Introduction
Before Operation Barbarossa, the German military was in transition. Adolf Hitler prioritized modernization and mechanization, but the German economy struggled to supply needed critical resources, particularly rubber and oil[1]. Further, logistical organization was fragmented between multiple generals: General Gercke oversaw rail and water transport, while General Wagner managed motor transport, creating inefficiencies. Gercke’s lack of authority over the navy and air force further hindered coordination[2]. These unresolved issues persisted as planning for Operation Barbarossa began.
Planning Problems
Planning for Operation Barbarossa started in August 1940, with two commands — OKH (Army High Command) and OKW (Armed Forces High Command) — conducting parallel studies. OKH emphasized road networks and proposed offensives toward Moscow and Kiev, while OKW prioritized railways and targeted the Warsaw-Moscow corridor[3]. These plans were not mutually exclusive, but Hitler’s Directive No. 21, issued in December 1940, introduced a third approach focused on capturing economic resources to sustain the campaign[4].
The operation launched on June 22, 1941, with 144 divisions advancing across an 800-mile front that was the Soviet border. Logistical failures emerged almost immediately, undermining the campaign’s early momentum[5].
Applying Joint Logistics Planning Standards
Operation Barbarossa lacked integrated planning between OKH and OKW, violating modern joint logistics principles like those in Joint Publication 4-0 (JP 4-0). Essential components, such as unified whole-of-government coordination[6], redeployment, and demobilization plans[7], were absent. A Theater Logistics Analysis could have anticipated critical issues[8], including incompatible railroad gauges, fuel shortages, and issues with Soviet rolling stock[9].
Initial and refined logistics estimates[10] were either inadequate or nonexistent. Shortages of railway staff, fuel, food, and ammunition, evident by August 1941, suggest these estimates were grossly inaccurate. The German economy, constrained by its socialist structure, struggled to produce goods flexibly and at scale. A Logistics Supportability Analysis[11] (LSA) could have addressed this by planning for sustained supply and equipment production while the operation was ongoing[12].
The absence of a Theater Distribution Plan[13] (presumably[14]) exacerbated resource allocation issues. With OKH and OKW developing separate large-scale plans and no LSA in place, there was no centralized system to track and distribute finite supplies and equipment across the operation’s components while the operation was ongoing.
Conclusion
While applying JP 4-0 to Operation Barbarossa is anachronistic, the lessons remain relevant. Logistical planning must be integrated with strategic and tactical planning to ensure operational success. Barbarossa’s failures underscore the critical need for unified command, comprehensive analysis, and robust resource distribution systems in military campaigns.
Footnotes
[1] Van Creveld, pp. 142 – 144.[2] Ibid, p. 145.
[3] Ibid, p. 148 – 149.
[4] Ibid, p. 149.
[5] Ibid, pp. 160 – 166, 168 – 171.
[6] JP 4-0, p. IV-2.
[7] Ibid, p. IV-3.
[8] Ibid, p. xi, IV-4.
[9] Van Creveld, p. 157.
[10] JP 4-0, p. IV-6.
[11] Ibid, IV-5.
[12] Kobren.
[13] JP 4-0, p. IV-5.
[14] Gaines & Snell.
Bibliography
Gaines, K. & Snell, R. “Setting and supporting the theater.” Army Sustainment, November-December 2015. https://www.army.mil/article/157230/setting_and_supporting_the_theater
Joint Publication 4-0. Joint Logistics. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019.
Kobren, B. “The Journey from Logistic Support Analysis to Product Support Analysis” Defense Acquisition Workforce, DAU Blogs. 25 August 2016. https://www.dau.edu/blogs/journey-logistic-support-analysis-product-support-analysis
Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
No comments:
Post a Comment