The Mexican War and World War I on the Conflict Continuum

Introduction

Joint Publications 3-0 Joint Operations includes a framework¹ for understanding both the varieties of miliary and military/civil operations as well as the phases of such operations. The foundation of this framework is the “conflict continuum”, the realization that peace and war aren’t the only two possible relations that can exist between nation-states, that other relations are possible, such as crisis response, security cooperation, etc. The purpose of this paper is to look at the Mexican-American War and World War I through this framework.

We begin with an explanation of manifest destiny, and how this policy drove the United States and Mexico into conflict. For purposes of evaluating the Mexican-American War along the conflict continuum, a history of that war is supplied.

A similar approach is taken with World War I: the history of WWI prior to our declaration of war is given, the reasons for our involvement are explained, and a brief description of the way we worked with the Allies is explained.

Next, the conflict continuum itself is described, including the phases a military operation moves through from beginning to end, and some of the examples of not-strictly combat operations are given. The Mexican-American War and World War I are then evaluated using this knowledge of the conflict continuum to classify the two wars and the phases they went through.

The concluding section recaps how these two wars demonstrate some of the finer points of JP 3-0, as well as a certain “slipperiness” in the shaping phase.

The Mexican-American War

In the mid 19^th century, a belief called “manifest destiny” became an informal American foreign policy². Advocated by various journalists and newspaper editors and adopted by certain politicians, manifest destiny called for the spread of freedom and American ideals westward through various means, including territorial acquisition. This is the context underlying US-Mexican diplomatic relations at the time and in part lead to the Mexican-American War.

Mexican territorial claims relinquished in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the Gadsden Purchase

The Mexican War started³ over a dispute about the location of Texas’s border, and by extension the southern American border. The Republic of Texas declared its independence from Mexico in 1836 and joined the United States on 29 December 1845, becoming the 28^th state. Mexico did not recognize Texas’ succession, and so when it became a member of the Union, we inherited the ongoing border dispute.

Again, where was Texas’ southern border? Mexico claimed the border should be the Nueces River, whereas America believed the border should be south of that, at the Rio Grande.

President James Polk offered to purchase⁴ the land north of the Rio Grande and west of Texas all the way to the Pacific Ocean for $25 million, but Mexico refused – Mexico was undergoing internal rebellions at the time, so it may not have been possible to accept payment.

To pressure Mexico to accept the purchase, Polk dispatched Pacific Squadron ships to blockade Mexico along the California coast and the Home Squadron to blockade Mexico’s Gulf coast. He also sent troops into the disputed Texas territory under the command of General Zachary Taylor.

On 25 April 1846, Mexican cavalry attacked Taylor’s troops. The Mexicans then attacked American forts on the Rio Grande. Taylor called for reinforcements and were able to defeat the Mexicans in the Battle of Palo Alto and the Battle of Resaca de la Palma. Polk lost all patience with Mexico at that point, and on 13 May of that year, Congress declared war.

While Taylor worked south, General Stephen Watts Kearny entered what would later be called New Mexico and captured Santa Fe without encountering any Mexican military forces. On 25 September 1846, Kearny left New Mexico under civilian government (with military support) and set out for California.

As this was happening, the Pacific Squadron received orders to blockade San Francisco Bay. Command of the squadron was transferred to Commodore Robert F. Stockton, and continuing south, his land forces entered Los Angeles without encountering opposing forces.

Kearny’s march continued. He crossed the Colorado River and engaged Mexican forces at the Battle of San Pasqual in modern-day California on 6 December 1846. He was trapped in a defensive position until American relief forces arrived. Kearny was then able to complete his march to Los Angeles.

On 8 January 1847, Kearny’s and Stockton’s forces engaged the Mexicans at the Battle of Rio San Gabriel. The Mexicans retreated and the next day they fought again at the Battle of La Mesa. The Mexicans were defeated, and this led to the Treaty of Cahuenga. This treaty ended the conflict in California but fighting continued south of Texas.

