Cheerful PDCA, OODA, and DOCA Loops

According to Goetsch & Davis, the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle is “a kind of generic, basic format for bringing order and logic to the problem-solving process.” It is not as detailed as a step-by-step process but rather is “a simple cycle that is allowed to continue until a solution’s results match the planned outcome.” (Goetsch & Davis, 2021, p. 274).

Similar cyclic processes are also used in military and local-defense contexts.

One of them is the so-called OODA loop (Boyd, 1995), which stands for observe-orient-decide-act. This is a decision-making framework that consists of the following stages:

• Observe – gather information from the environment
• Orient – analyze this collected information and determine its relevance to one’s mission
• Decide – choose a course of action based on the orientation
• Act – the chosen action is then executed

So, for example, suppose you see a group of fighters (observe). You analyze the situation to consider whether those fighters are friends or foes (orient). If they’re foes, you decide whether and how to act based on their size, position, and resources and your own size, position, and resources. If you decide to attack, do so with extreme aggression! Wash, rinse, and repeat.

The OODA loop is fundamental to all military action. Defeating the enemy requires either running your OODA loop faster than the bad guy’s loop or obstructing his OODA loop such as through misdirection.

In principle, the PCDA loop is similar to the OODA loop, except that observation happens earlier in the OODA loop than it does in the PCDA loop.

Cheerfully Executing a DOCA Loop
From Reuter's Training with America's Militias

Another loop, performed mostly by local-defense groups and other groups practicing irregular or so-called “4^th Generation” warfare (Lind & Thiele, 2015), is the DOCA loop, which stands for Disperse-Orient-Concentrate-Act. The idea is that in the context of irregular warfare, dispersed groups of fighters are hard to kill because they are… dispersed, and they only become combat-effective when they are close together. The stages are as follows:

• Disperse – spread out
• Orient – analyze the situation and determine its relevance to the mission
• Concentrate – move close to each other (or otherwise work in some coordinated manner)
• Act – execute the previously agreed-upon plan

Because this is a loop, the next stage after the act is to disperse. The neat thing is that the group of fighters is at risk only during the “concentrate” stage when they are close together.

For example, suppose the fighters’ mission is to destroy an enemy’s railroad line. They start out as dispersed. They make observations (orient) about the location of the railway line and how heavily it is defended. If they decide to complete their mission, they converge on the railroad line (concentrate) and sabotage it in some way (act). The loop starts over, so they disperse. Again, wash-rinse-repeat.

The OODA loop is the more fundamental of the two types of loops and works everywhere, even in business situations (D. Brown Management, 2024). Besides explicitly calling-out the “observe” stage, the primary difference between the OODA and DOCA loops is the way they repeat. With the way OODA is usually practiced, fighters would then return to home base and report their results. With the DOCA loops, the fighters have the option of building upon their success and continue with the mayhem!

Fun stuff!

References

Boyd, J. (1995). The Essence of Winning and Losing. https://web.archive.org/web/20110324054054/http://www.danford.net/boyd/essence.htm

D. Brown Management. (2024). Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (The OODA Loop). https://dbmteam.com/insights/observe-orient-decide-and-act-the-ooda-loop

Goetsch, D. L. & Davis, S. B. (2021). Quality management for organizational excellence: Introduction to total quality (9^th ed.). Pearson.

Lind, W. S. & Thiele, G. A. (2015). 4^th Generation Warfare Handbook. Castalia House. https://ia802901.us.archive.org/27/items/4thGenerationWarfareHandbookWilliamS.Lind28129/4th_Generation_Warfare_Handbook_-_William_S._Lind%25281%2529.pdf

Agile Combat Employment (ACE): Concepts and Criticisms

Introduction

The US Air Force Agile Combat Employment (ACE) is an operational approach that relies on distributing forces to reduce threats to the USAF while increasing unpredictability to our adversaries. According to the doctrinal note explaining ACE (AFDN 1-21)[1], the motivations for adopting this approach are the shrinking number of large bases, and the nature of current great power competitors who have the technological ability to convert fixed-location bases into contested areas.

