A Note on Culture and Leadership Style

The U.S. Army is empowering its soldiers with mission command: by requiring and rewarding initiative, trust and loyalty is engendered, just as it is in organizations practicing Total Quality Management (TQM) (Goetsch & Davis, 2021, p. 52). Obviously, bureaucracy is still present and it is not clear how initiative and bureaucracy can coexist.

It is interesting to compare this organizational culture with other military cultures that result in two diametrically opposed leadership styles: centralized control and Auftragstaktik, which is practiced by the German military as well as various self-defense forces.

Russia still clings to rigid, a top-down command style rooted in centralized control. As explained in (Bowen, 2024), "the Russian military continues to operate with a Soviet-style centralized command. This command style at the tactical level often has contributed to the types of inflexible operations that contributed to previous failures and casualties."

Former USSR satellites such as Ukraine maintain a similar approach. Oleksandr Syrskyi, the current Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has a "preference for a tightly controlled leadership structure that favors loyalty and personal closeness over purely professional criteria" (n.a., 2024).

The consequences of this centralized command were demonstrated in Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014: interviews (VICE News, March 22, 2014) with Ukrainian sailors (VICE News, March 16, 2014) showed them to be demoralized and directionless when one of their commanders defected to Russia and the government in Ukraine was in disarray.

The opposite of this is mission command or what the Germans call Auftragstaktik (Widder, 2002). These two styles of command are not the same, but in both, the commander specifies the mission and timeframe, and the way to accomplish this is left to the individual troop's initiative. Vandergriff (2018) gives a more comprehensive description of Auftragstaktik – instead of focusing on command and control, he describes it primarily as a form of professionalism and cultural philosophy expected of all members of the German Army: “subordinates could be trusted to take the action he thought appropriate, rather than stopping and waiting until contact could be re-established. This aggressive attitude allowed units to take advantage of fleeting opportunities and local successes.”

Vandergriff (2018) goes on to identify three virtues that German officers required: “knowledge, independence, and the joy of taking responsibility.” These virtues are expressed in Innere Führung, which the German Major General Werner Widder (2002) describes as leadership and civic education and is the foundation of the relationship between the individual soldier and society.

Thus, Vandergriff’s virtues not only describe the character of German officers but makes Auftragstaktik a natural corollary instead of a forced doctrine: German professionalism implies mission command, but not necessarily the reverse.

Self-defense forces have adopted Auftragstaktik out of necessity: their members are not professional warfighters, and they sometimes operate out of contact with their leaders for extended periods of time. In the absence of orders, the individual knows what to do: locate, close with, and destroy the enemy, and break his stuff. This is the exact opposite of what the Ukrainian sailors were doing.

The relation of culture and supporting leadership style in corporations parallels that in military or semi-military organizations: cultures of trust imply certain types of leadership styles, and when there is no trust, another leadership style is needed. The major difference between the corporations and the military organizations is the price for getting the culture and consequent leadership style wrong, and the speed at which that price is paid.

References

Bowen, A. (2024). "Russian Military Performance and Outlook." Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12606

Goetsch, D. L. & Davis, S. B. (2021). Quality management for organizational excellence: Introduction to total quality (9^th ed.). Pearson.

n.a. (2024). "Oleksandr Syrskyi shifts Ukrainian military leadership to vertical approach." New Voice of Ukraine. https://english.nv.ua/nation/new-ukraine-s-armed-forces-chief-changed-the-command-process-of-the-army-50431480.html

Vandergriff, D. E. (21 June 2018). “How the Germans defined Auftragstaktik: What mission command is – and – is not” Small Wars Journal. https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/how-germans-defined-auftragstaktik-what-mission-command-and-not

VICE News. (2014, March 16). Ukrainian Troops Speak Out: Russian Roulette in Ukraine [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GH3HGvZlhhk

VICE News. (2014, March 22). Taking over a Ukrainian Base: Russian Roulette in Ukraine [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tBLs_AsBtjg

Widder, W. (2002). “Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung: Trademarks of German leadership” Military Review, September-October 2002. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot-Spots/docs/MC/MR-Sep-Oct-2002-Widder.pdf

Prussia's Use of Railways

Introduction

Europe in the Nineteenth Century was in flux: Napoleon Bonaparte’s star was in descent, and the Industrial Revolution was beginning to yield technical advances. This paper investigates how Europe’s armies adapted to this fluid situation.

We begin by considering how various European armies emulated the Grande Armeé under Napoleon, and how theoreticians analyzed his logistics systems.

Next, we examine how Prussia prepared for future wars and started to utilize railroads for military purposes. Leading the way in the latter was Friedrich List[1], a German economist who proposed that a network of railways could allow troops to concentrate over vast distances, and Helmuth von Moltke, who would later become the First Chief of the German General Staff.

Two campaigns of the Prussian army are then surveyed. As Moltke wrote, “no plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force,” and these two campaigns are examined with an eye to the logistics failures that were encountered. The commonalities of these difficulties are listed, and we conclude with a note that these types of failures continue to the present day.

Graf Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800 - 1891) in full uniform of a Generalfeldmarschall of Prussia

European Armies After Napoleon

Armies were trying to duplicate logistical aspects of the Grande Armeé even before Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo. For example, the Austrian army limited the amount of baggage authorized in 1799-1800 and again after the Austrian defeat at the Battle of Austerlitz. As a result, the Austrian army was able to match the Grande Armeé’s marching performance in 1809[2].

