the end of hostilities, our participation became one of foreign humanitarian assistance, with the American Relief Administration¹⁹ providing massive amounts of relief supplies to Europe.

Conclusion

The two wars examined in this paper help to illuminate both the breadth and some of the subtilities of the conflict continuum framework given in JP 3-0.

Unlike WWI, the Mexican-American War was not a joint operation. JP 3-0 is still applicable though; the war was a joint operation where there were no partner nations – it was a coalition of one.

WWI demonstrated that in a joint operation, the United States need not be an active participant of every phase of conflict – it is sufficient that at least one PN engages in a given phase and passes the results on to the other members of the coalition. We entered that war over two years after it started, and we had to build upon the work the other partner nations either completed or were in process of completing.

As WWI ended, what was a large-scale combat operation became a humanitarian operation, showing that it is possible for a military operation or activity to change type as events unfold.

WWI also demonstrated the need for establishing a clear chain of command among partner nations, and that this chain of command must not result in an American service member being under command of a non-American coalition member. Pershing was adamant in this, and this prevented American troops from being used to prolong the stalemate instead of acting decisively to bring the war to a conclusion.

Finally, a certain ambiguity in the conflict continuum must be identified. According to JP 3-0, “shaping activities help set conditions for successful theater operations,” and that in the best case, “shaping activities may avert or diminish conflict.” The preparations President Polk made prior to the start of the Mexican-American war can technically be called shaping activities, but instead of either preventing war or helping ensure that operations are successful, Polk’s shaping operations became a threat²⁰, and the price of ignoring that threat was war. 

Footnotes

1. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, V-1 to V-20 and VI-1 to VI-4.
2. Millett, et. al., For the Common Defense.
3. Snow & Drew, From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond.
4. Stenberg, “The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1845.”
5. Carney, “Gateway South: the Campaign for Monterrey.”
6. Snow & Drew, From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond.
7. Stenberg, “The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1845.”
8. Snow & Drew, From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond.
9. Gaudi, African Kaiser.
10. Snow & Drew, From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond includes a discussion of why neutrality is not in general possible. This warrants a one-word response: Switzerland.
11. Bridgeland, Outrage at Sea.
12. Millett, et. al., For the Common Defense.
13. Ibid.
14. It is not clear whether “grey zone” activities could be included in the continuum. See Robinson, “The Missing, Irregular Half of Great Power Competition.”
15. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, V-7 to V-11.
16. Ibid, V-12 to V-14.
17. Ibid, V-2 to V-4 and V-4 to V-5.
18. UTA Libraries, “Winfield Scott.”
19. Patenaude, "A Race against Anarchy.”
20. Stenberg, “The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1845.”

Bibliography

Bridgeland, T. Outrage at Sea: Naval Atrocities in the First World War. Pen and Sword Books, 2002.

Carney, S. “Gateway South: the Campaign for Monterrey.” U.S. Army Campaigns of the Mexican War. Retrieved 25 June 2024 from https://history.army.mil/brochures/the%20campaign%20for%20monterrey/the%20campaign%20for%20monterrey.htm

Gaudi, R. African Kaiser: General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in Africa, 1914-1918. Dutton Caliber, 2017.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 22 October 2018.

Millett, A. R., Maslowski, P., & Feis, W. B. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the Unites States from 1607 to 2012. 3rd ed. Free Press, 2012.

Patenaude, B. "A Race against Anarchy: Even after the Great War ended, famine and chaos threatened Europe. Herbert Hoover rescued the continent, reviving trade, rebuilding infrastructure, and restoring economic order, holding a budding Bolshevism in check." Hoover Digest 2, 2020, pp. 183-200. Retrieved 25 June 2024 from https://www.hoover.org/research/race-against-anarchy

Robinson, E. “The Missing, Irregular Half of Great Power Competition.” Modern War Institute at West Point, 8 September 2020. Retrieved 25 June 2024 from https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-missing-irregular-half-of-great-power-competition/

Snow, D. & Drew, D. From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond: War and Politics in the American Experience. 3rd ed. Routledge, 2009.

Stenberg, R. “The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1845.” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 1935, pp. 39-68. https://doi.org/10.2307/3633243

UTA Libraries. “Winfield Scott.” A Continent Divided: The U.S. – Mexico War. N/D. Retrieved 25 June 2024 from https://libraries.uta.edu/usmexicowar/node/4877

Battle of Tanga, November 1914 - Part 2

Introduction

At the start of the First World War, Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was in command of the German colonial forces in German East Africa, far from the battlefields of Europe where the fate of the colony would be decided. He wanted to use his small forces, inadequate to protect the colony using purely defensive tactics, to divert British forces away from the European theater. To do this, “it was necessary not to split up our small available forces in local defense, but, on the contrary, to keep them together, to grip the enemy by the throat and force him to employ his forces for self-defense.” (Lettow-Vorbeck, pp. 3-4). Thus the German strategy used in the East African Campaign was devised. The first battle of this guerrilla war campaign would take place in the GEA port town of Tanga on 2-5 November 1914.

