Specialization of Labor in Military Logistics

Before and during Napoleon’s time, the lines between military specialties were blurred. There were no “pure” infantrymen or cavalrymen defined solely by their combat roles. Instead, each soldier juggled multiple tasks: infantrymen doubled as foragers, and cavalrymen did the same. Their duties extended beyond shooting and maneuvering on the battlefield to include gathering food and resources – instead of shooting, moving, and shooting some more, they were shooting, moving, and foraging. This began to change with the introduction of the magazine system, military wagons, and river barges. These advancements allowed Napoleon’s soldiers to focus more exclusively on being warriors, freeing them from the burden of foraging.

Meanwhile, logistics specialists existed since at least the time of Michel Le Tellier, but they were either public officials, or were purchasing agents[1], or were civilian bakers. They were specialists not by any military arrangement but simply because they were civilians. In 1807, Napoleon established a military train service that replaced the civilian owned and operated wagons[2] with military counterparts[3]. This may have been the start of logistics as an operational specialty.

When logistical systems were insufficient to meet the demands of a campaign – either anticipated (providing enough supplies to get the Grande Armée to a place where foraging became possible) or unexpected (Napoleon’s return from Moscow) – soldiers were forced to revert to procurement as part of their duties. This lack of specialization could have dire consequences: Van Creveld mentions an instance during the Austerlitz Campaign where Napoleon’s cavalry, moving ahead to villages earmarked for the infantry, depleting local food supplies[4]. As a result, the infantry had to venture farther afield to secure resources, thus disrupting operational tempo and cohesion.

French Cuirassier in 1809, by Joseph Louis Hippolyte Bellangé (1800-1866)

Footnotes

[1] Van Creveld, p. 22.
[2] Ibid, p. 18.
[3] Ibid, p. 62.
[4] Ibid, p. 55.

Bibliography

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. 2nd ed. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Napoleon’s Logistics Systems

Introduction

Napoleon Bonaparte, a military genius renowned for his strategic brilliance, faced some of the most defining moments of his career during the Austerlitz Campaign of 1805 and the Russian Campaign of 1812. These campaigns demonstrate both the heights of his logistical ingenuity and the limits of his ability to adapt to unforgiving environments.

This essay examines the logistical innovations implemented by Napoleon and the Grande Armée during those two campaigns. Following this, a quick comparison of two analyses of the defeat in Russia is made and a tentative alternative theory is proposed.

English translation of Charles Joseph Minard's 1869 figurative map of Napoleon's Russian Campaign. The thickness of the lines on top indicate the size of the Grande Armée, showing how it was decimated as it marched into and out of Moscow. The bottom line shows the temperatures the army encountered.
Graphic by DkEgy on Wikipedia.

The Austerlitz Campaign of 1805

During the War of the Third Coalition (1805-1806), Napoleon encountered one of the weaknesses of the magazine system when used for extended forays into enemy territory. It was a chicken-and-egg problem: the advancing troops required magazines ahead of them, but the magazines needed to be built and pre-stocked.

Napoleon solved this problem with a combination of logistics techniques: the head of the advancing troops would operate using supplies they carried, by wagon, or foraged. They then established magazines for use by the middle and tail of the advancing troops, as well as for the army on their return. These magazines would be stocked using a modified contribution system - instead of forcing the locals to contribute supplies to the army, the French would provide receipts that could later be redeemed. “Treat the inhabitants as if they were French”[1] was the idea.

Napoleon also established a series of relay stations after crossing the Rhine. Positioned every 15 to 18 miles, these secured stations established a line of communication. It was bidirectional: supplies moved from France to the advancing army, and sick, wounded, and prisoners were moved back into France.[2]  He created a second line of communication from Strasbourg to Augsburg. It was divided into seventeen sections, with 60 four-horse wagons operating between each. Van Creveld calculated that between 60 and 120 tons of clothing and ammunition could be shuttled per day in this manner.[3]

Van Creveld hints at a modification to the magazines themselves undertaken by Napoleon: instead of just being supply depots, they were also production locales: for example, Braunau was originally a depot that would bake 50K-60K rations per day in anticipation of a Russian advance. The Russians never came, so Braunau was converted to an advanced center of operations, where 100K rations per day were baked.[4]

Even with these modifications, Napoleon would be forced to modify his campaign: instead of passing through the Black Forest (sparsely populated and resource-poor), he would travel through the rich territories of Baden and Württemberg[5]. This indicates that it was still necessary to rely on foraging and plundering, even with these logistical improvements.

Regardless, Napoleon’s victory at the Battle of Austerlitz is considered a tactical masterpiece. As a result of the victory, the Third Coalition collapsed.

The Russian Campaign of 1812

Preparation for the Russian Campaign began over a year before it started: Napoleon had been collecting Intelligence since April 1811[6], he ordered rations, and he amassed ammunition. Earlier, in 1807, he established a military train service that replaced the civilian owned and operated wagons with military counterparts. He expanded this train service in preparation for the Russian Campaign, and he improved the logistics system in Poland through which his army must pass on its way to Moscow.

Napoleon still had to rely on foraging, but only as a supplement to the supplies that would be delivered via wagons and river barges.

The campaign encountered difficulties almost immediately: thunderstorms turned the roads into deep mud, hindering the movements of horses and wagons. The River Vilnya, which Napoleon relied on shipping supplies to Vilna, was too shallow. Laying ahead were further problems: “the country is so wooded that one has trouble to find room for a considerable number of troops”[7]. Finding water would also be difficult[8] for both France and Russia.