Zachary Taylor’s army continued into Mexico which led to Battle of Rio Monterrey on 21-24 September 1846. This was an urban battle (our first urban warfare experience since the Revolutionary War⁵), and we were defeated. An armistice was declared, but under orders from Washington, Taylor broke the armistice and continued marching south. He encountered General Antonio López de Santa Anna at Puerto de la Angostura. The resulting battle, the Battle of Buena Vista, lasted for two days, from 22-23 February 1847. Santa Anna retreated to Mexico City to put down an insurrection in Mexico City.

By this time, President Polk realized that occupying northern Mexico was insufficient to get Mexico agree to the purchase. An invasion of the Mexican interior was necessary. To this end, General Winfield Scott arrived off Veracruz by sea to begin the invasion on 9 March 1847. Scott performs first major amphibious landing in US history⁶ as part of the Siege of Veracruz. Mexican forces surrendered.

Scott then marched westward towards Mexico City. Santa Anna set up a defensive line close to Veracruz, but Scott sent cavalry ahead. The two forces met on 18 April 1847, and the Battle of Cerro Gordo ensued. Santa Anna again retreated to Mexico City with Scott laying chase.

Scott arrived at Mexico City and after defeating Mexican forces at the Battle of Contreras and the Battle of Churubusco (both ending on 20 August 1847), peace negotiations began. Negotiations broke down on 6 September 1947, however. In response, Scott fought additional battles (the Battle of Molino del Rey and Battle of Chapultepec) which led to the storming of the city gates and the capture of Mexico City.

The war ended on 2 February 1848 with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. This treaty gave us control not only over Texas to the Rio Grande, most of New Mexico, and all of California and Utah, but also parts of Arizona, Colorado, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Wyoming. In return, Mexico received $15 million, approximately half of Polk’s original offer⁷.

The remainder of Arizona and New Mexico were purchased in 1854 from Mexico for $10 million. With this purchase, called the Gadsden Purchase, the current position of the US southern border was established.

World War I

Nothing as grandiose as manifest destiny drove us into World War I. Rather our involvement was the result of an accumulation of events that included threats to maritime traffic, possible collusion between Mexico and the Central Powers, as well as ensuring the repayment of loans made to France, Britain, and Italy⁸.

The “Great War” was preceded by the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the throne of Austria-Hungary, and his wife on 28 June 1914 by a Serbian political activist while they were in Sarajevo. This led to the July Crisis, a series of military escalations and diplomatic incidents among the major European powers, which led to Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, marking the start of World War I. By August of that year, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Serbia, Great Britain, France, and Russia as well as Japan were at war. The Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the Central Powers on 31 October 1914, and Italy joined the Allied Powers on 23 May 1915.

Before Italy joined, war spread to European colonies, with Britain invading German East Africa on 3-5 November 1914. This battle, The Battle of Tanga (also called “The Battle of the Bees”) marked the beginning of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck’s African campaign⁹.

The United States attempted to stay militarily neutral while continuing economic trade with France, Britain, and Italy. In addition, American bankers made loans those nations. Early events in the war, especially the sinking of the RMS Lusitania by a German U-boat on 7 May 1915 resulting in the loss of 128 American lives, foretold that the United States would not be able to maintain neutrality¹⁰.

There were three events that lead America to enter the war on the side of the Entente: Germany’s breaking of the Sussex Pledge, the increasing likelihood that the Central Powers would be victorious, and the Zimmerman Telegram.

Following the sinking of several civilian vessels by German naval vessels early in the war, Germany issued the Sussex Pledge to the US on 4 May 1916. In this pledge, Germany made the following changes to its rules of naval engagement: passenger ships would not be targeted; merchant vessels would not be attacked unless inspection showed the presence of weapons; and merchant vessels would not be targeted unless those aboard could be rescued.

Eight months later, over the objections of the German Chancellor, the German navy convinced military leaders and Kaiser Wilhelm II that unrestricted submarine warfare could be used to defeat the Entente before the US entered the war¹¹. The Pledge was thus rescinded in January 1917.

The February 1917 Revolution in Russia indicated that due to political instability, Russia’s continued participation in the war could not be guaranteed. Russia was wavering, and the odds of the Central Powers winning increased. If they won, then the European Allies would (presumably) be unable to repay the loans that American bankers made to them.