This post is the second and final part of a series describing the Battle of Tanga; the first part described the physical and cultural geography of Tanga.

Description of the Battle

2 November

The convoy of 16 ships carrying IEF B arrives at station 15 miles east of Tanga. The HMS Fox, commanded by Captain Francis Wade Caulfeild, enters the harbor (Caulfeild, 1914). District Commissioner Auracher who worked under Governor Schnee and was also a lieutenant in the local Ascari police force, meets Captain Caulfeild aboard the HMS Fox with the captain calling for surrender. Auracher states he didn’t have the authority to do this, and he returned to Tanga to get instructions. He sends telegrams to Lettow-Vorbeck and to Schnee alerting them of the situation, and he warned the townsfolk (German and native) who fled inland. Auracher then resigned his position as District Commissioner and joined the Schutztruppe.

Lettow-Vorbeck was at the town of Moshi near Mount Kilimanjaro when the telegram arrived. He ordered a portion of the Schutztruppe to converge at Tanga using the Usambara Railway.

The HMS Fox, after not getting a reply from Auracher, left the bay and rejoined the squadron. Mine sweeping began in preparation for the landing of IEF B troops.

Direct landing at the harbor was rejected due to the possibility of mines as well as fear that the houses of Tanga were filled with German troops (Hordern & Stacke, p. 77). Major General Aitken, commander of IEF B, and Caulfeild thus considered three alternative landing sites along the Ras Kasone peninsula:

• Beach A: East side of Ras Kasone, close to the Red House
• Beach B: North side of the peninsula, close to the Signal Tower
• Beach C: Within the bay, somewhat close to the hospital.

Three possible landing sites. (Harvey, 2014)

Beach A was chosen for the initial landing as it was least likely to be defended (Harvey, 2014) and (Royal Navy Research Archive, N/D). The other two beaches would be later used once the British had established a presence. Of the three landing sites, Beach A was the least geographically favorable to the British troops: the coral reef was 500 yards from the shore, and the men had to wade ashore, frequently falling between the roots of the mangroves. The sandy beach was less than 10 feet wide at high tide. The first British troops landed with the goals of occupying the town, laying communication cable between the Red House and the town, and covering subsequent landings. They swarmed up the cliff to the Red House, set up a base there, and sent patrols 1/2 miles inward, encountering no Germans. Disembarkment continued for the rest of the night.

3 November

Troops commanded by Brigadier General Michael Tighe leave the Red House, arrive at the town at 0530 and set up a defensive line near the railway track. Meanwhile, Lettow-Vorbeck along with the first German troops from Moshi were arriving. Thick vegetation prevented the British from observing German movement. Tighe set about extending his line south while the German troops attempt to envelop the British left flank. Short range fighting ensued. The British tried to rush German positions twice, but were met with machine gun fire. HMS Fox, now off Beach C, opened fire on the town but to no avail. The enveloping maneuver continued, and Tighe retreated with Germans in pursuit.

First Attack of the Town, 3 November at 0830. (Anderson, 2002)

Fresh British troops arrived at 0830 and beat back the Germans, but falling tide slowed the landing (Astronomical Applications Department, N/D). Additional forces began landing on Beach B, but further British attacks were halted until a larger force could be concentrated. During an afternoon downpour, landings continued on all three beaches. (Hordern & Stacker, p. 83) Aitken finally came ashore at 1700. The town was deserted except for German scouts, but Aitken did not reconnoiter. At sunset, all three beaches were so congested that the remainder of the force would have to land the following morning.

4 November

The landing was completed by 0930. Dense vegetation continued to obscure German movements from the British at all three landing locations. The communication cable laid by the British on the previous day was cut, so the British had to rely on runners to send messages. (Hordern & Stacke, p. 83)

The British ordered an advance starting at 1230, and by 1400 the troops encountered somewhat clearer ground. At 1430 they engaged German patrols who drove them back, until additional troops arrived, and hot engagement ensued.

One of the infantry battalions present at the fighting along the railway, the 63^rd Palamcottah Light Infantry, collapsed and dispersed, and this shook another infantry battalion, the 98^th. According to one survivor, the Germans “employed fire tactics certainly never taught in India… controlled bursts of fire, directed by observers in trees.” (Hordern & Stacke, p. 86)

The 98^th Infantry were then stung by a swarm of bees, with one British troop receiving 300 stings to his head. This was the breaking point for the 98^th Infantry, and they scattered. This event led to the battle being called “The Battle of the Bees.”