Meanwhile, Russia realized that given the size of the Grande Armée and the genius of its leader, to defeat Napoleon required using techniques that to a modern reader appear to be irregular warfare tactics. The French army could only be defeated by distance, climate, and supply. Thus, the Russian army retreated away from the oncoming Grande Armée towards Moscow and in fact had destroyed that city so as to leave nothing for Napoleon to plunder. Further, the Russians swept the fields adjacent to the roads, forcing the French to forage at a distance[9].

Napoleon was pursued by the Russian army, militias, and Cossacks as he retreated back towards France. Their target wasn’t the Grande Armée itself, but rather their logistics system. Napoleon was reduced to foraging, and the Tsar’s forces wanted to deny them even that: the Russians controlled the Grande Armée’s movements, pushing them to retreat along the same roads it used to enter Moscow - paths that were already foraged and stripped bare during Napoleon’s advance.

This was not only Napoleon’s first major defeat but also his most disastrous. Approximately one million military and civilian fatalities were recorded. The result was not only a numerically smaller and demoralized military, but it also marked the first stage of failure of Napoleon’s designs for European conquest.

Why the Defeat?

A defeat of the magnitude Napoleon experienced during the Russian Campaign is rightly the subject of numerous historical and military analyses. Van Creveld attributed it to logistics concerns:

First, the army’s supply vehicles proved too heavy for the Russian ‘roads’, a problem aggravated still further when thunderstorms during the first fortnight of the campaign turned them into bottomless quagmires.  Secondly, the river Vilnya, on which Napoleon had relied for shipping supplies to Vilna, turned out to be too shallow to allow the barges through. Thirdly, discipline in the army was lax, with the result that the troops plundered indiscriminately instead of carrying out orderly requisitions, the outcome being, paradoxically, that the officers - at any rate, those who refused to take part in such excesses - starved even when the men found enough to eat.  Furthermore, the troops’ indiscipline caused the inhabitants to flee, and made the establishment of a regular administration in the army’s rear impossible. Fourthly, some of the troops, notably the German ones, simply did not know how to help themselves. Finally, there was deliberate destruction by the Russians. This sometimes assumed disastrous proportions, e.g. early in July when Murat reported he was operating in ‘very rich country’ which, however, had been thoroughly plundered by the Tsar’s soldiers.[10]

Clausewitz provides a different list of factors that contributed to the defeat:

a. The uninterrupted movement in advance (120 miles in 81 days), which prevented all following of sick, wounded, or tired.
b. Continual bivouacking.
c. Very bad weather in the first five days.
d. Want of precaution in supply, which, so early as upon reaching Witebsk, caused the issue of flour in place of bread.
e. A very hot and dry summer in a country scantily watered.
f. The bloody and extravagant offensive tactic by which Buonaparte always endeavoured to overwhelm his adversary.
g. The great deficiency in hospital preparations, making impossible the recovery and restoration to their corps of sick and wounded, which, indeed, first showed itself during the great halt in Moscow.[11]

Suggested in both these lists are a number of intelligence failures: a lack of detailed maps[12], the depth of relevant rivers at the time of the campaign, the dry conditions near Moscow, the thick forest, the rainy weather and what it did to the roads, the presence of militias and Cossacks, the scorched-earth mindset of the Russians, and so on. Napoleon had been gathering intelligence since April 1811, but all this was missed. All these intelligence gaps would have been discovered in preparation for the campaign, had Napoleon dispatched scouts.

Conclusion

Napoleon implemented great advances in logistics, and through his example downplayed the importance of siege warfare. His modifications to the magazine system, and the improved contribution system, allowed him to move an army as large as the Grande Armée on to enemy soil. He invaded a country then built a logistics system behind him while also establishing multiple lines of communication. Napoleon was apparently the first to create a continually resupplied ammunition depot.[13]. His planning contributed to his success in the Battle of Austerlitz, but his defeat in the Russian Campaign showed that logistic planning was insufficient to guarantee victory.

Footnotes

[1] Van Creveld, p. 53.
[2] Ibid, p. 53.
[3] Ibid, p. 56-57.
[4] Ibid, p. 60.
[5] Ibid, p. 50.
[6] Ibid, p. 62.
[7] Clausewitz, p. 148.
[8] Ibid, p. 193.
[9] Ibid, p. 178.
[10] Van Creveld, p. 65-66.
[11] Clausewitz, p. 97.
[12] Ibid. p. 193.
[13] Van Creveld, p. 57.

Bibliography

Clausewitz, C. von. The Campaign of 1812 in Russia. London, 1843. https://clausewitzstudies.org/readings/1812/Clausewitz-CampaignOf1812inRussia-EllesmereTranslation.pdf

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. 2nd ed. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Russia's Private Military Companies

Introduction

There is no doubt that the Russian Federation should be considered a near-peer competitor of the United States – they have a nuclear arsenal and a strong conventional military force that includes modern weapon systems such as UAVs and robotics (Grau & Bartles, 2016, pp. 371-380); they have considerable economic strength, and they exercise political influence on a global scale. Something missing from this list - and mostly from (Grau & Bartles, 2016) - are the methods and tools they use to achieve their political influence. Russia’s use of psychological operations to ideologically subvert their enemies is well known (Bezmenov, 2020), but they have a very potent tool in their asymmetric warfare arsenal: private military companies (PMCs).

