Russian Deception Operations in the Annexation of Crimea

Introduction

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 involved a combination of physical deception and propaganda used to trick the Crimeans into accepting Russian occupation, and to mask Russia's intentions from the rest of Ukraine and the world at large. The operation made it appear that a national socialist movement was forming in Kyiv, and that this movement would threaten the Russians living in Crimea. This illusion worked to delegitimize the government in Kyiv as well as to present Russia as saviors to the people of Crimea.

In this essay, a decomposition of data analysis is first performed. Next, the conditions favoring Russian annexation are listed. After that, the physical deception operation and the information campaign are described. Finally, the overall operation is very briefly analyzed into what Russian military analysts call “maskirovka,” meaning “little masquerade.” Unless mentioned otherwise, all information is taken from (Kofman, M., et al., 2017).

Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula. From USMC Quantico

Decomposition of Data Analysis

Actors

People of Crimea - the people of Crimea were passive in the start of the Russian campaign, but later accepted Russian presence.

"Little Green Men" (LGMs) - also called the "polite people," they were Russian troops wearing unmarked uniforms. Before their identity as Russian troops was revealed, their role raised concerns amongst the Crimeans, using FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) about the conditions in Ukraine.

Local militias, biker gangs, Cossacks, and members of special police units - they had Russian backing but were set-up to be opponents of the LGMs.

News outlets in Crimea - spread the narrative of a national socialist movement forming in Kyiv and that this was a threat to the Russians living in Crimea.

Major Actions

Establish a narrative that a national socialist movement was gaining strength in Kyiv, and that this movement will be a threat to Crimeans. This was done by the presence of the LGMs, their manufactured opposition, and the propaganda coming from the news outlets.

Seizure of the Crimean Parliament on February 27, 2014, by fifty operators from Russia's KSO (Special Operations Forces) masquerading as a local militia. This action presented the appearance that Crimeans wanted protection from Russia.

Targets

Being primarily an operation of deception, the target was the beliefs of the Crimeans, to convince them that a nascent national socialist movement in Kyiv would be a threat to their well-being, and that Russia would be able to protect them.

Objectives

Build an air of legitimacy allowing Russia to gain control of the Crimean Peninsula without serious kinetic or non-violent resistance.

Effects

The physical deception operation (the LGMs and their “opponents”) and the information campaign allowed Russia to annex Crimea with little bloodshed, if any.

Preconditions

Russia leveraged several pre-existing conditions to facilitate the annexation. The shared language and history between Crimea and Russia as described by Vladimir Putin in (Putin, 2021) and (Carlson & Putin, 2024) enabled Russian operatives to blend in effortlessly with the local populace, aiding covert operations. Additionally, the long-standing presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet near Crimea meant that the sight of Russian naval forces was routine for Crimeans, reducing immediate suspicion when military activities escalated.

Concurrently, the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, which started just weeks before the annexation, required a heightened security presence from Russia, providing a convenient cover for military maneuvers. On February 26, Russia further masked its intentions with a snap inspection of its forces, using this as a tactic to disguise troop movements towards Crimea.

Adding to the narrative of a growing fascist movement was political turmoil in Kyiv, in which Viktor Yanukovych, the then-president of Ukraine, abandoned Kyiv, leaving Euromaidan protesters in charge.

Physical Deception Operations

In the lead-up to the annexation of Crimea, Russia employed physical deception operations aimed at shaping public perception both within Crimea and internationally. The primary goal was to create the illusion that a national socialist movement was burgeoning in Ukraine, and that this movement posed a significant threat to the Crimean population. This made it appear that Russian intervention was a protective measure against the fascists.

Central to this deception was the presence of the so-called "little green men" (LGMs), unidentified soldiers without insignia who appeared in Crimea. Their sudden and unexplained presence suggested an impending armed takeover, instilling fear and uncertainty among the local populace. This ambiguity was crucial to the narrative of an external threat or a coup in motion.

The operation was not limited to these soldiers alone; it involved a mix of local militias, biker gangs, Cossacks, and former members of the Berkut special police unit. These groups played roles in street-level intimidation and in reinforcing the image of a grassroots resistance movement against supposed Ukrainian nationalists. They thus operated as manufactured opposition.

A significant event in this campaign occurred on 27 February 2014, when fifty operators from Russia's KSO (Special Operations Forces) masqueraded as a local militia and seized the Crimean Parliament. By raising the Russian flag over the parliament building, they visually and symbolically asserted control, further solidifying the narrative of a local shift towards Russian allegiance.

To give a veneer of legitimacy to these actions, a referendum was quickly organized. This vote was presented as a democratic process where the Crimeans could voice their preference for joining Russia. This move was part of the strategy to make the annexation appear as a response to the will of the Crimean people rather than an act of aggression by Russia.

The Information Campaign

Russia launched an extensive propaganda campaign using local Russian-language broadcasters, with three main objectives: to discredit the newly established government in Ukraine, to heighten the sense of peril among Russians living in Ukraine, and to create an illusion of widespread support for Crimea's reunification with Russia. This campaign was strategically timed to precede, accompany, and follow the military operations in Crimea, ensuring a narrative that aligned with the physical actions on the ground.

