Starburst Analysis and Information Sources for the Battle of COP Keating

Introduction

This essay attempts to come to an understanding of the major actions, participants, methods, and motives in the 3 October 2009 Battle of COP Keating in eastern Afghanistan. A starburst analysis will be done to achieve this. Further, some of the various information sources/perspectives will be examined to see what they can contribute to an understanding this battle.

Starburst Analysis

Who - The primary actors in the Battle of COP Keating were US and ANA forces versus Taliban insurgents, called AAF in the video. There were approximately 300 Taliban fighters involved. The US and ANA had 73 troops positioned at COP Keating plus 29 troops stationed at OP Fritsche. As the battle progressed, a QRF from FOB Bostic and air support joined the US and ANA side.

What - The key activity was the battle between the US and ANA forces against the Taliban fighters. Planning and observation were performed by Taliban leaders prior to the attack.

When - The battle took place on 3 October 2009, but planning began months prior. The attack was timed to correspond to scheduled closing of COP Keating and OP Fritsche.

Where - COP Keating and OP Fritsche were located near the town of Kamdesh in eastern Afghanistan (which led to another name for the battle, the Battle of Kamdesh). COP Keating was in mountainous terrain, at the bottom of a valley. Two sides of the camp were bounded by the Darreh ye Kushtoz River. The surrounding mountains were unsecured except for the one capped by OP Fritsche. COP Keating and OP Fritsche were not in direct line of sight. These mountains, along with a nearby mosque, would serve as Taliban fire locations.

Why - COP Keating was established in July 2006, positioned to disrupt insurgent supply lines from Pakistan. By dislocating the COP, the flow of weapons and fighters would resume.

How - The Battle of COP Keating was a two-pronged attack, one against COP Keating (the primary target), the other against OP Fritsche. Both targets were engaged simultaneously to prevent one from assisting the other. The nearest air support came from FOB Bostick, 10 minutes away by helicopter.

Information Sources

It is necessary to evaluate information that was available prior to the Battle of COP Keating as well as information generated after the battle occurred. One would expect various after-action reports of the Battle, but they have been repressed, and many details did not become known until the release of WikiLeaks’ Afghan War Diaries. Apparently, there were multiple intelligence failures. Building on (Gertz. 2009), Hershel Smith writes (Smith, 2009):

…defense intelligence had three reports of imminent danger but failed to act on this intelligence. What “smoking gun report” would have convinced them to take action we aren’t told…

Smith goes on to hint that a “smoking gun report” may have been in possession of the CIA.

Population studies (the human domain perspective) of the people living near COP Keating would be useful for determining local attitudes and for building a social network of the people. Adversary media, be it in the form of literature, internet posts, etc., would also help in creating a social network. This social network can then be infiltrated to gather information. The social network can then be analyzed to determine the major Taliban influencers who will then become the major targets for US forces. (Healy. 2013)

Another critical information stream would be a scholarly perspective. Thaler, et. al. (2013, p. 12) sites several academic papers (many published prior to the battle) stating that Afghanistan has a culture of independence and resistance. This is an extremely specific characterization and probably wouldn’t hold for all Afghani. If it applies to the people living near COP Keating, this will determine how Afghani would relate to or tolerate foreign presence, if at all.

Finally, the security practitioners’ perspective would provide a wealth information, not only about the Battle itself but about the conditions that existed prior to it as well as to make predictions about future engagements.

Both the COP and OP were targeted by 45 attacks between May 2009 and October 2009. One question that security practitioners could answer is this: did the insurgency forces display improvement in their operational ability during that time, and if so, in what areas?

An insurgency does not spring fully-formed from the forehead of Saint Mattis of the Blessed Order of the Knife Hands. It must have meager beginnings and, unless extinguished, will improve by becoming confident, learning new 4GW techniques, making use of changing logistics opportunities, etc. Once the baseline and trajectory are established, the insurgency’s future operations can be predicted.

Conclusion

The starburst analysis technique, combined with various information perspectives, helps us come to an understanding of the Battle of COP Keating. Until a comprehensive AAR, similar to the one performed for the similar Battle at Wanar (Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 2010) becomes available, there will always be questions.

