Introduction
There is no absence of targets for China in the South China Sea (SCS) - Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan in particular. China certainly has the ability to wage conventional war in the SCS, but the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also been pursuing "unrestricted warfare," (Qiao & Liang, 1999) wherein different types of non-kinetic actions (economic, psychological, cultural, international lawfare) are used to affect target nations, either to destabilize them or to turn them into client states. The fundamental concepts of unrestricted warfare are not limited to that type of warfare but also carry-over into conventional warfare as described below.
How the PRC Could Attack Nations in or Close to The South China Sea
China has claimed several islands in the SCS, in particular the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and have constructed airfields and ports on many of them. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies' "China Island Tracker" (CSIS, 2025), the CCP has built 20 outposts in the Paracel Islands and 7 in the Spratly Islands. In addition, the CCP has been creating artificial islands.
Each of these islands must be considered in the context of the PRC’s military: they can be used as airstrips, listening outposts, logistics sites, etc. (Center for Preventative Action, 2025)
China would use multi-domain warfare in any military operation in the SCS, but they will expand on the doctrine according to the concepts of unrestricted warfare. The authors of the unrestricted warfare doctrine asked the question "where is the battlefield" - and they answered "everywhere." (Qiao & Liang, 1999) This is relevant to kinetic warfare as follows: US military operations, in particular drone operations, are controlled remotely. For example, the drone strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki in 2011 was controlled from Creech Air Force Base outside Las Vegas, Nevada. (Zegart, 2022) That means that Las Vegas is a legitimate military target. The document defining multi-domain battle (TRADOC, 2017) explicitly states that we must think of the battlefield as “expanded” (TRADOC, 2017, p.6), so conflict with China would not be restricted to SCS, but it is not clear if the “remote control” situation was considered. If this is indeed the case, this represents a flaw in the multi-domain warfare doctrine.
China already is employing unrestricted warfare in the SCS. For example, the Belt and Road Initiative has been used to establish "hooks" into other countries' infrastructures, and the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia are all considered part of the Belt-and-Road Initiative, as is Indonesia (Council on Foreign Relations, N/D). The infrastructure constructed in those nations represents anywhere from 2% to 8% of their GDP (Steil, 2022).
An Effective Counter Strategy
As described in Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040 (TRADOC, 2017), the multi-domain battle (MDB) doctrine is applicable during pre-conflict competition stage, during armed conflict stage, and return-to-competition stage where the competitor is a "still-capable peer adversary" (TRADOC, 2017, p. 21). There are two things we can learn: First, MDB is applicable to the time before the start of armed conflict; second, the competitor is still capable after the conclusion of armed conflict. (?!?)
The second point is genuinely concerning since it explicitly allows for "endless wars", but that will not be examined here.
For the first point, MDB during the pre-conflict stage involves "conducting proactive stabilization campaigns, contesting destabilization campaigns, deterring escalation through the application of flexible deterrent options and rapid deterrence response options, and preparing for transition immediately into armed conflict should the adversary attack" (TRADOC, 2017, pp. 21-22). Destabilization campaigns are designed to cause internal strife.
This, along with military training exercises involving other nations in or near the SCS, could be sufficient to prevent a PRC attack.
If, however, kinetic warfare were to begin, the United States would likely pursue multi-domain warfare, hopefully with security measures to protect remote-controlled operations as described above.
Limiting Factors that US and Allied Forces Would Likely Encounter
For the non-kinetic possibility, the limiting factor (LIMFAC) would primarily be a lack of support from nations involved in the Belt-and-Road Initiative – besides the economic pressure there would also be serious levels of CCP propaganda in those nations.
For the kinetic possibility, the problem of positioning forces in the region should not be considered a major LIMFAC due to the presence of military bases in Japan. Coordination between US and Allied forces should be resolved by Joint Operation protocols. One LIMFAC would be the relative smallness of the militaries in the region. The major LIMFAC would be operational security: many American institutions have been compromised by the CCP, or are sympathetic to socialism, including the US Military as demonstrated by General Mark Milley, West Point student Spenser Rapone, etc. The sheer number of compromised institutions is a powerful weapon (Ferguson, 2019, pp. 3-59) with which we must contend.
References
CSIS. (2025). "China Island Tracker". Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/
Center for Preventative Action. (2025). "Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea". Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea
Council on Foreign Relations. (N/D). “China’s Approach to Global Governance” https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/
Ferguson, N. (2019). The Square and the Tower: Networks and Power, from the Freemasons to Facebook. Penguin Books.
Qiao & Liang. (1999). Unrestricted Warfare. Shadow Lawn Press. https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf
Steil, B. (2022). “Belt and Road Tracker”. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker
TRADOC. (2017). Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040. https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/MDB_Evolutionfor21st.pdf
Zegart, A. (2022). Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence. Princeton University Press.
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