This paper is roughly divided into two parts. The first part examines PMCs from a historical and economic perspective, showing that their ongoing existence makes sound financial sense. The second part counters this theoretical understanding with a description of how the Russians use PMCs. These usage patterns apply to all the PMCs employed by Russia, but the examples cited (mostly) refer to what was once Russia's premier PMC - the Wagner Group. This is followed by a description of a problem that can arise with PMCs: rebellion. We conclude with an attempt to synthesize the disparities between the economic ideals and the gritty reality of PMCs as encountered by the Russians.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the Wagner Group PMC

Characteristics of the Modern PMC

PMCs are nothing new on the world’s stage: in the form of mercenary armies, they date back at least to the First Punic War (264–241 BC) and have been in continuous use to the present day. In his classification and analysis of PMCs, P. W. Singer (2001) recognized the long history of mercenary forces, noting that the Dutch and English East Indies Companies commanded armies and navies larger than those in Europe - they were companies that had military departments. As time went on, this relation became inverted.

The crucial difference between modern PMCs and their mercenary ancestors is their organization: mercenary groups are loosely organized whereas modern PMCs are organized into corporations in part due to the privatization rush following the fall of the Soviet Union (Pałka, 2020). According to Singer (who uses privatized military firms (PMFs) instead of PMCs):

PMFs are hierarchically organized into incorporated and registered businesses that trade and compete openly on the international market, link to outside financial holdings, recruit more proficiently than their predecessors, and provide a wider range of military services to a greater variety and number of clients. Corporatization not only distinguishes PMFs from mercenaries and other past private military ventures, but it also offers certain advantages in both efficiency and effectiveness. (Singer, 2001, pp. 191)

One of the consequences of this is that PMCs compete on the open market, and they gain or lose customers based on their efficiency and effectiveness. This means that it is possible for them to advertise on the Internet, and it is possible for them to go out of business. For example, Singer (2001, p. 192) gives five examples of PMCs that have their own websites. Of these, four are apparently no longer in business and the fifth (Vinnell Corporation) is now a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman.

As of 2021, the Russian PMC industries consisted of somewhere between 10 and 15 known companies (Østensen & Bukkvoll, 2022, p. 133), and the resulting competition is extremely profitable for the individuals who work for these companies. For example (Østensen & Bukkvoll, 2022, p. 136, Table 1), a low-ranking regular contract soldier is paid 76,000 rubles (US $951) per month while stationed in Syria, and 30,000 rubles (US $376) per month at home. Compare this with a low-ranking Wagner soldier who is paid 120,000 rubles (US $1502) per month in Syria and 80,000 rubles (US $1001) per month while at home. There doesn't seem to be any reports of Wagner soldiers going unpaid, but there is a report of a woman who lost her husband in Syria having difficulty getting compensation (Roth, 2019).

The legitimacy of Russian PMCs and their fighters must be considered. For example, Wagner emerged during the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Initially, the name of this secretive group was unknown, but it was known that it was funded by a wealthy oligarch named Pavel Prigozhin.

As time went on, Wagner began training at two Russian military bases ordinarily used by the 10th Special Mission Brigade of GRU Spetsnaz (Katz, et. al., 2020). They were travelling on Russian Air Force transport aircraft (Rácz, 2020). Soon they were fighting alongside the Russian Army in Syria and Ukraine (Bowen, 2023, August 1), and their injuries were treated in Russian hospitals (Rácz, 2020).

By 4 November 2022, Wagner opened its headquarters at the PMC Wagner Center in Saint Petersburg. Larsen (2003) describes this evolution as a "normalization of discourse": what started as a shadowy organization ended with a Gazprom-built skyscraper (Altınbaş, 7 June 2023) whose purpose is to create “a comfortable environment for generating new ideas that would improve Russia’s defensive capacity” (Larsen, 2023, p. 420) - a description reminiscent of any number of Silicon Valley startups.

The PMC Wagner Center located in Saint Petersburg

Classification of PMCs

As mentioned in the above quote from Singer, PMCs are not limited to kinetic operations but have expanded their service offerings into logistics and support, intelligence, training, and advising. Building on a typology devised by Singer (2001), Arnold (2019) proposes the following four-fold classification of PMCs: first, there are military support firms (MSFs) that offer logistics and sustainment. Next, there are military consulting firms (MCFs) that offer training and advising. Private security companies (PSCs) offer defense and protection services. Finally, PMCs are offensive forces.

This spectrum makes PMCs in the broad sense extremely attractive from a business standpoint, assuming that these services can be offered in a cost-effective manner. PMCs can provide support to a country’s military (like the way the US military outsources some support, sustainment, and intelligence functions), they can supplement the defensive operations, or they even supplement or replace the offensive capabilities of a country’s military.

Up to this point, PMCs are presented as legitimate and cost-effective corporations that pay their soldiers well. This is all very rosy, to the point of being something out of Murray Rothbard’s libertarian utopia (Rothbard, 1973) or Robert Nozick’s night-watchman state (Nozick, 1974). A much more accurate understanding of PMCs comes when we examine their strategic use.

Usage Patterns

The typology of private military forces outlined above explains the capabilities of PMCs. This does not address the ways PMCs are employed by the countries using them, however. Russia uses PMCs to project power with plausible deniability, to secure economic interests, and to expand their geopolitical interests. The PMCs provide training to the local military and build their capacity. The Kremlin uses PMCs to manipulate domestic and elite dynamics, and even magnify Russia’s interests in international organizations.

Power Projection with Plausible Deniability
One of the primary roles of Russian PMCs is to extend Moscow’s military reach into regions where direct involvement would provoke international outrage or escalate tensions with the U.S. and NATO. From their nature as corporations, PMCs are economically conservative, therefore have a “low footprint.” On paper, PMCs can be hidden inside shell companies and complex contractual agreements. Through this, Russia maintains plausible deniability, allowing it to pursue its foreign policy objectives without implicating the Kremlin.

