Introduction
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 involved a combination of physical deception and propaganda used to trick the Crimeans into accepting Russian occupation, and to mask Russia's intentions from the rest of Ukraine and the world at large. The operation made it appear that a national socialist movement was forming in Kyiv, and that this movement would threaten the Russians living in Crimea. This illusion worked to delegitimize the government in Kyiv as well as to present Russia as saviors to the people of Crimea.
In this essay, a decomposition of data analysis is first performed. Next, the conditions favoring Russian annexation are listed. After that, the physical deception operation and the information campaign are described. Finally, the overall operation is very briefly analyzed into what Russian military analysts call “maskirovka,” meaning “little masquerade.” Unless mentioned otherwise, all information is taken from (Kofman, M., et al., 2017).
Decomposition of Data Analysis
Actors
People of Crimea - the people of Crimea were passive in the start of the Russian campaign, but later accepted Russian presence.
"Little Green Men" (LGMs) - also called the "polite people," they were Russian troops wearing unmarked uniforms. Before their identity as Russian troops was revealed, their role raised concerns amongst the Crimeans, using FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) about the conditions in Ukraine.
Local militias, biker gangs, Cossacks, and members of special police units - they had Russian backing but were set-up to be opponents of the LGMs.
News outlets in Crimea - spread the narrative of a national socialist movement forming in Kyiv and that this was a threat to the Russians living in Crimea.
Major Actions
Establish a narrative that a national socialist movement was gaining strength in Kyiv, and that this movement will be a threat to Crimeans. This was done by the presence of the LGMs, their manufactured opposition, and the propaganda coming from the news outlets.
Seizure of the Crimean Parliament on February 27, 2014, by fifty operators from Russia's KSO (Special Operations Forces) masquerading as a local militia. This action presented the appearance that Crimeans wanted protection from Russia.
Targets
Being primarily an operation of deception, the target was the beliefs of the Crimeans, to convince them that a nascent national socialist movement in Kyiv would be a threat to their well-being, and that Russia would be able to protect them.Objectives
Build an air of legitimacy allowing Russia to gain control of the Crimean Peninsula without serious kinetic or non-violent resistance.
Effects
The physical deception operation (the LGMs and their “opponents”) and the information campaign allowed Russia to annex Crimea with little bloodshed, if any.
Preconditions
Russia leveraged several pre-existing conditions to facilitate the annexation. The shared language and history between Crimea and Russia as described by Vladimir Putin in (Putin, 2021) and (Carlson & Putin, 2024) enabled Russian operatives to blend in effortlessly with the local populace, aiding covert operations. Additionally, the long-standing presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet near Crimea meant that the sight of Russian naval forces was routine for Crimeans, reducing immediate suspicion when military activities escalated.
Concurrently, the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, which started just weeks before the annexation, required a heightened security presence from Russia, providing a convenient cover for military maneuvers. On February 26, Russia further masked its intentions with a snap inspection of its forces, using this as a tactic to disguise troop movements towards Crimea.
Adding to the narrative of a growing fascist movement was political turmoil in Kyiv, in which Viktor Yanukovych, the then-president of Ukraine, abandoned Kyiv, leaving Euromaidan protesters in charge.
Physical Deception Operations
In the lead-up to the annexation of Crimea, Russia employed physical deception operations aimed at shaping public perception both within Crimea and internationally. The primary goal was to create the illusion that a national socialist movement was burgeoning in Ukraine, and that this movement posed a significant threat to the Crimean population. This made it appear that Russian intervention was a protective measure against the fascists.
Central to this deception was the presence of the so-called "little green men" (LGMs), unidentified soldiers without insignia who appeared in Crimea. Their sudden and unexplained presence suggested an impending armed takeover, instilling fear and uncertainty among the local populace. This ambiguity was crucial to the narrative of an external threat or a coup in motion.
The operation was not limited to these soldiers alone; it involved a mix of local militias, biker gangs, Cossacks, and former members of the Berkut special police unit. These groups played roles in street-level intimidation and in reinforcing the image of a grassroots resistance movement against supposed Ukrainian nationalists. They thus operated as manufactured opposition.
A significant event in this campaign occurred on 27 February 2014, when fifty operators from Russia's KSO (Special Operations Forces) masqueraded as a local militia and seized the Crimean Parliament. By raising the Russian flag over the parliament building, they visually and symbolically asserted control, further solidifying the narrative of a local shift towards Russian allegiance.
To give a veneer of legitimacy to these actions, a referendum was quickly organized. This vote was presented as a democratic process where the Crimeans could voice their preference for joining Russia. This move was part of the strategy to make the annexation appear as a response to the will of the Crimean people rather than an act of aggression by Russia.
The Information Campaign
Russia launched an extensive propaganda campaign using local Russian-language broadcasters, with three main objectives: to discredit the newly established government in Ukraine, to heighten the sense of peril among Russians living in Ukraine, and to create an illusion of widespread support for Crimea's reunification with Russia. This campaign was strategically timed to precede, accompany, and follow the military operations in Crimea, ensuring a narrative that aligned with the physical actions on the ground.
The primary audience for this propaganda was the Russian public, with Crimean residents as a secondary target. The groundwork for this was already laid due to the popularity of Russian television in Crimea. On 9 March 2014, Russia escalated its control over information by shutting down Ukrainian TV channels, thereby monopolizing the narrative. Russian TV frequently labeled Oleksandr Turchynov’s new Ukrainian government, which had replaced Viktor Yanukovych's government, as a "fascist junta," framing the annexation as a necessary intervention to protect ethnic Russians from this supposed threat.
Conclusion
Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 utilized both pre-existing conditions and sophisticated deception tactics. By exploiting the cultural and historical ties, along with the familiar presence of its naval forces, Russia managed to execute its strategy with stealth and legitimacy in the eyes of those within Crimea, Ukraine, Russian, and international audiences.
The use of physical deception through LGMs and local groups created a perception of imminent threat, justifying intervention under the guise of protection. Further, Russia’s information campaign not only discredited the Ukrainian government but also painted the annexation as a popular and protective move. Thus, Russia secured Crimea before Ukraine and international forces could confront this annexation.
To describe the overall process Russia used to capture Crimea, (Bouwmeester, 2021) uses the term “maskirovka,” a strategy of deception the goal of which is to “destabilize command structures and to create ‘fog of war’” by fabricating “a manageable form of chaos.” He calls the propaganda component “active intelligence” - the “active” part here would be the use of the LGMs and the manufactured resistance against them. Maskirovka has been part of Russian military operations at least since World War 2 (Maier, 2016, p. 4), and the annexation of Crimea shows that it is still part of the Russian Military’s quiver.
References
Bouwmeester, A. J. H. (2021). “The art of deception revisited (part 2): The unexpected annexation of Crimea in 2014.” Militaire Spectator. https://militairespectator.nl/artikelen/art-deception-revisited-part-2-unexpected-annexation-crimea-2014
Carlson, T. & Putin, V. (2024, February 6). Exclusive: Tucker Carlson Interviews Vladimir Putin [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fOCWBhuDdDo
Kofman, M., et al. (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html
Maier, M. (2016). A little masquerade: Russia’s evolving employment of maskirovka. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1022096.pdf
Putin, V. (2021). Article by Vladimir Putin ”On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians“. President of Russia. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181
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