Joseph as a Supply Chain Manager

Introduction

The overall theme of the story of Joseph as found in Genesis 37-50 is that of forgiveness: Joseph’s brothers threw him down a cistern then sold him into slavery, then convinced their father that Joseph was eaten by a wild animal. Later, after Joseph rises to power in Egypt, he invites his brothers and the rest of the family to live there. This was not unlimited forgiveness, however: he verified that the brothers were indeed remorseful before inviting them to Egypt. For purposes of this paper, the story of Joseph and how he overcame famine in Egypt will be interpreted through the lens of supply chain management.

Joseph's Coat Brought to Jacob
by Domenico Fiasella, c. 1640

Story of Joseph from the Book of Genesis

Joseph, son of Jacob, lived in Canaan with ten half-brothers, one full brother, and at least one half-sister. Joseph was Jacob’s favorite son, and two things made his brothers jealous. First, Joseph told them about two dreams he had that suggest his brothers will bow down to him. Second, Jacob gives him a "coat of many colors."

Joseph's brothers are mad enough to kill him when he comes looking for them in Dothan. The eldest brother, Reuben, instead suggests that they throw him into a cistern, with intentions to come back for him later. They follow through with this plan: they take his coat of many colors and then throw him down one of the cisterns.

The brothers see a caravan of Ishmaelites carrying spices and oils en route to Egypt. Judah (one of the brothers) says "we could kill our brother and hide his body. But then we will not get anything for ourselves." The brothers agree to this plan. They pull Joseph out of the cistern and sell him to the Ishmaelites for twenty silver coins (Genesis 37:28). The Ishmaelites took Joseph with them to Egypt.

Reuben returns to the cistern and sees that Joseph was not there - he's very upset. Reuben finds his other brothers and says: "Joseph is not in the well! What can I do now?" The brothers kill a goat and put its blood over the coat of many colors. They take the coat back to Jacob. Upon seeing the coat Jacob says: “It is my son's coat! A wild animal must have eaten him! The animal has torn Joseph's body into pieces.” His children tried to comfort Jacob, but he was inconsolable: “I will be sad until the day that I die, because my son is dead.”

Meanwhile, the caravan took Joseph into Egypt, where he was sold to Potiphar, captain of the Pharaoh's guards. Joseph eventually becomes the superintendent of Potiphar’s house.

Potiphar’s wife falsely accuses Joseph of sexual harassment, and he is imprisoned. God is with Joseph even while he's in prison, and as such the warden puts him in charge of all the other prisoners.

Joseph meets the Pharaoh's cupbearer and chef, both imprisoned for offending the Pharaoh. Both the cupbearer and the baker have disturbing dreams on the same night. Joseph interprets the cupbearer’s dream, learning that in three days the cupbearer will be released from prison and the Pharaoh will restore him to his former position. Joseph asks the cupbearer to remember him to the Pharaoh to get him out of prison. Joseph next interprets the baker’s dream, but the interpretation is grim: in three days, the Pharaoh will have the baker executed.

Three days later, on the Pharaoh's birthday, the events foretold by Joseph occur: the baker is executed, and the cupbearer is released and regains his position in the court. Unfortunately, the cupbearer forgets to ask the Pharaoh to release Joseph.

Two years after that, the Pharaoh has two disturbing dreams. In the first, seven lean cows eat seven fat cows. In the second, seven healthy heads of grain are devoured by seven thin, scorched heads of grain. The Pharaoh's wise men cannot interpret the dreams. The cupbearer then remembers Joseph and how he correctly interpreted the dreams while in prison.

Joseph is released from prison and credits God for his ability to interpret dreams. The Pharaoh's dreams, Joseph explains, mean the same thing: there will be seven years of abundance followed by seven years of famine. Joseph recommends that the Pharaoh appoint someone to oversee the collection of a fifth of the produce produced all throughout Egypt and store it for the famine. Joseph is recommending emergency preparedness (Martinez, 2022, p. 177-181).