Indeed, the October 1917 Revolution and the subsequent Civil War led to the Bolsheviks obtaining power. Vladimir Lenin signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, on 3 March 1918. With Russia no longer involved, Germany turned its attention to France and Great Britian.

In January 1917, Britain intercepted and decoded a telegram sent from the German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann to the German Minister to Mexico, offering US territory to Mexico should the enter war on the side of the Central Powers. The British then sent the telegram to the United States on 24 February. It was made available to the American public on 1 March¹².

On 6 April 1917, two years and eight months following the outbreak of war, the United States entered World War I on the side of the Allies. The first parts of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) arrived in June 1917 and continued to arrive over the next four months.

At this point in the war, the Allies and Central Powers were at a stalemate: 430 miles of trenches were dug between France and Germany, running from the North Sea and the Swiss border, and those trenches mostly remained fixed for over two years. This was well illustrated by the Battle of Verdun, lasting from 21 February to 18 December 1916, making it the longest battle of the war, and by the end there was little change in positions of the lines. Despite the use of chemical weapons, tanks, and aerial bombings, the Western Front remained in a deadlock, with neither side able to gain and hold territory.

The question then became how the US military would break this stalemate.

French and British military leaders initially wanted American forces to supplement the Allied ranks in a policy called “amalgamation”, essentially turning them into cannon fodder. General John J. Pershing, commander of the AEF, objected, refusing to allow his troops to be under the command of non-Americans¹³. Further, he rejected trench warfare and insisted on using “open warfare” which would capitalize on American mobility, aggressiveness, and marksmanship. Pershing did permit AEF troops to train with the French, however, before going into combat.

General John J. Pershing

Pershing’s requirement that American warriors operate under a completely American chain of command became a staple of future joint operations: Americans would fight alongside foreign troops, not under them.

As the AEF continued to arrive, larger and larger military operations were executed, culminating in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. This was the largest operation of the war, the goal of which was to evict German troops from France by attacking them along the entire Western Front. The battle began on 26 September 1918 and continued for 47 days. Pershing rotated his troops not only to maintain their strength but also so they could train incoming troops. In November, Americans advanced as fast as logistics allowed, at one point even advancing off the AEF headquarters’ maps.

The Meuse-Argonne Offensive ended when news of the Armistice arrived on 11 November 1918. This marked the end of World War I.

Fitting Those Wars into the Conflict Continuum

JP 3-0 explains that military conflict occurs on a “spectrum” or “continuum” with peace at one side and war at the other. This is of fundamental importance, as the authors of JP 3-0 are rejecting the idea that peace and war are the only two conditions that can exist between nations and other actors¹⁴. This idea is expanded in two ways: first, a joint operations model - an analysis of the progression of events as nations move about this continuum; second, a listing of some types of military operations that can include conflict but can also include military operations other than war (MOOTW).

The joint operation model¹⁵ describes how the United States and Partner Nations (PN) can prepare for conflict, conduct conflict, then end a conflict. There are six phases in the model:

Shape – activities to set the conditions for successful in-theater operations; shaping activities are primarily political (e.g. coalition building, securing overfly and navigation rights) but can also include multinational training exercises, intelligence sharing, etc.

Deter - Prevents adversaries (traditional, non-state actors, etc.) from either creating or capitalizing on a crisis.

Seize Initiative - Utilize all capabilities as early as possible to delay, impede, or halt enemy's initial aggression and prevent him from achieving his initial objectives. Ideas is to expand freedom of action of friendly forces (by, e.g. accessing and controlling infrastructure in theater) as well as degrading enemy's capabilities with the goal of resolving the crisis as soon as possible.

Dominate - Break enemy's will to resist by overmatching enemy's capabilities at critical times and places.

Stabilize - (Re)establish a secure environment, which can include (re)building infrastructure.

Enable Civil Authority - Support legitimate governance following conflict.

This six-stage model can be applied to other types of operations, including humanitarian assistance operations. Additional phases may be added depending on the type of operation, and it is the JFC that sets criteria for the transition between phases¹⁶.

