Introduction
At the start of the First World War, Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was in command of the German colonial forces in German East Africa, far from the battlefields of Europe where the fate of the colony would be decided. He wanted to use his small forces, inadequate to protect the colony using purely defensive tactics, to divert British forces away from the European theater. To do this, “it was necessary not to split up our small available forces in local defense, but, on the contrary, to keep them together, to grip the enemy by the throat and force him to employ his forces for self-defense.” (Lettow-Vorbeck, pp. 3-4). Thus the German strategy used in the East African Campaign was devised. The first battle of this guerrilla war campaign would take place in the GEA port town of Tanga on 2-5 November 1914.
This post is the second and final part of a series describing the Battle of Tanga; the first part described the physical and cultural geography of Tanga.
Description of the Battle
2 November
The convoy of 16 ships carrying IEF B arrives at station 15 miles east of Tanga. The HMS Fox, commanded by Captain Francis Wade Caulfeild, enters the harbor (Caulfeild, 1914). District Commissioner Auracher who worked under Governor Schnee and was also a lieutenant in the local Ascari police force, meets Captain Caulfeild aboard the HMS Fox with the captain calling for surrender. Auracher states he didn’t have the authority to do this, and he returned to Tanga to get instructions. He sends telegrams to Lettow-Vorbeck and to Schnee alerting them of the situation, and he warned the townsfolk (German and native) who fled inland. Auracher then resigned his position as District Commissioner and joined the Schutztruppe.
Lettow-Vorbeck was at the town of Moshi near Mount Kilimanjaro when the telegram arrived. He ordered a portion of the Schutztruppe to converge at Tanga using the Usambara Railway.
The HMS Fox, after not getting a reply from Auracher, left the bay and rejoined the squadron. Mine sweeping began in preparation for the landing of IEF B troops.
Direct landing at the harbor was rejected due to the possibility of mines as well as fear that the houses of Tanga were filled with German troops (Hordern & Stacke, p. 77). Major General Aitken, commander of IEF B, and Caulfeild thus considered three alternative landing sites along the Ras Kasone peninsula:
- Beach A: East side of Ras Kasone, close to the Red House
- Beach B: North side of the peninsula, close to the Signal Tower
- Beach C: Within the bay, somewhat close to the hospital.
Beach A was chosen for the initial landing as it was least likely to be defended (Harvey, 2014) and (Royal Navy Research Archive, N/D). The other two beaches would be later used once the British had established a presence. Of the three landing sites, Beach A was the least geographically favorable to the British troops: the coral reef was 500 yards from the shore, and the men had to wade ashore, frequently falling between the roots of the mangroves. The sandy beach was less than 10 feet wide at high tide. The first British troops landed with the goals of occupying the town, laying communication cable between the Red House and the town, and covering subsequent landings. They swarmed up the cliff to the Red House, set up a base there, and sent patrols 1/2 miles inward, encountering no Germans. Disembarkment continued for the rest of the night.
3 November
Troops commanded by Brigadier General Michael Tighe leave the Red House, arrive at the town at 0530 and set up a defensive line near the railway track. Meanwhile, Lettow-Vorbeck along with the first German troops from Moshi were arriving. Thick vegetation prevented the British from observing German movement. Tighe set about extending his line south while the German troops attempt to envelop the British left flank. Short range fighting ensued. The British tried to rush German positions twice, but were met with machine gun fire. HMS Fox, now off Beach C, opened fire on the town but to no avail. The enveloping maneuver continued, and Tighe retreated with Germans in pursuit.
Fresh British troops arrived at 0830 and beat back the Germans, but falling tide slowed the landing (Astronomical Applications Department, N/D). Additional forces began landing on Beach B, but further British attacks were halted until a larger force could be concentrated. During an afternoon downpour, landings continued on all three beaches. (Hordern & Stacker, p. 83) Aitken finally came ashore at 1700. The town was deserted except for German scouts, but Aitken did not reconnoiter. At sunset, all three beaches were so congested that the remainder of the force would have to land the following morning.
4 November
The landing was completed by 0930. Dense vegetation continued to obscure German movements from the British at all three landing locations. The communication cable laid by the British on the previous day was cut, so the British had to rely on runners to send messages. (Hordern & Stacke, p. 83)
The British ordered an advance starting at 1230, and by 1400 the troops encountered somewhat clearer ground. At 1430 they engaged German patrols who drove them back, until additional troops arrived, and hot engagement ensued.
One of the infantry battalions present at the fighting along the railway, the 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry, collapsed and dispersed, and this shook another infantry battalion, the 98th. According to one survivor, the Germans “employed fire tactics certainly never taught in India… controlled bursts of fire, directed by observers in trees.” (Hordern & Stacke, p. 86)
The 98th Infantry were then stung by a swarm of bees, with one British troop receiving 300 stings to his head. This was the breaking point for the 98th Infantry, and they scattered. This event led to the battle being called “The Battle of the Bees.”
Apiary warfare had been employed since the time of the Romans, and it is natural to believe that Lettow-Vorbeck was responsible for this swarming. He lays this belief to rest in his Reminiscences: “years afterwards I was asked by English officers whether we had used trained bees at Tanga but I may now perhaps betray the fact that at the decisive moment all the machine-guns of one of our companies were put out of action by these same "trained bees," so that we suffered from this new "training" quite as much as the English” (Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 44).
Other British troops stayed in the fight and fighting continued along the line established earlier. The right flank managed to cross the railway and entered the town, and street fighting ensued. The left flank attempted to advance but met a German counterattack.
The HMS Fox opened fire at 1545 but targeting was obscured by high vegetation and the hospital, and she only succeeded in hitting the hospital and British troops. The German medical personnel suffered no losses and continued tending to both German and British patients.
