What Does a Joint Logistician Do?

Introduction

What does a joint logistician (JL) do? How does he do it? How does this relate to the Joint Forces Commander's mission? JP 4-0 Chapter V answers these questions!

USN Sailors unloading vehicles in the Philippines 9 April 2023
From We are the Mighty

Executing Joint Logistics

"Executing joint logistics" describes actions and operations conducted by joint logistics forces in support of the Joint Force Commander's mission. Examples include:

• Force reception
• Theater distribution
• Mortuary affairs

Joint logistics spans the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, so transition from planning to execution is critical.

Persistent U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) presence in partner nations (PNs) is often undesirable to country teams, PN governments, or PN citizens. As such, requiring a low-visibility U.S. military presence and reliance on local or third-country nationals for logistics and construction to secure interagency and PN permissions. Operational Contract Support includes contractor management, tracking, and planning for contractors authorized to accompany the force. These contractors must support joint forces while adhering to restrictions on U.S. military and civilian contractor presence.

Formal agreements and permissions between the US and developing nations often involve long approval processes and restrictions on the types of funding and support authorized. So, agreements must be made starting as early as possible.

As part of the process of optimizing presence, JLs must be prepared to handle small and large operations.

Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically small-scale, short-duration missions that involve U.S. military forces, private sector, and interagency partners working with international organizations and NGOs, requiring logisticians to coordinate and integrate multinational, private-sector, and interagency logistics capabilities to support joint operations. These operations, such as foreign humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or defense support to civil authorities in the U.S., prioritize rapid delivery of critical commodities, with joint logistics often serving as the main effort, supporting the Department of State internationally or civilian authorities domestically to save lives and mitigate damage.

Major operations or campaigns involve deploying, sustaining, redeploying, and retrograding large combat forces, with joint logisticians developing comprehensive support plans, often leveraging contractor support, to address requirements, ensure readiness, and adapt to evolving priorities across operation phases while mitigating challenges such as CBRN-contaminated air and seaports. Logistics plans must be flexible to manage competing demands during the transition to the final phase, including stability activities, contract closeout, foreign humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and the retrograde of contaminated materiel, requiring special handling and significant planning for demilitarization and disposition to protect the force and mission resources.

Setting-Up the Theater

The Combatant Command (CCMD) J-4 oversees logistics operations across the theater, with the Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC) and/or Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC) expanding to synchronize and optimize force and materiel flow, augmented by representatives from Service components, USTRANSCOM, other combatant commands, and national partners. As operational tempo increases, additional joint logisticians and subject matter experts enhance JDDOCs, leveraging established networks and clear roles to ensure efficient coordination and synchronization of deployment and distribution without creating new, inefficient staffs.

Expeditionary theater opening capabilities enable Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) to rapidly insert and expand force capabilities into an operational area (OA), allowing Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) to adjust force flow flexibly in response to dynamic and asymmetric operational needs. These capabilities support initial OA entry missions, transitioning theater port of debarkation (POD) operations to a JFC-designated Service component and setting conditions for the arrival of larger Service theater distribution and sustainment forces as needed.

It is necessary to consider situations where communications are degraded due to threats, environmental factors, or OPSEC restraints imposed by the JFC. This contingency is overcome through alternative communication systems and protocols, as well as factoring this into a logistics risk assessment.

Burger King arriving at Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan on 19 May 2004
From Eater.com

Supplying the JFC with Situational Awareness

The JFC must be kept aware of the status and location of resources – he must have situational awareness. This includes not only physical items such as equipment, supplies, and munitions, but also items such as contracts and agreements. It is the JL that supplies this information, allowing the JFC to make accurate and timely decisions and to formulate and execute various directives. This visibility relies on timely and accurate data across the Geographic Combatant Commander’s (GCC) area of responsibility (AOR).

Joint logisticians enhance their awareness of the Joint Operations Area (JOA) through service reports, operational summaries, logistics situation reports (SITREPs), host nation (HN) reports, and automated systems like the munitions and bulk petroleum contingency reports. All of these are fed into the Global Combat Support System.

The Global Combat Support System (GCSS) is a web-based tool that allows for continuous updates on supplies, maintenance, and so on. The GCSS allows JFCs to integrate logistics into their situational awareness, and it allows logisticians to access consumption rates, detect shortfalls, predict requirements, and plan solutions for near-term (10 days or less), mid-term (about 30 days), and long-term (beyond 30 days) problems.

Supporting the Battle Rhythm

The JFC establishes a battle rhythm for operations, including mechanisms to maintain visibility across functional areas like logistics. The joint logistician supports this by creating a synchronized sustainment staff battle rhythm that aligns with the JFC’s and provides proactive logistics options. Integrating logistics reporting with operational updates, aligning with the operational planning cycle, minimizing shift changes during critical periods, and tying component logistics to the JFC’s battle rhythm enhance situational awareness and improve integrated support for the joint force.

To support the battle rhythm, a logistics synchronization matrix is maintained. It serves as a decision support tool that maps the phases of an operation over time. On the horizontal axis is time, and on the vertical axis are logistics functions. This displays critical tasks linked to responsible parties. It allows JLs to access progress and recommend adjustments. This matrix enables joint logisticians to visually represent the logistical concept of support, identify potential gaps, develop mitigation options, and adapt to an ever-changing operational environment.