Impressed with Joseph’s interpretations, the Pharaoh gives Joseph the role, making him second in command of Egypt: “I hereby put you in charge of the whole land of Egypt” (Genesis 41:41). Joseph, who is now 30, travels throughout Egypt, organizing the collection and storage of food during the seven plentiful years. Egypt is thus prepared for the famine.

When the famine strikes, Joseph opens the storehouses and sells grain back to the Egyptians. The famine was so severe that people from other countries came to Egypt to purchase grain, too. The inhabitants of Egypt, except the Egyptian priests, run out of money. “Then bring your livestock,” said Joseph. “I will sell you food in exchange for your livestock, since your money is gone.” (Genesis 47:16). The result was that the people sold their properties and themselves into slavery to Joseph for food. As the famine ended, Joseph mandated that 20% of all the food that the people grow will go to the Pharaoh. This condition will last until the time of Moses.

Lessons Learned from Joseph

First, Joseph based his plans upon forecasts – in this case, forecasts based on dreams interpreted through Divine knowledge. This continues to the present day, except that historical records, data science, and machine learning are potential sources of information. The important part is that the plans were knowledge-based, and following those plans would today be called “strategic planning” and “emergency preparedness.” Joseph’s overall approach was similar to what would now be called an anticipatory business model (Quigg, 2022, p. 16), except that instead of buying components and materials then manufacturing products from them. The food or grain was sent to storage for later sale.

Anticipatory Business Model (Quigg, 2022, p. 16)

Second, Joseph used storage to overcome the seven years of famine. This was done by collecting 20% of the people of Egypt’s grain during the previous seven plentiful years. The impact of this is to “smooth out” the available supply of grain, decreasing it during times of plenty and increasing it during the famine.

Third, Joseph used what we would now call warehouses to store the grain. This is important because warehouses are not just places of storage, but they are buildings that can be defended from looters as well as rodents.

Fourth, the warehouses were distributed throughout Egypt. This reduced the distance that people would have to travel to get their grain, but also minimized the risks of fires or floods to the overall food supply.

Joseph thus took a very rational, very modern, approach. By planning for the long term and executing those plans in a continuous and incremental manner (Parris & Pope, 2020, p. 29), he was able to get the people of Egypt through the seven-year famine.

References

Martinez, J. (2022). “Developing a resilience mindset: Joseph and his coat of many sufferings.” In B. E. Winston (Ed.), The mind of a leader: A Christian perspective of the thoughts, mental, and perceptions that shape leadership behavior. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 175-198. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07206-2_12

Parris, A. & Pope, D. (2020). “What Christian leaders can learn from lean.” Management Sciences 21, pp. 26-34. https://digitalcommons.acu.edu/mgt_sciences/21

Quigg, B. (2022). Supply Chain Management (1st ed). McGraw-Hill Create. https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781307866025

Review of "Effect of Supply Chain Integration on the Ppuri Industry"

Abstract

This is a review of “The Effect of Supply Chain Integration on Supply Chain Risk Management Capability and Firm Performance in the Ppuri Industry” (Jung et al, 2022). The background concepts as well as the relevant concepts from supply chain management necessary to explain this research are defined. The research model they study is described, a research model they are unable to verify. Some of the reasons the authors give for this failure are listed. The managerial applications (or lack thereof) are described. We conclude with comments about the follow-up research they expect to conduct.

Authors’ Purpose

The ppuri industry is a niche industry in South Korea (Dongki, 2021) involved in creating or finishing metal parts used in the making of automobiles, industrial machinery, household appliances, etc. The ppuri industry is also in trouble: ppuri companies have not expanded in any significant manner in recent times, and in fact many of the companies investigated by the authors in this paper went out of business during their research. The authors attempt to explain this by looking at the operation of the supply chain of ppuri companies. They examine the relationship between supply chain integration, supply chain risk management capability, and firm performance. The expected relationships do not hold, and the authors interpret why this happens.

