The Other Side of History: Tanga

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Thursday, March 7, 2024

Battle of Tanga, November 1914 - Part 2

Introduction

At the start of the First World War, Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was in command of the German colonial forces in German East Africa, far from the battlefields of Europe where the fate of the colony would be decided. He wanted to use his small forces, inadequate to protect the colony using purely defensive tactics, to divert British forces away from the European theater. To do this, “it was necessary not to split up our small available forces in local defense, but, on the contrary, to keep them together, to grip the enemy by the throat and force him to employ his forces for self-defense.” (Lettow-Vorbeck, pp. 3-4). Thus the German strategy used in the East African Campaign was devised. The first battle of this guerrilla war campaign would take place in the GEA port town of Tanga on 2-5 November 1914.

This post is the second and final part of a series describing the Battle of Tanga; the first part described the physical and cultural geography of Tanga.

Description of the Battle

2 November

The convoy of 16 ships carrying IEF B arrives at station 15 miles east of Tanga. The HMS Fox, commanded by Captain Francis Wade Caulfeild, enters the harbor (Caulfeild, 1914). District Commissioner Auracher who worked under Governor Schnee and was also a lieutenant in the local Ascari police force, meets Captain Caulfeild aboard the HMS Fox with the captain calling for surrender. Auracher states he didn’t have the authority to do this, and he returned to Tanga to get instructions. He sends telegrams to Lettow-Vorbeck and to Schnee alerting them of the situation, and he warned the townsfolk (German and native) who fled inland. Auracher then resigned his position as District Commissioner and joined the Schutztruppe.

Lettow-Vorbeck was at the town of Moshi near Mount Kilimanjaro when the telegram arrived. He ordered a portion of the Schutztruppe to converge at Tanga using the Usambara Railway.

The HMS Fox, after not getting a reply from Auracher, left the bay and rejoined the squadron. Mine sweeping began in preparation for the landing of IEF B troops.

Direct landing at the harbor was rejected due to the possibility of mines as well as fear that the houses of Tanga were filled with German troops (Hordern & Stacke, p. 77). Major General Aitken, commander of IEF B, and Caulfeild thus considered three alternative landing sites along the Ras Kasone peninsula:

Beach A: East side of Ras Kasone, close to the Red House
Beach B: North side of the peninsula, close to the Signal Tower
Beach C: Within the bay, somewhat close to the hospital.

Three possible landing sites. (Harvey, 2014)

Beach A was chosen for the initial landing as it was least likely to be defended (Harvey, 2014) and (Royal Navy Research Archive, N/D). The other two beaches would be later used once the British had established a presence. Of the three landing sites, Beach A was the least geographically favorable to the British troops: the coral reef was 500 yards from the shore, and the men had to wade ashore, frequently falling between the roots of the mangroves. The sandy beach was less than 10 feet wide at high tide. The first British troops landed with the goals of occupying the town, laying communication cable between the Red House and the town, and covering subsequent landings. They swarmed up the cliff to the Red House, set up a base there, and sent patrols 1/2 miles inward, encountering no Germans. Disembarkment continued for the rest of the night.

3 November

Troops commanded by Brigadier General Michael Tighe leave the Red House, arrive at the town at 0530 and set up a defensive line near the railway track. Meanwhile, Lettow-Vorbeck along with the first German troops from Moshi were arriving. Thick vegetation prevented the British from observing German movement. Tighe set about extending his line south while the German troops attempt to envelop the British left flank. Short range fighting ensued. The British tried to rush German positions twice, but were met with machine gun fire. HMS Fox, now off Beach C, opened fire on the town but to no avail. The enveloping maneuver continued, and Tighe retreated with Germans in pursuit.

First Attack of the Town, 3 November at 0830. (Anderson, 2002)

Fresh British troops arrived at 0830 and beat back the Germans, but falling tide slowed the landing (Astronomical Applications Department, N/D). Additional forces began landing on Beach B, but further British attacks were halted until a larger force could be concentrated. During an afternoon downpour, landings continued on all three beaches. (Hordern & Stacker, p. 83) Aitken finally came ashore at 1700. The town was deserted except for German scouts, but Aitken did not reconnoiter. At sunset, all three beaches were so congested that the remainder of the force would have to land the following morning.

4 November

The landing was completed by 0930. Dense vegetation continued to obscure German movements from the British at all three landing locations. The communication cable laid by the British on the previous day was cut, so the British had to rely on runners to send messages. (Hordern & Stacke, p. 83)

The British ordered an advance starting at 1230, and by 1400 the troops encountered somewhat clearer ground. At 1430 they engaged German patrols who drove them back, until additional troops arrived, and hot engagement ensued.