Commander's Critical Information Requirements

The Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) are elements of friendly and enemy information the commander identifies as critical to timely decision making. Joint logisticians update the critical information requirements related to logistics. Joint logisticians will most often use friendly forces information requirements to guide decision making. Those requirements are often a direct reflection of resources such as force availability, unit readiness, or materiel availability.

Joint Logistics Assessment

Assessment is a continuous process integral to planning and executing operations. It involves the entire staff, interagency, multinational partners, and stakeholders with the goal of analyzing changes in the operational environment and measure progress toward objectives. Logisticians provide data to evaluate logistics support effectiveness and adjust plans as needed. Logisticians collect input from end-users, service providers, and Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt) members to monitor, evaluate, and improve logistics support, ensuring it aligns with mission goals throughout a campaign or operation.

Turning Off the Lights

At any scale, the process of terminating joint operations is an involved process.

Terminating joint operations is a strategic process where the supported Combatant Commander (CCDR) proposes termination criteria, approved by the President or Secretary of Defense, to define the military end state when national strategic objectives are achieved. This end state marks a point where the military is no longer the primary tool for achieving remaining national objectives, based on specified conditions or a set period of time.

Joint logistics operations continue throughout a mission, but specific tasks like force reception may conclude earlier, requiring logisticians to monitor transitions, optimize resource use, and manage redeployment or withdrawal with synchronized efforts. Maintenance and materiel disposition planning involve preparing equipment for shipment, ensuring availability, minimizing readiness impacts, and handling retrograde, demilitarization, scrap, hazardous waste disposal, and decontamination per Department of Defense policies.

Upon termination of joint operations, joint logistics focuses on redeploying personnel and materiel, managing contractor departure, disposing of equipment, transitioning materiel and facilities to host nations or foreign military sales, closing ports, and terminating contracts and agreements. Plans must ensure the return of government-furnished property, monitor contractor equipment retrograde, and confirm receipt of goods and services with full payment before closing contracts. Contracting and payment officials remain engaged until all agreements are finalized.

Support for Special Operations

JLs must understand that SOF activities require nonstandard logistics, which involves overt, low-visibility, or legally authorized clandestine support to U.S. or foreign personnel in missions beyond standard logistics capabilities or outside conventional Department of Defense distribution networks. Logisticians adapt conventional principles like supply chain management, modifying or creating new tactics, techniques, and procedures to address unique acquisition, storage, funding, and transportation requirements while complying with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and approved authorities.

Logisticians supporting clandestine activities use conventional Department of Defense providers when suitable for operations security (OPSEC) but may employ other providers, with U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) potentially requesting Service contingency contracting officers for support.

Nonstandard logistics, driven by geopolitically sensitive missions or tactically significant operations, requires heightened OPSEC to protect operational details, where effective safeguarding of support concepts can determine mission success or failure across the full spectrum of military operations.

Conclusion

So, what does a joint logistician do?

The JL collaborates closely with the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to plan and support a wide range of operations. This partnership ensures that all logistical aspects of military operations are effectively coordinated and executed, enabling seamless mission success across various scenarios.

Throughout the lifecycle of an operation, JLs perform critical functions to maintain operational efficiency. They facilitate force reception to ensure troops and resources are properly integrated upon arrival. JLs also support the JFC's battle rhythm, coordinating the tempo and flow of activities to align with mission objectives. Finally, they oversee theater closure, managing the orderly withdrawal of forces and equipment to conclude operations.

To support JFCs in making accurate and timely decisions, JLs provide comprehensive logistics information. They use a variety of tools to deliver this support, including detailed reports and Situation Reports (SITREPs) that offer real-time updates on logistical status. Additionally, the Global Combat Support System enables efficient tracking and management of resources, while the logistics synchronization matrix aligns all logistical efforts to ensure coherence and responsiveness across the operation.

Operation Barbarossa from a Modern Logistics Planning Perspective

Introduction

Before Operation Barbarossa, the German military was in transition. Adolf Hitler prioritized modernization and mechanization, but the German economy struggled to supply needed critical resources, particularly rubber and oil[1]. Further, logistical organization was fragmented between multiple generals: General Gercke oversaw rail and water transport, while General Wagner managed motor transport, creating inefficiencies. Gercke’s lack of authority over the navy and air force further hindered coordination[2]. These unresolved issues persisted as planning for Operation Barbarossa began.

Planning Problems

Planning for Operation Barbarossa started in August 1940, with two commands — OKH (Army High Command) and OKW (Armed Forces High Command) — conducting parallel studies. OKH emphasized road networks and proposed offensives toward Moscow and Kiev, while OKW prioritized railways and targeted the Warsaw-Moscow corridor[3]. These plans were not mutually exclusive, but Hitler’s Directive No. 21, issued in December 1940, introduced a third approach focused on capturing economic resources to sustain the campaign[4].

The operation launched on June 22, 1941, with 144 divisions advancing across an 800-mile front that was the Soviet border. Logistical failures emerged almost immediately, undermining the campaign’s early momentum[5].

