Just finished responding to a jus in bello analysis of Hiroshima and Nagasaki written by an active-duty Marine. He is a Staff Sergeant who is also an assistant instructor at a Naval ROTC program at a midwestern state university. Said Marine wrote an essay stating that using nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were morally wrong. He was using the same Just War Theory and he sites the exact same facts as I did in my previous post, but he drew the exact opposite conclusion.
Unfortunately his post is private and I don't have permission to republish it here. Below is my hastily-written response. If it wasn't so rushed, I would expand on the "non-combatant vs supporter" theme by writing:
Just War Theorists go through considerable wrangling to determine who is a legitimate target and who isn't. In her text, Frowe talks about how "wide" to cast a net in order to catch the right targets:
too wide = all combatants plus some non-combatants
too narrow = some (but not all) combatants plus no non-combatants.
If we do cast too wide, which non-combatants are to be included as targets? The obvious targets, like civilians working in armament plants, makes sense. I would claim that the "journalists" who screeched for war, the politicians who clamored for war, and the defense contractors who profit before, during, and after the war make for far better targets than the actual combatants due to the amount of harm they cause.An assumption that needs to be checked is the "innocence" of non-combatants. It may be more accurate to call them "supporters" or "enablers," or at least some of them. Their innocence is problematic because of the way the general citizenry frequently get along in a totalitarian country such as Imperial Japan. When Germany was reunited after the fall of the Berlin Wall, lists of collaborators, informants, and other people who worked with the East German Stasi were released, and those were not short lists!
The following is my response to his essay.
Respectfully sir, you are wrong. Here's why...
In Chapter 5, Frowe1 lays all the cards on the table regarding jus in bello criteria. After giving a straw-man version of "realism," the main part of the chapter begins by saying that jus ad bellum and jus in bello must be kept logically separate. One of the reasons given is that the combatants may be conscripts, therefore the warfighters are tools and cannot be held morally responsible for their leaders. Those who accept that reasoning don't realize that at any point in history where conscription was used, there have always been draft resisters. For those who do volunteer, Frowe states2 that "by enlisting, they wave their right not to be killed in battle by the other side. They are therefore not wronged by being killed..." It isn't exactly clear how they give up their right to life, and many would claim that the right to life is one of the reasons why we do fight.
To get the Principle of Discrimination working, Frowe then attempts to distinguish between "combatants" and "non-combatants". A "Realist War Theorist" (the belief system I hold) would instead distinguish between "combatants" and "enablers" or "combatants" and "supporters," but let's continue with her dichotomy. For JWT, this creates a 4-way classification system - friendly combatants, our non-combatants, enemy combatants, and enemy non-combatants. There is much wrangling in Chapter 5 about the "value" assigned to the people in each class. There's nothing wrong with this.
On friendly combatants vs enemy combatants, the Just War Theorist Michael Walzer states3 "the moral status of individual soldiers on both sides is very much the same" and that "they face one another as moral equals." Really? By this, US Marines and soldiers are morally equivalent to the Japanese soldiers who participated in the "rape of Nanking." This was a six week long massacre that started when the Imperial Japanese Army invaded the Chinese city of Nanking4 in December 1937, during which 200,000 to 300,000 residents were killed, anywhere from 20,000 to 80,000 women and children raped, and 30,000 to 40,000 POWs executed.
Combining Walzer's position with the above quote from Frowe means our men are not wronged by being killed. As leaders, the men under our command are the most valuable things in the world. Those who have not been in that position would say "if they were so valuable, you would take them out of the combat zone." That only shows a lack of understanding of what warfighters and leading warfighters are all about: they follow you because they wish to follow themselves through you.
The Principle of Discrimination requires friendly non-combatants and enemy non-combatants to also be morally equal: they are both innocents not to be harmed. Really? When I read that, the following comparison jumped to mind: when 9/11 occurred, there were pictures of New Yorkers running away from the collapsing buildings, and there were pictures of people in the Middle East jumping with joy. People who hold non-combatants on both sides are equal must say that those are the same pictures.
Our combatants are more valuable than enemy combatants, and our non-combatants are more valuable than enemy non-combatants. This is why you fight for the men beside you and those behind you. This is also why you don't change sides. Believing this doesn't make you a “rampaging militiaman” as Frowe dismissively states5 (she's obviously never met a militiaman), it just means you have your priorities straight.
Regards,
Mike K
Footnotes
- Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace.
- Ibid.
- Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations.
- Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II.
- Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace.
Bibliography
Chang, I. The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. Basic Books, 2012.
Frowe, H. The Ethics of War and Peace. Taylor & Francis, 2022.
Walzer, M. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Basic Books, 2015.
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