References

ABC News. (5 February 2010). “Camp Keating officers disciplined for attack that killed 8 U. S. troops.” Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://abcnews.go.com/WN/Afghanistan/camp-keating-commanders-disciplined-attack-killed-22-us/story?id=9761160

Gertz, B. (29 October 2009). “DIA on Afghan intel” Washington Times. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/29/inside-the-ring-58944275/

Healy, K. (2013). Using metadada to find Paul Revere. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from: https://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-metadata-to-find-paul-revere/

Smith, H. (2 November 2009). “Systematic defense intelligence failures”. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/11/02/systemic-defense-intelligence-failures/

Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. (2010). “Wanat: Combat action in Afghanistan, 2008”. Combat Studies Institute Press. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Wanat.pdf

Steeb, Matsumura, Herbert, Gordon IV, & Horn. (2011). “Perspectives on the Battle of Wanat”. Rand Corporation. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP329z1.pdf

Thaler, Brown, Gonzalez, Mobley, & Roshan. (2013). “Improving the U.S. Military’s understanding of unstable environments vulnerable to violent extremist groups”. RAND Corporation. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR298.html

TRADOC G2 OE Enterprise G&V. (10 August 2012). “The battle of COP Keating - October 3rd, 2009”. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylUzySZb3L8

WikiLeaks War Diary. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/search/?q=cop+keating∓sort=date∓release=Afghanistan∓date__gte=2009-10-03∓date__lte=2009-10-09

Battle of COP Keating

Geographic Analysis

Combat Outpost (COP) Keating was positioned in the Kamdesh District of Afghanistan, 25 km away from the Pakistan border. It was located in mountainous terrain, at the bottom of a valley, along an unimproved road which ran alongside the Darreh ye Kushtoz River. The village of Urmal was located 200 meters west of the COP.

COP Keating, located at the bottom of a valley in the Kamdesh District of Afghanistan. Photo by Brad Larson.

The surrounding mountains were not secured, except for the one capped by OP Fritsche, located 2.2 miles south of COP Keating with a 2144 ft difference in elevation. COP Keating and OP Fritsche were not in line of sight of each other.

Close to COP Keating was a mosque located on a ridgeline that would serve as an enemy fire position.

This area - the COP, the OP, the mosque, and surrounding mountains – would be the location of the Battle of Kamdesh, also called the Battle of COP Keating. Taliban insurgents had engaged the ground unit assigned to COP Keating and OP Fritsche over 45 times since May 2009.

Squadron HQ was located at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Bostick, 30 km southeast of COP Keating, or 10 minutes flight time by helicopter. Task force and brigade headquarters were both located at FOB Fenty in Jalalabad, 137 km southwest of COP Keating, or 40 minutes flight time by helicopter. These bases would supply air and artillery support during the battle.

The Battle

At the time of the attack, COP Keating had 73 troops (53 US troops and 20 Afghan National Army (ANA)), and OP Fritsche had 29 troops (19 US and 10 ANA) stationed there.

Immediately prior to the attack, insurgents occupied the mosque and five nearby support by fire (SBF) positions. These positions were overlooking COP Keating and would also interfere with air support.

The attacks on FOB Keating and OP Fritsche began simultaneously on the morning of 3 October 2009. The mortar pit at COP Keating was pinned-down and soldiers were unable to return fire. Meanwhile, the men at OP Fritsche were pinned-down by other insurgents. Thus, the two OPs were unable to support each other.

FOB Bostick began indirect fire in support of COP Keating. Two F-15s arrived at COP Keating and began engaging insurgents. The insurgents continued attacking FOB Keating from three different directions, forcing the US and ANA troops to collapse into a defensive position within COP Keating.

OP Fritsche repulsed the insurgents and provided mortar fire in support of COP Keating.

Most of the buildings were on fire by this time and the base was partially overran by the insurgents. US forces pushed outwards to retake lost positions within COP Keating.

Part of a quick reaction force (QRF) from FOB Bostic arrived by helicopter at OP Fritsche, but weather delayed the rest of the QRF from arriving by one hour.

As fire continued to engulf COP Keating, the QRF departed OP Fritsche on foot towards COP Keating. Two hours into their descent, the QRF called-in close air support and engaged the insurgents. This forced the QRF to move using bounding overwatch, slowing their advance to COP Keating.