Operation Barbarossa, from Santa Clara University Digital Exhibits

Applying Joint Logistics Planning Standards

Operation Barbarossa lacked integrated planning between OKH and OKW, violating modern joint logistics principles like those in Joint Publication 4-0 (JP 4-0). Essential components, such as unified whole-of-government coordination[6], redeployment, and demobilization plans[7], were absent. A Theater Logistics Analysis could have anticipated critical issues[8], including incompatible railroad gauges, fuel shortages, and issues with Soviet rolling stock[9].

Initial and refined logistics estimates[10] were either inadequate or nonexistent. Shortages of railway staff, fuel, food, and ammunition, evident by August 1941, suggest these estimates were grossly inaccurate. The German economy, constrained by its socialist structure, struggled to produce goods flexibly and at scale. A Logistics Supportability Analysis[11] (LSA) could have addressed this by planning for sustained supply and equipment production while the operation was ongoing[12].

The absence of a Theater Distribution Plan[13] (presumably[14]) exacerbated resource allocation issues. With OKH and OKW developing separate large-scale plans and no LSA in place, there was no centralized system to track and distribute finite supplies and equipment across the operation’s components while the operation was ongoing.

Conclusion

While applying JP 4-0 to Operation Barbarossa is anachronistic, the lessons remain relevant. Logistical planning must be integrated with strategic and tactical planning to ensure operational success. Barbarossa’s failures underscore the critical need for unified command, comprehensive analysis, and robust resource distribution systems in military campaigns.

Footnotes

[1] Van Creveld, pp. 142 – 144.
[2] Ibid, p. 145.
[3] Ibid, p. 148 – 149.
[4] Ibid, p. 149.
[5] Ibid, pp. 160 – 166, 168 – 171.
[6] JP 4-0, p. IV-2.
[7] Ibid, p. IV-3.
[8] Ibid, p. xi, IV-4.
[9] Van Creveld, p. 157.
[10] JP 4-0, p. IV-6.
[11] Ibid, IV-5.
[12] Kobren.
[13] JP 4-0, p. IV-5.
[14] Gaines & Snell.

Bibliography

Gaines, K. & Snell, R. “Setting and supporting the theater.” Army Sustainment, November-December 2015. https://www.army.mil/article/157230/setting_and_supporting_the_theater

Joint Publication 4-0. Joint Logistics. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019.

Kobren, B. “The Journey from Logistic Support Analysis to Product Support Analysis” Defense Acquisition Workforce, DAU Blogs. 25 August 2016. https://www.dau.edu/blogs/journey-logistic-support-analysis-product-support-analysis

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Destroying the Ho Chi Minh Trail

Introduction

The thesis of this post is that, despite multiple aerial interdiction campaigns, the Ho Chi Minh Trail (HCMT) could not have been put out of commission without capturing the land on which it operated. This thesis is supported by the fact that extended aerial bombardment had only minimal operation on its operation, and by consideration of the structure of the HCMT's network of roads, footpaths, and streams.

After presenting the history of the HCMT as well as other supply routes the Communists used to move fighters and supplies into South Vietnam, the geography and meteorology upon which the HCMT operated will be examined. Next, the size and extent of the HCMT will be described as well as how the Communists used the trail. Next, the major interdiction operations targeting the HCMT will be described. This includes Operation Igloo White, an early example of an "Electronic Battlefield system," to use the terminology of Banner (1993). Finally, the resiliency of the HCMT will be addressed – why weren't the aerial interdictions and the millions of tons of ordnance dropped on the HCMT incapable of halting its operation?

A-6 Intruder drops ordnance over North Vietnam, from The National Naval Aviation Museum.

Background Information

The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Vietcong (VC) operating in South Vietnam were supplied by China and the USSR through four routes:

1. Across the DMZ between North Vietnam and South Vietnam
2. By sea along the east coast of North and South Vietnam
3. By sea to Cambodia, then overland to South Vietnam
4. Through Laos into South Vietnam – this was the Ho Chi Minh Trail

Map from Encyclopedia Britannica.

The DMZ between North and South Vietnam was established in 1954 and was approximately 47 miles long. It was, by nature, forbidden. Delivery by sea to North and South Vietnam was halted by Operation Market Time in 1966. The Sihanouk Trail (the Cambodian route) was closed in 1970 when Prince Norodom Sihanouk was ousted and replaced by the US-friendly Lon Nol.

This left the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which became the primary target for interdiction operations.

The history of the HCMT extends back to the end of World War II and the First Indochina War (Hanyoc, 2002). The Vietminh needed an effective backwoods logistics system for this war, and this eventually became the bane of the anti-Communists.

In May 1959, the government of North Vietnam decided to launch a war of unification - the Second Indochina War, which later became the Vietnam War. During the planning process they established Transportation Group 559, tasked with upgrading and operating the HCMT. Group 559 employed approximately 100,000 people at any time, including, according to Banner (1993):

• Engineers
• Porters
• Drivers
• Mechanics
• Laborers
• Ground security units
• Anti-aircraft units
• Hospitals
• Complete assortment of other administrative and logistical support units

Geographical and Meteorological Considerations

The border between South Vietnam and Laos runs for 300 miles, but only 125 miles was involved in the HMCT. Banner (1993) calls this the “Tchepone Corridor,” named after a Laotian town in the vicinity. The western half of the Tchepone Corridor is flat or rolling hills; the remainder, a 65 mile wide stretch, is part of the Chaine Annamitique mountain range, and this was the causeway of the HCMT.