One of the infantry battalions present at the fighting along the railway, the 63^rd Palamcottah Light Infantry, collapsed and dispersed, and this shook another infantry battalion, the 98^th. According to one survivor, the Germans “employed fire tactics certainly never taught in India… controlled bursts of fire, directed by observers in trees.” (Hordern & Stacke, p. 86)

The 98^th Infantry were then stung by a swarm of bees, with one British troop receiving 300 stings to his head. This was the breaking point for the 98^th Infantry, and they scattered. This event led to the battle being called “The Battle of the Bees.”

Collapse of the 63^rd in progress, 98^th about to be swarmed by bees, and Germans enveloping remaining British forces. 4 November at 1640 hours. (Anderson, 2002)

Apiary warfare had been employed since the time of the Romans, and it is natural to believe that Lettow-Vorbeck was responsible for this swarming. He lays this belief to rest in his Reminiscences: “years afterwards I was asked by English officers whether we had used trained bees at Tanga but I may now perhaps betray the fact that at the decisive moment all the machine-guns of one of our companies were put out of action by these same "trained bees," so that we suffered from this new "training" quite as much as the English” (Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 44).

Other British troops stayed in the fight and fighting continued along the line established earlier. The right flank managed to cross the railway and entered the town, and street fighting ensued. The left flank attempted to advance but met a German counterattack.

The HMS Fox opened fire at 1545 but targeting was obscured by high vegetation and the hospital, and she only succeeded in hitting the hospital and British troops. The German medical personnel suffered no losses and continued tending to both German and British patients.

More Germans arrived. The 2^nd Loyal North Lancashires withdrew, encountering machine gun fire as they crossed the roads. By 1600 all British had withdrawn from the town a second time.

Aitken recalled all troops, and one British officer referred to the troops on the beaches as “demoralized rabble”. (Hordern & Stacke, p. 91). The Germans reestablished a minor presence in the town. Aitken decided against a night attack and moved his forces to the tip of the peninsula.

Aitken then had two options: remain behind the defensive line they established at Ras Kasone or re-embark and leave. Potable water was becoming scarce, and no British reinforcements were coming, so at 2300 Aitken decided to re-embark. When a junior officer brought geographic information for another attack to a Brigade-Major, the Brigade-Major told him “The only information of any value now is that which will help us get out of this… place as soon as possible.” (Hordern & Stacke, p. 91)

5 November

The final phase of the withdrawal was described by Hordern & Stacke (p. 95) as follows: “Throughout, by almost the only piece of good fortune to be recorded anywhere in the melancholy story of the expedition, the withdrawal of the troops was effected without interference by the enemy. How tragically it might have ended, had the Germans shown even a little of the enterprise that might have been expected of them, will be sufficiently apparent.”

The British had to leave considerable equipment behind - they attempted to destroy it but had insufficient time to do so. German forces captured 455 rifles, 8 machine guns, and 600,000 rounds of ammunition. They also picked up medical supplies, telephone gear, plus clothing, warm coats, and blankets. (Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 45)

The British evacuation was completed by 1520, and the final matter requiring attention was the wounded troops in the hospital. The Germans allowed them to be evacuated only if they promised not to serve again in the war. Seventy-four British troops were returned and 49 had to stay at the hospital as they were unfit to be moved (Hordern & Stacke, p. 95). The convoy departed for Mombasa.

Instances like these, as well as the Christmas Truces of 1914, are what made the Great War to be perhaps the last “gentleman’s war.” Even in a gentleman’s war there are casualties, however: 64 German and Askaris were killed, 80 were wounded and 1 was missing. 360 British were killed, 487 wounded, and 148 missing. (Anderson, p. 120)

After the Battle

Aitken cabled the news of his defeat to London on 5 November. It arrived at a bad time for the British: The First Battle of Ypres was still ongoing, the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the Germans, and the British lost the Battle of Coronel – their first naval defeat since the 1812 Battle of Lake Champlain. For these reasons, the British government kept news of the defeat secret for several months.

Upon returning to Mombasa, Major-General Aitken began to reorganize his forces in preparation for the defense of the East Africa Protectorate. He was stricken by malaria and was still in the hospital when on 4 December he was ordered to hand over his command and return to England. After review by the Lord Kitchener and the War Office, Aitken was reduced in rank to colonel and put on half-pay for the remainder of the war.