Summary of the Article and its Context

This paper is a study of the ppuri industry in South Korea, an industry that produces or finishes metal parts for large manufacturers. The industry has been struggling in recent years, and the authors attempt to understand the cause of this in terms of supply chain operation. In their study, they find that the relation between supply chain integration and firm performance is not what the authors expected.

They admit that their study suffered from some problems (it used a small sample size and was conducted during COVID-19) but are unable to explain this counterintuitive situation. They make some observations about the conditions in the ppuri industry that may explain this, the most striking one involves the significant difference in size between ppuri companies and the manufacturers they supply. They leave this investigation for future research.

Background of the Issue

The ppuri industry, also called the "root industry," in South Korea is the industry of making metal parts using casting, molding, plastic working, and welding, or finishing those parts using heat or surface treatment (Jung et al, 2022, p. 32-33). These parts are then assembled by manufacturers into automobiles, appliances, industrial or restaurant equipment, etc. (Dongki, 2021). It is called "root" because those parts are of fundamental importance to the manufacturers, and that the parts find their way into many industrial and consumer products.

The ppuri industry has been struggling as illustrated by the facts that ppuri companies are small companies that remain small, that companies have difficulties in finding employees, and that the companies are unable to be competitive due to lack of R&D activities. A South Korea-Japan trade dispute in July 2019 only intensified these problems (Yung et al, 2022, p. 33).

Attempts have been made to strengthen the competitiveness of this industry using strategies that involve increasing supply chain integration. It is expected that tightening SC integration would improve the performance of ppuri companies. But does it?

The authors attempt to investigate the relationship between supply chain integration, the capacity to manage supply chain risk, and overall firm performance. They do this by surveying managers working in ppuri companies and arrive at some counterintuitive observations.

Application of Relevant Supply Chain Management Theory

Modern supply chain management (SCM) has long recognized the fundamental importance of supply chains in company operation, and SC managers understand how well-run supply chains can add value to the products that customers purchase. Because of this, risks to the supply chain must be well understood.

A supply chain risk (Son, 2018, p. 2296-2297) is any event that diminishes the operation of the supply chain. These risks can include buyer-related risks (distortion of demand information or demand volatility), supplier-related risks (poor raw material quality or supplier bankruptcy). Finally, there are internal-process risks such as change in production costs. Supply chain risk management (SCRM) (Son, 2018, p. 2297-2300) are the steps needed to reduce risks or vulnerabilities to the supply chain.

Supply chain integration, one of the holy grails of contemporary supply chain management (Quigg, 2022, p. 24-52), is the degree of cooperation within and between participating organizations. The authors classify integration as being internal or external, and external integration is further broken down into supplier integration and buyer integration.

Supplier integration is an organization’s ability to develop, maintain, and manage long-term relationships with suppliers (Jung, 2022, p. 35). Buyer integration is the practice of managing customer relationships and improving overall customer satisfaction.

External integration allows for cost reduction, productivity and agility improvements, and ease of obtaining resources (Quigg, 2022, p. 373). It also improves operational performance measured by quality, cost, delivery, and flexibility. This improved operational performance should eventually lead to increased company performance (Jung, 2022, p. 35).

In contrast, internal integration are organizational practices that encourage various departments to share knowledge (Jung, 2022, p. 35-36). This knowledge supports external integration and allows the company to achieve company goals. It also allows sharing and cooperation among departments thereby reducing conflict and promoting corporate stability.

Managerial Implications of Article Findings

Based off all this, the authors propose the following hypotheses about the relationships between the above types of integration and overall company performance:

H1a: Supplier integration improves firm performance.
H1b: Buyer integration improves firm performance.
H1c: Internal integration improves firm performance.

