Operation Desert Storm – an Analysis

Introduction

“Conventional warfare” is a relative term: what counts as conventional warfare depends on the time the war was fought, and frequently depends on the weapons or tactics used. Still, lessons learned in previous conflicts are applicable to subsequent wars: The Greeks at the Battle of Thermopylae used phalanx formations which have not withstood the test of time, but they also used delay tactics, feign retreats, and use of geography to constrain the enemy, all of which are timeless. So, while the phalanx eventually became obsolete, the other aspects were fundamental in all future military operations.

Thousands of years after Thermopylae came the trench warfare of WWI, followed by the mechanized warfare of WWII, with its blitzkriegs and tanks. The Gulf War was primarily a technological war, with weaponry so advanced that those used in previous wars appeared to be as anachronistic as the phalanx formation. Thus the Gulf War became the “conventional” war of the day.

This paper examines the operational components of the Gulf War and the interpretation of that war by American military analysts as well as by near-peer competitors.

Goals of the Gulf War

The Gulf War had both strategic goals and strategic constraints. The goals were to remove the Iraqi invasion force from Kuwait, and to degrade the military to prevent it from attacking Saudi Arabia, Israel, and other nearby countries. The constraint was to not degrade the military so far that it wouldn’t be a credible deterrence to Iranian invasion.

To accomplish this, combined air and ground operations were employed. The air operation was designed to destroy Iraqi air power, weaken its ground forces, and prepare the way for the ground invasion.

The precursor to Operation Desert Storm was, of course, Operation Desert Shield. Desert Shield allowed the George H. W. Bush administration to assemble the Coalition forces, and to position those forces for what would come next, should Saddam not withdraw from Kuwait. It gave time for the economic sanctions placed upon Iraq to have an effect. Finally, it allowed Coalition forces to train in a desert environment.

Demolished vehicles line Highway 80, also known as the "Highway of Death", the route fleeing Iraqi forces took as they retreated from Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm. Photo by Tech. Sgt. Joe Coleman, 18 April 1991.

Operation Desert Storm was divided into four phases¹. Phase I was to be a strategic air campaign designed to disrupt Iraq’s command and control over their forces, and to destroy NBC weapons research and production facilities. Phase II was to establish air supremacy over Kuwait. The goal of Phase III was to isolate Iraqi forces in Kuwait from reinforcement and resupply. Finally, Phase IV was to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

The first three phases were air campaigns and will be treated as a whole.

The Air Operation

The air operation lasted from 17 January 1991 to 23 February 1991, during which Coalition forces performed over 100,000 sorties and dropped 85,000 tons of bombs.

The air campaign began with the destruction of enemy radar sites near the Saudi-Iraqi border by American Apache and Pave Low helicopters. If left intact, those sites would warn Iraq of upcoming attacks. Following this, the weapons of choice were Tomahawk cruise missiles launched by ships positioned in the Persian Gulf, stealth bombers dropping “smart” bombs, and F/A-18 Hornets carrying anti-radar missiles. These latter homed-in on radar antennas, destroying them. This completed the destruction of Iraq’s radar system, thereby degrading their air capability. It further blinded Iraq from observing and responding to Coalition activities. Bombing continued using television-guided and laser-guided missiles.

At the time, Iraq’s air force was the sixth largest in the world. This changed due to three factors: first, aerial combat in which 36 Iraqi aircraft were downed; second, destruction of 254 aircraft while on the ground (either in standard or underground hangers); and finally, relocation of military assets into Iran.

It was originally thought that this movement of aircraft was a result of pilot desertion, but it was later proven that this was Saddam’s attempt at preserving Iraqi air power. This was confirmed from documents captured during the occupation of Iraq following the 2003 invasion². The US did not capture all the documents, however – some fell into the hands of Iran or Iranian-backed groups; these documents included the names of Iraqi pilots from the Iraq-Iran War, and those pilots were targeted for execution³.

Commercial aircraft were moved into Iran as well. Iraq’s deal with Iran for sheltering aircraft covered only civilian and transport aircraft, so it came as a surprise that Iraqi military aircraft were crossing into Iranian airspace.

When questioned over this, Iranian officials promised to keep Saddam’s aircraft until the conclusion of the Gulf War. Many of the aircraft would be incorporated into the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Aviation Division and would never be returned⁴.

