Introduction
The US Air Force Agile Combat Employment (ACE) is an operational approach that relies on distributing forces to reduce threats to the USAF while increasing unpredictability to our adversaries. According to the doctrinal note explaining ACE (AFDN 1-21)[1], the motivations for adopting this approach are the shrinking number of large bases, and the nature of current great power competitors who have the technological ability to convert fixed-location bases into contested areas.
Instead of using fixed-location bases. ACE entails the dispersal of forces into enduring locations (ELs) and contingency locations (CLs). ELs serve as hubs for CL spokes. Forces can move from CL to CL as the situation demands. These CLs are easy to conceal and allow for flexible responses. As described in AFDN 1-21:
“ACE shifts operations from centralized physical infrastructures to a network of smaller, dispersed locations that can complicate adversary planning and provide more options for joint force commanders. Its value is derived from the ability to hold adversary targets at risk from multiple locations that are defensible, sustainable, and relocatable. Airmen should expect to conduct operations at a speed, scope, complexity, and scale exceeding recent campaigns from distributed locations.”
ACE thus reduces the target value of large fixed-location bases, while multiple CLs complicates the planning of our adversaries.
AFDN 1-21 lists three “enablers” that are required for this system: first are Multi-Capable Airmen (MCA), who are able to perform tasks outside their primary occupation (AFSC). Second, MCAs are expected to operate according to mission command, meaning they must rely on their initiative to carry-out their commander’s intention. Finally, there are tailorable force packages that can be rapidly delivered to CLs as needed.
ACE uses a common lexicon with joint partners (posture, command and control, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, information, intelligence, and fires). The two most distinctive of these are sustainment, and command and control.
For command and control, it is assumed that there is a robust communication system in place that is adaptive and resilient even in the most challenging of environments.
For sustainment, logistics needs to operate on a push system using predictive modeling; local and regional consumer markets would alleviate stresses to the distribution system.
ACE Compared With 4th Generation Warfare Operations
In many ways, ACE is similar to 4th generation warfare (4GW)[2]. Both expect their individual fighters to possess multiple skills and the ability to improvise, adapt, and overcome. ACE uses mission command, whereas 4GW uses the similar Auftragstaktik (an aggressive form of professionalism and cultural philosophy expected of all members of a force)[3]. ACE logistics relies on a push methodology whereas 4GW uses a combination of push and pull systems. Both use local support to supplement shortcomings in the logistics systems.
The operational methods of both ACE and 4GW forces are described by the DOCA loop[4]: disperse – orient – concentrate – act. Being dispersed, the CLs are, separately, low-value targets. They must concentrate to bring significant force to bear against a target.
ACE is different from 4GW in that the latter does not have ELs. A shared problem both ACE and 4GW forces have is described below.
Logistics Problems
Ackerman[5] finds that the ACE doctrine has unrealistic logistics expectations. Aircraft require tremendous amounts of maintenance, and the needed spare pool size would be large. Cannibalization of aircraft that are not mission capable to ensure others are mission capable would be an option. He states that “ACE employment capability sounds great in a lab or an academic setting; however, many assumptions with logistics and sustainment must occur in order to achieve success.”
Problems identified by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
Derek Solon provides an overview[6] of a People’s Republic of China analysis of ACE, which the Chinese refer to as the “water lily plan.” The Chinese identify three problems with[7] ACE:
First, fearing counterstrikes, countries may not allow the USAF to use their airfields as CLs. This fear could make even reliable allies unreliable.
Second, ACE will not reduce the AF’s reliance on permanent bases, since the EL hub is still supporting the CL spokes. The EL is still a target, and its elimination will greatly limit the functions of the CLs.
Finally, it is possible for an adversary to “short circuit” ACE by getting inside its OODA loop: “if the opponent deploys sea and air reconnaissance and strike platforms in advance to shorten the kill chain, it is entirely possible to capture the short time window when US aircraft dock at small forward bases and carry out precision strikes.”[8]
Synchronization Issues
In order to be combat-effective, the forces of multiple CLs must concentrate their firepower. Doing this requires these CLs to operate in a synchronized manner, which requires a well-functioning medium-range communication system. This is explicitly listed in AFDN 1-21 as a requirement, but it is a significant point of failure. Even a partial failure of the communication system (only affecting one CL, for example) would still degrade the overall capabilities of the combined EL and its CLs.
Conclusion
As Ackerman would say, ACE looks good on paper, but the logistics and synchronization problems together with the issues found by the People’s Liberation Army would seem to indicate that ACE would not work in practice.
Footnotes
[1] USAF, Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21: Agile Combat Employment.[2] Lind & Thiele. 4th Generation Warfare Handbook.
[3] Widder, “Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung.”
[4] Lind & Thiele. 4th Generation Warfare Handbook, p. 69.
[5] Ackerman, “Agile Combat Employment: A War-Time Readiness Fallacy.”
[6] Solon, “The PLA’s Critical Assessment of the Agile Combat Employment Concept.”
[7] Yuan Yi, et al. “The US Air Force's "agile combat deployment" is difficult.”
[8] Ibid.
Bibliography
Ackerman, R. “Agile Combat Employment: A War-Time Readiness Fallacy.” Universal Synaptics. 10 October 2022. Retrieved 26 September 2024 from https://www.usynaptics.com/agile-combat-employment-a-war-time-readiness-fallacy/
Lind, W. S. & Thiele, G. A. 4th Generation Warfare Handbook. Castalia House, 2015. Retrieved 26 September 2024 from https://ia802901.us.archive.org/27/items/4thGenerationWarfareHandbookWilliamS.Lind28129/4th_Generation_Warfare_Handbook_-_William_S._Lind%25281%2529.pdf
Solon, D. “The PLA’s Critical Assessment of the Agile Combat Employment Concept.” China Brief 21(14), 16 July 2021. Retrieved 25 September 2024 from https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-critical-assessment-of-the-agile-combat-employment-concept/
USAF. Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21: Agile Combat Employment. 23 August 2022. Retrieved 24 September 2024 from https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDN_1-21/AFDN%201-21%20ACE.pdf
Widder, W. “Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung: Trademarks of German leadership.” Military Review, September-October 2002. Retrieved 25 September 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot-Spots/docs/MC/MR-Sep-Oct-2002-Widder.pdf
Yuan Yi, Xu Wenhua, Xu Jinhua. “The US Air Force's "agile combat deployment" is difficult.” China Military Network, Ministry of National Defense Network. 2 July 2020. Retrieved 26 September 2024 from http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2020-07/02/content_265061.htm
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