Instead of using fixed-location bases. ACE entails the dispersal of forces into enduring locations (ELs) and contingency locations (CLs). ELs serve as hubs for CL spokes. Forces can move from CL to CL as the situation demands. These CLs are easy to conceal and allow for flexible responses. As described in AFDN 1-21:

“ACE shifts operations from centralized physical infrastructures to a network of smaller, dispersed locations that can complicate adversary planning and provide more options for joint force commanders. Its value is derived from the ability to hold adversary targets at risk from multiple locations that are defensible, sustainable, and relocatable. Airmen should expect to conduct operations at a speed, scope, complexity, and scale exceeding recent campaigns from distributed locations.”

ACE thus reduces the target value of large fixed-location bases, while multiple CLs complicates the planning of our adversaries.

AFDN 1-21 lists three “enablers” that are required for this system: first are Multi-Capable Airmen (MCA), who are able to perform tasks outside their primary occupation (AFSC). Second, MCAs are expected to operate according to mission command, meaning they must rely on their initiative to carry-out their commander’s intention. Finally, there are tailorable force packages that can be rapidly delivered to CLs as needed.

ACE uses a common lexicon with joint partners (posture, command and control, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, information, intelligence, and fires). The two most distinctive of these are sustainment, and command and control.

For command and control, it is assumed that there is a robust communication system in place that is adaptive and resilient even in the most challenging of environments.

For sustainment, logistics needs to operate on a push system using predictive modeling; local and regional consumer markets would alleviate stresses to the distribution system.

ACE Compared With 4th Generation Warfare Operations

In many ways, ACE is similar to 4th generation warfare (4GW)[2]. Both expect their individual fighters to possess multiple skills and the ability to improvise, adapt, and overcome. ACE uses mission command, whereas 4GW uses the similar Auftragstaktik (an aggressive form of professionalism and cultural philosophy expected of all members of a force)[3]. ACE logistics relies on a push methodology whereas 4GW uses a combination of push and pull systems. Both use local support to supplement shortcomings in the logistics systems.

The operational methods of both ACE and 4GW forces are described by the DOCA loop[4]: disperse – orient – concentrate – act. Being dispersed, the CLs are, separately, low-value targets. They must concentrate to bring significant force to bear against a target.

ACE is different from 4GW in that the latter does not have ELs. A shared problem both ACE and 4GW forces have is described below.

Logistics Problems

Ackerman[5] finds that the ACE doctrine has unrealistic logistics expectations. Aircraft require tremendous amounts of maintenance, and the needed spare pool size would be large. Cannibalization of aircraft that are not mission capable to ensure others are mission capable would be an option. He states that “ACE employment capability sounds great in a lab or an academic setting; however, many assumptions with logistics and sustainment must occur in order to achieve success.”

Problems identified by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army

Derek Solon provides an overview[6] of a People’s Republic of China analysis of ACE, which the Chinese refer to as the “water lily plan.” The Chinese identify three problems with[7] ACE:

First, fearing counterstrikes, countries may not allow the USAF to use their airfields as CLs. This fear could make even reliable allies unreliable.

Second, ACE will not reduce the AF’s reliance on permanent bases, since the EL hub is still supporting the CL spokes. The EL is still a target, and its elimination will greatly limit the functions of the CLs.

Finally, it is possible for an adversary to “short circuit” ACE by getting inside its OODA loop: “if the opponent deploys sea and air reconnaissance and strike platforms in advance to shorten the kill chain, it is entirely possible to capture the short time window when US aircraft dock at small forward bases and carry out precision strikes.”[8]

Synchronization Issues

In order to be combat-effective, the forces of multiple CLs must concentrate their firepower. Doing this requires these CLs to operate in a synchronized manner, which requires a well-functioning medium-range communication system. This is explicitly listed in AFDN 1-21 as a requirement, but it is a significant point of failure. Even a partial failure of the communication system (only affecting one CL, for example) would still degrade the overall capabilities of the combined EL and its CLs.