The best example of this is the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014: the use of “little green men” (LGMs) - which later turned out to be Wagner operatives - allowed Russia to wage an undeclared war while officially denying involvement. Combined with the power vacuum following the Revolution of Dignity, Wagner’s operations were so quick and so subtle that Crimea was captured in about 4 weeks with only a handful of causalities. Internationally, it was not known who was behind the operation, until it was too late.

Securing Economic Interests
Moscow uses PMCs to expand its economic footprint, especially in resource-rich but politically unstable regions. The PMCs stabilize a region in return for access to oil and mineral rights. For example, in the Central African Republic, Wagner has protected mining operations and trained local forces since 2018. In return, Russian firms were able to access gold and diamond deposits. Similarly, PMCs supported Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in return for gold mining rights.

Expanding Geopolitical Influence
In regions where Western influence has waned, Russia uses PMCs to position itself as a viable alternative to Western security partnerships. Russia has deployed PMCs to Mali, Mozambique, Madagascar, and other African countries, stepping-in where U.S. or French influence has declined. In Mali, for example, Wagner replaced French counterterrorist forces in 2021, opposing Islamist forces while obtaining to mineral resources.

Training and Capacity Building
Russia uses PMCs as force multipliers by training local militaries, thereby extending Russia’s influence without a large troop presence. This strengthens the local government while embedding Russian interests into the local security apparatus.

Conducting Hybrid Warfare and Psychological Operations
PMCs engage in intelligence gathering, political manipulation, and psychological operations. The goal here is to destabilize countries, flame discord among adversaries, and push pro-Russian narratives.

Managing Domestic, Elite, and Global Dynamics
PMCs like Wagner frequently recruit foreign troops or prisoners. By doing this, the domestic repercussions of high causalities or a failed operation are minimized. Lucrative contracts to PMCs are given to loyal oligarchs, thereby rewarding them while ensuring that their actions are aligned with Russia’s agenda. Finally, by supporting allies or destabilizing adversaries, PMCs magnify Russia’s voice in the UN and other international organizations.

The Wagner Rebellion

The above-listed usage patterns all come from the PMCs' employers. There are, in addition, problems that come from within the PMCs themselves. Some of those issues (allegations of human rights violations, war crimes, etc.) are not limited to PMCs by any means. One problem specific to PMCs is how they relate to their employers.

The relation between Russia's military and PMCs such as Wagner has always been nebulous. Russia has allowed Wagner to train using its military bases, some military decorations have been awarded to Wagner employees, and so on. The real problems with PMCs come from questions over their effectiveness and their loyalty. Most famously, Niccolò Machiavelli wrote in The Prince:

Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. (Machiavelli, 2024)

This “destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is [deferred]” is demonstrated in Wagner’s role in the annexation of Crimea: there was no wanton destruction, and the operation succeeded with very minimal fatalities. Modern eyes see this as a feature, while Machiavelli perceives this as a bug, but it must be remembered that he was penning advice to new princes.

What certainly is a bug is the potential for disloyalty on the part of mercenary armies, or modern PMCs, implied by that quote. These “armies for hire” have a mixed record when it comes to rebellions. The First Punic War immediately transitioned into the Mercenary War (241 - 237 BC), where the mercenaries employed by Carthage mutinied over unpaid wages (Hoyos, 2000). Other mercenary forces have magnificent histories, such as the Hessians during the American Revolutionary War; others had sometimes mutinied, such as the condottieri leading mercenary armies of the Middle Ages that Machiavelli was (perhaps) denouncing. Wagner fell into the latter category with its rebellion in 2023. The following description comes from the reporting of Darya Korsunskaya and Guy Faulconbridge (2023) and Mikael Pir-Budagyan and the RM Staff (2023).

The Wagner Rebellion was a dispute between Yevgeny Prigozhin (Wagner’s founder and leader), Sergei Shoigu (Russian Defense Minister), and Valery Gerasimov (Chief of the General Staff). Prigozhin accused Shoigu and Gerasimov of corruption, incompetence, and withholding ammunition and artillery from Wagner. Criticisms of this form may be common inside the Russian military, but what was uncommon was the way Prigozhin leveled these charges: he used social media, in particular Telegram.

The dispute came to a head when the Russian Ministry of Defense required all PMC fighters to sign contracts directly with the Russian military, placing them under the command of Shoigu. Prigozhin saw this as an attempt to dismantle Wagner.

Prigozhin announced on 23 June 2023 via Telegram that he was launching a “march for justice” against Russian military leadership. He claimed it was not a coup against Vladimir Putin but rather a protest against the Ministry of Defense’s mismanagement of the war in Ukraine. An estimated 25,000 Wagner fighters began moving from eastern Ukraine into Russia.

That night, Wagner forces seized control of military facilities in Rostov-on-Don, a major logistical hub for the Ukraine war. They did this without significant resistance. It was unclear whether the Russian Federal Security Service was aware of this plot (Bowen, 2023, June 28).

The next morning, an armed Wagner convoy began advancing towards Moscow, again encountering little resistance. Security forces set-up roadblocks, and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov – a Putin loyalist – deployed his own forces to confront Prigozhin's. Moscow was placed on heightened alert. Prigozhin again claimed that his goal was to hold Shoigu and Gerasimov accountable, but Prigozhin’s actions suggested a challenge to Putin.

By the afternoon of 24 June, President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus had negotiated a deal with Prigozhin. Under this agreement, Prigozhin would stand down and withdraw in exchange for amnesty for himself and his fighters. Further, Prigozhin would relocate to Belarus, and the fighters who joined him on this march could either join the Russian military, return to civilian life, or follow him into exile.