More Germans arrived. The 2nd Loyal North Lancashires withdrew, encountering machine gun fire as they crossed the roads. By 1600 all British had withdrawn from the town a second time.
Aitken recalled all troops, and one British officer referred to the troops on the beaches as “demoralized rabble”. (Hordern & Stacke, p. 91). The Germans reestablished a minor presence in the town. Aitken decided against a night attack and moved his forces to the tip of the peninsula.
Aitken then had two options: remain behind the defensive line they established at Ras Kasone or re-embark and leave. Potable water was becoming scarce, and no British reinforcements were coming, so at 2300 Aitken decided to re-embark. When a junior officer brought geographic information for another attack to a Brigade-Major, the Brigade-Major told him “The only information of any value now is that which will help us get out of this… place as soon as possible.” (Hordern & Stacke, p. 91)
5 November
The final phase of the withdrawal was described by Hordern & Stacke (p. 95) as follows: “Throughout, by almost the only piece of good fortune to be recorded anywhere in the melancholy story of the expedition, the withdrawal of the troops was effected without interference by the enemy. How tragically it might have ended, had the Germans shown even a little of the enterprise that might have been expected of them, will be sufficiently apparent.”
The British had to leave considerable equipment behind - they attempted to destroy it but had insufficient time to do so. German forces captured 455 rifles, 8 machine guns, and 600,000 rounds of ammunition. They also picked up medical supplies, telephone gear, plus clothing, warm coats, and blankets. (Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 45)
The British evacuation was completed by 1520, and the final matter requiring attention was the wounded troops in the hospital. The Germans allowed them to be evacuated only if they promised not to serve again in the war. Seventy-four British troops were returned and 49 had to stay at the hospital as they were unfit to be moved (Hordern & Stacke, p. 95). The convoy departed for Mombasa.
Instances like these, as well as the Christmas Truces of 1914, are what made the Great War to be perhaps the last “gentleman’s war.” Even in a gentleman’s war there are casualties, however: 64 German and Askaris were killed, 80 were wounded and 1 was missing. 360 British were killed, 487 wounded, and 148 missing. (Anderson, p. 120)
After the Battle
Aitken cabled the news of his defeat to London on 5 November. It arrived at a bad time for the British: The First Battle of Ypres was still ongoing, the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the Germans, and the British lost the Battle of Coronel – their first naval defeat since the 1812 Battle of Lake Champlain. For these reasons, the British government kept news of the defeat secret for several months.
Upon returning to Mombasa, Major-General Aitken began to reorganize his forces in preparation for the defense of the East Africa Protectorate. He was stricken by malaria and was still in the hospital when on 4 December he was ordered to hand over his command and return to England. After review by the Lord Kitchener and the War Office, Aitken was reduced in rank to colonel and put on half-pay for the remainder of the war.
Lettow-Vorbeck’s victory convinced Governor Schnee to abandon his diplomatic approach to the British, and it was a morale booster for his troops and the civilian population: it brought the natives and German colonists onto Lettow-Vorbeck’s side.
The Battle of Tanga laid the foundation for the rest of the East African Campaign. Lettow-Vorbeck knew that he would be getting no logistic support from Germany, so he did what all guerrilla fighters do: live off the enemy. Using the rifles, ammunition, and other supplies left by the withdrawing British, he was able to supply his men with improved weapons and uniforms. Lettow-Vorbeck hoped that the Battle of Tanga would convince the British to commit considerable forces in pursuit of him – forces that could not be used in the European theater - and in that he succeeded.
Conclusion
The utter defeat handed to the British at the Battle of Tanga was due to multiple errors not only by Major-General Aitken but also by the planners back in London. The overall operation was “planned” with almost no information about the geography of Tanga or about the strengths and positions of German forces, and Aitken made no effort correct these deficiencies. IEF B was far too small to accomplish the mission of capturing GEA. Even if Aitken did capture Tanga and followed the Usambara Railway 200 miles into the interior, a large German force would be waiting for him at Mount Kilimanjaro. IEF B received upgraded rifles prior to departure but were given no opportunity to train with them. Also, the British possessed greater artillery than the Germans, but there was no plan for its organized use. Finally, the IEF B had to complete a 14-day voyage to Tanga which played havoc with the health of the Indian troops.
Lieutenant-Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck had extensive knowledge of GEA – its geography, terrain, weather patterns, the tropical diseases there, and so on. He was fluent in Swahili. Further, he spent considerable time training with his German Askari troops, in many instances converting them from constabulary forces to fighting forces. It is these differences that made him the victor in this battle.
References
Anderson, R. (2002). Battle of Tanga 1914. Tempus Publishing, Ltd.
Astronomical Applications Department. (N/D). US Naval Observatory. Retrieved 2 March 2024 from https://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/index
Caulfeild, F. W. (1914). Logs of the HMS Fox. Retrieved 2 March 2024 from https://www.naval-history.net/OWShips-WW1-05-HMS_Fox.htm
Gaudi, R. (2017). African Kaiser: General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in Africa, 1914-1918. Dutton Caliber.
Harvey, K. J. (2014). Battle of Tanga, German East Africa, 1914. Pickle Partners Publishing.
Hordern, C. & Stacke, H. (1941). Military Operations East Africa volume 1, August 1914 – September 1916. His Majesty’s Stationary Office.
Lettow-Vorbeck, P. E. v. (2021). My Reminiscences of East Africa. Good Press.
Royal Navy Research Archive. (N/D). RNAS Tanga. Retrieved 2 March 2024 from https://www.royalnavyresearcharchive.org.uk/FAA-Bases/Tanga.htm
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