In preparation for the D-Day Invasion, the Allies coordinated with the French Resistance to sabotage railways and bridges, along with electrical systems, telephone cables, etc. The purpose of this was to either halt or slow the movement of German troops and supplies into Normandy.
The Normandy Landings occurred on 6 June 1944 and by that time, Normandy was effectively isolated from the Germans. Thus, the only German resistance to the Allies had to come from forces already in place.
After the Landings, the Allies established a lodgment. To begin capturing territory, British forces conducted several operations to fix German forces on the eastern side of the Allied bridgehead. This allowed America's Operation Cobra to create a gap in the German line on the western side of the bridgehead, to break out of Normandy, and this allowed American forces to roll-up German forces as they poured into France starting on 1 August 1944.
How to supply the Allies as they penetrated the French interior? None of the available options seemed workable:
- The bridges and railways taken out couldn't be repaired fast enough
- Supply by air was impractical because airspace was not completely under control of the Allies
- Use of waterways was also impractical because the barges that would be used required rivers with sufficient width and depth. Also, the barges would need docks and cranes for loading and unloading
- Finally, the French roads were not wide enough to support the two-way traffic of large military vehicles.
What was the Red Ball Express?
That other option was a motor transportation operation called the Red Ball Express (RBE). Service began on 25 August 1944 in support of the First and Third Armies. One-way roads were used to solve the problem of narrow roads; these roads were dedicated to RBE traffic and operated on a 24-hour basis.
It was called the "Red Ball Express" because expedited rail freight was marked by red circles. RBE vehicles were also marked in this way.
RBE roads were closed loops that started in St. Lô in Normandy, but sometimes the drivers had to go north to the harbor at Cherbourg.
A variety of trucks used, including flatbeds and 2.5-ton cargo trucks ("deuce and a half"). There were two drivers per truck, and 73% of them were African-Americans. The convoys consisted of a minimum of 25 trucks spaced at 60-yard intervals. At the start and end of the convoy were jeeps that set pace, provided navigation, and (for the trailing jeep) acted as "cleanup."
The convoy's speed limit was set at 25 MPH, though convoys frequently exceeded that speed. While passing through villages, speed was reduced to 10 MPH. The drivers took 10-minute breaks every hour, but those were often skipped. They also took food breaks every 6 hours, lasting 30 minutes.
Once the convoy reached its destination, cargo was often transferred to other trucks for movement to the front.
Besides drivers and truck mechanics, military police were stationed along the route to guide traffic and prevent theft.
Road-Side Maintenance
Becasue of the operational tempo, regular maintenance schedules had to be abandoned. Instead, maintenance was provided in an ad-hoc manner using road-side maintenance stops, offering specialized services such as:
- Check battery
- Check wiring
- Check tires
- Check oil filters
- Check fuel filters
- Clean spark plugs
- Clean air cleaner
- Tighten bolts
- Clean windshield
- Etc.
This list was from a 1944 film produced by the Army Pictorial Service Signal Corps called "Rolling to the Rhine." Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PKRNYKoIEj0
When trucks broke-down, they were moved to the side of the road, allowing the rest of the convoy to pass. Wreckers were dispatched to move the truck to nearest repair station.
- Photo by Lawrence Riordan/U.S. Army, circa 1944.
Expanded Misison and Security Issues
As the Germans were being evicted from France, the front moved eastward, and it was necessary to extend the RBE's routes to Soissons and Verdun. RBE was also instrumental in providing aid to the now-liberated Paris.
Cargo theft was common, with local French stealing cargo, and sometimes the drivers would sell their freight. German POWs were one of the things carried on the return trip, and they would commit sabotage by adding water to the gas cans (jerricans). For these reasons, police were stationed in towns, at maintenance shops, along routes, and at depots.
Statistics
The maximum daily amount of cargo moved was reached on the 4th-5th day of the operation, when 12,300 long tons were delivered, carried by 6000 vehicles. Over the lifetime of the operation, 412,193 long tons were moved forward.