Collapse of the 63^rd in progress, 98^th about to be swarmed by bees, and Germans enveloping remaining British forces. 4 November at 1640 hours. (Anderson, 2002)

Apiary warfare had been employed since the time of the Romans, and it is natural to believe that Lettow-Vorbeck was responsible for this swarming. He lays this belief to rest in his Reminiscences: “years afterwards I was asked by English officers whether we had used trained bees at Tanga but I may now perhaps betray the fact that at the decisive moment all the machine-guns of one of our companies were put out of action by these same "trained bees," so that we suffered from this new "training" quite as much as the English” (Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 44).

Other British troops stayed in the fight and fighting continued along the line established earlier. The right flank managed to cross the railway and entered the town, and street fighting ensued. The left flank attempted to advance but met a German counterattack.

The HMS Fox opened fire at 1545 but targeting was obscured by high vegetation and the hospital, and she only succeeded in hitting the hospital and British troops. The German medical personnel suffered no losses and continued tending to both German and British patients.

More Germans arrived. The 2^nd Loyal North Lancashires withdrew, encountering machine gun fire as they crossed the roads. By 1600 all British had withdrawn from the town a second time.

Aitken recalled all troops, and one British officer referred to the troops on the beaches as “demoralized rabble”. (Hordern & Stacke, p. 91). The Germans reestablished a minor presence in the town. Aitken decided against a night attack and moved his forces to the tip of the peninsula.

Aitken then had two options: remain behind the defensive line they established at Ras Kasone or re-embark and leave. Potable water was becoming scarce, and no British reinforcements were coming, so at 2300 Aitken decided to re-embark. When a junior officer brought geographic information for another attack to a Brigade-Major, the Brigade-Major told him “The only information of any value now is that which will help us get out of this… place as soon as possible.” (Hordern & Stacke, p. 91)

5 November

The final phase of the withdrawal was described by Hordern & Stacke (p. 95) as follows: “Throughout, by almost the only piece of good fortune to be recorded anywhere in the melancholy story of the expedition, the withdrawal of the troops was effected without interference by the enemy. How tragically it might have ended, had the Germans shown even a little of the enterprise that might have been expected of them, will be sufficiently apparent.”

The British had to leave considerable equipment behind - they attempted to destroy it but had insufficient time to do so. German forces captured 455 rifles, 8 machine guns, and 600,000 rounds of ammunition. They also picked up medical supplies, telephone gear, plus clothing, warm coats, and blankets. (Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 45)

The British evacuation was completed by 1520, and the final matter requiring attention was the wounded troops in the hospital. The Germans allowed them to be evacuated only if they promised not to serve again in the war. Seventy-four British troops were returned and 49 had to stay at the hospital as they were unfit to be moved (Hordern & Stacke, p. 95). The convoy departed for Mombasa.

Instances like these, as well as the Christmas Truces of 1914, are what made the Great War to be perhaps the last “gentleman’s war.” Even in a gentleman’s war there are casualties, however: 64 German and Askaris were killed, 80 were wounded and 1 was missing. 360 British were killed, 487 wounded, and 148 missing. (Anderson, p. 120)

After the Battle

Aitken cabled the news of his defeat to London on 5 November. It arrived at a bad time for the British: The First Battle of Ypres was still ongoing, the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the Germans, and the British lost the Battle of Coronel – their first naval defeat since the 1812 Battle of Lake Champlain. For these reasons, the British government kept news of the defeat secret for several months.

Upon returning to Mombasa, Major-General Aitken began to reorganize his forces in preparation for the defense of the East Africa Protectorate. He was stricken by malaria and was still in the hospital when on 4 December he was ordered to hand over his command and return to England. After review by the Lord Kitchener and the War Office, Aitken was reduced in rank to colonel and put on half-pay for the remainder of the war.

Lettow-Vorbeck’s victory convinced Governor Schnee to abandon his diplomatic approach to the British, and it was a morale booster for his troops and the civilian population: it brought the natives and German colonists onto Lettow-Vorbeck’s side.

The Battle of Tanga laid the foundation for the rest of the East African Campaign. Lettow-Vorbeck knew that he would be getting no logistic support from Germany, so he did what all guerrilla fighters do: live off the enemy. Using the rifles, ammunition, and other supplies left by the withdrawing British, he was able to supply his men with improved weapons and uniforms. Lettow-Vorbeck hoped that the Battle of Tanga would convince the British to commit considerable forces in pursuit of him – forces that could not be used in the European theater - and in that he succeeded.