The Tchepone Corridor was crossed by streams and rivers that mostly flow southwest to the Mekong River. Overcoming these waterways involved extensive bridging, but the waterways provided lateral movement and were used during the rainy seasons which limited road usage.

The HCMT was mostly located in a tropical rainforest, described as “almost impenetrable primeval forests.” Laos receives an average of 140 inches per year of rainfall, mostly between May and October. All-weather routes that were constructed later in the war permitted year-round use, but most of the conflict occurred during the dry season.

Banner (1993) describes the overall geography as “severe” but notes that once the NV “found ways of accomplishing their missions, the geographical traits of the area were an important asset to the North Vietnamese and an incredible hindrance to US interdiction efforts.”

Extent and Usage

As described above, the HCMT fits into a land area 65 miles long by 25 miles wide. The length of roads and trails that Group 559 built into that area was huge: 10,000 miles in total. In addition, thousands of kilometers of fuel pipeline were laid. In places where the tropical rainforest didn't provide cover, 1,800 miles of road were camouflaged.

The rate of construction increased as the Vietnam War continued: in 1965, 450 km/year of road was laid; by 1970 and 1971 this rate peaked to nearly 1000 km/year.

Supplies were moved along the HCMT in various means. Trucks were used over stretches that were paved. Carts and bicycles were also used. There are examples of Vietcong fighters crossing bridges by climbing underneath them to avoid being seen. Boats were used and were used more frequently during the rainy season.

The HCMT was used in three ways: north to south transportation, south to north movement, and as a rear area for the VC and NVA.

For north to south usage, the HCMT was primarily used to move personnel and ammunition into SV. The North Vietnamese claimed that 45 million tons of supplies were moved during the war. In 1969, 90% of all ammunition came through the HCMT and the Sihanouk Trail. The weapons were already in South Vietnam.

Besides ammunition, 26% of food and 27% of construction materials were transported into South Vietnam. Except for the ammunition, the Viet Cong were establishing a self-sustaining presence in South Vietnam.

These numbers vary by source: for example, the CIA estimated that between 1966 and 1971, 630,000 fighters were moved south, along with 100,000 tons of food, 50,000 tons of ammunition, and 400,000 weapons. (Hanyok, 2002, p.94)

For south to north movement, the HCMT was used to move injured personnel to first aid stations and hospitals. As it goes, some VNA and VC medical facilities were established within Laos, so injured fighters didn't need to be moved all the way to North Vietnam.

The HCMT was also used to transport personnel for training. Again, this doesn't imply that fighters needed to be moved to NV, since training facilities were established within Laos.

Families of fighters were moved north for their safety and to avoid being used as leverage.

Finally, captured documents were moved north for review by the North Vietnamese Army, the Chinese, and the Soviets.

In addition to being a transportation network, the HCMT was used as the rear area for the VC and the NVA. The variety of personnel employed by Group 559 allowed for command-and-control bases to be operated; maintenance and storage facilities were operated; training and recuperation areas were also maintained. The rear provided sanctuary for VC and NVA families. There was some limited farming in this area. Finally, the area was used to procure supplies from the local population.

Interdiction Operations

Because the HCMT was primarily located in Laos, that country became a primary target for American forces.

Conflict was already underway in northern Laos: the Laotian government was fighting Communist forces – the Pathet Lao. Neither the US nor the NV were permitted to have forces in Laos by the 1962 Geneva Accords. The US followed these Accords while NV left forces there. The Pathet Lao were thus supported by and operating at the behest of the North Vietnamese government. The war in Northern Laos thus became a proxy war inside another proxy war.

In southern Laos, no ground or aerial campaigns were allowed, again because of the 1962 Accords. Further complicating the situation was the US ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan. He was completely opposed to all military action in Laos, and this led to the HCMT being given the nickname "Sullivan's Freeway."

In both situations, the Americans needed to get "creative." They did this in two ways: first, the US would fly non-combat missions over Laos, gather intelligence, and pass that intel on to the Laotian Government or to South Vietnam forces; second, they would use covert actions, usually implemented by the CIA.

Operations intended to impede the use of the HCMT by the NVA and VC can be divided into two types: conventional bombing campaigns and "data driven" campaigns. Neither of these turned out to be effective.

Map from Staaveren, 1993, p. 99

There were four major conventional bombing operations that targeted the HCMT: Operations Rolling Thunder(March 1965 – October 1968), Barrel Roll(December 1964 – March 1973), Steel Tiger(April 1965 – November 1968), and Tiger Hound(December 1965 – November 1968). There were also unconventional operations called Operation Igloo White and Operation Commando Hunt that involved electronic warfare. These will be described shortly.

Operation Rolling Thunder targeted industrial infrastructure and military targets within NV, including the part of the HCMT within NV. Approximately 300,000 sorties were flown by USAF and USN aircraft, dropping approximately 643,000 tons of ordinance. Because it targeted NV itself, the risks of escalation by China and the USSR were high. Of the four operations listed here, this was the most costly in terms of aircraft and lives (Staaveren, 2002).