Internal integration also makes the supply chain more agile, enabling faster and more effective responses to environmental changes. Further, it also improves the company’s ability to identify internal risks in the supply chain. Integration is thus expected to improve SCRM capability, and the following hypotheses are posited by the authors:

H2a: Supplier integration improves SCRM capability.
H2b: Buyer integration improves SCRM capability.
H2c: Internal integration improves SCRM capability.

Finally, improvement of SCRM capability should have a positive impact on corporate performance, so the authors propose one final hypothesis:

H3: SCRM capability improves firm performance.

Combining these hypotheses together generates a research model where each of the three types of integration (supplier, buyer, and internal) positively bolster firm performance and SCRM capability, and that SCRM capability improves firm performance.

Research Model from (Jung et al, 2022)

The authors are unable to verify this research model, however common-sensical it may seem. In particular, supply chain integration does not improve firm performance, at least when it comes to supplier and buyer integration. Supplier and internal supply chain integration were shown to have a positive impact on SCRM capability, but buyer integration was not. Finally, SCRM capability was shown to positively impact firm performance.

The authors were thus unable to verify three of the seven hypotheses stipulated above. In summary:

H1a: Supplier integration → firm performance – not supported.
H1b: Buyer integration → firm performance – not supported.
H1c: Internal integration → firm performance – supported.
H2a: Supplier integration → SCRM capability – supported.
H2b: Buyer integration → SCRM capability – not supported.
H2c: Internal integration → SCRM capability – supported.
H3: SCRM capability → firm performance – supported.

How can this be explained? The authors specifically note that their study may suffer from a small sample size: surveys were sent to 928 ppuri companies, seventy-five responded, but one was rejected because it was incomplete. The authors used the remaining seventy-four responses as the base of this study. They also state that many of the unreturned responses were caused by the ppuri companies going out of business.

Another flaw in their study noted by the authors is that it was conducted during the COVID-19 plague. They did not investigate how the plague specifically hampered their investigation.

The authors do propose an explanation for the unexpected relationships between supply chain integration, firm performance, and SCRM capability:

Firms in the Ppuri industry play a role as suppliers of large companies in the supply chain, and most of them perform simple manufacturing and processing tasks at the request of buying companies. Therefore, even if the level of buyer integration increases, firms in the Ppuri industry might not fully achieve the advantages of buyer integration, including cost reduction, productivity improvement, and ease of securing resources, due to the power imbalance between supply chain partners. (Jung et al, 2022, p. 43)

In other words, the great difference in size between ppuri companies and the manufacturers they supply somehow explains the lack of expected relationships. They do not investigate this explanation, either statistically or through deductive logic. If they do investigate it in a future paper, they should check to see if a similar phenomenon occurs in other situations where this “power imbalance” is in effect.

The authors recommend that ppuri companies do take steps needed to integrate suppliers and buyers into their supply chain, and they expect that this will improve SCRM capability and firm performance. These recommendations are not borne out in this paper, and verifying their recommendations would require A/B testing.

Because of the quality of the research and the very niche nature of the ppuri industry, implementing their unproven recommendations in another industry is justified only because having an integrated supply chain makes sense.

Conclusion

The authors have established that supply chain integration doesn’t necessarily improve supply chain risk management capabilities nor firm performance. Because of the counterintuitive nature of that statement – as well as problems executing this study – further research is certainly needed.

References

Bax, J. & Ruel, S. (2021). “Can supply chain risk management practices mitigate the disruption impacts on supply chains’ resilience and robustness? Evidence from an empirical survey in a COVID-19 outbreak era.” International journal of production economics, 233, 107972. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2020.107972

Dongki, L. (2021). “What is PPURI industry?” Korea National PPURI Industry Center. Retrieved 8 October 2021 from https://www.techconnect.kr/html/?pmode=UserAddon&smode=ajax&fn=ViewFile&fileSeq=6724