Not everyone was seeking to emulate the Grande Armeé, however. The two primary critics of Napoleon were André de Roginat and Carl von Clausewitz.

André de Roginat argued[3] that Napoleon paid insufficient attention to lines of communication during his campaigns. While de Roginat believed that penetration deep into enemy territory could be successful when executed by small armies, he maintained that large armies faced problems due to their great need for subsistence, ammunition, and replacements. These problems forced the large invading army to live off the land, which resulted in desertions, indiscipline, and conflicts with the local population. De Roginat went as far as labeling the Austerlitz Campaign the “height of madness” due to the number of deaths by starvation, even though Austerlitz was Napoleon’s most successful campaign.

De Roginat proposed[4] an alternative to Napoleon’s reliance on magazines, requisitioning, and living off the land: the army was to be loaded with 8 days’ provisions and advance 30 to 40 leagues (90 to 120 miles). They would stop, take stock, then wait for the Armeé de Reserve to arrive. Stores would be accumulated, and a new base would be established. Once this was all complete, the process would repeat.

Von Clausewitz’s criticisms[5] were less specific. He acknowledged the speed of Napoleon’s troop movements and argued that the need to requisition supplies could cause delays comparable to those in a base supply system. He believed that the requisition system became more advantageous for longer distances, noting that war conducted by requisitions was superior to one by magazines.

Russians implemented reforms favoring requisitions starting in 1812, but commanders were unable or unwilling to follow, resulting in “much suffering” during the campaigns of 1828-1829 (against Turkey) and 1831 (against Poland). Russia introduced “ambulant magazines” in 1846 and established trains of bakeries and butcheries. These proved ineffective during the Crimean War of 1853-1856, and the result was “innumerable carcasses of men and horses lined the routes to Bulgaria and Sebastopol.”[6]

Prussia Prepares for War

Van Creveld describes Prussia’s logistics system as “sketchy” from 1814-1815[7]. There was no formal body of train officers until 1816, and even then, a body of NCOs was established. This remained until Wilhelm of Prussia wrote that logistics was the weakest part of the Prussian army. Reforms were initiated in 1853 to bolster the train system. This included designating a staff officer in each corps to create a “nuclei” of train personnel that would train 14 days per year. In 1856, these “nuclei” were expanded into battalions consisting of five provision columns, a field bakery, one main hospital, and four field hospitals.

As all this was happening, a product of the Industrial Age was making its debut: the railroad. The Prussian military was initially hesitant to use railroads, their hesitation being rooted in the fear that “good communications only made a country easier to overrun.”[8] The army even opposed commercial railroads. The Prussians took interest in railroads in 1848-1849 when moving troops by road became unsafe, for whatever reason.

In 1859, the first Eisenbahntruppe formation was established to make minor railroad repairs and to build small bridges, leaving larger work to civilian experts. They were expected to guard the rails was well as restore them; the task of guarding the rail was taken away from them in 1866.[9]

The importance of railroads became painfully apparent to Moltke as Austria was amassing forces along the border in 1866. Prussia was slow to mobilize due to Bismarck’s desire to avoid limiting diplomatic options until the last moment[10]. The five railways to the front allowed Moltke to rapidly deliver three Prussian armies and their supplies to the front. This arrangement worked well for Moltke, who had an unusual working definition of “concentration of forces”: concentration was “achieved not when men and units stood shoulder to shoulder on a given spot, but when the distance between units permitted their concentric cooperation and mutual support.” [11]

Prussian Campaign of 1866

As part of the Austro-Prussian War (also called the Seven Weeks War), the Prussian Campaign of 1866 revealed many problems in the train company organization[12]. Supply trains had to share the roads with infantry, cavalry, and artillery columns, with supply trains given lowest priority. Supply trains were thus separated from the troops they were supposed to supply. Further, unauthorized vehicles joined the supply trains, and individual vehicles rested on the roads, thus blocking them. Congestion became acute in defiles and other narrow passages.

In parallel with utilizing supply trains, the Prussians also employed railroads during this campaign. As mentioned above, Prussia was late in mobilizing but compensated for this by utilizing all five railways leading to the frontier. This enabled deployment along a 200-mile arc, giving rise to Moltke’s innovative “strategy of external lines,” a decentralized approach to maneuvering multiple armies toward a unified goal[13].

This campaign encountered significant logistical hurdles, particularly the “last mile” problem: while transporting supplies to railheads was efficient, distributing them from there to the troops proved far more challenging. To address this, Moltke brought his railway expert, Von Wartensleben, into the field, a decision that inadvertently stripped the supply system of centralized oversight. Without direction, corps quartermasters flooded the railheads with excessive supplies, sending forward vast quantities that overwhelmed the endpoints.

This lack of coordination led to severe congestion, with 17,900 tons of supplies trapped on the railway lines, unable to move forward or back. Rail cars, intended for transport, became makeshift storage units, causing bread to go stale, fodder to rot, and horses to starve as troops advanced beyond the reach of their lagging supply convoys. The breakdown exposed the limitations of relying heavily on railways without solving the final distribution stage. Van Creveld argues that, despite Prussia’s extensive use of rail, it did not significantly influence the campaign’s progress, as the system faltered under pressure. Compounding the issue, Prussian forces could not utilize Austrian railways, which were strategically blocked by fortresses, further limiting their logistical flexibility.