Conclusion

The utter defeat handed to the British at the Battle of Tanga was due to multiple errors not only by Major-General Aitken but also by the planners back in London. The overall operation was “planned” with almost no information about the geography of Tanga or about the strengths and positions of German forces, and Aitken made no effort correct these deficiencies. IEF B was far too small to accomplish the mission of capturing GEA. Even if Aitken did capture Tanga and followed the Usambara Railway 200 miles into the interior, a large German force would be waiting for him at Mount Kilimanjaro. IEF B received upgraded rifles prior to departure but were given no opportunity to train with them. Also, the British possessed greater artillery than the Germans, but there was no plan for its organized use. Finally, the IEF B had to complete a 14-day voyage to Tanga which played havoc with the health of the Indian troops.

Lieutenant-Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck had extensive knowledge of GEA – its geography, terrain, weather patterns, the tropical diseases there, and so on. He was fluent in Swahili. Further, he spent considerable time training with his German Askari troops, in many instances converting them from constabulary forces to fighting forces. It is these differences that made him the victor in this battle.

References

Anderson, R. (2002). Battle of Tanga 1914. Tempus Publishing, Ltd.

Astronomical Applications Department. (N/D). US Naval Observatory. Retrieved 2 March 2024 from https://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/index

Caulfeild, F. W. (1914). Logs of the HMS Fox. Retrieved 2 March 2024 from https://www.naval-history.net/OWShips-WW1-05-HMS_Fox.htm

Gaudi, R. (2017). African Kaiser: General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in Africa, 1914-1918. Dutton Caliber.

Harvey, K. J. (2014). Battle of Tanga, German East Africa, 1914. Pickle Partners Publishing.

Hordern, C. & Stacke, H. (1941). Military Operations East Africa volume 1, August 1914 – September 1916. His Majesty’s Stationary Office.

Lettow-Vorbeck, P. E. v. (2021). My Reminiscences of East Africa. Good Press.

Royal Navy Research Archive. (N/D). RNAS Tanga. Retrieved 2 March 2024 from https://www.royalnavyresearcharchive.org.uk/FAA-Bases/Tanga.htm

Battle of Tanga, November 1914 - Part 1

Introduction

The Battle of Tanga (2 – 5 November 1914) was the beginning of Germany’s WWI East African Campaign, a long-term plan to draw Allied troops and resources away from the European theater using minimal German forces. British Indian Expeditionary Force B, consisting of 8,000 soldiers possessing artillery and naval support, attempted to capture the port city of Tanga in German East Africa, now Tanzania. The German defending force, made up of approximately 1,100 German and African troops armed with antiquated firearms, soundly defeating IEF B.

This post describes the battle, the commanders involved, and the factors leading to British defeat. The physical and cultural environments are examined, and it is shown that the Germans were very familiar with the environment, whereas the British were willfully ignorant of Tanga. This difference greatly contributed to the outcome of the battle.

Prior to the Battle

Both Germany and Britain founded African colonies at the end of the 19th century, but the relationship between the European powers and the natives took very different courses: Britain used its East Africa Protectorate (later Kenya) primarily for commercial reasons, importing Indian laborers to supplement or replace native Africans. Germany took a more paternalistic approach to German East Africa (later Tanzania), educating the natives, incorporating them into the police force as well as the Schutztruppe (German colonial forces), where they were known as the German Askari. The German officers learned Swahili, and the Askari, seeing that they were becoming Germans, repaid all this with strong loyalty. (Gaudi, 2017)

Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, the new commander of the Schutztruppe, arrived in GEA in January 1914 (Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 4), though he did have prior contact with the colony and its civilian governor, Heinrich Schnee. Both suspected that war was coming to Europe but took different approaches to what should be done: Schnee sought to uphold the Congo Treaty of 1885 and keep GEA neutral whereas Lettow-Vorbeck realized that the colony and its Schutztruppe could be used to divert Allied forces away from the European theater.

Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck

After arriving, Lettow-Vorbeck evaluated the military potential of the colony: he toured the country, evaluated the status and quality of military and quasi-military forces, their armaments, the logistic situation, as well as the terrain and overall environment including the presence of diseases. In addition, he met with some of the individuals that will play a role in the campaign to come (Lettow-Vorbeck, pp. 4-8). He knew that Tanga's strategic importance as the gateway to the interior of Africa would make it a primary target for the British.

Once the war began, the British organized the Indian Expeditionary Force B under command of Major General Arthur Aitken. The British plan was to capture Tanga, then follow a 200-mile-long railway stretch towards Mount Kilimanjaro, the most economically developed portion of GEA and the most immediate threat to the British colony to the north. From there IEF B was to capture the rest of GEA (Hordern & Stacke, pp. 65-67). It is not clear how this was to happen - Aitken was tasked to capture an area larger than France using only 8,000 troops!