Conclusion

As Ackerman would say, ACE looks good on paper, but the logistics and synchronization problems together with the issues found by the People’s Liberation Army would seem to indicate that ACE would not work in practice.

Footnotes

[1] USAF, Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21: Agile Combat Employment.
[2] Lind & Thiele. 4th Generation Warfare Handbook.
[3] Widder, “Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung.”
[4] Lind & Thiele. 4th Generation Warfare Handbook, p. 69.
[5] Ackerman, “Agile Combat Employment: A War-Time Readiness Fallacy.”
[6] Solon, “The PLA’s Critical Assessment of the Agile Combat Employment Concept.”
[7] Yuan Yi, et al. “The US Air Force's "agile combat deployment" is difficult.”
[8] Ibid.

Bibliography

Ackerman, R. “Agile Combat Employment: A War-Time Readiness Fallacy.” Universal Synaptics. 10 October 2022. Retrieved 26 September 2024 from https://www.usynaptics.com/agile-combat-employment-a-war-time-readiness-fallacy/

Lind, W. S. & Thiele, G. A. 4^th Generation Warfare Handbook. Castalia House, 2015. Retrieved 26 September 2024 from https://ia802901.us.archive.org/27/items/4thGenerationWarfareHandbookWilliamS.Lind28129/4th_Generation_Warfare_Handbook_-_William_S._Lind%25281%2529.pdf

Solon, D. “The PLA’s Critical Assessment of the Agile Combat Employment Concept.” China Brief 21(14), 16 July 2021. Retrieved 25 September 2024 from https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-critical-assessment-of-the-agile-combat-employment-concept/

USAF. Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21: Agile Combat Employment. 23 August 2022. Retrieved 24 September 2024 from https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDN_1-21/AFDN%201-21%20ACE.pdf

Widder, W. “Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung: Trademarks of German leadership.” Military Review, September-October 2002. Retrieved 25 September 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot-Spots/docs/MC/MR-Sep-Oct-2002-Widder.pdf

Yuan Yi, Xu Wenhua, Xu Jinhua. “The US Air Force's "agile combat deployment" is difficult.” China Military Network, Ministry of National Defense Network. 2 July 2020. Retrieved 26 September 2024 from http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2020-07/02/content_265061.htm

Some Lessons from Napoleon’s Russian and Italian Campaigns

Introduction and Background

Geography plays a role in all military operations, either allowing or hindering the movement of troops and supplies. Due to the wide area covered by Napoleon’s various campaigns, he encountered a wide variety of topographies, including variations in population density, rivers, unimproved Russian roads, and mountainous terrain. The sheer size of Russia itself becomes another factor. Together with the available logistics systems, these terrains presented Napoleon with numerous challenges and his enemies with numerous opportunities. This paper examines some of the terrains he encountered, considers the success to which various logistics systems worked, and how his enemies exploited weaknesses when the logistics systems failed in specific geographic contexts. We conclude with some hypotheses about why, when Napoleon’s logistics systems failed, his enemies’ succeeded.

As background, the primary means of supplying the Grande Armée were the magazine system, the use of purchasing agents, plunder and foraging, water courses, and carrying supplies either by individual soldiers or by horse drawn wagons . Magazines were inapplicable when campaigning into new territories, and depending on the terrain, the other means of supply would also become inapplicable, leaving the army dependent on what could be carried by troops and horse drawn wagons.

Retreat of the French Grand Army from Moscow, Intercepted by Russian Cossacks, 1812
- John Augustus Atkinson (1813)

Varying Population Density

Both purchasing agents and plunder assume that the army's area of operation was populated to some extent: purchasing agents must haggle with the local population to acquire the needed supplies, and plundering requires towns and farms from which to loot. The long march undertaken by Napoleon during the Russian Campaign crossed areas with varying population densities, some where the population was dispersed, and others that were densely populated - here, “densely populated” meant any place having from 70 to 120 people per square mile In the sparsely-populated areas, using the supplies carried by the troops or by horse were the only options for sustainment.