The Campaign of 1870 of the Franco-Prussian War

During the Campaign of 1870, the Prussians (now called Germans because of the unification) continued to use railroads, though they faced an opponent with a more advanced railway system. The French railway[14] was widely considered superior to Germany’s due to its purposeful strategic design, prioritizing military utility over commercial interests. In contrast to Germany’s "geometric network" of north-south and east-west lines, the French system featured lines running parallel to the frontier, connecting the major forts and forming a complex web of routes extending from a central hub. This configuration offered significant military flexibility, facilitating swift troop and supply movements along fortified borders and throughout the country. By focusing on defense and mobilization rather than compass directions, France gained a clear logistical advantage.

Still, Moltke was able to penetrate hundreds of miles into enemy territory. Prussian forces encountered similar problems to the Campaign of 1866: suppliers rushed materials forward without considering the unloading stations’ capacity to manage them. A shortage of unloaders, combined with the inability of the army’s horse-drawn transport columns to clear accumulating stock, exacerbated the problem. Local commanders worsened the situation by commandeering railway wagons to serve as temporary storage, leading to trains being backed up for hundreds of miles. To mitigate this, Moltke instructed his commanders to deploy cavalry to seize French wagons and locomotives, though these efforts were hampered by sabotage, further disrupting operations.

By the war’s end, the Prussians captured and operated 2,300 miles of French track.[15] This railway operation was marked by chaos, including frequent crashes, derailments, and even trains plunging into the Meuse River. These incidents stemmed from poor maintenance and the Germans’ lack of experience with the French railway system.

As a side note: just as the Campaign of 1866 inspired Moltke’s external lines strategy, the Campaign of 1870 inspired[16] Moltke’s Auftragstaktik, a command-and-control style that focuses on individual initiative. This is similar to the U.S. military’s concept of mission command but differs in that Auftragstaktik is based on the virtues of “knowledge, independence, and the joy of taking responsibility.”[17]

Common Failures

Despite the four years between the two campaigns, and even though railroads became more common, the same problems were encountered and remained unsolved.

The first difficulty encountered was the problem of unloading - how to rapidly remove supplies from a rail car? The standard way was to unload cargo from the side. The Prussian army experimented with wooden ramps to unload them from the rear instead of the side.[18]

Next, there is the problem of one-way tracks. Track can only have one train operating on it in a single section, and this entailed either having the tracks arranged in loops; or that trains could operate only as shuttles with loading and unloading at the ends of the segments; or that side rails be built to allow trains to pass each other; or that only one train was permitted to use the entire rail line. The latter is the most impractical approach. Unfortunately, Van Creveld does not indicate which method was adopted.

Breakdowns along the rail were a real possibility and were addressed by Moltke in his reforms of 1859 that created the Eisenbahntruppe. There was also the problem of sabotage. To address this, Moltke had hostages carried along in the locomotives to dissuade saboteurs.[19]

Then there is the problem of congestion. Breakdowns and sabotage accounted for some congestion, but the fundamental source is that more supplies were being sent than the transport method (train rails) or destination (railhead) could manage. Congestion can be mitigated by having the railhead signal to the rear the quantity of supplies they can manage. It isn’t clear what forms of communication existed along any individual line of Prussian military rail, but at the time couriers and semaphores were used and telegraphs were coming into use. The simplest form of communication – sending messages back to the rear carried by the railroad engineers – would have helped.

Finally, there is the “last mile problem.” This is a term from information technology and transportation logistics that describes how the delivery of goods or services becomes extremely difficult or expensive as the package nears its destination. In the situations encountered in the two campaigns discussed here, the last mile problem was exacerbated by the fact that the destinations are troops, and they are constantly in motion.

Conclusions

All the difficulties encountered during the two campaigns, especially the problem of congestion and the last mile problem, are still with us today. Anyone who drives during rush hour has encountered congestion; anyone whose plane had to circle an airport instead of landing has encountered congestion. The fact that delivering supplies to a distribution center takes a few large trucks, while getting packages to a customer’s home takes many delivery vans is an example of the last mile problem.

In a sense, Moltke made contact with universal phenomena, problems that the transition from supply trains to railroads did not solve, problems that continue to this day. Van Creveld discredits Moltke’s optimism for railways, stating that promised supplies didn’t catch up to the troops until after the major battles were won. During the Campaign of 1866, for example, the supply trains fell behind the troops on 29 June and did not catch up with them until after the Battle of Königgrätz was fought and won on 3 July 1866[20]. What Van Creveld misses, though, is that railways allowed for rapid concentration of troops and supplies before fighting began in both campaigns. He also underappreciated how, under Moltke, the Prussians captured and operated 2,300 miles of French track. Moltke was thus able to use the enemy’s own resources against itself.

Endnotes

[1] Lechner.
[2] Van Creveld, p. 75.
[3] Ibid, p. 75.
[4] Ibid, p. 76.
[5] Ibid, p. 76.
[6] Ibid, p. 77.
[7] Ibid, p. 77.
[8] Ibid, p. 82.
[9] Ibid, p. 91-92.
[10] Showalter, p. 63.
[11] Ibid, p. 62.
[12] Van Creveld, p. 80.
[13] Ibid, p. 84.
[14] Ibid, p. 86.
[15] Ibid, p. 96.
[16] Coumbe, p. 92-95.
[17] Vandergriff.
[18] Ibid, p. 83.
[19] Ibid, p. 96.
[20] Ibid, p. 80.