Whereas Lettow-Vorbeck familiarized himself with the environment, Aitken performed no reconnaissance prior to the battle. Further, he made no effort to acclimate his Indian troops to the African climate, train with them using the new rifles supplied to them just prior to departure, practice landings, etc. (Hordern & Stacke, p. 70). IEF B assembled in Bombay and was originally to set sail for Tanga on 30 September, but departure was delayed for two weeks, during which the troops had to stay aboard the ships that would become the convoy. The convoy finally departed on 16 October, travelling at 8 knots, the speed of the slowest ship, for their two-week voyage to Tanga.

The Environment: Physical Elements

The terrain, climate, and other physical elements of the battle site certainly favored the "home team," especially when the opponent did no intelligence-gathering. Tanga is a port city in German East Africa, now Tanzania, five degrees south of the equator. It is located on the south side of Tanga Bay, which has a depth ranging from 3 to 5 fathoms. The east side of the bay is bounded by the Ras Kasone peninsula which partially separates the bay and Tanga Harbor from the Indian Ocean. Edging the peninsula’s sandy beaches are 20-30 feet tall cliffs. The east side of the peninsula (where the initial British landing would take place) is bordered by mangroves, and 500 yards to the east of the mangroves is a coral reef. The beaches on the west side were sandy and narrow. (Anderson, 2002)

Physical and Cultural Geography of Tanga. (Harvey, 2014)

The climate of the area is tropical and has two rainy seasons: the “long rains” occurring from January to April, and the “short rains” during October and November. The battle occurred near the middle of the short rains, when the November temperature ranged between 72° and 88° F, the average humidity is 76%, and average monthly rainfall is approximately 5.5 inches. Malaria is mostly transmitted during the long rains, mostly.

The eastern coast was separated from the town by dense bush, mango groves, rubber tree plantations, and cultivated fields. The townsfolk also raised bees for their honey. Connecting the peninsula and the town were a series of roads cutting through the bush and the plantations. At least three of those roads extended past Tanga into the interior. Together with the Usambara Railway, those roads made Tanga very valuable to the British.

The Environment: Cultural Elements

In 1914, Tanga was the second largest port in German East Africa. Its shipping harbor was on the northeast side of the town, and consisted of a jetty and a customs shed, but it did not have any cranes. The harbor and jetty were serviced by rail that curved along the east side of town before turning west. This rail separated the German and African quarters of Tanga. The shipping rail connected to the Usambara Railway, which ran from Tanga to Moshi, a town close to Mount Kilimanjaro. As the battle proceeded, the railway would be used to transport and concentrate German troops into Tanga. If captured, the British could use the railway to transport troops and supplies into northern GEA to control that part of the colony. The town had facilities supporting the Usambara Railway, including a train station and maintenance workshops. Located to the east of the town was the cemetery, and a drainage ditch separated the eastern part of the shipping rail spur from that cemetery. There was also a hospital that served German, African, and British patients.

Ras Kasone, the peninsula separating Tanga Harbor from the Indian Ocean, had three structures that would be used by the British during their occupation: a signal tower, and two buildings called the “Red House” and the “White House.”

The colonial administration under Governor Heinrich Schnee wanted the colony to stay neutral during World War I and was willing to leave Tanga and other ports defenseless. Meanwhile Lt. Col. Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, commander of the German Colonial Army (Schutztruppe), wanted to use conflict in East Africa to divert British troops away from the European theater. The colonists were trapped in the middle: native Askaris formed the bulk of the Schutztruppe, but the Germans wanted to maintain neutrality.

In part 2, a daily breakdown of the battle will be discussed.

References

Anderson, R. (2002). Battle of Tanga 1914. Tempus Publishing, Ltd.

Astronomical Applications Department. (N/D). US Naval Observatory. Retrieved 2 March 2024 from https://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/index

Caulfeild, F. W. (1914). Logs of the HMS Fox. Retrieved 2 March 2024 from https://www.naval-history.net/OWShips-WW1-05-HMS_Fox.htm

Gaudi, R. (2017). African Kaiser: General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in Africa, 1914-1918. Dutton Caliber.

Harvey, K. J. (2014). Battle of Tanga, German East Africa, 1914. Pickle Partners Publishing.

Hordern, C. & Stacke, H. (1941). Military Operations East Africa volume 1, August 1914 – September 1916. His Majesty’s Stationary Office.

Lettow-Vorbeck, P. E. v. (2021). My Reminiscences of East Africa. Good Press.

Royal Navy Research Archive. (N/D). RNAS Tanga. Retrieved 2 March 2024 from https://www.royalnavyresearcharchive.org.uk/FAA-Bases/Tanga.htm

Comparing Revolutionary War and WWI Soldiers' Experiences

Introduction

Since America’s beginning, we have been defended by both militia forces as well as regular military, but the sharpest contrast between fighters of the Revolutionary War and those of the First World War is made by comparing the militiamen of the War of Independence with the soldiers of World War I. This paper compares the experiences of those two types of warriors, examines the reasons for entering WWI, and how the history of that war and its veterans were erased.