Prigozhin went to Belarus but returned to Russia within weeks. Two months after the start of the mutiny, on 23 August 2023, Prigozhin died in a mysterious plane crash along with several Wagner commanders. This event decapitated Wagner, and Russia quickly moved to dismantle it: heavy military equipment was transferred to the Russian armed forces, and Wagner fighters were absorbed into the Russian military and redeployed to Ukraine under new command, led by individuals like Andrei Troshev, a former Wagner employee appointed by Putin.

Wagner's presence in Africa has been replaced by Africa Corps (Faulkner, 2024), which has been called “a rebranded Wagner Group” (Lechner & Eledinov, 2024). As with Ukraine, this could simply be a nationalization of Wagner's activities, but Africa Corps was certainly on a short leash. Wagner is no longer an independent force, and now exists only as a reminder that Russia is willing to use PMCs as proxy forces.

Conclusion

PMCs represent an economically attractive way to project power, and the Russian Federation isn't afraid to use them. Their actions in Crimea and various African nations prove that they can be effective foreign policy tools, if used correctly. The Wagner Rebellion shows that success is not guaranteed, and that PMCs can be dangerous to the countries that hire them: the Russians fed Wagner, yet they still bit the hand.

Still, PMCs are too valuable to be abandoned (Jefferies, 2002), and Russia continues sponsoring PMCs in the Middle East and Africa (Bryjka, 2023). This would suggest that Russia – and indeed all nations – devise criteria under which PMCs should be employed. If anything is to be learned from Russia's experience with Wagner, it is that like any military or quasi-military force, an understanding of that force’s tactics, operations, and strategies are not sufficient – the way that force is used politically must be considered.

 

Bibliography

Altınbaş, Ö. (7 June 2023). “Inside the Wagner Center.” United World International. https://unitedworldint.com/30305-inside-the-wagner-center/

Arnold, T. (2019). “The Geoeconomic Dimensions of Russian Private Military and Security Companies.” Military Review, November-December 2019. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/ND-19/Arnold-Geoeconomic-Dimensions.pdf

Bezmenov, Y. (2020). “Former KGB Agent, Yuri Bezmenov, Warns America About Socialist Subversion.” [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z1EA2ohrt5Q

Bowen, A. (2023, June 28). “Wagner Group Mutiny in Russia.” Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12186

Bowen, A. (2023, August 1). "Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC)." Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12344

Bryjka, F. (2023). “Not just Wagner: Russia Backing a Host of Semi-Private Military Companies.” PISM. https://pism.pl/publications/not-just-wagner-russia-backing-a-host-of-semi-private-military-companies

Faulkner, C., et. al. (2024). “Africa Faces the Unintended Consequences of Relying on Russian PMCs.” Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/05/africa-russian-pmcs/

Grau, L. & Bartles, C. (2016). The Russian Way of War. Foreign Military Studies Office. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf

Hoyos, D. (2000). “Towards a Chronology of the ‘Truceless War,’ 241-237 B.C.” Rheinisches Museum Für Philologie, 143(3/4), 369–380. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41234468

Jefferies, I. (2002). “Military Companies – A Positive Role to Play in Today's International System.” Connections, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 2002), pp. 103-125. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26322969

Katz, B. et. al. (2020). “Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. https://russianpmcs.csis.org/

Korsunskaya, D. & Guy Faulconbridge, G. (2023, June 26). “Russia's Prigozhin in his own words on the 'mutiny'.” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-prigozhin-his-own-words-mutiny-2023-06-26/

Lechner, J. & Eledinov, S. (2024). “Is Africa Corps a Rebranded Wagner Group?” Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/

Machiavelli, M. (2024). The Prince. Translated by W. K. Marriott. https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1232/pg1232.txt

Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books.

Østensen, Å. G., & Bukkvoll, T. (2022). “Private military companies – Russian great power politics on the cheap?” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 33(1–2), 130–151. 29 September 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1984709

Pałka, W. (2020). “The Awakening of Private Military Companies.” Warsaw Institute. https://warsawinstitute.org/awakening-private-military-companies/

Pir-Budagyan, M. & the RM Staff. (2023). “Prigozhin’s Mutiny by the Hour.” Russia Matters. https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/prigozhins-mutiny-hour

Rácz, A. (2020). “Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State.” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 21 September 2020. https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state

Roth, A. (2019). “’There’s no one to help’: Russian mercenary industry’s toll on families.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/26/russia-drive-into-africa-shines-light-on-mercenary-industry

Rothbard, M. (1973). For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto. Collier Books.

Singer, P. (2001). “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security,” International Security 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001-2002): 186–220. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3092094

Yuri Bezmenov on Ideological Subversion

KGB defector Yuri Bezmenov (Barrera, 2022) recorded a video (Bezmenov, 2020) in which he outlined the process of ideological subversion the KGB used to destabilize a nation. This process allows for the subversion of a nation from within, without the need for military conflict. It is a slow process that involves four stages.

Screen capture from the video. Yuri Bezmenov is on the left.

The first stage is demoralization. It takes 15 to 20 years and aims to erode the values and principles of a nation’s population. This begins with re-educating a generation, then waiting for that generation to take positions in civil service, universities, business, and media. The propaganda is so extreme that the indoctrinated will reject the evidence of their senses and will be unable to act in their own best interest. Bezmenov recorded this video in 1984, and states that the demoralization stage is complete.

The next stage is destabilization in which core institutions such as the economy, the military, and foreign relations, are undermined. This phase lasts from 2-5 years and disrupts the nation’s ability to function effectively.