The Ground Operation

Following the destruction of Iraq’s radar and communication facilities, their command-and-control ability was thereby lost. This included Iraq’s logistic capabilities, leaving their ground forces in and around Kuwait unsupported. The ground operation began on 24 February 1991 when Marines began heading towards Kuwait City. Within the first 24 hours of the ground operation, 10,000 Iraqi troops surrendered (by end of operation, a total of 50,000 prisoners were taken). The large number of surrenders were caused by the incessant bombing operations of the Coalition forces, the inability of Iraqi ground troops to communicate with their commanders, and the shear lack of logistical support.

The opening hours of the land operation would also see the creation of a forward operating base (FOB Cobra) deep within Iraq territory. FOB Cobra would serve as a staging base for the tank war that followed.

Approximately 1,900 tanks, mostly M1A1 Abrams were brought in to battle Soviet-built T-72s, manned by Republican Guard members. Coalition forces destroyed over 3,300 of these tanks through air and ground attacks in what were some of the largest tank battles in American history. At least 100 tanks were destroyed by AH-64 “tank-killer” helicopters, which challenged the prevailing belief that the best weapon against a tank was another tank.

Iraq withdrew from Kuwait almost immediately, but not before setting fire to 700 Kuwaiti oil wells, some of which they surrounded by mines.

All Coalition military operations were halted 100 hours after the start, but under four conditions: all Iraqi military operations must stop, including Scud missile attacks; all Coalition military prisoners and Kuwaiti civilian hostages must be immediately released; Iraq would comply with all relevant UN resolutions; and the Iraqi army must assist in locating and removing all land and sea mines.

On 27 February Saddam surrendered, and on 3 March 1991 Iraq signed the official cease fire agreement.

Consequences – Interpretation by American Analysts

Taken together, the air and land operations achieved the war’s strategic goals: it removed the Iraqi occupation forces from Kuwait, it degraded Iraq’s military so that it could no longer attack Saudi Arabia and Israel, but it didn’t degrade them to the point where they were unable to defend themselves against Iran.

Operation Desert Storm has been described as an “effects-based operation” (EBO) in that the purpose was to neutralize the enemy without necessarily destroying their forces. While this is true at face value, EBO was reformulated as a “software approach to warfare” when it was systemized by the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). This introduced considerable baggage: computer-modeling software, operational net assessment, and system-of-system analysis.

The EBO doctrine was criticized by Lt. General Paul Van Riper and General James Mattis⁵ because operational control moved from commanders to staff; it entailed centralized decision-making along with consequent micromanagement; and that the doctrine gave the illusion of complete knowledge of the enemy’s present and future states. Finally, it overemphasized the importance of air power and minimized the usefulness of ground forces.

The EBO interpretation of the Gulf War was rejected, as was the entire concept of effects-based operations.

The “naïve” formulation of EBO was retained, however, and is now called “effects-based approach to operations” (EBAO) in Air Force doctrine⁶. EBAO is no longer a strategy but instead a “way of thinking.” While annihilation and attrition are still viable options, “the ultimate aim in war is not just to overthrow the enemy’s military power but to compel them to do one’s will.”⁷

Interpretation by Near-Peer Competitors

The success of Operation Desert Storm was noted by our near-peer competitors. Both China and Russia realized that it was impossible for them to compete against America in conventional conflicts, so they began considering alternative means of warfare.

Russia pursued what Kilcullen called “liminal warfare”⁸ which involves covert actions operating below the threshold which a military response would be warranted… until it was too late. It is a refined version of gray zone warfare. A good example of this strategy was the Russian take-over of Crimea⁹: Russians created and supported sympathetic unions and political parties; Cossacks and Serbian paramilitary groups were imported, which appeared to destabilize the region. Russia responded with “relief columns” in response to this “humanitarian crisis,” but the true goal was to support pro-Russian forces already inside the country. By the time the true purpose of Russia’s “relief” became clear, a military response from NATO was not possible because there apparently was no military invasion.

For China, the new warfare was called “unrestricted warfare” (UW) which consists of cultural, economic and political moves as forms of warfare¹⁰, either applied individually or in combination. UW is founded on the belief that “everything that can benefit mankind can also harm him.”¹¹ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, the authors of Unrestricted Warfare, the text that gave us the name UW, state that “the best way to achieve victory is to control, not to kill.”¹² The similarity of goals with the Air Force’s conception of EBAO is striking.