The conflict continuum can also include MOOTW, and JP 3-0 provides examples of these types, including noncombatant evacuation, foreign internal defense, counterdrug operations, and so on¹⁷. It is possible for an operation to move between these types: for example, the Afghanistan War began as a military engagement, then transformed to a combination of counterinsurgency and defense support of civil authorities.

Of the examples of military operations and activities listed in JP 3-0, the Mexican-American War would count as a military engagement. The shaping phase included Polk’s initial offer to purchase the territory is described above. The blockade established along Mexico’s Gulf and California coasts as well as the placement of troops south of the Nueces River constituted the deter phase. Seizing initiative and domination phases are the parts where Taylor moved south of the Nueces River, Kearny’s march into California, and Winfield Scott’s amphibious landing and march to Mexico City.

Kearny’s activities in New Mexico demonstrate both stabilization (his initial establishment of a military government in Santa Fa) and the enabling of civil authority (leaving a civilian government in place along with military support).

With the capture of Mexico City, Scott “imposed martial law, maintaining order through an even-handed policy that treated U.S. troops and the Mexican populace equally.¹⁸” This would count as stabilization. It isn’t clear how the Unites States enabled civilian authority, though perhaps the final payment of $15 million helped in that regard.

World War I was different in that we were not involved in the conflict until 32 months after it started. Although for us it was certainly a large-scale combat operation, we initially played a supporting role until AEF arrived in full and found its stride. So, while we were not present at the beginning, the Allies (PNs) were. Thus, the shape and deter phases were performed (or, rather, not performed) by the Allies. Our entrance was at the dominate phase. Following the end of hostilities, our participation became one of foreign humanitarian assistance, with the American Relief Administration¹⁹ providing massive amounts of relief supplies to Europe.

Conclusion

The two wars examined in this paper help to illuminate both the breadth and some of the subtilities of the conflict continuum framework given in JP 3-0.

Unlike WWI, the Mexican-American War was not a joint operation. JP 3-0 is still applicable though; the war was a joint operation where there were no partner nations – it was a coalition of one.

WWI demonstrated that in a joint operation, the United States need not be an active participant of every phase of conflict – it is sufficient that at least one PN engages in a given phase and passes the results on to the other members of the coalition. We entered that war over two years after it started, and we had to build upon the work the other partner nations either completed or were in process of completing.

As WWI ended, what was a large-scale combat operation became a humanitarian operation, showing that it is possible for a military operation or activity to change type as events unfold.

WWI also demonstrated the need for establishing a clear chain of command among partner nations, and that this chain of command must not result in an American service member being under command of a non-American coalition member. Pershing was adamant in this, and this prevented American troops from being used to prolong the stalemate instead of acting decisively to bring the war to a conclusion.

Finally, a certain ambiguity in the conflict continuum must be identified. According to JP 3-0, “shaping activities help set conditions for successful theater operations,” and that in the best case, “shaping activities may avert or diminish conflict.” The preparations President Polk made prior to the start of the Mexican-American war can technically be called shaping activities, but instead of either preventing war or helping ensure that operations are successful, Polk’s shaping operations became a threat²⁰, and the price of ignoring that threat was war. 

Footnotes

1. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, V-1 to V-20 and VI-1 to VI-4.
2. Millett, et. al., For the Common Defense.
3. Snow & Drew, From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond.
4. Stenberg, “The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1845.”
5. Carney, “Gateway South: the Campaign for Monterrey.”
6. Snow & Drew, From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond.
7. Stenberg, “The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1845.”
8. Snow & Drew, From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond.
9. Gaudi, African Kaiser.
10. Snow & Drew, From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond includes a discussion of why neutrality is not in general possible. This warrants a one-word response: Switzerland.
11. Bridgeland, Outrage at Sea.
12. Millett, et. al., For the Common Defense.
13. Ibid.
14. It is not clear whether “grey zone” activities could be included in the continuum. See Robinson, “The Missing, Irregular Half of Great Power Competition.”
15. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, V-7 to V-11.
16. Ibid, V-12 to V-14.
17. Ibid, V-2 to V-4 and V-4 to V-5.
18. UTA Libraries, “Winfield Scott.”
19. Patenaude, "A Race against Anarchy.”
20. Stenberg, “The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1845.”