Bibliography

Coumbe, A. “Operational Command in the Franco-Prussian War.” U.S. Army War College, 1991. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA527978.pdf

Lechner, J. “Developments in Logistics after Napoleon.” [Video], n/d. https://libertyuniversity.instructure.com/courses/764197/pages/watch-developments-in-logistics-after-napoleon?module_item_id=83250132

Showalter, D. “Mass Multiplied by Impulsion: The Influence of Railroads on Prussian Planning for the Seven Weeks' War.” Military Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Apr. 1974), pp. 62-67. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1987237

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Vandergriff, D. “How the Germans defined Auftragstaktik: What mission command is – and – is not.” Small Wars Journal, 21 June 2018. https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/how-germans-defined-auftragstaktik-what-mission-command-and-not

The Opposite of Good Leadership

Military structures vary widely in how they empower — or fail to empower — their troops. While some forces cling to rigid, top-down command styles rooted in centralized control, others embrace a decentralized approach that unleashes the initiative of individual soldiers. This contrast is starkly evident when comparing the Soviet-influenced militaries of Russia and Ukraine with the principles of mission command, such as the German Auftragstaktik. The difference isn’t just theoretical — it’s a matter of battlefield outcomes.

Demoralized Ukranian Troops During the Occupation of Crimea
Image from "Ukrainian Troops Speak Out: Russian Roulette in Ukraine" (VICE News, March 16, 2014)

Empowerment is something that is not practiced in all militaries. Consider the Russian military: according to (Bowen, 2024), "the Russian military continues to operate with a Soviet-style centralized command. This command style at the tactical level often has contributed to the types of inflexible operations that contributed to previous failures and casualties."

Ukraine was a satellite of the USSR for years and apparently maintains a similar approach. Oleksandr Syrskyi, the current Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has a "preference for a tightly controlled leadership structure that favors loyalty and personal closeness over purely professional criteria" (n.a., 2024).

The consequences of this centralized command was demonstrated in Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014: interviews (VICE News, March 22, 2014) with Ukrainian sailors (VICE News, March 16, 2014) showed them to be demoralized and directionless when one of their commanders defected to Russia and the government in Ukraine was in disarray.

The opposite of this is mission command or what the Germans call Auftragstaktik (Widder, 2002). These two styles of command are not exactly the same (Klepper, 2024), but in both, the commander specifies the mission and timeframe, and the way to accomplish this is left to the individual troop's initiative. In the absence of orders, the troop knows what to do: locate, close with, and destroy the enemy, and break his stuff. This is the exact opposite of what the Ukrainian sailors were doing.

References

Bowen, A. (2024). "Russian Military Performance and Outlook." Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12606

Klepper, M. (2024). American Mission Command vs German Auftragstaktik. The Other Side of History Blog. https://the-other-side-of-history.blogspot.com/2024/01/american-mission-command-vs-german.html

n.a. (2024). "Oleksandr Syrskyi shifts Ukrainian military leadership to vertical approach." New Voice of Ukraine. https://english.nv.ua/nation/new-ukraine-s-armed-forces-chief-changed-the-command-process-of-the-army-50431480.html

VICE News. (2014, March 16). Ukrainian Troops Speak Out: Russian Roulette in Ukraine [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GH3HGvZlhhk

VICE News. (2014, March 22). Taking over a Ukrainian Base: Russian Roulette in Ukraine [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tBLs_AsBtjg

Widder, W. (2002). “Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung: Trademarks of German leadership” Military Review, September-October 2002. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot-Spots/docs/MC/MR-Sep-Oct-2002-Widder.pdf

On a Conceptual Model of Military Leadership

Introduction

A conceptual model is an abstract representation of a complex idea stripped of inessential details so that key elements are revealed. This paper looks at a conceptual model of military leadership proposed in (Catino, n.d.). We begin by attempting to define leadership at an appropriate level of abstraction. Next, four traits that a military leader should have according to this conceptual model are examined. Finally, we describe a situation containing an ineffable quality missed by conceptual models.

Definitions of Leadership

Some partial definitions of leadership at a level of abstraction appropriate for a conceptual model include:

1. "Leadership is to give purpose." This is overly broad, and the connection to a mission is not clear.
2. “I need living companions, who will follow me because they want to follow themselves — and to the place where I will.” This is from Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 1883). The part about "following themselves" means that those being led have certain abilities they want to exercise – just as a painter wants to paint or a boxer wants to box, a warrior wants to fight. Following a leader allows them to exercise that ability.
3. "To influence or direct others to accomplish a mission that is set before you." This is better but requires the leader to accomplish only one goal.
4. To correct this deficiency, this can be modified as follows: "To influence or direct others to complete a mission that is set before you, and then build upon the results of that accomplishment."

Essential Traits from a Conceptual Model

The “7-C” conceptual model of military leadership from (Catino, n.d.) lists the following traits: Christ, conviction, competency, community, conflict, communication, and character. While all these are important, I believe that the four most essential traits for a leadership model are character, competency, communication, and conviction.

Character - these are virtues that a leader must possess. The USMC lists 14 leadership virtues in their "JJ DID TIE BUCKLE" acronym: justice, judgement, dependability, initiative, decisiveness, tact, integrity, enthusiasm, bearing, unselfishness, courage, knowledge, loyalty, and endurance (USMC, 2016, p. 2-4). By having these virtues, an individual becomes a leader worth following.

Competency - competency in a leader is not just mastery of relevant technical skills but also the ability to rapidly make decisions in high-stress situations. This instills trust in leadership. Further, the leader expects his followers to be competent and will mentor the followers, teaching and transferring those skills to the followers. All this is covered under USMC's traits of knowledge, judgement, integrity, bearing, decisiveness, and initiative.