The clearest example of UW in action is the Belt and Road Initiative, in which China loans money to a host country to build infrastructure in that host country. These loans included predatory interest rates and backed by unconvertible Chinese currency. The actual construction requires that only Chinese labor be used so no local jobs were created. If the country defaults on the loan, ownership of the new infrastructure goes to China; if the host country does not default, the country must repay the loan to China. Either way the host country becomes a vassal state.

The direct correlation between the results of the Gulf War and unrestricted warfare is explicit: the text Unlimited Warfare has an entire chapter describing the Gulf War and the lessons Americans learned and what we did not learn. The connection between the Gulf War and liminal warfare is not so clear, though the ease at which American M1A1 Abrams tanks destroyed Soviet-made T-72 tanks surely made an impression on the Russians.

Both liminal warfare and unrestricted warfare build upon elements of past techniques. Liminal war is similar to Soviet attempts to undermine Western institutions, and unrestricted warfare – in particular the Belt and Road Initiative – is like the tributary system practiced by the Chinese during their dynastic era. Much as the tactics used by the Greeks at the Battle of Thermopylae served as the foundation for future battles, these historical precedents underly Russia’s and China’s new approaches to warfare.

Conclusion

The Gulf War left Saddam Hussein in place – regime change was not part of the UN mandates and it was expected that he would be toppled by internal rebellions. Insurgencies by Kurdish and Shiite groups within Iraq lead to crackdowns by Saddam, and in response, US and British forces established two no-fly zones: one in the north to protect the Kurds and one in the south to protect Shiite Muslims. These no-fly zones would remain in place until the 2003 Iraq War.

Something else that remained in place were the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq by the US and the UN. Because they were still in effect at the time of the later invasions, those sanctions could not be used to pressure Saddam to leave office.

The Gulf War became the model of conventional warfare due to its success, speed of execution, and relatively small number of Coalition casualties. It was a “textbook” war, but that textbook was studied by Russia and China. In response, they devised their own counterstrategies: liminal warfare and unrestricted warfare, respectively. If these are the future forms of warfare, then what counts as “conventional warfare” must be updated.

Footnotes

1. Snow & Drew, From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond: War and Politics in the American Experience.
2. Michael Brill, “Remembering Desert Storm and the Gulf War(s) Odyssey of Iraq’s Air Force, Part 1”
3. Ibid.
4. Michael Brill, “Remembering Desert Storm and the Gulf War(s) Odyssey of Iraq’s Air Force, Part 2”
5. James Mattis, “USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects-based Operations.”
6. John T. Correll, “The Assault on EBO.”
7. U.S. Air Force, AFDP 3-0 Operations and Planning, p. 19.
8. David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West.
9. Robert Leonhard, Little Green Men: A Primer on Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-14.
10. Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from the Gulf War.”
11. Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare.
12. Ibid.

 

Bibliography

U.S. Air Force, AFDP 3-0 Operations and Planning, 4 November 2016. Retrieved 23 November 2024 from https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-0/3-0-AFDP-OPERATIONS-PLANNING.pdf

Brill, M. “Remembering Desert Storm and the Gulf War(s) Odyssey of Iraq’s Air Force, Part 1” Wilson Center Sources and Methods. 14 January 2021. Retrieved 22 May 2024 from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/remembering-desert-storm-and-gulf-wars-odyssey-iraqs-air-force-part-1

Brill, M. “Remembering Desert Storm and the Gulf War(s) Odyssey of Iraq’s Air Force, Part 2” Wilson Center Sources and Methods. 15 January 2021. Retrieved 22 May 2024 from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/remembering-desert-storm-and-gulf-wars-odyssey-iraqs-air-force-part-2

Cheng, D. “Chinese Lessons from the Gulf War.” November 2011. Retrieved 22 May 2024 from https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11966.8.pdf

Correll, J. “The Assault on EBO” Air Force Magazine, January 2013. Retrieved 23 May 2024 from https://www.airandspaceforces.com/PDF/MagazineArchive/Documents/2013/January%202013/0113EBO.pdf

Kilcullen, D. The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West. Oxford University Press, 2020.