Jung, J., Shin, J., & Yang, H. (2022). “The effect of supply chain integration on supply chain risk management capability and firm performance in the ppuri industry.” Seoul Journal of Business, 28 (2), 31-48. https://doi.org/10.35152/snusjb.2022.28.2.002

Quigg, B. (2022). Supply Chain Management (1st ed). McGraw-Hill Create. https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781307866025

Son, C. (2018). “Supply chain risk management: A review of thirteen years of research.” American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 8 (12), 2294-2320. https://10.4236/ajibm.2018.812154

Longshoremen, Automation, and Obsolete Machines

Robots have replaced many workers in supply chains positions, and this was one of the issues for which the International Longshoremen's Association went on strike. In fact, ILA president Harold Daggett demanded “absolute airtight language that there will be no automation or semiautomation” in the contract they want to get with the United States Maritime Alliance (USMA) (Lynch & Weil, 2024). It is interesting that Daggett did not call for retraining of dockworkers, and he is doing nothing ameliorate the effects of automation on dock workers. Any good leader would do all he can for his men, and there are things that he can be doing: retraining, transferring his men to areas less likely to be automated, etc. Otherwise, Daggett's men will soon be nothing more than obsolete equipment.

They did go on strike, and one of the strikers' signs read "robots don't pay taxes." This only adds to the problem - most people not in a union would read this and deduce that people are paying too much in taxes.

Then there's Daggett's statement that "I will cripple you, and you have no idea what that means." This came at the end of an interview with him on the YouTube channel ran by the International Longshoresmen's Association:

Guys who sell cars can’t sell cars, because the cars ain’t coming in off the ships. They get laid off. Third week, malls are closing down. They can’t get the goods from China. They can’t sell clothes. They can’t do this. Everything in the United States comes on a ship, they go out of business. Construction workers get laid off because the materials aren’t coming in. The steel’s not coming in. The lumber’s not coming in. They lose their job. Everybody’s hating the longshoremen now because now they realize how important our jobs are… In today’s world I’ll cripple you. I will cripple you, and you have no idea what that means, nobody does. (ILA, 2024)

This is more than bluster, it is an out-and-out threat aimed not at the USMA but at American society as a whole.

ILA President Harold J. Daggett

These three things - bad leadership, the calls to be tax chattel, and the leader's threat against America - are arguments in favor of automation, or at least reasons for the ILA to replace Daggett.

The ILA strike began on 1 October 2024 and ended three days later. The ILA and the USMA agreed to a 62% wage increase for the dock workers over the six year tentative deal. The issue of automation will be addressed in approximately 100 days, on 15 January 2025, after the election.

Automation of the type that ILA is rightfully concerned is limited to businesses large enough to afford robotics: Amazon, auto manufacturers, companies requiring large warehouses, etc. Smaller companies are immune to this form of automation, at least at present. Daggett can position his men at these smaller companies. Daggett can also have his men trained to repair the same automation systems the USMA so desperately wants. Irony, though, is something lost on Daggett.

References

International Longshoremen's Association. (2024, 5 September). A Candid Conversation With ILA President Harold J. Daggett On Wide Range of Important Topics [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=822WNvhQHKI

Lynch, D. & Weil, J. (2024). The Washington Post, 5 October 2024. Retrieved 6 October 2024 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/10/05/port-strike-workers-jobs-automation-union/

Cloud- Based Hosting and Supply Chain Reliability

One technology that plays a crucial role in supply chain management (SCM) is cloud-based supply chain management systems. As will be described, cloud-based SCM systems can both mitigate and cause supply chain disruptions.

Cloud-based SCM systems can be either self-hosted by a company or are hosted by a cloud service provider. The primary advantage of self-hosting is data privacy: data is stored on the company’s own servers. The disadvantages are costs as well as vulnerability to physical disruptions (Temjanovski et al., 2021, pp. 28-30).