This is followed by a crisis stage which lasts from 6 weeks to a few months. During this crisis, a major event or series of events triggers a period of severe dysfunction in the country’s systems, leading to confusion and disorder.

The last stage is “normalization” in which adversarial forces step in to “restore order.” These forces take control of the nation and institute new ideologies. This phase solidifies control and allows the new rulers to enforce the new order. Once the adversarial forces complete their takeover, their early supporters are eliminated, as these useful idiots are no longer useful. This would be a repeat of the Kronstadt Uprising, in which early supporters of the Bolsheviks were “shot like partridges.” (Chapple, 2021)

Bezmenov believed that to reverse this process will require a national effort to reform the education system, focusing on patriotism and the history and civics that makes patriotism reasonable. He recommended that the U.S. must stop aiding communism: supply them with no credit, no money, no grain deals, and no recognition.

The KGB no longer exists in the form Bezmenov knew, and the Soviet Union has collapsed, but ideological subversion described by Bezmenov is still an effective process – the names of the players have simply changed. This process is certainly playing out in current American politics, with woke ideologues taking the place of the KGB, and the deep state replacing Soviet Russia.

 

References

Barrera, J. (2022). “Chaos Agent.” CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/newsinteractives/features/yuri-bezmenov-soviet-defector-canada

Bezmenov, Y. (2020). “Former KGB Agent, Yuri Bezmenov, Warns America About Socialist Subversion.” [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z1EA2ohrt5Q

Chapple, A. (2021). “'Shot Like Partridges': The Crushing of The Kronstadt Uprising.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/crushing-of-kronstadt-uprising-lenin/31102658.html

ODNI's Future Scenarios

Introduction

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has developed five scenarios on how the world will unfold by 2040 (Strategic Futures Group, 2021). The first three revolve around the form and level of US-China rivalry. The remaining two assume that globalization has broken down and been replaced by either separate security and economic blocs, or by some form of revolutionary change.

All these scenarios have one thing in common: they all assume that climate change is a real thing. Further, the authors of most of the scenarios have misunderstood the popular interpretation of COVID-related actions, and they assume that communist or socialist forms of government are economically self-sustaining as long as they’re not too authoritarian. This is highly indicative of the political state within the DNI.

This paper describes and analyzes two of these scenarios that seem likely – or rather least unlikely. The underlying assumptions of each are described, and a PESTLIED (political – economic – social – technological – legal – international – environmental – demographics) analysis (Eaton Business School, n.d.) is performed on those scenarios. Next, one of the scenarios is compared to Fukuyama’s “end of history” theory. Finally, an alternative scenario that seems more likely is described.

AfD support is highest in East Germany during 23 February 2025 Election
Map from Alicja Hagopian of The Independent

Scenario 4: Separate Silos

In this scenario, the world fragments into economic and security blocs centered around the US, China, the EU, Russia, and India. These blocs are “inward looking,” focusing on self-sufficiency and defense. Developing countries that are not aligned with one of these blocs are on the verge of becoming failed states. Climate change is ignored.

Viewing this scenario through the lens of PESTLIED analysis, we see that politically, the blocs avoid direct armed conflict but do use small wars to divert attention from domestic political problems. Smaller countries that are not part of these blocs become unstable.

Separating economies results in massive financial losses and inefficient supply chains, according to the DNI. Prices for consumer goods rose dramatically, presumably due to inability to outsource. Because of limited travel, the travel and tourism sectors collapse. Because of reduced offshoring and inability to recruit from other nations, countries devote resources to domestic education. Nations not aligned with any of these blocs are expected to be abandoned economically, which can lead to radicalization and civil unrest (TRADOC, 2007, 3-4).

Technological advances within the blocs include energy technologies, AI, and additive manufacturing. Technology, however, is restricted to within the individual blocs, and states not in one of the blocs are left behind. Progress in technologies flounder because separate blocs cannot recruit global talent.

States adopt legal systems that are mixtures of authoritarianism and democracy, adopting surveillance and repression. On the international stage, these political blocs are the major players. Small wars occur along the borders of the blocs. Nuclear weapons proliferate.

Due to the self-sufficiency of the blocs, there is no joint effort to protect the environment and fight climate change. Similarly, other leftist causes such as poverty or healthcare discrepancies are not addressed.

Waves of immigrants attempt to enter wealthier countries but are rejected. Between this and the inability to recruit globally, the demographics of each bloc remain stable.

The DNI faults this scenario because climate change is not addressed. The authors also assume that economic success is not sustainable without outsourcing or importing foreign talent. The prediction that small wars (or proxy wars) would be common does seem like a reasonable prediction. The declining population of many first world countries is not factored into this scenario.

Scenario 1: Renaissance of Democracies

The “Renaissance of Democracies” scenario predicts extreme economic and technological growth in western nations. The rise of China is no longer seen as inevitable. China, Russia, and other authoritarian regimes become less predictable and more aggressive. Within the democracies, though, free speech is a secondary concern, taking a back seat to social tranquility.

Applying PESTLIED analysis to this, we see that countries become either democracies or more authoritarian. China becomes more authoritarian, and as mentioned above, the rise of China is no longer seen as inevitable. Russia continues to be authoritarian and invades Soviet-bloc countries. The DNI describes this as being done to divert attention away from internal problems.

For the countries that shift to democracy, their economies open, allowing for innovation and growth. Russia and China remain authoritarian, and their economies stagnate as a result.

Education is more widely available due to remote learning platforms developed in response to COVID-19. Civic nationalism is reinvigorated by increased transparency and improved accountability. This comes with the price of rejecting freedom of speech.