Dunham notes the wide variability of daily shipment.
Comparing RBE with Contemporary Commercial Drivers
Similarities
- Team drivers were used for the same reason: longer distances could be crossed in a single day.
- Both took scheduled food breaks
- Drove predetermined, regular routes, though with commercial drivers it is frequently possible to use alternative routes depending on road conditions.
- Both have on-the-road maintenance shops. For civilian vehicles these are primarily for emergency maintenance, but for RBE vehicles these were often routine maintenance.
- On the return trip, RBE trucks were not necessarily deadheading (backhauling an empty cargo container back to the point of origin.) Instead, they carried POWs, expended artillery casings, empty gas cans (jerricans), and bodies of Americans killed in action.
- Finally, both used escort or pilot vehicles. In civilian sector, these are ordinarily used to flag a wide load, but for RBE there is a security aspect.
Differences
- The primary difference between RBE and professional drivers is that RBE operated in a war zone, which meant higher stress levels and higher caloric expenditure.
- RBE used roads that were dedicated to RBE traffic which were exclusively one-way.
- The quality of the roads that RBE operated upon were significantly lower than what is found on typical modern freeways. This resulted in RBE vehicles being stuck in mud, slipping off road, etc.
- RBE took hourly breaks, which is to be expected when operaring as a driver in a war zone.
- As described above, there was no regular maintenance schedule for RBE vehicles, whereas commercial fleets have in-house maintenance shops that adhere to regular maintenance schedules.
- RBE drivers operated in convoys. This means that vehicles arrived at destination in a particular order, the overall speed of the convoy was determined by the slowest vehicle, etc.
- Finally, the "company" that RBE worked for was the same as the "customer" they supplied – both being the US military. With commercial drivers, the freight company is often different from the owner of the freight being carried. The primary exception to this is Amazon.
End of the Red Ball Express
As Allies consolidated their victory, more efficient logistics systems became available:
- Railways and bridges were repaired
- Ports closer to front were captured, like Antwerp
- POL (petroleum, oils and lubricants) pipeline constructed
- Control of airspace solidified
As these transport modes became available, RBE proved to be cost-prohibitive, and service was ended 16 November 1944. RBE-like operations continued in other parts of France, however.
The XYZ Express
Lessons learned from the RBE were incorporated into similar motor transport operations, the most successful of which was the XYZ Express.
Lasting from 25 March - 31 May 1945, the XYZ Express moved freight from France and Belgium to Allied forces deep inside Germany near the end of the war, sustaining the U.S. Ninth, First, Third, and Seventh Armies. The average daily lift was 12,895 tons, and a total of 871,895 tons of freight were moved over 63 days.
Conclusion
The Red Ball Express was the first use of long-range motor transport to solve the problem of moving supplies to a rapidly advancing front. Subsequent operations later in WWII (and beyond) incorporated some of the lessons learned from the RBE:
- Use shorter routes
- Utilize multiple routes to avoid congestion
- Use Experienced drivers
- More centralized command and control allowed for better scheduling
Bibliography
Atkinson, R. "Operation COBRA and the Breakout at Normandy." U.S. Army, 22 July 2010. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/42658/operation_cobra_and_the_breakout_at_normandy
Bykofsky, J. & Larson, H. The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas. Center for Military History, United States Army, 1990. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://history.army.mil/html/books/010/10-21/CMH_Pub_10-21.pdf
Carey, C. "The Red Ball Express: Past Lessons for Future Wars." Military Review, March-April 2021. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2021/Carey-Red-Ball-Express/
Dunham, E. U.S. Army Transportation in the European Theater of Operations, 1942-1945. Combined Arms Research Library, June 1946. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/5777/
Medford, E. & Frazier, M. ""Keep 'em Rolling" African American Participation in the Red Ball Express." U.S. Army Transportation Corps, December 1993. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://transportation.army.mil/history/studies/red_ball_express.html