Leonhard, R. Little Green Men: A Primer on Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-14. United States Army Special Operations Command, 2015. Retrieved 21 May 2024 from https://www.jhuapl.edu/sites/default/files/2022-12/ARIS_LittleGreenMen.pdf

Mattis, J. “USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects-based Operations.” Parameters 38, no. 3 (2008), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2437. Retrieved 23 May 2024 from https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2437&context=parameters

Qiao L. & Wang X. Unrestricted Warfare. PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing, 1999.

Snow, D. & Drew, D. From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond: War and Politics in the American Experience. Routledge, 2009.

Spalding, R. War Without Rules: China’s Playbook for Global Domination. Sentinel Press, 2022.

Legal and Moral Authorization to Conduct the Gulf War

Introduction: Historical and Operational

On 2 August 1990, the Iraq military, under command of Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait. The invasion not only left Iraq in possession of Kuwait’s people, land, and mineral resources, it also left Iraq in a position to attack Saudi Arabia, which Saddam had threatened to do. This led to the Gulf War of 1990-1991 in which the United States and her allies fought to restore Kuwait’s independence and to protect Saudi Arabia’s territory.[1] [2]

There were two phases to the Gulf War: Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Of the two, Desert Shield is most relevant here.

Operation Desert Shield was primarily an operational stage in that military resources were positioned and coordinated so that they could be used to accomplish specific political goals. The idea is, to quote Clausewitz, “that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.” In the Gulf War, the political objectives were to liberate Kuwait and to protect the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia[3].

USMC patrol near a burning well close to Kuwait City on March 7, 1991. (AP)

Legal Authorizations of the Gulf War[4]

Immediately following the invasion, President George H. W. Bush issued executive orders[5] banning trade and financial transactions with Iraq as well as implementing a travel ban. He further ordered that Iraqi assets within the US be frozen. Two days later, the House and Senate separately passed legislation supporting those executive orders, but neither of these were signed into law.

These executive orders were mirrored by the UN Security Council when it passed Resolution 661 on 6 August 1990 which imposed numerous economic sanctions on Iraq. These sanctions included bans on trade and financial transactions, except for medicines and food; a freezing of Iraqi government assets abroad; embargos on oil and arms; and so on. Approximately one hundred and ten countries took part in the embargo.

Bush began building an international coalition to isolate Iraq both militarily and diplomatically. The coalition was (at the time) unique in that it had a single purpose and was not meant to be long-term. Bush and his ambassadors were even able to alienate Iraq from members of the Arab League. Israel was kept neutral to avoid destabilizing the coalition, even though Iraq launched Scud missiles targeting Israel during the last month of Desert Shield.

Meanwhile, coalition military assets were being positioned in the region in readiness for Desert Storm.

On 29 November 1990, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 678, which authorized coalition members to use all necessary means to secure peace, giving Iraq a deadline of 15 January 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait.

On 14 January, the day before the UN deadline, the 102nd Congress passed H.J.Res.77, the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, which was the closest Congress came to an actual declaration of war. George H. W. Bush signed it into law (Public Law No: 102-1), and in his signing statement, Bush announced that

…[M]y request for congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President's constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.[6]

Saddam Hussein ignored the UN deadline for withdrawal, and Operation Desert Storm began on 17 January 1991.

Just War Theory and the Gulf War

Just War Theory (JWT) is a tradition of military ethics that uses criteria to ensure that a war is ethically justifiable. Western JWT began with Saint Augustine and was refined and extended by Saint Thomas Aquinas. The tradition continues through the 1992 Catechism of the Catholic Church. Contemporary JWT, as espoused by Michael Walzer[7], for example, is secular but maintains several Christian attributes, notably an altruistic ethical foundation.

In either the Christian or secular forms, JWT has two primary components: criteria for when to justly begin a war (jus ad bellum) and criteria for just conduct during war (jus in bello)[8]. Of the two components, jus ad bellum would be most relevant here.

To justly enter a state of war, the war must satisfy all of the following criteria: war must be publicly declared by the appropriate authority; it must be for just cause and just intentions; it must be a last resort; the means used must be proportional to the provocation; and there must be a reasonable chance of success.

As the sole power to declare war is granted to Congress by the Constitution, the Gulf War does not satisfy the jus ad bellum criterion that a just war must be publicly declared by the proper authority.