Foraging requires a suitable geographic environment from which foragers can hunt or gather food, wood, fodder, and other naturally-available goods. This became a problem during the march to Moscow since there were vast areas unsuitable for foraging . For example, large wastelands in Central Europe simply did not have the food to supply the troops and fodder to feed the horses.

Another aspect of purchasing agents, plunder, and foraging is that the large armies of the time would strip the area bare of all usable goods if it was stationary or slowly moving. To avoid “burning out” an area, the army must be kept on the march.

The Russians realized that the Grande Armée survival depended on agents, plunder, and foraging, and so they responded by evacuating and burning the towns and farms that Napoleon would encounter on his march to Moscow. By doing this, the Russians forced Napoleon to rely only upon his supply wagons and what could be personally carried.

Rivers

Rivers, if sufficiently broad and deep, can be used to deliver goods, but crossing them requires the construction of bridges. During the Battle of Berezina, the retreating French army needed to construct pontoon bridges – the existing bridges over the Berezina River having been destroyed. The battle occurred on 26 - 29 November 1812, and the river was not frozen. Napoleon ordered the construction of one bridge for the infantry . Once constructed, he dispatched a force of 7000 men across it to defend the far end . He then constructed a separate bridge for artillery. Once his army and most of the stragglers had crossed, he ordered the two pontoon bridges destroyed. This delayed the Cossacks and Russian Army in their pursuit of the trailing edge of Napoleon’s army. Unfortunately, those same forces were also located on the opposite side of the Berezina River – the side to which Napoleon just crossed.

Condition of Russia’s Roads

A man-made geographic aspect of Russian terrain were the unimproved roads. Unlike the roads of France and other western European countries, Russian roads were frequently just unpaved dirt tracks . These roads became quagmires during thunderstorms and winter thaws, and considerably slowed the movement of Napoleon’s troops and horse drawn wagons.

Except in cities such as Moscow, the roads weren’t sophisticated networks, and this limited the options Napoleon had for either reaching or retreating from Moscow. To avoid the resource-stripped areas caused by the French Army’s approach into Moscow, Napoleon wanted to take an alternative route out of Russia. At the Battle of Maloyaroslavets on 24 October 1812, Napoleon was forced by the Russians to retrace the path he took into Moscow.

Geographic Scale and Weather Variability

Another geographic feature of Russia that worked against Napoleon was its sheer size. Taking Warsaw as the starting point of the Russian Campaign, the distance between Warsaw and Moscow is approximately 715 miles, and the French army crossed that distance, carrying what they couldn’t forage, loot, or purchase. What worked against Napoleon worked for the armies of Tsar Alexander I: the Russians exploited this great distance by retreating before Napoleon, drawing the Grande Armée deep into Russian territory. This not only stretched-out their supply lines but also made Napoleon subject to attack by the Cossacks and the Russian Army.

The Russian Campaign lasted for over 5 months, from late summer to winter, and so the temperatures and weather conditions would change drastically over that time. As such, Napoleon’s army had to carry clothing and gear for multiple seasons.

Mountains

The Russian Campaign did not involve traversing mountainous terrain, though it would have if Napoleon went beyond Moscow. The Italian Campaigns of 1792 - 1801 required the French army to navigate through the Alps’ rugged terrain, and the steep and narrow passes made moving supplies and artillery difficult. For example, getting relief troops to the Siege of Genoa (19 April – 4 June 1800) required moving Napoleon’s Reserve Army through the Great St. Bernard Pass , which is the third highest pass in the Swiss Alps. Genoa fell before he could arrive, so Napoleon instead targeted the Austrians.