The Militia Experience

The militia predates the independence of the United Stated by more than a century. It was a tradition that came along as part of being colonies of the British Empire, but the militias of the New World rapidly evolved into a distinct, uniquely American, institution. The primary opponent of the militias were the Indians, who conducted raids and ambushes by operating in small, mobile war parties. From Millet, et. al. (2012):

“Warriors would move stealthily, spread out over a considerable distance to avoid being ambushed themselves, and rapidly concentrate for a whirling attack—often at night, during storms, or in dense fog so as to catch their adversaries off guard and confuse them. Then the Indians would vanish into the wilderness.”

The militias, meanwhile, were still practicing European-style battlefield tactics such as close-order formations, loading their muskets using a fifty-six step process, then firing those muskets in unaimed mass volleys. The Indians easily defeated them, as “it was as easy to hit them as to hit a house.” (Millet, et. al, p.34).

The militias were slow to adapt, but adapt they did, for natural selection is a hard teacher. Commanders such as Benjamin Church (c. 1639 – 1718) began incorporating Indians into the ranks, learning from them, emulating them, and soon it was the militias that were using cover and concealment, attacking the enemy’s weakest spots, targeting and firing at individual enemies, conducting hit-and-run raids and ambushes, and avoiding tight formations. In general, the militias were practicing what would later be called the DOCA loop – disperse, orient, concentrate, act – as described by William S. Lind (Lind & Thiele, 2015, p.73).

It wasn’t just the fighting tactics that made the Colonial and Revolutionary War militias unique – the militia was a local institution, organized for local defense, and at least partially self-funded. It evolved naturally from a light infantry (not line infantry) institution to include cavalry and (later) naval components as needs and opportunities presented themselves.

The psychology of militiamen can be inferred from this quote (Millet, et. al., p.30):

“From whatever social class they came, once enlisted for an expedition the men who filled the ranks believed they had a legal contract with the provincial government that could not be breached without the mutual consent of both parties… Once authorities broke the contract, the troops felt no compunction against staging a mutiny or deserting in mass, even in the midst of a campaign. To the colonial soldiers these actions were legal and sensible, but to British regulars serving alongside the provincials during the colonial wars, such violations of military discipline were intolerable.”

Indeed, the attitude of the British regulars was exemplified by British Major General James Abercrombie who described the militiamen as the “rif-raf of the continent” (Millet, et. al., p.30), and to this imperious attitude and sense of entitlement one can only expect the average militiaman to respond, “rif-raf and proud!” Abercrombie’s point is salient, however, and this is one of the reasons the regular Army existed.

Cooperation between regular Army forces and the militia continued past the War of Independence. For example, at the Battle of New Orleans at the conclusion of the War of 1812, the Americans were commanded by a militiaman (Andrew Jackson was a major general in the Tennessee militia) and the American forces were a combination of the Army, Marines, and militias from several states. During the Civil War, militia-like (partisan) warfare was used by both sides, and John Mosby’s Raiders coordinated attacks and performed reconnaissance with the needs of local Army commanders in mind.

Reasons for America’s Entry into World War I

In the run-up to the war, Americans attempted to separate German culture from Prussian militarism, but we also felt kindred for the Allied nations (Neiberg, 2014). German actions soon forced us into the camp of Entente Powers.

First, American banks and businesses made massive loans to the Allied nations. If they didn’t win the war, those loans would not be repaid.

Germany invaded Belgium in 1914, and rumors of German atrocities against civilians began to circulate. This atrocity propaganda swept the U.S. leading to anti-German sentiment.

In 1915, Germany began unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic Ocean, and one of the vessels the U-boats sank was the Lusitania, which caused the death of over one thousand people including 123 Americans. Several American cargo vessels were sunk in 1917.

In January 1917, the British intercepted a telegram sent from German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmerman to the German diplomat to Mexico. In this telegram, Zimmerman proposed an alliance between Germany and Mexico, and if Germany were to win, Mexico would be able to annex Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. The British passed the telegram to the Americans, and it was publicized by the press on March 1st. The United States declared war on Germany on April 6th.

Comparing Wartime Experiences

The most obvious difference between the Revolutionary War and WWI were the weapons and fighting techniques. There was no Revolutionary War equivalent to mustard gas and trench warfare.