Bibliography

Bridgeland, T. Outrage at Sea: Naval Atrocities in the First World War. Pen and Sword Books, 2002.

Carney, S. “Gateway South: the Campaign for Monterrey.” U.S. Army Campaigns of the Mexican War. Retrieved 25 June 2024 from https://history.army.mil/brochures/the%20campaign%20for%20monterrey/the%20campaign%20for%20monterrey.htm

Gaudi, R. African Kaiser: General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in Africa, 1914-1918. Dutton Caliber, 2017.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 22 October 2018.

Millett, A. R., Maslowski, P., & Feis, W. B. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the Unites States from 1607 to 2012. 3rd ed. Free Press, 2012.

Patenaude, B. "A Race against Anarchy: Even after the Great War ended, famine and chaos threatened Europe. Herbert Hoover rescued the continent, reviving trade, rebuilding infrastructure, and restoring economic order, holding a budding Bolshevism in check." Hoover Digest 2, 2020, pp. 183-200. Retrieved 25 June 2024 from https://www.hoover.org/research/race-against-anarchy

Robinson, E. “The Missing, Irregular Half of Great Power Competition.” Modern War Institute at West Point, 8 September 2020. Retrieved 25 June 2024 from https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-missing-irregular-half-of-great-power-competition/

Snow, D. & Drew, D. From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond: War and Politics in the American Experience. 3rd ed. Routledge, 2009.

Stenberg, R. “The Failure of Polk's Mexican War Intrigue of 1845.” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 1935, pp. 39-68. https://doi.org/10.2307/3633243

UTA Libraries. “Winfield Scott.” A Continent Divided: The U.S. – Mexico War. N/D. Retrieved 25 June 2024 from https://libraries.uta.edu/usmexicowar/node/4877

Comparing Revolutionary War and WWI Soldiers' Experiences

Introduction

Since America’s beginning, we have been defended by both militia forces as well as regular military, but the sharpest contrast between fighters of the Revolutionary War and those of the First World War is made by comparing the militiamen of the War of Independence with the soldiers of World War I. This paper compares the experiences of those two types of warriors, examines the reasons for entering WWI, and how the history of that war and its veterans were erased.

The Militia Experience

The militia predates the independence of the United Stated by more than a century. It was a tradition that came along as part of being colonies of the British Empire, but the militias of the New World rapidly evolved into a distinct, uniquely American, institution. The primary opponent of the militias were the Indians, who conducted raids and ambushes by operating in small, mobile war parties. From Millet, et. al. (2012):

“Warriors would move stealthily, spread out over a considerable distance to avoid being ambushed themselves, and rapidly concentrate for a whirling attack—often at night, during storms, or in dense fog so as to catch their adversaries off guard and confuse them. Then the Indians would vanish into the wilderness.”

The militias, meanwhile, were still practicing European-style battlefield tactics such as close-order formations, loading their muskets using a fifty-six step process, then firing those muskets in unaimed mass volleys. The Indians easily defeated them, as “it was as easy to hit them as to hit a house.” (Millet, et. al, p.34).

The militias were slow to adapt, but adapt they did, for natural selection is a hard teacher. Commanders such as Benjamin Church (c. 1639 – 1718) began incorporating Indians into the ranks, learning from them, emulating them, and soon it was the militias that were using cover and concealment, attacking the enemy’s weakest spots, targeting and firing at individual enemies, conducting hit-and-run raids and ambushes, and avoiding tight formations. In general, the militias were practicing what would later be called the DOCA loop – disperse, orient, concentrate, act – as described by William S. Lind (Lind & Thiele, 2015, p.73).

It wasn’t just the fighting tactics that made the Colonial and Revolutionary War militias unique – the militia was a local institution, organized for local defense, and at least partially self-funded. It evolved naturally from a light infantry (not line infantry) institution to include cavalry and (later) naval components as needs and opportunities presented themselves.