Conclusions

As shown here, the methods for supplying the Grande Armée were sometimes insufficient for the terrains Napoleon encountered. When they worked, they worked well, but when they failed, they frequently allowed Napoleon's enemies to exploit those failures. This sounds paradoxical at first: the Russians had to solve the same logistical problems as did Napoleon - why did Napoleon fail but Russia and the Cossacks succeed? This can be attributed to home-field advantage, but there were at least two other factors in play.

First, the targets Napoleon and the Russians chose were different: Napoleon was fighting the Russian Army, whereas the Russians were fighting Napoleon’s logistics system, as illustrated by the scorched-earth tactics, the fighting retreats, etc. Second, the Cossacks were fighting a completely different type of war: the Cossacks operated in a distributed manner reminiscent of America’s Colonial Militias after Benjamin Church taught them how to be militiamen. This would imply that the Cossacks were engaging in what would now be called “Fourth Generation Warfare ,” but significant research would be needed to prove or disprove that conjecture.

 

Bibliography

Bennett, L. “The Grand Failure: How Logistics of Supply Defeated Napoleon in 1812.” Primary Source 1 (No. 1). 2011. Retrieved 10 July 2024 from https://psource.sitehost.iu.edu/PDF/Archive%20Articles/Spring2011/LynchBennettArticle.pdf

Burton, R. Napoleon’s Campaigns in Italy: 1796-1797 and 1800. George Allen and Company, 1912. Retrieved 15 July 2024 from https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.241698/page/n1/mode/2up?q=bernard

Clausewitz, C. V. The Campaign if 1812 in Russia. New-Street-Square, 1835. Retrieved 14 July 2024 from https://clausewitzstudies.org/readings/1812/Clausewitz-CampaignOf1812inRussia-EllesmereTranslation.pdf

Jelineo, J. “Napoleon’s Logistics; or How Napoleon Learned to Worry about Supply.” Air Command and Staff College. April 2012. Retrieved 10 July 2024 from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1022125.pdf

Lind, W. & Thiele, G. Fourth Generation Warfare Handbook. Castalia House, 2015.

Mikaberidze, A. Napoleon's Great Escape: The Battle of the Berezina. London: Pen and Sword, 2010.

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (2nd ed). Cambridge University Press, 2004.

The OODA Loop and the DOCA Loop

The OODA Loop

The most fundamental description of military action (as well as all action in general) is that it operates according to the OODA loop:

• Observe
• Orient
• Decide
• Act

Each step feeds forward to the next step, but the Decide stage can feed back to the Observe stage if no action is taken. Once the Act stage is entered, the feedback is to the Observe stage - that's why its called a loop. It isn't necessary that the Action is complete before returning to the Observe stage, such as when the action is not going as expected. The Observe stage is where intelligence gathering happens and the Orient stage is one of intelligence analysis. The Decide and Act stages are operational.

John Boyd's OODA Loop. Illustration by Patrick Edwin Moran from
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3904554

The OODA loop was developed by USAF Colonel John Boyd as a model for combat operations, but is applicable to any situation where one's actions are based upon evidence. It is universal, and in the context of combat operations both opponents will be executing their own OODA loops.

Thought of in this way, there are two methods to disrupt an enemy's actions:

• Block one or more steps of the enemy's OODA loop
• Execute your OODA loop at a faster rate

For example, using a smoke grenade to conceal your movements prevents the enemy from observing your actions, thus blocking his OODA loop. Or, suppose you observe the enemy moving towards a hill, probably to capture it. You realize that the hill has some value (orient), decide that you can defend that hill, and move your forces to protect it (act), arriving first. That is an example of executing your OODA loop faster than the enemy did his.

The above examples are small in scale. Here's an example on a far larger scale: you observe non-government organizations helping illegal immigrants cross your southern border. This is unacceptable because it allows violent criminals to enter into your country, it harms programs meant for citizens, it is distructive to our infrastructure, it lowers chances for employment, it alters the political landscape, and it dilutes our culture. You decide that the flow of illegal immigrants can be lessened by countering the NGOs, and take legal action against them. Regardless of the success of the court proceedings (even if proceedings aren't complete), you return to the Observe stage and the loop continues.