The “just cause” and “just intentions” criteria are highly subjective, but these are usually taken to mean that the goal of a war is to redress harms, address human rights violations, and reestablish a just peace. The Gulf War could pass those criteria.

The “option of last resort” criteria was also met, since both the US and UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq immediately following their invasion of Kuwait, and the UN gave an explicit deadline for Iraq to withdraw along with a clear statement of what would happen if they didn’t. Between the first imposition of sanctions by the US and the UN’s deadline for withdrawal, 166 days elapsed, which was more than sufficient time for economic sanctions to hit home. Diplomacy failed; economic sanctions failed; war thus became the last resort.

The “reasonable chance of success” criteria was also satisfied: between the far larger American military and the operational and logistical preparations made before Desert Storm began, success was highly likely.

Finally, the “proportional response” criterion is met, presumably: the coalition forces were used against Iraq’s to evict them from Kuwait and to prevent excursions into Saudi Arabia all while leaving Iraq able to defend itself from Iran. Others would point to the large number of casualties together with harms caused by the economic sanctions as proof that the response was not proportional.

JWT requires all these jus ad bellum criteria to be met for a nation to justly enter a state of war. There never was a declaration by the appropriate authority[9]; whether the proportional response criterion was satisfied is debatable; and the just cause and good intentions are extremely subjective. The Gulf War violated the proper declaration condition, so it cannot be considered a just war.

It must be noted that (besides pacifism) there is at least one other ethical theory of war, which is usually called “realist.” This theory holds that a war must be declared and executed only in a nation’s best interest. The goal of JWT is to minimize the brutality or war; a side effect of the realist position is to shorten the duration and frequency of wars. Unfortunately, realist war theories are presented only as a straw man[10], and the theory currently lacks a holistic exposition.

Conclusion

In the case of the Gulf War, the legal and the moral justifications were at odds: the war was certainly sanctioned by the United Nations and (while stopping short of a full declaration of war) it was approved by Congress; according to Just War Theory (either biblical or secular), it was an unjust war.

There is an additional justification that must be considered: popular support. This must be considered under Clausewitz’s people-military-government trinity, and it explains the incessant and fawning media coverage the Gulf War received, making it into what was sometimes called the “video game war.”

In reviewing the buildup to the war, one must wonder why George H. W. Bush went through the media and the UN as opposed to petitioning Congress[11]. The answer lies in his signing statement for the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution – he explicitly doubted the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. Instead of addressing that directly or addressing the problems the WPR was meant to correct, he ignored it. This is something all subsequent presidents would do.

Footnotes

[1] Westermeyer, Liberating Kuwait.

[2] Stewart, War in the Persian Gulf.

[3] Snow, D. & Drew, D. From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond.

[4] The chronology of events in this section follows Englehardt, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm”

[5] EO 12722 and 12723.

[6] Bush, Bush, Statement on Signing the Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force Against Iraq.

[7] Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars.

[8] A third component (jus post bellum) that addresses justice following the conclusion of a war, was added relatively late in the Just War Tradition.

[9] This is disputed in O’Brien, “Desert Storm: A Just War Analysis.”

[10] Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace.

[11] Burgin, “Rethinking the Role of the War Powers Resolution.”

Bibliography

Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 1991, Public Law No: 102-1, Retrieved 16 May 2024 from https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/house-joint-resolution/77/text

Burgin, E. “Rethinking the Role of the War Powers Resolution: Congress and the Persian Gulf War.” Notre Dame Journal of Legislation 21 (no. 23) (1995). Retrieved 15 May 2024 from https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1232&context=jleg

Bush, G. H. W. Statement on Signing the Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force Against Iraq. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush (1991, Book I), 14 January 1991. Retrieved 16 May 2024 from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1991-book1/html/PPP-1991-book1-doc-pg40.htm

Englehardt, J. P. “Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Chronology and Troop List for the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis.” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 25 March 1991. Retrieved 13 May 2024 from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA234743.pdf

Frowe, H. The Ethics of War and Peace. Routledge, 2022.

O’Brien, W. “Desert Storm: A Just War Analysis.” St. John’s Law Review 66 (no. 3), Fall 1992. Retrieved 16 May 2024 from https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1794&context=lawreview

Snow, D. & Drew, D. From Lexington to Baghdad and Beyond: War and Politics in the American Experience. Routledge, 2009.