The QRF arrived 13 hours after the attack started. They began clearing operations and established a landing zone to allow for medical evacuation (MEDIVAC). Enemy fire prevented MEDIVAC fights from using that landing zone, but additional air support allowed the flights to commence.

Sixteen hours after the attack began, the last MEDIVAC flight left COP Keating. Eight U.S. soldiers were killed and 27 wounded; eight ANA soldiers were wounded. Approximately twenty-seven insurgents were killed. Only one of the buildings remained intact. The munitions depot was abandoned following US departure, which was then looted by the Taliban. The depot was bombed by Americans on 6 October to destroy any remaining munitions. Four officers were disciplined because of the attack. (ABC News, 2010).

Starburst Analysis

Starburst analysis is a structured analytic technique (SAT) that seeks to ensure that analysists have a grasp of the situation they’re investigating. It allows them to enumerate the actors, to handle information overload, and to differentiate and isolate root causes from symptoms. It allows analysts to identify gaps in their intelligence.

Who are the Primary Actors?

The primary actors consisted of US and ANA forces fighting against Taliban insurgents. The US and ANA forces had 73 troops stationed at COP Keating and 29 troops stationed at OP Fritsche. The QRF from FOB Bostic and air support reinforced COP Keating. Approximately 300 Taliban insurgents were involved.

What were the Key Activities?

The key activity was the battle between US/ANA troops and the Taliban fighters at COP Keating and OP Fritsche. This was preceded by planning and observation by the Taliban.

When

The battle itself took place on 3 October 2009 but planning by the Taliban and village elders started months prior.

Where

The battle took place at COP Keating (located at the bottom of a valley) and the nearby OP Fritsche, located at a higher elevation but not within direct line of sight. The Taliban attack made use of the mountains surrounding COP Keating to not only rain fire down upon the camp but also attack any incoming air support. In addition, the insurgent attack on OP Fritsche pinned-down the forces located there. The insurgents made use of a local mosque as a firing position, which the Americans would be loathe to attack.

Why

COP Keating was established in July 2006 and was left in place to prevent weapon shipments and insurgent movements across the Pakistan border. The Taliban attack was designed to dislocate the COP, presumably to allow the flow of weapons and fighters to continue.

How

The Battle of COP Keating was a two-pronged attack, one against COP Keating (presumably the primary target), the other against OP Fritsche. Both targets were engaged simultaneously to prevent one from assisting the other. Kept isolated, the nearest air support to the COP and OP was 10 minutes away by helicopter from FOB Bostick.

Information Sources

It is necessary to evaluate information that was available prior to the Battle of COP Keating as well as information sources generated after the battle took place.

Hindsight is 20/20 and one would expect to find analyses of the Battle of COP Keating. Beyond one TRADOC video, not much information is available besides personal accounts, popular books, as well as the 2020 movie called “The Outpost.” Many of the details of the battle did not come to light until the WikiLeaks Afghan War Diaries. Analysis of the battles were no doubt performed, but it may have been the case that analysts found some fundamental security flaw that was best kept secret.

Apparently, there were multiple intelligence failures. Building on (Gertz. 2009), Hershel Smith writes (Smith, 2009):

…defense intelligence had three reports of imminent danger but failed to act on this intelligence. What “smoking gun report” would have convinced them to take action we aren’t told…

Smith goes on to hint that a “smoking gun report” may have been in possession of the CIA.

Prior to the battle, there are the lessons learned from the 45 times that US forces engaged the Taliban since May 2009. Each engagement would be amenable to Starburst Analysis; in particular, information about the names and numbers of insurgents involved, the weapons and tactics they used, as well as the kinds of information they used in formulating their attacks. The troops involved could all be interviewed. All of this information would be local to the area of COP Keating of course.

The Battle of Wanat, which occurred on 13 July 2008, could also serve as a source of information. This battle was similar to the Battle of COP Keating in many ways, including the number of fighters on each side, geography, the distance from FOBs, etc. Unlike COP Keating, analyses of the Battle of Wanat are publicly available. (Steeb, et. al., 2011), (Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 2010).