Operation Barrel Roll targeted Pathet Lao (the communist forces in Laos) as well as the HCMT in northeast Laos. It was conducted by the USAF, USN, and the CIA, in coordination with Laotian forces and Hmong guerrillas.

Operation Steel Tiger began in April 1965. This was an adjunct of Operation Rolling Thunder which began the previous month. It was limited to the parts of Laos west of NV, north of the DMZ and Tchepone. Operation Steel Tiger was later rolled-in to Operation Commando Hunt (see below). Approximately 3 million tons of bombs were dropped over the lifetime of the operation, including later phases.

Operation Tiger Hound was part of Steel Tiger and focused on interdiction in southeast Laos in support of US and SV ground operations. It involved precise air strikes smaller than Steel Tiger's broad air strikes.

Planning for all these operations included the goal of disrupting the HCMT, but in each case the outcome was limited (Staaveren, 1993). Reasons for this are addressed later.

What about defoliation operations? Operation Ranch Hand, which ran from 1962 - 1971, was the US Air Force’s effort to eliminate the forest canopy that concealed the insurgents by spraying Agent Orange and other defoliants. The focus of this operation was South Vietnam, but herbicidal warfare in Laos and Cambodia were prohibited. Why? The usual answer to that question is that defoliation operations were disallowed for the same reasons that air combat operations over those countries were prohibited. Given that Operation Rolling Thunder and the other campaigns were somehow deemed acceptable, it is not clear why Ranch Hand wasn't extended into Laos.

Operations Igloo White and Commando Hunt

All the conventional campaigns gathered intel for use by US and SV forces, but gathering intel wasn't the primary purpose of those operations. To overcome limited intelligence, the US established a large-scale sensor network called Igloo White and an integrated attack system based on this system called Commando Hunt.

These two operations were early examples of what Banner (1993) calls “Electronic Battlefield (EB) systems." This system was proposed by a think tank called the Jason Committee, which presented their design for a system consisting of the sensor network, aerial reconnaissance, and a constantly replenished mine belt. Secretary McNamara accepted the proposal, and the first sensors were dropped in Laos in December 1967. This operation would soon be called Igloo White.

The sensor network consisted of approximately 20,000 sensors dropped on known or suspected logistics sites. They recorded vibration, motion, sound, and sometimes smells. Overhead aircraft would collect the transmissions from these sensor packages and retransmit them to the Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC) located at Nakhon Plano, Thailand. This data would be analyzed by computers with target information passed to air controllers or directly to attack aircraft.

 

Photo showing two Igloo White sensors, from Shields (1971).

The evolution of Igloo White from initial concept to final form is described in excruciating detail in (Staaveren, 1993, pp. 255 - 267). From an outsider's perspective, one must wonder if the personnel involved were paid on an hourly basis!

Data recorded by these sensors would be stored until requested by aircraft operating overhead, in "the cloud." This information would be analyzed and serve as the basis for highly targeted operations.

Illustration from Shields (1971) showing actionable information ISC computers produced from sensor data.

From a contemporary perspective, Igloo White and Commando Hunt were both strange and innovative.

Sensors, though not necessarily electronic, are commonly used by survivalists and preppers to detect the approach of undesirable people (enemies, rival preppers, etc.) The use of these sensors stops there – they inform the people who placed them of the need for defensive action. The end. With Igloo White and Commando Hunt, the sensors provided information that can then be used to hunt down the Communists travelling along the HCMT. From a survivalist perspective, this is an unfamiliar and strange way to use sensor information.

Igloo White and Commando Hunt were innovative in that they were an early example of the Internet of Things (IoT). With IoT one can create a network of one or more sensors that transmits data "into the cloud." This data is analyzed, and actionable information is produced.

Explaining the Interdiction Failures

Why did the aerial campaigns fail to completely disrupt the HCMT? It comes down to the structure of the HCMT.

The left side of this picture shows two simple examples of logistics networks – dots represent bases and lines represent trails.

At top left is a very simple tree that Kress (2016) would claim to be a model of a traditional military logistics system. On the bottom left is a very simplified model of the HCMT.

The right side shows the results of removing one line from these two networks. For the tree, removing any single line results in the network being disconnected. For the simplified HCMT model, removing a single line never results in disconnected components.

Now, the tree model used by Kress (2016) can not be considered a realistic model of a military logistics network. This was confirmed in a personal communication from Prof. James Lechner, who writes on 7 April 2025:

The root and tree branch metaphor is not a bad one but not the whole story. Some classes of supply - like ammunition can only come from very specific sources like an ammunition holding area at theater level. Others like food/water, gasoline, construction materials etc can be procured locally almost anywhere in the world. Based on availability (local v theater v strategic) the items are gathered at specific levels either Corps (brought in from theater or above) or brigade/battalion (local) then organized into means of transportation (convoy, airlift, etc.). The units on the ground then take charge of these convoys or parts of them when they come into their operational area and are responsible for distribution/delivery to the company and platoon level.