Communication – communication is the ability to clearly and concisely express intent and objectives to those being led. Communication works in both directions, and it is necessary for a leader to understand what his followers report, resolve any ambiguities, and other purposes. Communication extends beyond immediate subordinates since communication is necessary to report status and progress to people higher in the chain of command. This allows for coordinated action and unity of effort.

Conviction - conviction is a firmly held belief or faith that a goal or mission is justified, and that the leader’s team can accomplish it. Conviction in a leader rallies the followers and fosters a sense of unity. Conviction is different from stubbornness since conviction can change with compelling evidence and can adapt to evolving conditions. Conviction would fall under the USMC's courage, justice, knowledge, and endurance virtues.

Conclusion - The Man in the Arena

Those traits are necessary but not sufficient for a complete conceptual model of military leadership, I believe.

Consider Teddy Roosevelt's "man in the arena" metaphor (Roosevelt, 1910). Character and competency are necessary to inspire men to follow you. Communication is what is needed to tell them they're about to enter the arena and what their mission is. Conviction is the belief that it is worthwhile to enter the arena and that there's a reasonable chance of success.

Entering the arena requires courage, but what about conduct within that arena?

From limited personal experience it is as if a switch has been flipped, and confidence and habit are replaced by mastery and aggression; the desire for success is replaced by the need to dominate. It's not clear whether or how this joie de guerre is covered by the enthusiasm listed in the JJ DID TIE BUCKLE acronym.

References

Catino, M. S. (n. d.). Military Leadership: A Conceptual Model. [Video] https://libertyuniversity.instructure.com/courses/743862/pages/watch-military-leadership-a-conceptual-model

Nietzsche, F. (1883). Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. (T. Common, tr.) https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1998/pg1998-images.html

Roosevelt, T. (1910, April 23). "Citizenship in a Republic." Theodore Roosevelt Center at Dickinson State University. https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Learn-About-TR/TR-Encyclopedia/Culture-and-Society/Man-in-the-Arena.aspx

U.S. Marine Corps. (2016). Leading Marines. (MCWP 6-10) https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/LLI/MLD/Fidelity/Leading%20Marines%20MCWP%206-10.pdf?ver=2018-09-26-095807-367

Military Leadership: A Conceptual Model

Definitions of Leadership

Here are some partial definitions of leadership:

1. "Leadership is to give purpose" - very broad, and the connection to goal or mission is not clear.
2. “I need living companions, who will follow me because they want to follow themselves — and to the place where I will”. This is from Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The part about "following themselves" means that those being led have certain abilities they want to exercise - a painter wants to paint, a boxer wants to box, warrior wants to fight. Following a leader allows them to exercise that ability.
3. "To influence or direct others to accomplish a goal that set before you." This is better but requires the leader to accomplish only one goal.
4. To correct this deficiency, this can be modified as follows: "To influence or direct others to accomplish a goal that set before you, and then build upon the results of that accomplishment."

Conceptual Model

Major characteristics of military leadership include:

• Character - these are virtues that a leader must possess. The USMC lists 14 leadership traits in their "JJ DID TIE BUCKLE" acronym: justice, judgement, dependability, initiative, decisiveness, tact, integrity, enthusiasm, bearing, unselfishness, courage, knowledge, loyalty, and endurance.
• Competency - this is covered under USMC's traits of knowledge, judgement, integrity, bearing, decisiveness, and initiative.
• Communication - the ability to clearly and concisely express intent to those being led, and convince them of the importance of a goal or mission.
• Conviction - this is a firmly held belief or faith that a goal or mission is just and that your team can accomplish it. This would maybe fall under the USMC's courage, justice, knowledge, and endurance traits.

Those virtues are necessary but not sufficient for a complete conceptual model military leadership, I believe.

Consider Teddy Roosevelt's "man in the arena" metaphor. Character and competency are necessary to inspire men to follow you. Communication is what is needed to tell them they're about to enter the arena and what their mission is. Conviction is the belief that that there's a reasonable chance of success in that arena.

Entering the arena requires courage, but what about conduct within that arena?

From limited personal experience it is as if a switch has been flipped, and confidence and habit are replaced by mastery and aggression; the desire for success is replaced by the need for dominate. It's not clear whether or how this joie de guerre fits into the usual list of virtues.

References

N/A. MCRP 6-11B (with Change 1): Marine Corps Values: A User's Guide for Discussion Leaders. 20 October 1998. Retrieved 9 August 2024 from https://www.fitness.marines.mil/Portals/211/Docs/FFI/MCRP%206-11B%20%20W%20CH%201%20Marine%20Corps%20Values_A%20User's%20Guide%20for%20Discussion%20Leaders.pdf

Nietzsche, F. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. (T. Common, tr.) Retrieved 9 August 2024 from https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1998/pg1998-images.html

Roosevelt, T. "Citizenship in a Republic." 23 April 1910. Retrieved 9 August 2024 from https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Learn-About-TR/TR-Encyclopedia/Culture-and-Society/Man-in-the-Arena.aspx

Comparing Effective Military and Civilian Intelligence Teams

Introduction

The following notes are based on my experiences and observations while working to document and limit the damage caused by Antifa during the fiery but mostly peaceful riots of the 2020 “Summer of Love.” I participated in three “operations”:

1. Tracking the evolution of CHAZ/CHOP in Seattle, Washington
2. Tracking the riots in Philadelphia
3. Tracking a major Antifa/BLM protest in one of the suburbs of Philadelphia

These operations contained elements of military intelligence, police investigation, private investigation, and corporate competitor analysis but do not fit easily into any one of those categories. However, there is much in common with military intelligence when it comes to building an effective team to monitor those riots.