Hosting by a cloud service provider is the usual way companies host their SCM systems. While the company no longer “owns” their data, the problems of scaling and of IT and security maintenance are transferred to the cloud service provider. This is usually less expensive than self-hosting. In addition, supply chain visibility is generally available to supply chain partners (Temjanovski et al., 2021, p. 30).

The largest cloud service provider is Amazon Web Services (AWS). They provide services to most parts of the world, the major exceptions include Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Within the United States, AWS has servers located in four regions (large geographic areas) for private or commercial use plus two separate regions dedicated to government use (AWS Documentation, n.d.). Each region has anywhere from two to four availability zones (distinct locations within a region), and within those availability zones are one or more data centers. AWS documentation notes that each datacenter has “redundant power, networking, and connectivity, and housed in separate facilities” (AWS Documentation, n.d.). At each level (region, AZ, datacenter), a failure at one level is isolated from other levels. Data is mirrored between the different AZs in a region, ensuring redundancy.

Because of all this, data loss is extremely rare. Permanent service outages are even rarer, requiring the serious faults at geographically dispersed locations. Service interruptions are possible, however, even with AWS’ level of redundancy and fault tolerance.

For example, an outage in US-EAST-1 Region on 30 July 2024 made Ring home security cameras and doorbells unusable. Numerous web services went down, including Goodreads. This outage wasn’t limited to online services: Whole Foods registers were down, and Amazon delivery drivers couldn’t complete their routes because the app they use when delivering packages was unavailable (Harris, 2024).

Cloud-based SCM software is certainly cost effective, permits visibility to supply chain partners, and data loss is avoided through periodic backups as well as redundant storage. Service outages do occur, and the 30 July 2024 outage shows that these outages have grave consequences to both online and real-world services.

References

AWS Documentation. (n.d.). “Regions and Availability Zones.” Retrieved 15 September 2024 from https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/global-infrastructure/regions_az/

Harris, D. (2024). “AWS outage hits Amazon services, Ring, Whole Foods, Alexa.” CRN. Retrieved 15 September 2024 from https://www.crn.com/news/cloud/2024/aws-outage-hits-amazon-services-ring-whole-foods-alexa

Temjanovski, R., Bezovski, Z., & Apasieva, T. J. (2021). Cloud computing in logistic and supply chain management environment. Journal of Economics, 6(1), 23-32. Retrieved 15 September 2024 from https://eprints.ugd.edu.mk/27861/2/4191-Article%20Text-6939-1-10-20210224.pdf

Supply Chain Disruptions: Boycotts

Concept

A supply chain disruption is an unexpected interruption in the flow of goods or services. Supply chain disruptions can be caused by demand volatility, transportation issues, supplier issues, talent shortages, political instability, pandemics, and various other reasons. For each of these categories, there are several specific types of causes. For example, demand volatility can be caused by seasonal demand variations, competitor actions, etc.

A source of demand volatility is through consumer boycotting. One can easily predict the effects a boycott would have on the targeted company: loss of revenue, tarnishing of corporate reputation, and erosion of customer loyalty. With the latter, the customer will consider using competing goods and services. The practical consequence of this is that if the customer happens to like the competitor better, that customer is potentially lost forever to the boycotted company. These are the immediate effects of a boycott. What are the consequences to the targeted company’s supply chain?

Research into the effects of boycotts on supply chain logistics crosses many academic lines including marketing, politics, and business management. A quick scholarly literature review on the effects of boycotts on supply chains frequently also include the effects of sanctions. These published texts tend to focus on multinational supply chains and evaluate the boycotts and sanctions through the criteria of DEI, ESG, corporate social advocacy, circular supply chains, and sustainability using the attendant leftist political philosophy. The overall thrust of this research is: "first world company boycotted - third world hardest hit."