The psychology of militiamen can be inferred from this quote (Millet, et. al., p.30):

“From whatever social class they came, once enlisted for an expedition the men who filled the ranks believed they had a legal contract with the provincial government that could not be breached without the mutual consent of both parties… Once authorities broke the contract, the troops felt no compunction against staging a mutiny or deserting in mass, even in the midst of a campaign. To the colonial soldiers these actions were legal and sensible, but to British regulars serving alongside the provincials during the colonial wars, such violations of military discipline were intolerable.”

Indeed, the attitude of the British regulars was exemplified by British Major General James Abercrombie who described the militiamen as the “rif-raf of the continent” (Millet, et. al., p.30), and to this imperious attitude and sense of entitlement one can only expect the average militiaman to respond, “rif-raf and proud!” Abercrombie’s point is salient, however, and this is one of the reasons the regular Army existed.

Cooperation between regular Army forces and the militia continued past the War of Independence. For example, at the Battle of New Orleans at the conclusion of the War of 1812, the Americans were commanded by a militiaman (Andrew Jackson was a major general in the Tennessee militia) and the American forces were a combination of the Army, Marines, and militias from several states. During the Civil War, militia-like (partisan) warfare was used by both sides, and John Mosby’s Raiders coordinated attacks and performed reconnaissance with the needs of local Army commanders in mind.

Reasons for America’s Entry into World War I

In the run-up to the war, Americans attempted to separate German culture from Prussian militarism, but we also felt kindred for the Allied nations (Neiberg, 2014). German actions soon forced us into the camp of Entente Powers.

First, American banks and businesses made massive loans to the Allied nations. If they didn’t win the war, those loans would not be repaid.

Germany invaded Belgium in 1914, and rumors of German atrocities against civilians began to circulate. This atrocity propaganda swept the U.S. leading to anti-German sentiment.

In 1915, Germany began unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic Ocean, and one of the vessels the U-boats sank was the Lusitania, which caused the death of over one thousand people including 123 Americans. Several American cargo vessels were sunk in 1917.

In January 1917, the British intercepted a telegram sent from German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmerman to the German diplomat to Mexico. In this telegram, Zimmerman proposed an alliance between Germany and Mexico, and if Germany were to win, Mexico would be able to annex Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. The British passed the telegram to the Americans, and it was publicized by the press on March 1st. The United States declared war on Germany on April 6th.

Comparing Wartime Experiences

The most obvious difference between the Revolutionary War and WWI were the weapons and fighting techniques. There was no Revolutionary War equivalent to mustard gas and trench warfare.

The militiamen and WWI soldiers had different views of their respective enemies. For militiamen, the enemy Indians could be depersonalized by race and culture, and the Redcoats could be depersonalized by political philosophy. The enemy of American WWI soldiers was different in language but were of the same race and similar culture. This explains why the American people attempted to separate German education, culture, and industry from the “imperial and military” Prussian state in the American run-up to entry in WWI (Neiberg, 2014).

The circumstances and reasons for hostilities during the colonial era and the Revolutionary War were completely different from those during WWI. For the militiamen, the stakes in the conflict were extremely personal and local, and they were vested in the outcome as the stakes were the militiaman’s home and family. The same cannot be said for the WWI soldiers – the war was distant and the causes were partially economic. Further, America entered the war with little national self-interest, which means the individual soldiers needn’t have any rational value for participating, and the same can be said for individual soldiers of other countries. Although America didn’t participate in them, this explains the Christmas frontline truces on the Western Front during Christmas 1914 as recounted by Wilfred Ewart (Ewart, 1920). These kinds of truces would never have occurred during the colonial era or the Revolutionary War.

There is the level of freedom of militiamen compared to WWI soldiers. The militiamen operated under well-circumscribed contracts, whereas the men under the military were under obligation for “the duration.” There was less local service and more service overseas. There was less local control (or even no local control) and more federal control.

Further, federal control included control over industries and manufacturing, with businesses and factories being nationalized. The economic subtext of the war was not lost on the populace, as American banks and businesses made huge loans to the Allies and thus they had financial interest in victory.