The organization and processes described here are not limited to monitoring Antifa but are also applicable to the investigation of child predators and human traffickers.

The purpose here is to examine how these civilian intelligence teams operate, with the long-term goal of adapting the aspects that make military intelligence teams effective to these civilian analogs.

Goal of an Effective Intelligence Team

The goal of an effective intelligence team is to develop relevant, accurate, timely, and actionable information. This goal is realized by three “information paths” within the team:

1. Incoming data (raw and unverified – could be called “pre-intelligence”)
2. Analyses by individuals and teams to convert this data into intelligence (verify, deconflict, and determine significance)
3. “Upward” movement as intelligence is organized and unified with other sources and becomes actionable.

These aren’t one-way paths, however – there must be a cycle that starts with evaluating a piece of information’s accuracy, classifying it according to relevance, and using that intel to drive follow-up investigations.

Qualities of Good Intelligence Team Members

Besides initiative, the most important quality that all team members must have is a sense of objectivity, which means that the team member:

• Can distinguish reality from hearsay and from political bias
• Can judge the quality of incoming data
• Is self-aware enough to know what he/she does not know
• Has a bearing of “effective professionalism”

A skill any analyst must possess is the ability to translate intelligence goals into relevant collection and analysis tasks. This doesn’t come naturally to many people and must be developed through experience and mentorship.

The team member must possess appropriate technical skills, such as using GIS, working with OSINT sources, having the ability to infiltrate, etc. Infiltration (either physical or on-line) is not something everyone is willing to do and requires the ability to be inconspicuous while still making important observations. We found that for best results – in general and not just for infiltration - the team member’s skills and interests must be matched to his role.

Finally, team members must understand and practice excellent OPSEC. This need was demonstrated when one of the teams tracking the riots in Philadelphia (not mine!) decided to live-stream their operations on YouTube. This allowed Antifa supporters to locate the exact hotel room from which they were operating in under 30 minutes.

Leader’s Role

The leader of an intelligence team must be able to identify intelligence gaps and set goals to fill those gaps, and clearly communicate those goals to the analysts. He must prevent team members from “going down the wrong rabbit holes” – performing investigations on topics or individuals not clearly related to the goals. He must act as a sounding board while providing analysts with a healthy dose of skepticism when appropriate.

The leader must be able to package-up the results of the team into recommendations and supporting documents for action by the relevant authorities. In the case of Antifa, child predators, or human traffickers, those authorities are law enforcement agencies.

Leadership Style

The sociologist Douglas McGregor described two broad styles of leadership, which he labeled Theory X (lack of trust in subordinates which leads to micromanagement) and Theory Y (confidence in subordinate’s ability to be self-motivated)¹. McGregor recommends Theory Y, though it can devolve into “servant leadership.”

A different way of looking at Theory Y are the leadership styles known as "mission command" and the older German concept of "Auftragstaktik." Mission command has officially been a part of the US military command doctrine since the 1980s, though was practiced much earlier², and states that a good commander sets the mission and constraints (e.g. time bounds), and lets subordinates choose the means to accomplish the mission. Auftragstaktik³ is broader and more fundamental than mission command because it is a type of military professionalism based on three virtues: “knowledge, independence, and the joy of taking responsibility.” Mission command can thus be seen as a corollary of Auftragstaktik.

Mission command and Auftragstaktik are both excellent and appropriate styles for leading effective intelligence teams, either civilian or military.

Establishing a Team

Once a group of individuals comes together to perform intelligence activities, and after basic groundwork (meeting times, communication methods, etc.) is laid, there are three tasks that must be performed: creating an area study, identifying and developing information sources, and making contacts with law enforcement.

An area study is packaged information about the team’s geographical area of interest. Besides physical aspects (physical terrain, weather, transportation systems, and critical infrastructure), the area study must include economic, political, and cultural factors (businesses, governance, law enforcement and security agencies, and political leanings). Finally, it must include a threat overview - in this case that would be information about the local Antifa members and activities. This will involve performing a RAFT (relationships, actors, functions, tensions) analysis⁴ on Antifa.

One assumption commonly made when doing an area study is that the adversary’s command structure lies within the area of interest. Groups such as Antifa are decentralized organizations, and human traffickers are sometimes trans-national, so a RAFT analysis not constrained by geographic area is an invaluable supplement to the traditional area study.

Certain aspects of the area study will stay constant (e.g. physical terrain) whereas others (e.g. Antifa membership) will change, sometimes rapidly, and it is important to update the area study as needed.

The new team must also identify and develop information sources. For direct human sources this includes recruiting and vetting informants, determining their accuracy and reliability, and “handling.” There are also tasks needed for indirect sources: finding mainstream media news sources and online video streams that provide on-the-spot coverage, locating and infiltrating relevant chat rooms and other messaging systems, etc. Even GIS requires setup: for example, finding and importing the correct map layers for some geographic information systems can be an involved process.

Social media is yet another source of information. Antifa members like to announce their proclivities, the larger the forum the better. Once an Antifa member’s account is located on a social media platform, it is easy to find his/her followers and monitor their posts. This is very valuable, and for remote intel operations it is one of the few available roads to inside information.