A typical example of the effects of sanctions and boycotts is the research by Shalpegin and Kumar (2023). They do not supply concrete definitions of “sanctions” and “boycotts”, though they do differentiate them by stating that sanctions are mandated by authorities (governments, multinational organizations, or NGOs) whereas boycotts are implemented voluntarily. It is interesting to note that they do not consider the consequences to the boycotted company and its “local” supply chain but instead focus on the consequences to offshore suppliers that participate in the company's supply chain.

Shalpegin and Kumar (2023, pp. 3-5) state that suppliers are impacted through direct relationship with the targeted company (meaning that suppliers may also be boycotted or sanctioned). In addition, the suppliers may be unable to access foreign markets or certain forms of technology, as the supplier relied on the targeted company for access. Finally, there may be logistics failures for the supplier in the forms of bottlenecks and reduced capacity (See discussion in Quigg (2022, pp. 59-77)). These are the ways sanctions and boycotts travel among supply chain members, “jeopardizing the principles of diversity, equity, and inclusion in supply chains.” (Shalpegin & Kumar, 2023, p. 1).

One of the solutions to the problems (real or imaginary) that Shalpegin and Kumar (2023, p. 5) identify is to shorten the supply chains, i.e., to use local sourcing. Local sourcing is not a complete solution, however. The ultimate form of local sourcing, nationalism, will obviously impact multinational enterprises (MNEs). Charpin (2021, p. 4) finds that “nationalism could engender supply chain disruptions via discriminatory practices toward all foreign MNEs and how national animosity may generate additional risks for the MNEs of nations in conflict with one another.” Charpin (2021, p. 8) is apparently comfortable with the concept of corporate nationality, but notes that this option is not legally supported. The solution Charpin (2021, p. 8) proposes is for MNEs to relocate their supply chain activities from offshore locations to home country locations. This activity protects a company from sanctions but still leaves them open to boycotts.

How damaging are boycotts to companies? King (2017) holds that “[w]hile boycotts rarely hurt revenues, they can threaten a company’s reputation, especially by generating negative media coverage.” Meanwhile, there seems to be no uniform agreement on the average duration of consumer boycotts. Levesque & Nam (2019) note that a boycott of Nestle lasted for seven years, while a boycott of Star-Kist lasted “almost no time at all.” Lasarov, Hoffman, and Orth (2023) also do not predict the duration of consumer boycotts, but they do note that during what they call the “heat-up phase” of a boycott, there is a sharp decrease of interest after two weeks. King (2017) notes that “we can’t pay attention to any single controversy for very long.” King recommended that “targeted companies might do better to simply “wait it out” rather than taking action in response to a boycott that might be in the news one day and out the next.”

Combining these two lines of research, one can conclude that boycotts – regardless of duration – have a minor negative impact on corporate revenue, and that “waiting it out” is a viable strategy. Thus, the consequences to the targeted company’s supply chain are negligible. Is this really the case?

Applications and Examples

With this as background, we examine two recent examples of boycotts. These boycotts show that “customer satisfaction” is more complicated than presented in Quigg (2022, pp. 103 – 110).

The first case we consider is the 2020 boycott of Goya, a large Latin food brand with markets in North America and Europe. Goya CEO and co-owner Robert Unanue praised President Donald Trump’s Hispanic Prosperity Initiative in July of 2020. Several Latino politicians and artists, most notably Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Julian Castro, called for a boycott of the brand. Almost immediately a counter-boycott or “buycott” was started by supporters of Trump and Goya. At the end of 2020, Unanue sarcastically named Ocasio-Cortez as “employee of the month,” claiming that the boycott/buycott expanded Goya’s customer base resulting in a sales spike and prompted the opening of a new food production facility in Texas to meet increased demand.

Research by Liaukonytė et al (2022) pegged the sales spike at 22% overall, with an increase of 56.4% in Republican counties and no decrease in Democrat counties. In addition, there was no sales decrease among Goya’s core customer base. The sales spike dissipated within three weeks. Liaukonytė et al (2022) provide no information on the effects of the buycott on Goya’s supply chain, unfortunately.