Stewart, R. War in the Persian Gulf: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm August 1990 – March 1991. Center of Military History, May 2010. Last retrieved 12 May 2024 from https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-117-1/CMH_70-117-1.pdf

Walzer, M. Just and Unjust Wars. Basic Books 2015.

Westermeyer, P. Liberating Kuwait: U.S. Marines in the Gulf War, 1990–1991. History Division USMC, 2014. Retrieved 13 May 2024 from https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/Liberating%20Kuwait.pdf

Attack on the Motor Tanker Mercer Street

Descriptive Analysis

On 29 July 2021, the Motor Tanker Mercer Street was attacked twice by Iranian drones while operating in the Gulf of Oman. A third drone attack on 30 July 2021 created a 6-foot-wide hole in the pilot house, resulting in the death of the tanker’s captain and a security officer. The USS Ronald Reagan and USS Mitscher rendered aid. Evidence was collected by an American Explosive Ordnance Disposal team, and a multinational team performed forensic analysis on the debris.[1]

From an agency collaboration perspective, investigations, such as the one completed for this attack, are complicated by the multiple nations operating and crewing the vessel. In the case of the Mercer Street, the ship was flagged under Liberia, was owned by the Japanese, and managed by an Israeli company. The ship’s captain was Romanian, and the security officer killed was British.

This multi-national vessel operation is certainly not unique to the Mercer Street – a February 2024 report from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development explained the situation as follows:

A typical ship may be built in the Republic of Korea, crewed by Filippino [sic] seafarers recruited through a crewing agency based in Cyprus, owned by a German investment fund, technically inspected by an Indian classification society, registered under the flag of the Marshall Islands, insured by a protection and indemnity club in Norway, fuelled [sic] at a bunkering station in Singapore and operated by liner shipping company in Denmark.[2]

Root Cause Analysis

Use of military forces against merchant ships operating in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea areas have gone back at least to the Tanker Wars of 1984 – 1988. This involved attacks on merchant vessels operating in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman by both Iran and Iraq. During that time, 411 ships were attacked, 239 of which were oil tankers[3].

The attack on the Mercer Street was a continuation of Iraq’s policy of harassing any vessel not bound for an Iraqi port. It is a form of low-intensity conflict aimed at countries opposed to Iran, or at least not aligned with Iran.

The Mercer Street was attacked primarily because it was operated by Zodiac Maritime, Ltd., an Israeli company. Other recently attacked ships[4], such as the TRF Moss and the oil tanker Richmond Voyager, are either US-owned or have no clear ownership-ties with Israel or America. These attacks have led vessels to set their Automatic Identification System messages to read “norelationtoisrael” or “allchinesecrew.”[5]

Implication Analysis

The Iranian and Iranian-backed Houthi attacks in these two gulfs, together with Somali pirate attacks, is making commercial shipping in the entire area cost prohibitive. As such, traffic that once passed through the Suez Canal is now routed around the Cape of Good Hope[6].

Shift in shipping routes from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope, from UNCTAD, “Navigating Troubled Waters”

Revenue generated by the Suez Canal constituted 2.3 percent of Egypt’s GDP in 2023. This has dropped 40% because of Iranian-backed piracy[7]. In addition, foreign trade in East African countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Sudan have also decreased[8].

Anticipation Analysis

From the time of the Mercer Street attack, Iran has continued harassing and/or attacking merchant vessels operating in the Gulf of Omar and the Gulf of Aden, either directly or via Yemen’s Houthi rebels. It is expected that these attacks will continue in response to ongoing Israeli operations against the Gaza Strip.

The economic losses to Egypt and East African countries can lead to political destabilization of those countries. The rerouting of traffic around the Cape of Good Hope adds additional transport time, fuel costs, and crew costs to the shipped goods.

Foot Notes

[1] USCENTCOM. “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Investigation into the Attack on the Motor Tanker Mercer Street.”

[2] UNCTAD, “Navigating Troubled Waters”

[3] N/A. “Strait of Hormuz.”

[4] N/A, “U.S. Prevents Iran from Seizing Two Merchant Tankers in Gulf of Oman.”

[5] Duggal & Haddad, “Mapping the Red Sea attacks.”