In anticipating the creation of actionable information, it is necessary to identify the consumers, those who will act on that information (after they perform their own analysis), and this usually means law enforcement agencies. Given the “hands off” approach many law enforcement agencies and district attorneys take with Antifa, it may be necessary to “shop around” to find the proper consumer. Prosecuting child predators is something most law enforcement agencies are willing to do; the record on human trafficking seems to be mixed.

Specialized Intelligence Teams

There are types of military intelligence teams, such as Female Engagement Teams, Culture Support Teams, Human Terrain Teams, and High Value Target Teams, that use specialized approaches when confronting adversaries.

Human Terrain Teams

Human Terrain Teams consist of sociologists and cultural anthropologists used to advise military personnel on social norms and taboos within a target population⁵. There really is no civilian analog to HTTs – private or police investigators cannot afford to maintain a staff of social scientists, and any attempt to provide cultural interpretations of events involving child predators or human traffickers is nothing but rationalizing evil.

The other types of teams do have certain parallels in civilian intelligence operations.

Female Engagement Teams

In conflict zones in which women are marginalized, like in Afghanistan, Female Engagement Teams (FETs) were used to gain the trust and confidence of Afghani women⁶. They were initially controversial because they involved putting female soldiers or Marines into combat situations. The effectiveness of FETs and the related Culture Support Teams were brought into question because the FET were not able to maintain prolonged contact with the female population of any particular village⁷. Further, FETs required a male contingency to provide security.

In civilian and law enforcement intelligence teams, women can play several specialized roles. In child predator stings, they can serve as “prey,” specifically in the time immediately prior to in-person contact by the predators. In operations to disrupt human trafficking or prostitution rings, women go undercover with the goals of observing and recording evidence of wrongdoings by the ring leaders, and (maybe) getting prostitutes to disaffect.

These civilian and law enforcement intelligence operations are more successful than FETs for several reasons: first, limited time of contact is not an issue with child predator or human trafficking operations – contact is maintained only as long as it is needed to catch the predator or disrupt the traffickers; there is no need to maintain contact in perpetuity. Second, there is no need to provide ongoing security by male team members - security is supplied only as-needed.

Another reason for the success of undercover female officers is their expected behavior while undercover: by their actions, undercover officers seek to raise standards by eliminating criminals, and there is no attempt to be “culturally sensitive” to the predators and traffickers. The same cannot be said for FET members – their presence is designed to minimize “cultural threat” while still hoping to win female hearts and minds. This was demonstrated by the requirements that FET members have male escorts and that they always keep their heads covered.

High-value Target Teams

High-value Target Teams (HTTs) are interagency operations that use network-based targeting, combine intelligence with operational capability, and employ counterterrorist and counterinsurgency methodologies in unison. The idea is to use intelligence to find leaders (high-value individuals) in the insurgency network, and then target them with sufficient force and accuracy so that they are eliminated while isolating peaceful civilians from the effects of the elimination⁸. This tactic was credited for success in Iraq in 2007-2008 – by eliminating the most powerful insurgents, the civilian authorities gained the time needed to establish themselves and to dominate the less powerful insurgents.

There is no direct analog of HTTs in civilian intelligence operations, simply because either the operational capability is separated from the intelligence capacity, or (as in situations described above where district attorneys are sympathetic with Antifa) the operational capability is completely absent. There are a few similarities between HTTs and civilian intelligence teams, however. The most obvious one is that both analyze their adversaries’ networks to identify leaders and to seek and exploit vulnerabilities. The other similarities mostly lie in the factors determining team success. In particular, civilian teams are small, have common purpose, are not divided by loyalties to outside agencies.

Comparison and Conclusions

Military and civilian intelligence teams share the goal of gathering valuable, timely, and actionable information about their adversaries. They both use methodologies such as RAFT analysis to organize that information and derive additional intel from it. They face the same problems – vetting sources, distinguishing false leads from actual evidence, identifying intel gaps, contending with rapidly changing intel priorities, maintaining OPSEC, and so on.

Both types of teams have similar organizations (both in terms of personnel and information flows), and their success depends on the effective leadership of competent and enthusiastic team members.

They face similar adversaries: during the GWOT, military intel teams were tasked with gathering information about Islamic extremists; civilian intel teams are needed to gather info on Antifa, child predators, and human traffickers. All these enemies have either no leaders or have a decentralized organization. They are also located and operate within the common population, and so they can “blend in.”

The similarities end there.

Military intelligence teams have the advantage when it comes to available information and resources. Civilian intel teams are limited to OSINT, IMINT, and limited forms of geospatial intelligence. Military intel teams are capable of all that plus SIGINT, MASINT, etc.

Military intelligence teams and civilian intel teams differ in that the former are part of a larger organization (the U.S. military) that legally can and oftentimes does act based on the recommendations from their intel teams. Civilian intel teams are not part of a larger organization, and many district attorneys support and cover for Antifa and similar groups.

Another difference is the quantity of information that is available to each – military intel teams must contend with information overload. Civil intel teams scramble for each bit of knowledge, so in that they are like private investigators. The only situation where the volume of information is remotely comparable is with the firehose of information available from social networks.

Perhaps the most important difference between military intelligence teams and the type of teams described here is that the former is a profession. It has a shared body of knowledge; various schools such as the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC) and the United States Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) transmit that knowledge; and it has fictional heroes such as James Bond, Jason Bourne, Ethan Hunt, and even Sterling Archer, to inspire people to enter that vocation. In short, military intelligence has a culture.