Innovation is occurring, especially in robotics, AI, the Internet of Things, energy storage, biotech, and additive manufacturing. Unfortunately, some of this technology is applied to censorship.

Laws and international agreements are put in place to limit the harmful effects of technologies… and disinformation. Multilateral cooperation on issues such as climate change, rules for managing space, the seabed, and the Arctic. Environmental and climate issues are seen as solvable due to innovation, economic strength, and societal cohesion.

In Russia and China there is an aging population, which entails population collapse. This, together with debt and the inefficiencies of their state-directed economy, lead to internal discontent. Any change in the demographics of other countries is not mentioned.

One thing that the DNI gets right is that Russia would invade former satellite countries. The reason that is given – to divert attention away from political infighting and other forms of internal strife – is not completely plausible. A better explanation is that they invade in order to collect resources and drain the invaded country’s economy.

Fukuyama and the Renaissance of Democracies

The global resurgence in democracies described in Scenario 1 is eerily similar to the outcome predicted in Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History and the Last Man” (Fukuyama, 1992). According to Fukuyama, a perfect democratic utopia emerges on a global scale, and political-historic evolution ends. This is forward-looking, as opposed to the historical analysis presented in Bradford DeLong’s "Slouching Towards Utopia" (DeLong, 2022). DeLong reviews the history of the 20th Century and how technology has impacted the global economy, whereas Fukuyama is concerned with the end-state of society. Even China and Russia are expected to reject communism in favor of democracy, according to Fukuyama.

Not mentioned in DNI’s Scenario 1 but alluded to in Fukuyama is a way where a "renaissance of democracies" can occur. Let's call it "convergence to acceptable levels of socialism" (CALS). The idea is that governments will impose only so much socialism as the populace is willing to tolerate. This can go in two ways: liberalization of communist countries (demonstrated by China and by Russia after the fall of the Soviets), or creeping socialism (as seen in the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and other countries).

Fascism and communism cannot satisfy human needs, and the only alternative end state is democracy in the misty-eyed and soppy sense of the word used by Fukuyama (and apparently by the DNI). The core problem with DNI's scenario, Fukuyama's plan, and this CALS theory is that "democracy" is confused with "republic" - democracy is tyranny of the majority and as such there are no individual rights.

Besides this confusion of democracy with limited republics, there is another problem: democracies can fail. Examples include the French Revolution, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, the Arab Spring, etc. Indeed, the last two revolutions are seen by Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1996) as direct counterexamples to Fukuyama's "end of history" theory. Why should we even imagine democracies as something that could fail? In the case of the Arab Spring, Samuel Huntington explained this by noting that allegiance to political theory is mostly a Western concept, but other cultures adhere to tribal, racial, or religious allegiance, Islam in particular.

Conclusion

The five scenarios presented in “Global Trends 2040” are interesting future histories, but none are terribly convincing. The two considered here can be considered the “least wrong.” The DNI assumes that self-sufficient economies are unworkable, thereby rejecting Scenario 4. Recent history shows that a “renaissance of democracies” – described either by Scenario 1, Fukuyama’s “end of history,” or the CALS theory – are very prone to failure.

A scenario that seems more likely begins with the US adapting a populist nationalism blueprint, adjusting military and economic policies accordingly. This is duplicated in Argentina, East Germany (see above map), Romania, and some others. The resulting economic strength gives to the US a “bargaining chip” against the leftward swing in allies such as Canada, the UK, Germany, and Australia. We cannot predict that the US can halt this creeping socialism, but we can predict that our relationships with those allies will be reevaluated.

References

DeLong, B. (2022). Slouching Towards Utopia: An Economic History of the Twentieth Century. Basic Books.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). End of History and the Last Man. Free Press.

Huntington, S. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster.

Eaton Business School. (n.d.). "The PESTLIED model that matters in the 21st Century." Eaton Business School. https://ebsedu.org/blog/pestlied-model-in-21st-century

The Strategic Futures Group. (March 2021). "Scenarios for 2040: Charting the Future Amid Uncertainty". Office of the Director of National Intelligence. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/introduction

TRADOC. (2007). Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terrorism. https://irp.fas.org/threat/terrorism/sup1.pdf

The Opposite of Good Leadership

Military structures vary widely in how they empower — or fail to empower — their troops. While some forces cling to rigid, top-down command styles rooted in centralized control, others embrace a decentralized approach that unleashes the initiative of individual soldiers. This contrast is starkly evident when comparing the Soviet-influenced militaries of Russia and Ukraine with the principles of mission command, such as the German Auftragstaktik. The difference isn’t just theoretical — it’s a matter of battlefield outcomes.

Demoralized Ukranian Troops During the Occupation of Crimea
Image from "Ukrainian Troops Speak Out: Russian Roulette in Ukraine" (VICE News, March 16, 2014)

Empowerment is something that is not practiced in all militaries. Consider the Russian military: according to (Bowen, 2024), "the Russian military continues to operate with a Soviet-style centralized command. This command style at the tactical level often has contributed to the types of inflexible operations that contributed to previous failures and casualties."

Ukraine was a satellite of the USSR for years and apparently maintains a similar approach. Oleksandr Syrskyi, the current Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has a "preference for a tightly controlled leadership structure that favors loyalty and personal closeness over purely professional criteria" (n.a., 2024).

The consequences of this centralized command was demonstrated in Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014: interviews (VICE News, March 22, 2014) with Ukrainian sailors (VICE News, March 16, 2014) showed them to be demoralized and directionless when one of their commanders defected to Russia and the government in Ukraine was in disarray.