Lettow-Vorbeck’s victory convinced Governor Schnee to abandon his diplomatic approach to the British, and it was a morale booster for his troops and the civilian population: it brought the natives and German colonists onto Lettow-Vorbeck’s side.

The Battle of Tanga laid the foundation for the rest of the East African Campaign. Lettow-Vorbeck knew that he would be getting no logistic support from Germany, so he did what all guerrilla fighters do: live off the enemy. Using the rifles, ammunition, and other supplies left by the withdrawing British, he was able to supply his men with improved weapons and uniforms. Lettow-Vorbeck hoped that the Battle of Tanga would convince the British to commit considerable forces in pursuit of him – forces that could not be used in the European theater - and in that he succeeded.

Conclusion

The utter defeat handed to the British at the Battle of Tanga was due to multiple errors not only by Major-General Aitken but also by the planners back in London. The overall operation was “planned” with almost no information about the geography of Tanga or about the strengths and positions of German forces, and Aitken made no effort correct these deficiencies. IEF B was far too small to accomplish the mission of capturing GEA. Even if Aitken did capture Tanga and followed the Usambara Railway 200 miles into the interior, a large German force would be waiting for him at Mount Kilimanjaro. IEF B received upgraded rifles prior to departure but were given no opportunity to train with them. Also, the British possessed greater artillery than the Germans, but there was no plan for its organized use. Finally, the IEF B had to complete a 14-day voyage to Tanga which played havoc with the health of the Indian troops.

Lieutenant-Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck had extensive knowledge of GEA – its geography, terrain, weather patterns, the tropical diseases there, and so on. He was fluent in Swahili. Further, he spent considerable time training with his German Askari troops, in many instances converting them from constabulary forces to fighting forces. It is these differences that made him the victor in this battle.

References

Anderson, R. (2002). Battle of Tanga 1914. Tempus Publishing, Ltd.

Astronomical Applications Department. (N/D). US Naval Observatory. Retrieved 2 March 2024 from https://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/index

Caulfeild, F. W. (1914). Logs of the HMS Fox. Retrieved 2 March 2024 from https://www.naval-history.net/OWShips-WW1-05-HMS_Fox.htm

Gaudi, R. (2017). African Kaiser: General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in Africa, 1914-1918. Dutton Caliber.

Harvey, K. J. (2014). Battle of Tanga, German East Africa, 1914. Pickle Partners Publishing.

Hordern, C. & Stacke, H. (1941). Military Operations East Africa volume 1, August 1914 – September 1916. His Majesty’s Stationary Office.

Lettow-Vorbeck, P. E. v. (2021). My Reminiscences of East Africa. Good Press.

Royal Navy Research Archive. (N/D). RNAS Tanga. Retrieved 2 March 2024 from https://www.royalnavyresearcharchive.org.uk/FAA-Bases/Tanga.htm

Battle of Tanga, November 1914 - Part 1

Introduction

The Battle of Tanga (2 – 5 November 1914) was the beginning of Germany’s WWI East African Campaign, a long-term plan to draw Allied troops and resources away from the European theater using minimal German forces. British Indian Expeditionary Force B, consisting of 8,000 soldiers possessing artillery and naval support, attempted to capture the port city of Tanga in German East Africa, now Tanzania. The German defending force, made up of approximately 1,100 German and African troops armed with antiquated firearms, soundly defeating IEF B.

This post describes the battle, the commanders involved, and the factors leading to British defeat. The physical and cultural environments are examined, and it is shown that the Germans were very familiar with the environment, whereas the British were willfully ignorant of Tanga. This difference greatly contributed to the outcome of the battle.

Prior to the Battle

Both Germany and Britain founded African colonies at the end of the 19th century, but the relationship between the European powers and the natives took very different courses: Britain used its East Africa Protectorate (later Kenya) primarily for commercial reasons, importing Indian laborers to supplement or replace native Africans. Germany took a more paternalistic approach to German East Africa (later Tanzania), educating the natives, incorporating them into the police force as well as the Schutztruppe (German colonial forces), where they were known as the German Askari. The German officers learned Swahili, and the Askari, seeing that they were becoming Germans, repaid all this with strong loyalty. (Gaudi, 2017)

Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, the new commander of the Schutztruppe, arrived in GEA in January 1914 (Lettow-Vorbeck, p. 4), though he did have prior contact with the colony and its civilian governor, Heinrich Schnee. Both suspected that war was coming to Europe but took different approaches to what should be done: Schnee sought to uphold the Congo Treaty of 1885 and keep GEA neutral whereas Lettow-Vorbeck realized that the colony and its Schutztruppe could be used to divert Allied forces away from the European theater.

Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck

After arriving, Lettow-Vorbeck evaluated the military potential of the colony: he toured the country, evaluated the status and quality of military and quasi-military forces, their armaments, the logistic situation, as well as the terrain and overall environment including the presence of diseases. In addition, he met with some of the individuals that will play a role in the campaign to come (Lettow-Vorbeck, pp. 4-8). He knew that Tanga's strategic importance as the gateway to the interior of Africa would make it a primary target for the British.

Once the war began, the British organized the Indian Expeditionary Force B under command of Major General Arthur Aitken. The British plan was to capture Tanga, then follow a 200-mile-long railway stretch towards Mount Kilimanjaro, the most economically developed portion of GEA and the most immediate threat to the British colony to the north. From there IEF B was to capture the rest of GEA (Hordern & Stacke, pp. 65-67). It is not clear how this was to happen - Aitken was tasked to capture an area larger than France using only 8,000 troops!

Whereas Lettow-Vorbeck familiarized himself with the environment, Aitken performed no reconnaissance prior to the battle. Further, he made no effort to acclimate his Indian troops to the African climate, train with them using the new rifles supplied to them just prior to departure, practice landings, etc. (Hordern & Stacke, p. 70). IEF B assembled in Bombay and was originally to set sail for Tanga on 30 September, but departure was delayed for two weeks, during which the troops had to stay aboard the ships that would become the convoy. The convoy finally departed on 16 October, travelling at 8 knots, the speed of the slowest ship, for their two-week voyage to Tanga.

The Environment: Physical Elements

The terrain, climate, and other physical elements of the battle site certainly favored the "home team," especially when the opponent did no intelligence-gathering. Tanga is a port city in German East Africa, now Tanzania, five degrees south of the equator. It is located on the south side of Tanga Bay, which has a depth ranging from 3 to 5 fathoms. The east side of the bay is bounded by the Ras Kasone peninsula which partially separates the bay and Tanga Harbor from the Indian Ocean. Edging the peninsula’s sandy beaches are 20-30 feet tall cliffs. The east side of the peninsula (where the initial British landing would take place) is bordered by mangroves, and 500 yards to the east of the mangroves is a coral reef. The beaches on the west side were sandy and narrow. (Anderson, 2002)

Physical and Cultural Geography of Tanga. (Harvey, 2014)

The climate of the area is tropical and has two rainy seasons: the “long rains” occurring from January to April, and the “short rains” during October and November. The battle occurred near the middle of the short rains, when the November temperature ranged between 72° and 88° F, the average humidity is 76%, and average monthly rainfall is approximately 5.5 inches. Malaria is mostly transmitted during the long rains, mostly.

The eastern coast was separated from the town by dense bush, mango groves, rubber tree plantations, and cultivated fields. The townsfolk also raised bees for their honey. Connecting the peninsula and the town were a series of roads cutting through the bush and the plantations. At least three of those roads extended past Tanga into the interior. Together with the Usambara Railway, those roads made Tanga very valuable to the British.

The Environment: Cultural Elements

In 1914, Tanga was the second largest port in German East Africa. Its shipping harbor was on the northeast side of the town, and consisted of a jetty and a customs shed, but it did not have any cranes. The harbor and jetty were serviced by rail that curved along the east side of town before turning west. This rail separated the German and African quarters of Tanga. The shipping rail connected to the Usambara Railway, which ran from Tanga to Moshi, a town close to Mount Kilimanjaro. As the battle proceeded, the railway would be used to transport and concentrate German troops into Tanga. If captured, the British could use the railway to transport troops and supplies into northern GEA to control that part of the colony. The town had facilities supporting the Usambara Railway, including a train station and maintenance workshops. Located to the east of the town was the cemetery, and a drainage ditch separated the eastern part of the shipping rail spur from that cemetery. There was also a hospital that served German, African, and British patients.

Ras Kasone, the peninsula separating Tanga Harbor from the Indian Ocean, had three structures that would be used by the British during their occupation: a signal tower, and two buildings called the “Red House” and the “White House.”

The colonial administration under Governor Heinrich Schnee wanted the colony to stay neutral during World War I and was willing to leave Tanga and other ports defenseless. Meanwhile Lt. Col. Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, commander of the German Colonial Army (Schutztruppe), wanted to use conflict in East Africa to divert British troops away from the European theater. The colonists were trapped in the middle: native Askaris formed the bulk of the Schutztruppe, but the Germans wanted to maintain neutrality.

In part 2, a daily breakdown of the battle will be discussed.