The point still holds, however: a logistics network like used in the HCMT is extremely hard to disrupt by removing lines. The situation is even worse when we consider removing a single dot (or base) from a tree. Except for the "leaves," removing a single base in the above tree will disconnect the tree into multiple components.

This is why the aerial campaigns failed: the HCMT was resilient by nature of its arrangement.

Conclusions

The importance of the HCMT extends beyond its logistic value to the North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong: it was a model of a logistics system worthy of being studied and emulated by both conventional and irregular forces. Indeed,

The Ho Chi Minh Trail is one of the great achievements in military engineering of the twentieth century.

This money quote is taken from page 94 of Hanyok's 2002 report titled Spartans in Darkness: American SIG/NT and the Indochina War 1945-1975. Here, Hanyok was describing not only the extent of the HCMT but also the role it played in the Vietnamese communist war effort:

It took on an existence of its own and consumed the efforts of an enormous number of people to keep it running, especially in the face of the Allied air offensive determined to shut it down. Their effort was a success.

Banner (1993) dives extensively into plans for invading Laos as proposed in the post-war memoir of General Westmoreland and others, and he draws two conclusions: first, the invasion of Laos planned by Westmoreland would be extremely costly in terms of lives; second, the Vietcong had established a self-sufficient presence in South Vietnam. This second claim is only partially true, however, as the VC were still importing their ammunition using the HCMT.

There is another aspect that is not addressed, at least in the literature consulted here: it seems that the HCMT was not only a military logistics route but a civilian economic route, too. When paths or bases were destroyed by aerial bombardment, it made sense for those to be repaired both for civilian and military purposes. This made the HCMT even harder to disrupt, as it was necessary not to destroy it but rather to deny access to it by the Communists.

Given all this, it is not surprising that the HCMT survived the Vietnam War: not only was it designed to be a very resilient system, it was in the interest of both the military and the civilians to keep it running.

Bibliography

Banner, G. War for the Ho Chi Minh Trail. US Army Command and General Staff College, 1993. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA272827.pdf

Kress, M. Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations, 2nd Edition. Springer, 2016.

Hanyok, R. Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945 – 1975. Center for Cryptologic History, 2002. https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-histories/spartans_in_darkness.pdf

Shields, H. IGLOO WHITE January 1970 – September 1971. HQ PACAF Directorate of Operations Analysis, 1 November 1971. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA485194.pdf

Staaveren, J, Interdiction in Southern Laos 1960 – 1968. Center for Air Force History, 1993. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA439950.pdf

Staaveren, J. Gradual Failure: The War Over North Vietnam 1965-1966. Air Force Historical Studies Office, 2002. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA440196.pdf

Prussia's Use of Railways

Introduction

Europe in the Nineteenth Century was in flux: Napoleon Bonaparte’s star was in descent, and the Industrial Revolution was beginning to yield technical advances. This paper investigates how Europe’s armies adapted to this fluid situation.

We begin by considering how various European armies emulated the Grande Armeé under Napoleon, and how theoreticians analyzed his logistics systems.

Next, we examine how Prussia prepared for future wars and started to utilize railroads for military purposes. Leading the way in the latter was Friedrich List[1], a German economist who proposed that a network of railways could allow troops to concentrate over vast distances, and Helmuth von Moltke, who would later become the First Chief of the German General Staff.

Two campaigns of the Prussian army are then surveyed. As Moltke wrote, “no plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force,” and these two campaigns are examined with an eye to the logistics failures that were encountered. The commonalities of these difficulties are listed, and we conclude with a note that these types of failures continue to the present day.

Graf Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800 - 1891) in full uniform of a Generalfeldmarschall of Prussia

European Armies After Napoleon

Armies were trying to duplicate logistical aspects of the Grande Armeé even before Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo. For example, the Austrian army limited the amount of baggage authorized in 1799-1800 and again after the Austrian defeat at the Battle of Austerlitz. As a result, the Austrian army was able to match the Grande Armeé’s marching performance in 1809[2].

Not everyone was seeking to emulate the Grande Armeé, however. The two primary critics of Napoleon were André de Roginat and Carl von Clausewitz.

André de Roginat argued[3] that Napoleon paid insufficient attention to lines of communication during his campaigns. While de Roginat believed that penetration deep into enemy territory could be successful when executed by small armies, he maintained that large armies faced problems due to their great need for subsistence, ammunition, and replacements. These problems forced the large invading army to live off the land, which resulted in desertions, indiscipline, and conflicts with the local population. De Roginat went as far as labeling the Austerlitz Campaign the “height of madness” due to the number of deaths by starvation, even though Austerlitz was Napoleon’s most successful campaign.

De Roginat proposed[4] an alternative to Napoleon’s reliance on magazines, requisitioning, and living off the land: the army was to be loaded with 8 days’ provisions and advance 30 to 40 leagues (90 to 120 miles). They would stop, take stock, then wait for the Armeé de Reserve to arrive. Stores would be accumulated, and a new base would be established. Once this was all complete, the process would repeat.

Von Clausewitz’s criticisms[5] were less specific. He acknowledged the speed of Napoleon’s troop movements and argued that the need to requisition supplies could cause delays comparable to those in a base supply system. He believed that the requisition system became more advantageous for longer distances, noting that war conducted by requisitions was superior to one by magazines.