The militiamen and WWI soldiers had different views of their respective enemies. For militiamen, the enemy Indians could be depersonalized by race and culture, and the Redcoats could be depersonalized by political philosophy. The enemy of American WWI soldiers was different in language but were of the same race and similar culture. This explains why the American people attempted to separate German education, culture, and industry from the “imperial and military” Prussian state in the American run-up to entry in WWI (Neiberg, 2014).

The circumstances and reasons for hostilities during the colonial era and the Revolutionary War were completely different from those during WWI. For the militiamen, the stakes in the conflict were extremely personal and local, and they were vested in the outcome as the stakes were the militiaman’s home and family. The same cannot be said for the WWI soldiers – the war was distant and the causes were partially economic. Further, America entered the war with little national self-interest, which means the individual soldiers needn’t have any rational value for participating, and the same can be said for individual soldiers of other countries. Although America didn’t participate in them, this explains the Christmas frontline truces on the Western Front during Christmas 1914 as recounted by Wilfred Ewart (Ewart, 1920). These kinds of truces would never have occurred during the colonial era or the Revolutionary War.

There is the level of freedom of militiamen compared to WWI soldiers. The militiamen operated under well-circumscribed contracts, whereas the men under the military were under obligation for “the duration.” There was less local service and more service overseas. There was less local control (or even no local control) and more federal control.

Further, federal control included control over industries and manufacturing, with businesses and factories being nationalized. The economic subtext of the war was not lost on the populace, as American banks and businesses made huge loans to the Allies and thus they had financial interest in victory.

There was also resistance to America’s participation in WWI. To tramp down those protesting involvement, the Wilson administration resorted to propaganda - creating the Committee on Public Information (CPI) and the Creel Committee to fill all communication channels with pro-war and anti-German agitprop. The committee's output was targeted not at the enemy but rather against Americans, and when this propaganda wasn't sufficient, the 1918 Sedition Act was “[e]nforced enthusiastically by Justice Department agents” and “the Sedition Act gave the 1918 mobilization a vicious edge.” (Millet, et. al, p.410).

Operating in the background was the rise of Progressivism and Taylorism which minimized the importance of the individual in everything they touched. From the standpoint of a fighter during the Revolutionary War, this would be completely alien and anathema to the American spirit and tradition of freedom. Militiamen were the machine; WWI soldiers were cogs in the machine.

Most important, perhaps, is the sense of completion in their respective battles. If a militiaman survived a battle, he was sure to see not only the end of it but also the end of the campaign and the war as a whole. The same cannot be said for the American soldier in WWI, due in part to our late entry.

The Lost Generation

Gertrude Stein referred to American expatriate writers living in Paris as “a lost generation,” but the term soon expanded to refer to the entire generation of people that came of age during the First World War. The phrase was memorialized at the start of Ernest Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises, and the literature of that era projected hedonism, a disconnection from the previous generation’s values, and a recognition of the inflation that the price of achieving the American Dream was undergoing.

Three of the major authors of that period – Ernest Hemingway, E. E. Cummings, and John Dos Passos – were ambulance drivers during the war, and their works describe not only their wartime experiences (almost to the point of being autobiographical) but also include strong anti-war sentiments. An excellent example of this is found in Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms.

Given the parallels between Hemingway's life (serious drinker, American ambulance driver in the Italian army during WWI, met the love of his life after being injured) and the life of the narrator of A Farewell to Arms (serious drinker, American ambulance driver in the Italian army during WWI, met the love of his life after being injured), we must interpret the following quote from that novel as representing Hemingway's true outlook on the war:

“I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious and sacrifice and the expression in vain. We had heard them, sometimes standing in the rain almost out of earshot, so that only the shouted words came through, and had read them, on proclamations that were slapped up by billposters over other proclamations, now for a long time, and I had seen nothing sacred, and the things that were glorious had no glory and the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago if nothing was done with the meat except to bury it. There were many words that you could not stand to hear and finally only the names of places had dignity. Certain numbers were the same way and certain dates and these with the names of the places were all you could say and have them mean anything. Abstract words such as glory, honour, courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates.” (Hemingway, 1929)

The novel included several harrowing descriptions of what ambulance drivers must have experienced but notice that this quote is a rejection of not only the mechanics of warfare, but of the jingoism that surrounds the war-making process. This anti-war sentiment extended beyond ambulance drivers to the writings of American combat veterans (e.g., William March’s Company K) and to writers from other countries (such as the German Erich Maria Remarque in his All Quiet on the Western Front).

Erasing the Lost Generation

In the time between the end of the First World War and now, the history of the war was belatedly recognized, or the soldier's trust was betrayed, or its history has been outright erased and diluted. For example, no WWI memorial appeared in Washington D.C. until 1931, and that memorial was small in comparison to the Liberty Memorial in Kansas City, Missouri, built in 1926, which commemorated the same war. An elaborate upgrade is planned to the D.C. memorial for 2024.