There was also resistance to America’s participation in WWI. To tramp down those protesting involvement, the Wilson administration resorted to propaganda - creating the Committee on Public Information (CPI) and the Creel Committee to fill all communication channels with pro-war and anti-German agitprop. The committee's output was targeted not at the enemy but rather against Americans, and when this propaganda wasn't sufficient, the 1918 Sedition Act was “[e]nforced enthusiastically by Justice Department agents” and “the Sedition Act gave the 1918 mobilization a vicious edge.” (Millet, et. al, p.410).

Operating in the background was the rise of Progressivism and Taylorism which minimized the importance of the individual in everything they touched. From the standpoint of a fighter during the Revolutionary War, this would be completely alien and anathema to the American spirit and tradition of freedom. Militiamen were the machine; WWI soldiers were cogs in the machine.

Most important, perhaps, is the sense of completion in their respective battles. If a militiaman survived a battle, he was sure to see not only the end of it but also the end of the campaign and the war as a whole. The same cannot be said for the American soldier in WWI, due in part to our late entry.

The Lost Generation

Gertrude Stein referred to American expatriate writers living in Paris as “a lost generation,” but the term soon expanded to refer to the entire generation of people that came of age during the First World War. The phrase was memorialized at the start of Ernest Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises, and the literature of that era projected hedonism, a disconnection from the previous generation’s values, and a recognition of the inflation that the price of achieving the American Dream was undergoing.

Three of the major authors of that period – Ernest Hemingway, E. E. Cummings, and John Dos Passos – were ambulance drivers during the war, and their works describe not only their wartime experiences (almost to the point of being autobiographical) but also include strong anti-war sentiments. An excellent example of this is found in Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms.

Given the parallels between Hemingway's life (serious drinker, American ambulance driver in the Italian army during WWI, met the love of his life after being injured) and the life of the narrator of A Farewell to Arms (serious drinker, American ambulance driver in the Italian army during WWI, met the love of his life after being injured), we must interpret the following quote from that novel as representing Hemingway's true outlook on the war:

“I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious and sacrifice and the expression in vain. We had heard them, sometimes standing in the rain almost out of earshot, so that only the shouted words came through, and had read them, on proclamations that were slapped up by billposters over other proclamations, now for a long time, and I had seen nothing sacred, and the things that were glorious had no glory and the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago if nothing was done with the meat except to bury it. There were many words that you could not stand to hear and finally only the names of places had dignity. Certain numbers were the same way and certain dates and these with the names of the places were all you could say and have them mean anything. Abstract words such as glory, honour, courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates.” (Hemingway, 1929)

The novel included several harrowing descriptions of what ambulance drivers must have experienced but notice that this quote is a rejection of not only the mechanics of warfare, but of the jingoism that surrounds the war-making process. This anti-war sentiment extended beyond ambulance drivers to the writings of American combat veterans (e.g., William March’s Company K) and to writers from other countries (such as the German Erich Maria Remarque in his All Quiet on the Western Front).

Erasing the Lost Generation

In the time between the end of the First World War and now, the history of the war was belatedly recognized, or the soldier's trust was betrayed, or its history has been outright erased and diluted. For example, no WWI memorial appeared in Washington D.C. until 1931, and that memorial was small in comparison to the Liberty Memorial in Kansas City, Missouri, built in 1926, which commemorated the same war. An elaborate upgrade is planned to the D.C. memorial for 2024.

Something that must have soured veterans of the Great War was the conclusion of the 1932 Bonus March. The Bonus March was a protest on Washington, D.C., in which thousands of WWI veterans and their families demanded early payment for the bonus certificates that were issued to them in 1924 but could not be redeemed until 1945. President Herbert Hoover ordered the U.S. Army to clear the protesters’ campsites, and the list of participants in this operation reads like a who’s who of World War II leadership. Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur had George S. Patton’s 3rd Cavalry advance on the protesters. The Bonus Marchers cheered the troops, believing that they were marching in their honor. The troops turned on their brothers-in-arms and responded with tanks, bayonets, and tear gas. The Bonus Marchers were thus evicted, their camps burned. The official Army incident report was authored by Dwight Eisenhower, then a military aide to MacArthur, and that report endorsed the whole affair. (Dickson & Allen, 2020)

An example of the erasure of WWI history is the story of how Armistice Day became Memorial Day in 1954, as recounted and analyzed by Kurt Vonnegut:

“When I was a boy... all the people of all the nations which had fought in the First World War were silent during the eleventh minute of the eleventh hour of Armistice Day, which was the eleventh day of the eleventh month.