Russians implemented reforms favoring requisitions starting in 1812, but commanders were unable or unwilling to follow, resulting in “much suffering” during the campaigns of 1828-1829 (against Turkey) and 1831 (against Poland). Russia introduced “ambulant magazines” in 1846 and established trains of bakeries and butcheries. These proved ineffective during the Crimean War of 1853-1856, and the result was “innumerable carcasses of men and horses lined the routes to Bulgaria and Sebastopol.”[6]

Prussia Prepares for War

Van Creveld describes Prussia’s logistics system as “sketchy” from 1814-1815[7]. There was no formal body of train officers until 1816, and even then, a body of NCOs was established. This remained until Wilhelm of Prussia wrote that logistics was the weakest part of the Prussian army. Reforms were initiated in 1853 to bolster the train system. This included designating a staff officer in each corps to create a “nuclei” of train personnel that would train 14 days per year. In 1856, these “nuclei” were expanded into battalions consisting of five provision columns, a field bakery, one main hospital, and four field hospitals.

As all this was happening, a product of the Industrial Age was making its debut: the railroad. The Prussian military was initially hesitant to use railroads, their hesitation being rooted in the fear that “good communications only made a country easier to overrun.”[8] The army even opposed commercial railroads. The Prussians took interest in railroads in 1848-1849 when moving troops by road became unsafe, for whatever reason.

In 1859, the first Eisenbahntruppe formation was established to make minor railroad repairs and to build small bridges, leaving larger work to civilian experts. They were expected to guard the rails was well as restore them; the task of guarding the rail was taken away from them in 1866.[9]

The importance of railroads became painfully apparent to Moltke as Austria was amassing forces along the border in 1866. Prussia was slow to mobilize due to Bismarck’s desire to avoid limiting diplomatic options until the last moment[10]. The five railways to the front allowed Moltke to rapidly deliver three Prussian armies and their supplies to the front. This arrangement worked well for Moltke, who had an unusual working definition of “concentration of forces”: concentration was “achieved not when men and units stood shoulder to shoulder on a given spot, but when the distance between units permitted their concentric cooperation and mutual support.” [11]

Prussian Campaign of 1866

As part of the Austro-Prussian War (also called the Seven Weeks War), the Prussian Campaign of 1866 revealed many problems in the train company organization[12]. Supply trains had to share the roads with infantry, cavalry, and artillery columns, with supply trains given lowest priority. Supply trains were thus separated from the troops they were supposed to supply. Further, unauthorized vehicles joined the supply trains, and individual vehicles rested on the roads, thus blocking them. Congestion became acute in defiles and other narrow passages.

In parallel with utilizing supply trains, the Prussians also employed railroads during this campaign. As mentioned above, Prussia was late in mobilizing but compensated for this by utilizing all five railways leading to the frontier. This enabled deployment along a 200-mile arc, giving rise to Moltke’s innovative “strategy of external lines,” a decentralized approach to maneuvering multiple armies toward a unified goal[13].

This campaign encountered significant logistical hurdles, particularly the “last mile” problem: while transporting supplies to railheads was efficient, distributing them from there to the troops proved far more challenging. To address this, Moltke brought his railway expert, Von Wartensleben, into the field, a decision that inadvertently stripped the supply system of centralized oversight. Without direction, corps quartermasters flooded the railheads with excessive supplies, sending forward vast quantities that overwhelmed the endpoints.

This lack of coordination led to severe congestion, with 17,900 tons of supplies trapped on the railway lines, unable to move forward or back. Rail cars, intended for transport, became makeshift storage units, causing bread to go stale, fodder to rot, and horses to starve as troops advanced beyond the reach of their lagging supply convoys. The breakdown exposed the limitations of relying heavily on railways without solving the final distribution stage. Van Creveld argues that, despite Prussia’s extensive use of rail, it did not significantly influence the campaign’s progress, as the system faltered under pressure. Compounding the issue, Prussian forces could not utilize Austrian railways, which were strategically blocked by fortresses, further limiting their logistical flexibility.

The Campaign of 1870 of the Franco-Prussian War

During the Campaign of 1870, the Prussians (now called Germans because of the unification) continued to use railroads, though they faced an opponent with a more advanced railway system. The French railway[14] was widely considered superior to Germany’s due to its purposeful strategic design, prioritizing military utility over commercial interests. In contrast to Germany’s "geometric network" of north-south and east-west lines, the French system featured lines running parallel to the frontier, connecting the major forts and forming a complex web of routes extending from a central hub. This configuration offered significant military flexibility, facilitating swift troop and supply movements along fortified borders and throughout the country. By focusing on defense and mobilization rather than compass directions, France gained a clear logistical advantage.

Still, Moltke was able to penetrate hundreds of miles into enemy territory. Prussian forces encountered similar problems to the Campaign of 1866: suppliers rushed materials forward without considering the unloading stations’ capacity to manage them. A shortage of unloaders, combined with the inability of the army’s horse-drawn transport columns to clear accumulating stock, exacerbated the problem. Local commanders worsened the situation by commandeering railway wagons to serve as temporary storage, leading to trains being backed up for hundreds of miles. To mitigate this, Moltke instructed his commanders to deploy cavalry to seize French wagons and locomotives, though these efforts were hampered by sabotage, further disrupting operations.