The second boycott we consider is the 2023 boycott of Bud Light, which was caused by two events. The first event was the widespread recognition of comments by Alissa Heinerscheid, Bud Light’s vice president of marketing, stating the need to “evolve and elevate” the brand to be inclusive, stating that existing marketing was “fratty and [used] out-of-touch humor.”

The second event was the decision to use “trans-influencer” Dylan Mulvaney as a representative of this brave new inclusive world. At the time, Mulvaney was participating in a self-promotion campaign called “365 Days of Girlhood” which of course did not sit well with conservatives as well as members of the “LGB without the TQ” and “trans-exclusionary radical feminists” groups.

The resulting backlash was a boycott of Bud Light products (but not all AMBev products). Three months after the boycott began, Bud Light sales had decreased 28% compared to the same time in previous years. Analysis by Liaukonytė et al (2024) (the same researchers who investigated the Goya boycott) found that sales decreased 32% in Republican counties and 22% in Democrat counties.

Bud Light went silent on the issue, and the boycott continued. In the summer of 2023, the Human Rights Campaign excoriated Anheuser-Busch (Bud Light’s owner) stating that:

In this moment, it is absolutely critical for Anheuser-Busch to stand in solidarity with Dylan and the trans community. However, when faced with anti-LGBTQ+ and transphobic criticism, Anheuser-Busch’s actions demonstrate a profound lack of fortitude in upholding its values of diversity, equity, and inclusion.

This started a secondary boycott that may have resulted in the above-noted sales decrease in Democrat counties.

According to Liaukonytė et al (2024), sales of Bud Light were persistently down for at least eight months, with sales down by 32% in Q4 2023. Heinerscheid and other members of the marketing team left the company, though the exact dates and details of their departures have not been made public.

Liaukonytė et al (2024) did consider the effects this boycott had on Bud Light’s supply chain, stating that the ongoing decline resulted in:

retailers and distributors reducing shelf space for Bud Light, illustrating how boycotts can lead to a negative feedback loop. What started as a consumer-led boycott generated downstream adjustments from retailers and distributors. These supply-side adjustments hurt the brand’s visibility and further exacerbated the negative impact on Bud Light’s performance.

These two examples – the Goya boycott/buycott and the Bud Light boycott – fly in the face of the “conventional wisdom” on boycotts: they need not be the short-term affairs, the effects on company profits is not always negative and negligible, and it is not always best to “wait it out”.

 

References

Charpin, R. (2022). “The resurgence of nationalism and its implications for supply chain risk management.” International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management. 5(1), 4-28. https:// 10.1108/IJPDLM-01-2021-0019

King, B. (2017). “Do Boycotts Work?” Northwestern Institute for Policy Research. Retrieved 12 September 2024 from https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/news/2017/king-corporate-boycotts.html

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Comparing Military Logistics vs Commercial Logistics

Comparing Military Logistics vs Commercial Logistics

Similarities

• Requires various supplies in order to proceed
• Consumes supplies as operations continue - and operations halt when supply is exhausted
• Both have various supply classes
• Impracticality of carrying and maintaining all the supplies needed for an extended period of time
• Both use networks of supply bases and have transportation routes
• Predictable usage cycles (fighting seasons in military, Christmas season for commercial)
• Unpredictable demand spikes (unforeseen offensives in military, commercial products "go viral")

Differences

• Military has virtually unlimited funding; commercial activities must operate within budget
• Military supplies are subject to physical attack from an enemy, commercial supplies are not - usually
• Military logistic networks are organized into trees; commercial networks aren't
• Commercial activities can rapidly reorganize supply chains; military has "friction"
• Raiding is acceptable in military context, but isn't in commercial context.

A large number of Union Pacific trains were raided in LA in Jan 2022. UP has their own police department, but they did nothing to prevent the looting. Their failure lets me know there's a gray zone between military and commercial logistics, and that is a zone that should be occupied.