Civilian teams have none of that – they come together in an impromptu manner, they must invent/discover the tradecraft needed to accomplish their goals, then they disband only to be reinvented when another group of agitators gains momentum – Hamas protesters, anyone? The closest thing to being an exception are individuals and teams that hunt for child predators and human traffickers. They mostly operate using sting operations, and while the results of these operations are popularized, the implementation details best remain trade secrets. Other than this limited exception, civilian intelligence teams have no means of transmitting their experience, or creating a body of knowledge, or building a culture. It is not a profession, it is an avocation.

Which is the superior institution? In combat situations, military intelligence teams have the wherewithal and experience to be extremely effective. In riot control and law enforcement situations, civilian intelligence teams are better in at least one aspect: it is more difficult to turn civilian intel teams inwards towards mass surveillance.

2020 Antifa/BLM Riots. Kerem Yucel/AFP via Getty Images

Footnotes

1. Mind Tools Content Team, “Theory X and Theory Y: Understanding Peoples’ Motivations.”
2. Andrew Kiser, Mission Command: The Historical Roots of Mission Command in the US Army.
3. Donald Vandergriff, “How the Germans defined Auftragstaktik”
4. Dale Eikmeier, “Design for Napoleon’s Corporal”
5. Ben Connable, “Human Terrain System is Dead, Long Live … What?”
6. Megan Katt, “Blurred Lines: Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan”
7. Ibid.
8. Christopher Lamb & Evan Munsing, “Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation”

Bibliography

Connable, B. “Human Terrain System is Dead, Long Live … What?” Military Review, January-February 2018. Retrieved 25 April 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/Human-Terrain-System-is-Dead-Long-Live-What

Eikmeier, D. “Design for Napoleon’s Corporal.” Small Wars Journal, 27 September 2010. Last retrieved on 25 April 2024 from https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/557-eikmeier.pdf

Kiser, A. J. Mission command: The historical roots of mission command in the US Army. Defense Technical Information Center, May 2015. Last retrieved on 24 April 2024 from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1001514.pdf

Lamb, C. & Munsing, E. “Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Perspectives, No. 4, 2011. Retrieved on 24 April 2024 from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-4.pdf

Mind Tools Content Team. “Theory X and Theory Y: Understanding Peoples’ Motivations.” Mind Tools website, N/D. Retrieved on 25 April 2024 from https://www.mindtools.com/adi3nc1/theory-x-and-theory-y

Vandergriff, D. E. “How the Germans defined Auftragstaktik: What mission command is – and – is not” Small Wars Journal, 21 June 2018. Retrieved 25 April 2024 from https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how-germans-defined-auftragstaktik-what-mission-command-and-not

American Mission Command vs German Auftragstaktik

When considering the role that command philorophies played in the Battle of France, one must ask if our current concept of mission command matches Germany’s Auftragstaktik?

Taken at face value (commanders specify objective while leaving means up to individuals), mission command is brilliant for skirmishes as performed by the French Maquis and other insurgency forces. The mission goal and timeframe are set by de Gaulle or other distant allied commanders, the maquisards kill the bad guys and break their stuff, while semi-politicians like Jean Moulin endeavored to hold together the non-rural factions (the French Resistance, not the Maquis who operated primarily in rural areas). Given the perhaps romanticized psychology of the Maquis, as well as the necessity for decentralized organization and the faster OODA looping that comes from local control, mission command is a perfect match for them.

Vandergriff (2018) gives a more comprehensive description of Auftragstaktik – instead of focusing on command and control, he describes it primarily as a form of professionalism and cultural philosophy expected of all members of the German Army: “subordinates could be trusted to take the action he thought appropriate, rather than stopping and waiting until contact could be re-established. This aggressive attitude allowed units to take advantage of fleeting opportunities and local successes.”

Vandergriff (2018) goes on to identify three virtues that German officers required: “knowledge, independence, and the joy of taking responsibility.” These virtues are expressed in Innere Führung, which the German Major General Werner Widder (2002) describes as leadership and civic education and is the foundation of the relationship between the individual soldier and society.

Thus, Vandergriff’s virtues not only describe the character of German officers but makes Auftragstaktik a natural corollary instead of a forced doctrine: German professionalism implies mission command, but not necessarily the reverse.

It is interesting to note that while command and control has been official doctrine in the U.S. Army from 1980 (Kiser 2015), a set of corresponding virtues wasn’t released until 2023 in the Air Force’s doctrine on mission command. These virtues - character, competence, capability, cohesion, and capacity (U.S. Air Force, 2023) - show a maturation of U.S. doctrine to something closer to a complete version of Germany’s Auftragstaktik.

References

Kiser, A. J. (May 2015) “Mission command: The historical roots of mission command in the US Army.” Defense Technical Information Center. Last retrieved on 28 January 2024 from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1001514.pdf

U.S. Air Force. (14 August 2023). “Air Force doctrine publication 1-1: Mission Command” Retrieved on 28 January 2024 from https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_1-1/AFDP%201-1%20Mission%20Command.pdf

Vandergriff, D. E. (21 June 2018). “How the Germans defined Auftragstaktik: What mission command is – and – is not” Small Wars Journal. Retrieved 7 April 2025 from https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/how-germans-defined-auftragstaktik-what-mission-command-and-not

Widder, W. (2002). “Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung: Trademarks of German leadership” Military Review, September-October 2002. Retrieved on 28 January 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot-Spots/docs/MC/MR-Sep-Oct-2002-Widder.pdf