The battle sites are separated by straight line distance of 56 km, so a different set of Taliban fighters may have been involved. Starburst Analysis of the Battle of Wanat could indicate common actors, tactics, and weapons when compared to the Battle of COP Keating, however. These commonalities would allow analysts to figure out the hierarchical structure of the Taliban as well as to observe the evolution of their weapons and tactics. Final analyses of the Battle of Wanat were completed after the Battle of COP Keating, but preliminary studies must have been available.

Population studies of the people living near COP Keating would be useful for determining local attitudes and for building a social network of the people.

Another critical information stream would be a scholarly perspective. Thaler, et. al. (2013, p. 12) sites several academic papers (many published prior to the battle) stating that Afghanistan has a culture of independence and resistance. This is a very specific characterization and probably wouldn’t hold for all Afghani. If it applies to the people living near COP Keating, this will determine how Afghani would relate to or tolerate foreign presence, if at all.

 

References

ABC News. (5 February 2010). “Camp Keating officers disciplined for attack that killed 8 U. S. troops.” Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://abcnews.go.com/WN/Afghanistan/camp-keating-commanders-disciplined-attack-killed-22-us/story?id=9761160

Gertz, B. (29 October 2009). “DIA on Afghan intel” Washington Times. Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/29/inside-the-ring-58944275/

Smith, H. (2 November 2009). “Systematic defense intelligence failures”. Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/11/02/systemic-defense-intelligence-failures/

Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. (2010). “Wanat: Combat action in Afghanistan, 2008”. Combat Studies Institute Press. Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Wanat.pdf

Steeb, Matsumura, Herbert, Gordon IV, & Horn. (2011). “Perspectives on the Battle of Wanat”. Rand Corporation. Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP329z1.pdf

Thaler, Brown, Gonzalez, Mobley, & Roshan. (2013). “Improving the U.S. Military’s understanding of unstable environments vulnerable to violent extremist groups”. RAND Corporation. Retrieved 29 June 2024 from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR298.html

TRADOC G2 OE Enterprise G&V. (10 August 2012). “The battle of COP Keating - October 3rd, 2009”. Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylUzySZb3L8

WikiLeaks War Diary. Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/search/?q=cop+keating∓sort=date∓release=Afghanistan∓date__gte=2009-10-03∓date__lte=2009-10-09

Starburst Analysis of the PRC’s Treatment of the Uyghurs

Introduction to Starburst Analysis

Starburst analysis is a structured analytic technique (SAT) used to combat “the premature closing of minds,” which Marvin (2013) described as a common pitfall for intelligence analysts. To avoid this, starburst analysis seeks to ensure that analysists have a grasp of the situation they’re investigating. It allows them to enumerate the actors, to handle information overload, and to differentiate and isolate root causes from symptoms. It allows analysts to identify gaps in their intelligence. Using starburst analysis and other SATs, intelligence analysts hope to achieve objectivity, putting aside personal objectives and ethics. This objectivity is attained rapidly.

Starburst analysis requires the analyst to identify essential facts about an operational environment, doing so entails the analyst to answer the following questions:

• Who – who are the key actors?
• What – what are the key activities and operations?
• When – when did they occur? What changes are happening to the participants over time?
• Where – what locations did those activities happen?
• Why – why are the key activities occurring? What are the causes?
• How – details about the activities – how are these activities conducted?

In this post, starburst analysis is applied to the treatment of Uyghurs in China.

Who are the Primary Actors?

The Uyghurs are a Turkic ethnic group living in China. They practice a moderate form of Sunni Islam, speak a Turkic language, and are culturally and historically affiliated with Central Asia.

Within the Chinese Communist Party, the primary actors are Chen Quanguo and Ma Xingrui. Chen was the CCP Secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region from 2016 to 2021, and was also the Political Commissa of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. He oversaw the construction of internment camps used to imprison Uyghurs and established a surveillance system used to monitor Uyghurs and to track escapees from the camps. (Maizland, 2022)

Chin was replaced in 2021 by Ma Zingrui. While he has loosened restrictions on the population, Ma stated in March 2024 that the sinofication of mosques will continue as it is “inevitable”. (Chen, 2024)

Where do the Uyghurs Live?

Uyghurs mostly live in the XUAR (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) located in the northeast of China. This province borders eight countries including several Muslim countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). The province is mineral rich, produces most of China’s cotton, has the largest coal and natural gas reserves in China, and 20% of its oil reserves.