The DOCA Loop

The most fundamental description of actions in irregular warfare is that it operates according to the DOCA loop:

• Disperse
• Orient
• Concentrate
• Act

The DOCA loop was named by William S. Lind in his writings on light infantry and 4^th generation warfare, but it is an extremely old concept. For example, in pre-colonial America, the Indians were repeatedly winning battles against the Colonial Militias – the Indians were using irregular warfare (surprise attacks followed by dispersion) while the militias were practicing European-style battle tactics (close order formations, loading muskets using 56 steps, firing in mass unaimed volleys, etc.). Colonel Benjamin Church saw this and began incorporating Indians into his ranks. Soon, it was the militias that were avoiding tight formations, using cover and concealment, attacking at weak spots, targeting and firing at individual enemies, and conducting hit-and-run raids.

The single steps of the DOCA loop are more involved than those of the OODA loop. For example, the "Orient" phase includes actions that set-up the enemy for the "Act" phase, and the "Act" phase targets a single enemy weakness, and is attempted ony after reconnaissance shows that success is highly probable. Another aspect of the DOCA loop is that it is to be executed rapidly and aggressively. In terms of light infantry, Lind and Thiele (2015) state:

Light infantry tactics are offensive in character, even during defensive operations. Light infantrymen do not hold a line. Light infantry tactics follow the principles of maneuver warfare, attacking by infiltration and defending by ambush. It uses ambushes on the offensive as well, by ambushing withdrawing or reinforcing enemy units, sometimes deep in the enemy’s rear. Light infantry applies an ambush mentality to both planning and execution...

...light infantry can exploit its small arms skills while denying the enemy effective employment of his superior firepower. Light infantry hugs the enemy and forces him to fight at short ranges on its terms.

The DOCA loop is applicable not only to sabotage and assassination missions, but also to how freedom fighters would, for example, retrieve supply drops or free prisoners.

As in the OODA loop, a counter-insurgency operation at the tactical level has two options:

• Block one or more steps of the insurgency's DOCA loop
• Adapt the style of irregular warfare and execute your DOCA loop at a faster rate.

Here's a historical example of the first option: in late July through early August 1944, the Maquis (rural resistance fighters) converged at the Vercors Massif in southeast France (Lieb & Dennis, 2012) in preparation for the Invasion of Provence (Operation Dragoon) which was originally scheduled to occur simultaneously with the Invasion of Normandy. The invasion was delayed and the order to disperse was never received. The 157^th Reserve Division of the Wehrmacht observed evidence of significant Maquis activity in and around the Vercors Massif in south-east France. Besides sabotaging rail traffic and assisinating Germans and collaborators, the Germans realized that they could hinder German retreat. Using a large force that consists of ground, airborne, and mountaineering components, they decide to act on the Maquis, and send in forces to kill or capture (then kill) as many Maquis as possible. The Maquis converged for an extended period without performing a relevant action, and the Germans prevented them from dispersing. In essence, the Germans prevented the Maquis from closing their DOCA loop.

From this one example, it may appear that freedom fighters executing a DOCA loop will always lose to traditional military forces. This is not always the case! The Maquis successfully executed a vast number of sabotage operations both in Occupied and Vichy France and were able to severely degrade German logistics prior to the Invaison of Normandy.

References

Boyd, J. (1995). The Essence of Winning and Losing. Retrieved 26 February 2024 from https://web.archive.org/web/20110324054054/http://www.danford.net/boyd/essence.htm

Lieb, P. & Dennis, P. (2012). Vercors 1944: Resistance in the French Alps. Osprey Publishing.

Lind, W. S. & Thiele, G. A. (2015). 4^th Generation Warfare Handbook. Castalia House. Retrieved 26 February 2024 from https://ia802901.us.archive.org/27/items/4thGenerationWarfareHandbookWilliamS.Lind28129/4th_Generation_Warfare_Handbook_-_William_S._Lind%25281%2529.pdf