[6] UNCTAD, “Navigating Troubled Waters”

[7] Dom Magli, “Red Sea crisis triggers 40 per cent drop in Suez Canal revenues.”

[8] Vreÿ & Blaine, “Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean Attacks Expose Africa’s Maritime Vulnerability.”

Bibliography

Duggal, H. & Haddad, M. “Mapping the Red Sea attacks: How Houthi attacks on one of the world’s main maritime trade routes have impacted international trade.” Interactive Al Jazeera, 22 February 2024. Last retrieved 2 May 2024 from https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2024/mapping-red-sea-shipping-attacks/

Magli, D. “Red Sea crisis triggers 40 per cent drop in Suez Canal revenues.” Port Technology International, 15 January 2024. Last retrieved on 2 May 2024 from https://www.porttechnology.org/news/red-sea-crisis-triggers-40-per-cent-drop-in-suez-canal-revenues/

N/A. “U.S. Prevents Iran from Seizing Two Merchant Tankers in Gulf of Oman.” U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, 5 July 2023. Retrieved 1 May 2024 from https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3448330/us-prevents-iran-from-seizing-two-merchant-tankers-in-gulf-of-oman/

N/A. “Strait of Hormuz: Accessing the threat to oil flows through the Strait.” Strauss Center, August 2008. Retrieved 2 May 2024 from https://www.strausscenter.org/strait-of-hormuz-tanker-war/

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. “Navigating Troubled Waters: Impact to Global Trade of Disruption of Shipping Routes in the Red Sea, Black Sea and Panama Canal”. UNCTAD Rapid Assessment, February 2024. Retrieved 2 May 2024 from https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/osginf2024d2_en.pdf

USCENTCOM. “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Investigation into the Attack on the Motor Tanker Mercer Street.” U.S. Central Command Press Release, 6 August 2021. Retrieved 1 May 2024 from https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/2722418/us-central-command-statement-on-the-investigation-into-the-attack-on-the-motor/

Vreÿ, F. & Blaine, M. “Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean Attacks Expose Africa’s Maritime Vulnerability.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 9 April 2024. Retrieved 2 May 2024 from https://africacenter.org/spotlight/red-sea-indian-ocean-attacks-africa-maritime-vulnerability/

Just War Analysis of the 2003 American Invasion of Iraq

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the 2003 American Invasion of Iraq according to jus ad bellum criteria – were we in the right to start that war? We begin with the historical context including the faulty information about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. That history is then used to determine whether the invasion passes the jus ad bellum standards of Just War Theory.

Historical Background¹

Official build-up for the invasion began with the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002”, also known as the “Iraq Resolution”, which was passed in October 2002 by the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. It authorized the use of American forces against Iraq in what would be called “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” The factors used to justify the war included:

1. Iraq’s development and possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) as well as operation of mobile weapons labs
2. Their possession of unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver said WMDs
3. Their support for terrorism, including harboring members of al-Qaeda and paying bounties to the families of suicide bombers
4. Saddam Hussein’s repression of the Iraqi people and the Kurds

This was followed by the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 of November 2002 which demanded that Iraq allow weapons inspectors back into the country. Iraq appeared to comply with the resolution.

In early 2003, President George Bush and British PM Tony Blair stated that Iraq was hindering the UN weapons inspectors. Leaders of Germany and France sought extended inspections and wanted to give Iraq more time to comply with the inspectors.

On 5 February 2003 Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a presentation to the UN Security Council claiming that Iraq had maintained its stockpile of WMDs, that it was hiding evidence of its WMDs from UN weapons inspectors, that it silenced its weapons scientists, and that it continued to harbor al-Qaeda terrorists. These were the reasons used to start the war.

On 17 March, President Bush gave Saddam an ultimatum: leave Iraq in 48 hours. He didn’t.

On 20 March 2003 kinetic operations began with precision-guided missile attacks against the suspected location of Saddam Hussain, followed by bombings of government and military buildings. Major operations were completed six weeks later, and the occasion was marked by President Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” speech on 1 May 2003.

On 30 September 2004 the Iraq Survey Group, a multinational group organized by the CIA and the Pentagon, released a report (the Duelfer Report) stating that Iraq had no significant amount of chemical WMDs³. It was believed that the WMDs did exist – and were used against the Kurds – but the weapons were sent to Syria. The idea that Iraq was a state sponsor of terrorism remains unclear.