China thus has a vested economic interest in the XUAR, and officials refer to it as a “core hub” for the Belt and Road Initiative. To this end, the PRC has taken steps to eliminate Uyghur culture, or at least replace the Uyghur population in the XUAR with Han Chinese.

What is CCP Policy towards the Uyghurs, and How is it Implemented?

As part of this program, mosques have been demolished or altered to remove motifs and Arabic writings.

There has been internment of 1 to 1.8 million Uyghurs and other Muslims in the re-education camps built by Chen Quanguo. The internees like in barbaric conditions and are made to renounce their Islamic faith. There are also forced labor programs requiring Uyghurs to work in labor-intensive industries including textile and apparel industries, and employment there involves political indoctrination. Refusal to work in such factories may result in detention.

There has also been programs of population replacement, substituting the Uyghurs in the XUAR with Han Chinese. (Lum & Weber, 2023)

One CCP religious affairs official has written (HRW, 2021) that their goal with the Uyghurs is to “break their lineage, break their roots, break their connections, and break their origins. Completely shovel up the roots of ‘two-faced people,’ dig them out, and vow to fight these two-faced people until the end,” where the phrase “two-faced people” refers to party members who are ideologically disloyal to the party.

When Did Key Activities Take Place

Between 1990 and 2001, over 200 acts of terrorism were attributed by the CCP to different Uyghur groups. These groups were primarily acting out of neighboring Turkestan, however, and the main terrorist organization within the XUAR is no longer in existence.

As mentioned above, internment camps were built by Chen Quanguo starting in 2017, and they continue to be in operation. Further, XUAR officials have instituted programs to eliminate the culture and language of the Uyghur. They enacted laws that “prohibits ‘expressions of extremification’ and placed restrictions upon dress and grooming, traditional Uyghur customs, and adherence to Islamic dietary laws (halal).” (Lum & Weber, 2023)

Why is it Being Done?

Past deadly incidents in the XUAR have been attributed by the CCP to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The ETIM, even at its height, was poorly financed and lacked the capacity to carry-out any attacks. The ETIM was declared a terrorist organization in 2002 and added to the Terrorist Exclusion List in 2004. It was removed from the Terrorist Exclusion List in 2020 since there has been no credible evidence that the group continues to exist.

Thus, while the Uyghurs may have had terrorist connections in the past, this was no longer the case by the time the internment camps were created in the XUAR. The CCP’s ultimate goal remains the same: to destroy the Uyghurs, their language, their culture.

As terrorist sympathies is no longer a motivation for their destruction, one is left with two possible explanations for the CCP’s animosity towards the Uyghurs:

• Enforcement of ideological purity
• Economic reasons – to make the XUAR into a hub of the Belt and Road Initiative.

What Actions did the United States Take?

The United States took several steps in response to CCP treatment of the Uyghurs (Lum & Weber, 2023), including:

• The imposition of economic sanctions on specific PRC officials and Chinese companies involved in forced labor
• Protection of Uyghur-Americans from harassment or intimidation by CCP agents
• Import restrictions that block the import of goods (including tomatoes and cotton originating in the XUAR

Conclusion

Starburst analysis allows intelligence analysts to quickly understand their operating environment. It allows them to identify key players and actions and allows the analyst to distinguish the essential from the irrelevant. All this was demonstrated here for the Chinese Uyghurs.

References

Chen, L. (2024). “Top official from China's Xinjiang says 'Sinicisation' of Islam 'inevitable'”. Reuters. Retrieved 28 March 2024 from https://www.reuters.com/world/china/top-official-chinas-xinjiang-says-sinicisation-islam-inevitable-2024-03-07/

Human Rights Watch. (2021). “Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots: China’s Crimes Against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims”. Retrieved 28 March 2024 from https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting

Lum, T. & Weber, M. A. (2023). “China Primer: Uyghurs”. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved on 26 March 2024 from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10281

Maizland, L. (2022). “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang”. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on 28 March 2024 from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights

Marvin, A. (2013). “Dangers of Ethnicity in Analysis”. Small Wars Journal. Retrieved on 27 March 2024 from https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/dangers-of-ethnicity-in-analysis