Something that must have soured veterans of the Great War was the conclusion of the 1932 Bonus March. The Bonus March was a protest on Washington, D.C., in which thousands of WWI veterans and their families demanded early payment for the bonus certificates that were issued to them in 1924 but could not be redeemed until 1945. President Herbert Hoover ordered the U.S. Army to clear the protesters’ campsites, and the list of participants in this operation reads like a who’s who of World War II leadership. Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur had George S. Patton’s 3rd Cavalry advance on the protesters. The Bonus Marchers cheered the troops, believing that they were marching in their honor. The troops turned on their brothers-in-arms and responded with tanks, bayonets, and tear gas. The Bonus Marchers were thus evicted, their camps burned. The official Army incident report was authored by Dwight Eisenhower, then a military aide to MacArthur, and that report endorsed the whole affair. (Dickson & Allen, 2020)

An example of the erasure of WWI history is the story of how Armistice Day became Memorial Day in 1954, as recounted and analyzed by Kurt Vonnegut:

“When I was a boy... all the people of all the nations which had fought in the First World War were silent during the eleventh minute of the eleventh hour of Armistice Day, which was the eleventh day of the eleventh month.

“It was during that minute in nineteen hundred and eighteen, that millions upon millions of human beings stopped butchering one another. I have talked to old men who were on battlefields during that minute. They have told me in one way or another that the sudden silence was the Voice of God. So we still have among us some men who can remember when God spoke clearly to mankind.

“Armistice Day has become Veterans' Day. Armistice Day was sacred. Veterans' Day is not.” (Vonnegut, 1973)

Erected in 1921 and completed in 1931, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Arlington National Cemetery was to be the final resting place for the remains of an unidentified WWI service member, and so in a sense it was a WWI memorial. The purpose of this memorial has been diluted since that time, however.

In 1956, President Eisenhower (of Bonus March fame) approved the addition of the remains of two additional unknown soldiers to the Tomb, and in 1958 the unknown WWI soldier was joined by the remains of unknown soldiers from World War II and the Korean War. (Arlington National Cemetery, n.d.) The Arlington National Cemetery began plans to recognize a Vietnam War unknown even before the end of that war, but by 1984 only one set of American remains from Vietnam had not been identified. President Reagan presided over the internment ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, but the remains were exhumed in 1998 and DNA testing was used to provide a positive identification. To this day, the crypt dedicated to the Vietnam War Unknown is empty, and in 1999 it was rededicated to honor all missing service members from that war. (Arlington National Cemetery, n.d.)

In the span of under 80 years, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier changed from being the resting place of one unknown WWI service member to the resting place of a total of three unknown service members as well as missing service members from the Vietnam War. Its focus has changed to be a “distinctive, multigenerational shrine.” (Arlington National Cemetery History Office, p.207)

Conclusion

The militiamen of the Revolutionary War and the soldiers of World War I were different in fighting techniques, spirit, and relation to the government as a whole. One way they were similar was that both the WWI soldiers and the militiamen had their histories erased. This was described above for WWI soldiers. For the militia, it was the Dick Act of 1903: the Act created the National Guard which assimilated the militia’s symbolism (such as American Revolution Statuary) and the date of formation (according to their website, the National Guard’s official birth date isn’t 1903 but instead is December 13, 1636, when the Massachusetts colonial legislature organized militia regiments). The National Guard didn’t adopt the militia’s maneuver warfare or self-funding model, and most importantly the militia’s independent ethos was completely rejected.

References

Arlington National Cemetery. (n.d.). Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Retrieved from: https://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/Explore/Monuments-and-Memorials/Tomb-of-the-Unknown-Soldier

Arlington National Cemetery History Office. (n.d.). A Century of Honor: A Commemorative Guide to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Retrieved from: https://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/Portals/0/TUS%20Commemorative%20Guide%2020210924.pdf

Dickson, P. & Allen, T. (2020). The Bonus army: An American Epic. Dover Publications.

Ewart, W. (1920). Two Christmas Mornings of the Great War: Personal Accounts of the Christmas Frontline Truces. Harper’s Magazine. Retrieved from: https://harpers.org/archive/1920/12/two-christmas-mornings-of-the-great-war/

Hemingway, E. (1929). A Farewell to Arms. Scribner.

Lind, W. S. & Thiele, G. A. (2015). 4th Generation Warfare Handbook. Castalia House.

Millett, A. R., Maslowski, P., & Feis, W. B. (2012). For the Common Defense: A Military History of the Unites States from 1607 to 2012 (3rd ed.). Free Press.

Neiberg, M. (2014). Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917. Diplomatic History, 38(4). https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhu023

Vonnegut, K. (1973). Breakfast of Champions: A Novel. Dial Press.