The opposite of this is mission command or what the Germans call Auftragstaktik (Widder, 2002). These two styles of command are not exactly the same (Klepper, 2024), but in both, the commander specifies the mission and timeframe, and the way to accomplish this is left to the individual troop's initiative. In the absence of orders, the troop knows what to do: locate, close with, and destroy the enemy, and break his stuff. This is the exact opposite of what the Ukrainian sailors were doing.

References

Bowen, A. (2024). "Russian Military Performance and Outlook." Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12606

Klepper, M. (2024). American Mission Command vs German Auftragstaktik. The Other Side of History Blog. https://the-other-side-of-history.blogspot.com/2024/01/american-mission-command-vs-german.html

n.a. (2024). "Oleksandr Syrskyi shifts Ukrainian military leadership to vertical approach." New Voice of Ukraine. https://english.nv.ua/nation/new-ukraine-s-armed-forces-chief-changed-the-command-process-of-the-army-50431480.html

VICE News. (2014, March 16). Ukrainian Troops Speak Out: Russian Roulette in Ukraine [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GH3HGvZlhhk

VICE News. (2014, March 22). Taking over a Ukrainian Base: Russian Roulette in Ukraine [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tBLs_AsBtjg

Widder, W. (2002). “Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung: Trademarks of German leadership” Military Review, September-October 2002. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot-Spots/docs/MC/MR-Sep-Oct-2002-Widder.pdf

On a Conceptual Model of Military Leadership

Introduction

A conceptual model is an abstract representation of a complex idea stripped of inessential details so that key elements are revealed. This paper looks at a conceptual model of military leadership proposed in (Catino, n.d.). We begin by attempting to define leadership at an appropriate level of abstraction. Next, four traits that a military leader should have according to this conceptual model are examined. Finally, we describe a situation containing an ineffable quality missed by conceptual models.

Definitions of Leadership

Some partial definitions of leadership at a level of abstraction appropriate for a conceptual model include:

1. "Leadership is to give purpose." This is overly broad, and the connection to a mission is not clear.
2. “I need living companions, who will follow me because they want to follow themselves — and to the place where I will.” This is from Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 1883). The part about "following themselves" means that those being led have certain abilities they want to exercise – just as a painter wants to paint or a boxer wants to box, a warrior wants to fight. Following a leader allows them to exercise that ability.
3. "To influence or direct others to accomplish a mission that is set before you." This is better but requires the leader to accomplish only one goal.
4. To correct this deficiency, this can be modified as follows: "To influence or direct others to complete a mission that is set before you, and then build upon the results of that accomplishment."

Essential Traits from a Conceptual Model

The “7-C” conceptual model of military leadership from (Catino, n.d.) lists the following traits: Christ, conviction, competency, community, conflict, communication, and character. While all these are important, I believe that the four most essential traits for a leadership model are character, competency, communication, and conviction.

Character - these are virtues that a leader must possess. The USMC lists 14 leadership virtues in their "JJ DID TIE BUCKLE" acronym: justice, judgement, dependability, initiative, decisiveness, tact, integrity, enthusiasm, bearing, unselfishness, courage, knowledge, loyalty, and endurance (USMC, 2016, p. 2-4). By having these virtues, an individual becomes a leader worth following.

Competency - competency in a leader is not just mastery of relevant technical skills but also the ability to rapidly make decisions in high-stress situations. This instills trust in leadership. Further, the leader expects his followers to be competent and will mentor the followers, teaching and transferring those skills to the followers. All this is covered under USMC's traits of knowledge, judgement, integrity, bearing, decisiveness, and initiative.

Communication – communication is the ability to clearly and concisely express intent and objectives to those being led. Communication works in both directions, and it is necessary for a leader to understand what his followers report, resolve any ambiguities, and other purposes. Communication extends beyond immediate subordinates since communication is necessary to report status and progress to people higher in the chain of command. This allows for coordinated action and unity of effort.

Conviction - conviction is a firmly held belief or faith that a goal or mission is justified, and that the leader’s team can accomplish it. Conviction in a leader rallies the followers and fosters a sense of unity. Conviction is different from stubbornness since conviction can change with compelling evidence and can adapt to evolving conditions. Conviction would fall under the USMC's courage, justice, knowledge, and endurance virtues.

Conclusion - The Man in the Arena

Those traits are necessary but not sufficient for a complete conceptual model of military leadership, I believe.

Consider Teddy Roosevelt's "man in the arena" metaphor (Roosevelt, 1910). Character and competency are necessary to inspire men to follow you. Communication is what is needed to tell them they're about to enter the arena and what their mission is. Conviction is the belief that it is worthwhile to enter the arena and that there's a reasonable chance of success.

Entering the arena requires courage, but what about conduct within that arena?

From limited personal experience it is as if a switch has been flipped, and confidence and habit are replaced by mastery and aggression; the desire for success is replaced by the need to dominate. It's not clear whether or how this joie de guerre is covered by the enthusiasm listed in the JJ DID TIE BUCKLE acronym.

References

Catino, M. S. (n. d.). Military Leadership: A Conceptual Model. [Video] https://libertyuniversity.instructure.com/courses/743862/pages/watch-military-leadership-a-conceptual-model

Nietzsche, F. (1883). Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. (T. Common, tr.) https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1998/pg1998-images.html

Roosevelt, T. (1910, April 23). "Citizenship in a Republic." Theodore Roosevelt Center at Dickinson State University. https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Learn-About-TR/TR-Encyclopedia/Culture-and-Society/Man-in-the-Arena.aspx

U.S. Marine Corps. (2016). Leading Marines. (MCWP 6-10) https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/LLI/MLD/Fidelity/Leading%20Marines%20MCWP%206-10.pdf?ver=2018-09-26-095807-367