By the war’s end, the Prussians captured and operated 2,300 miles of French track.[15] This railway operation was marked by chaos, including frequent crashes, derailments, and even trains plunging into the Meuse River. These incidents stemmed from poor maintenance and the Germans’ lack of experience with the French railway system.

As a side note: just as the Campaign of 1866 inspired Moltke’s external lines strategy, the Campaign of 1870 inspired[16] Moltke’s Auftragstaktik, a command-and-control style that focuses on individual initiative. This is similar to the U.S. military’s concept of mission command but differs in that Auftragstaktik is based on the virtues of “knowledge, independence, and the joy of taking responsibility.”[17]

Common Failures

Despite the four years between the two campaigns, and even though railroads became more common, the same problems were encountered and remained unsolved.

The first difficulty encountered was the problem of unloading - how to rapidly remove supplies from a rail car? The standard way was to unload cargo from the side. The Prussian army experimented with wooden ramps to unload them from the rear instead of the side.[18]

Next, there is the problem of one-way tracks. Track can only have one train operating on it in a single section, and this entailed either having the tracks arranged in loops; or that trains could operate only as shuttles with loading and unloading at the ends of the segments; or that side rails be built to allow trains to pass each other; or that only one train was permitted to use the entire rail line. The latter is the most impractical approach. Unfortunately, Van Creveld does not indicate which method was adopted.

Breakdowns along the rail were a real possibility and were addressed by Moltke in his reforms of 1859 that created the Eisenbahntruppe. There was also the problem of sabotage. To address this, Moltke had hostages carried along in the locomotives to dissuade saboteurs.[19]

Then there is the problem of congestion. Breakdowns and sabotage accounted for some congestion, but the fundamental source is that more supplies were being sent than the transport method (train rails) or destination (railhead) could manage. Congestion can be mitigated by having the railhead signal to the rear the quantity of supplies they can manage. It isn’t clear what forms of communication existed along any individual line of Prussian military rail, but at the time couriers and semaphores were used and telegraphs were coming into use. The simplest form of communication – sending messages back to the rear carried by the railroad engineers – would have helped.

Finally, there is the “last mile problem.” This is a term from information technology and transportation logistics that describes how the delivery of goods or services becomes extremely difficult or expensive as the package nears its destination. In the situations encountered in the two campaigns discussed here, the last mile problem was exacerbated by the fact that the destinations are troops, and they are constantly in motion.

Conclusions

All the difficulties encountered during the two campaigns, especially the problem of congestion and the last mile problem, are still with us today. Anyone who drives during rush hour has encountered congestion; anyone whose plane had to circle an airport instead of landing has encountered congestion. The fact that delivering supplies to a distribution center takes a few large trucks, while getting packages to a customer’s home takes many delivery vans is an example of the last mile problem.

In a sense, Moltke made contact with universal phenomena, problems that the transition from supply trains to railroads did not solve, problems that continue to this day. Van Creveld discredits Moltke’s optimism for railways, stating that promised supplies didn’t catch up to the troops until after the major battles were won. During the Campaign of 1866, for example, the supply trains fell behind the troops on 29 June and did not catch up with them until after the Battle of Königgrätz was fought and won on 3 July 1866[20]. What Van Creveld misses, though, is that railways allowed for rapid concentration of troops and supplies before fighting began in both campaigns. He also underappreciated how, under Moltke, the Prussians captured and operated 2,300 miles of French track. Moltke was thus able to use the enemy’s own resources against itself.

Endnotes

[1] Lechner.
[2] Van Creveld, p. 75.
[3] Ibid, p. 75.
[4] Ibid, p. 76.
[5] Ibid, p. 76.
[6] Ibid, p. 77.
[7] Ibid, p. 77.
[8] Ibid, p. 82.
[9] Ibid, p. 91-92.
[10] Showalter, p. 63.
[11] Ibid, p. 62.
[12] Van Creveld, p. 80.
[13] Ibid, p. 84.
[14] Ibid, p. 86.
[15] Ibid, p. 96.
[16] Coumbe, p. 92-95.
[17] Vandergriff.
[18] Ibid, p. 83.
[19] Ibid, p. 96.
[20] Ibid, p. 80.

Bibliography

Coumbe, A. “Operational Command in the Franco-Prussian War.” U.S. Army War College, 1991. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA527978.pdf

Lechner, J. “Developments in Logistics after Napoleon.” [Video], n/d. https://libertyuniversity.instructure.com/courses/764197/pages/watch-developments-in-logistics-after-napoleon?module_item_id=83250132

Showalter, D. “Mass Multiplied by Impulsion: The Influence of Railroads on Prussian Planning for the Seven Weeks' War.” Military Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Apr. 1974), pp. 62-67. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1987237

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Vandergriff, D. “How the Germans defined Auftragstaktik: What mission command is – and – is not.” Small Wars Journal, 21 June 2018. https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/how-germans-defined-auftragstaktik-what-mission-command-and-not