“It was during that minute in nineteen hundred and eighteen, that millions upon millions of human beings stopped butchering one another. I have talked to old men who were on battlefields during that minute. They have told me in one way or another that the sudden silence was the Voice of God. So we still have among us some men who can remember when God spoke clearly to mankind.

“Armistice Day has become Veterans' Day. Armistice Day was sacred. Veterans' Day is not.” (Vonnegut, 1973)

Erected in 1921 and completed in 1931, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Arlington National Cemetery was to be the final resting place for the remains of an unidentified WWI service member, and so in a sense it was a WWI memorial. The purpose of this memorial has been diluted since that time, however.

In 1956, President Eisenhower (of Bonus March fame) approved the addition of the remains of two additional unknown soldiers to the Tomb, and in 1958 the unknown WWI soldier was joined by the remains of unknown soldiers from World War II and the Korean War. (Arlington National Cemetery, n.d.) The Arlington National Cemetery began plans to recognize a Vietnam War unknown even before the end of that war, but by 1984 only one set of American remains from Vietnam had not been identified. President Reagan presided over the internment ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, but the remains were exhumed in 1998 and DNA testing was used to provide a positive identification. To this day, the crypt dedicated to the Vietnam War Unknown is empty, and in 1999 it was rededicated to honor all missing service members from that war. (Arlington National Cemetery, n.d.)

In the span of under 80 years, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier changed from being the resting place of one unknown WWI service member to the resting place of a total of three unknown service members as well as missing service members from the Vietnam War. Its focus has changed to be a “distinctive, multigenerational shrine.” (Arlington National Cemetery History Office, p.207)

Conclusion

The militiamen of the Revolutionary War and the soldiers of World War I were different in fighting techniques, spirit, and relation to the government as a whole. One way they were similar was that both the WWI soldiers and the militiamen had their histories erased. This was described above for WWI soldiers. For the militia, it was the Dick Act of 1903: the Act created the National Guard which assimilated the militia’s symbolism (such as American Revolution Statuary) and the date of formation (according to their website, the National Guard’s official birth date isn’t 1903 but instead is December 13, 1636, when the Massachusetts colonial legislature organized militia regiments). The National Guard didn’t adopt the militia’s maneuver warfare or self-funding model, and most importantly the militia’s independent ethos was completely rejected.

References

Arlington National Cemetery. (n.d.). Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Retrieved from: https://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/Explore/Monuments-and-Memorials/Tomb-of-the-Unknown-Soldier

Arlington National Cemetery History Office. (n.d.). A Century of Honor: A Commemorative Guide to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Retrieved from: https://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/Portals/0/TUS%20Commemorative%20Guide%2020210924.pdf

Dickson, P. & Allen, T. (2020). The Bonus army: An American Epic. Dover Publications.

Ewart, W. (1920). Two Christmas Mornings of the Great War: Personal Accounts of the Christmas Frontline Truces. Harper’s Magazine. Retrieved from: https://harpers.org/archive/1920/12/two-christmas-mornings-of-the-great-war/

Hemingway, E. (1929). A Farewell to Arms. Scribner.

Lind, W. S. & Thiele, G. A. (2015). 4th Generation Warfare Handbook. Castalia House.

Millett, A. R., Maslowski, P., & Feis, W. B. (2012). For the Common Defense: A Military History of the Unites States from 1607 to 2012 (3rd ed.). Free Press.

Neiberg, M. (2014). Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917. Diplomatic History, 38(4). https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhu023

Vonnegut, K. (1973). Breakfast of Champions: A Novel. Dial Press.