The justification for the war changed at this point to the plight of the Iraqi and Kurdish people under Saddam, and the goal became removing him and the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party from power.

The war did not end by this time, for once we defeated the Ba’ath Party, the insurgency started. Politics abhors a vacuum, and we began fighting a new enemy.

Just Cause

St. Augustine lists² three jus ad bellum conditions: defending against attack, recapturing things taken, and punishing a nation that has done wrong. According to (faulty) intelligence, Iraq’s people and its neighbors were in immediate danger from WMDs, and according to (accurate) intelligence, Saddam’s regime was actively violating the individual rights of its citizens. Thus, our invasion of was justified because we were defending others against imminent danger and punishing Iraq for doing wrong by the Kurds and other Iraqi people.

Proportionality

Proportionality is a slippery concept in action. The broad idea is that when an enemy destroys one of our ships, we destroy one of theirs, when the enemy downs one of our airplanes, we do the same to one of his airplanes, and so on. The enemy is supposed to remain stationary while we pursue a proportionate response. Nice theory, but in practice things don’t work that way.

The reality is more like this: the enemy destroys one of our vessels, and in our act of responding proportionally, the enemy sends fighters to stop our response, we then use surface-to-air missiles, and so on. Each combatant is starring in his own “Saving Private Ryan” movie, and once the situation escalates it becomes extremely difficult to stop.

An alternative to proportionality is this: does our response not only stop the immediate harm but also removes the capability of performing similar harm in the future? The American forces disabled Iraq’s air defense system, which allowed the ground invasion to go forward unencumbered. We targeted only government and military installations, and the government and military were the ones harming people. We not only stopped them doing harm and we also prevented them from repeating this harm in the future. This theory has plenty of edge cases, and it may not be possible to justify this approach within Just War Theory.

Reasonable Chance of Success

The 2003 invasion of Iraq was a well-designed and well-implemented plan that involved combined use of air and ground forces. Our Air Force, Marines, and Army were far superior to the corresponding Iraqi forces, so we had a very reasonable chance of success.

Legitimate Authority and Public Declaration

Congress has the power to declare war, and while the Iraq Resolution was approved by Congress, it did not declare war. The Resolution only authorized President Bush to use military force against Iraq. However, the Iraq Resolution can be seen as a public declaration announcing America’s intention to initiate military action against that country.

Right Intentions

If Iraq possessed WMDs and weapons labs, and if Iraq possessed the capability to deliver the WMDs, and if Saddam had plans of using these weapons on the Iraqis or other people, then we had the right intentions for invading Iraq with the goal of removing those weapons and delivery capabilities.

As it goes, Iraq didn’t have WMDs, but the treatment of the Iraqis and Kurds under Saddam and the Ba’ath Party was still an issue. Our intentions to drive Saddam from power and to De-Ba’athify the government were good intentions, and our actions were in support of those intentions.

Does this mean America must topple oppressive governments all over the world? It does not, for doing so does not further any pressing national interest. National interest does not play a direct role in Just War Theory, however.

Last Resort

At the time of the 2003 invasion, economic sanctions against Iraq were still in place. These sanctions were in response to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Further economic pressure could not be applied.

Multiple diplomatic solutions (the Iraq Resolution, Resolution 1441, Colin Powell’s presentation to the UN Security Council, and finally the 48 hour demand of Saddam to leave the country) were attempted but each proved unsuccessful. All non-violent options were exhausted, and so the war was indeed one of last resort.

Conclusion

Based on all the usual criteria of jus ad bellum - principles of just cause, proportionality, reasonable chance of success, legitimate authority and public declaration, right intention, and last resort – it can be concluded that we were justified in this military action according to Just War Tradition. This conclusion holds regardless of the existence of WMDs.

From a “realist war theory” perspective, the invasion cannot be justified. If anything, the invasion violates the realpolitik “Pottery Barn rule” – you break it, you buy it. By eliminating Saddam Hussein’s regime, we metaphorically broke Iraq, dysfunctional that it was, and we ended up buying it over the next 8 years.

References

1. Draper, R. (2020). To Start a War: How the Bush Administration Took America into Iraq. Penguin Books.

2. Holmes, A. F. (2005). War and Christian Ethics. Baker Academic.

3. Ricks, T. E. (2006). Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. Penguin Press.