The primary audience for this propaganda was the Russian public, with Crimean residents as a secondary target. The groundwork for this was already laid due to the popularity of Russian television in Crimea. On 9 March 2014, Russia escalated its control over information by shutting down Ukrainian TV channels, thereby monopolizing the narrative. Russian TV frequently labeled Oleksandr Turchynov’s new Ukrainian government, which had replaced Viktor Yanukovych's government, as a "fascist junta," framing the annexation as a necessary intervention to protect ethnic Russians from this supposed threat.

Conclusion

Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 utilized both pre-existing conditions and sophisticated deception tactics. By exploiting the cultural and historical ties, along with the familiar presence of its naval forces, Russia managed to execute its strategy with stealth and legitimacy in the eyes of those within Crimea, Ukraine, Russian, and international audiences.

The use of physical deception through LGMs and local groups created a perception of imminent threat, justifying intervention under the guise of protection. Further, Russia’s information campaign not only discredited the Ukrainian government but also painted the annexation as a popular and protective move. Thus, Russia secured Crimea before Ukraine and international forces could confront this annexation.

To describe the overall process Russia used to capture Crimea, (Bouwmeester, 2021) uses the term “maskirovka,” a strategy of deception the goal of which is to “destabilize command structures and to create ‘fog of war’” by fabricating “a manageable form of chaos.” He calls the propaganda component “active intelligence” - the “active” part here would be the use of the LGMs and the manufactured resistance against them. Maskirovka has been part of Russian military operations at least since World War 2 (Maier, 2016, p. 4), and the annexation of Crimea shows that it is still part of the Russian Military’s quiver.

References

Bouwmeester, A. J. H. (2021). “The art of deception revisited (part 2): The unexpected annexation of Crimea in 2014.” Militaire Spectator. https://militairespectator.nl/artikelen/art-deception-revisited-part-2-unexpected-annexation-crimea-2014

Carlson, T. & Putin, V. (2024, February 6). Exclusive: Tucker Carlson Interviews Vladimir Putin [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fOCWBhuDdDo

Kofman, M., et al. (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html

Maier, M. (2016). A little masquerade: Russia’s evolving employment of maskirovka. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1022096.pdf

Putin, V. (2021). Article by Vladimir Putin ”On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians“. President of Russia. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181

War in the South China Sea

Introduction

There is no absence of targets for China in the South China Sea (SCS) - Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan in particular. China certainly has the ability to wage conventional war in the SCS, but the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also been pursuing "unrestricted warfare," (Qiao & Liang, 1999) wherein different types of non-kinetic actions (economic, psychological, cultural, international lawfare) are used to affect target nations, either to destabilize them or to turn them into client states. The fundamental concepts of unrestricted warfare are not limited to that type of warfare but also carry-over into conventional warfare as described below.

How the PRC Could Attack Nations in or Close to The South China Sea

China has claimed several islands in the SCS, in particular the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and have constructed airfields and ports on many of them. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies' "China Island Tracker" (CSIS, 2025), the CCP has built 20 outposts in the Paracel Islands and 7 in the Spratly Islands. In addition, the CCP has been creating artificial islands.

Each of these islands must be considered in the context of the PRC’s military: they can be used as airstrips, listening outposts, logistics sites, etc. (Center for Preventative Action, 2025)

China would use multi-domain warfare in any military operation in the SCS, but they will expand on the doctrine according to the concepts of unrestricted warfare. The authors of the unrestricted warfare doctrine asked the question "where is the battlefield" - and they answered "everywhere." (Qiao & Liang, 1999) This is relevant to kinetic warfare as follows: US military operations, in particular drone operations, are controlled remotely. For example, the drone strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki in 2011 was controlled from Creech Air Force Base outside Las Vegas, Nevada. (Zegart, 2022) That means that Las Vegas is a legitimate military target. The document defining multi-domain battle (TRADOC, 2017) explicitly states that we must think of the battlefield as “expanded” (TRADOC, 2017, p.6), so conflict with China would not be restricted to SCS, but it is not clear if the “remote control” situation was considered. If this is indeed the case, this represents a flaw in the multi-domain warfare doctrine.

China already is employing unrestricted warfare in the SCS. For example, the Belt and Road Initiative has been used to establish "hooks" into other countries' infrastructures, and the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia are all considered part of the Belt-and-Road Initiative, as is Indonesia (Council on Foreign Relations, N/D). The infrastructure constructed in those nations represents anywhere from 2% to 8% of their GDP (Steil, 2022).

Extent of the Belt and Road Initiative as of 2107. From (Steil, 2022)

An Effective Counter Strategy

As described in Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040 (TRADOC, 2017), the multi-domain battle (MDB) doctrine is applicable during pre-conflict competition stage, during armed conflict stage, and return-to-competition stage where the competitor is a "still-capable peer adversary" (TRADOC, 2017, p. 21). There are two things we can learn: First, MDB is applicable to the time before the start of armed conflict; second, the competitor is still capable after the conclusion of armed conflict. (?!?)

The second point is genuinely concerning since it explicitly allows for "endless wars", but that will not be examined here.

For the first point, MDB during the pre-conflict stage involves "conducting proactive stabilization campaigns, contesting destabilization campaigns, deterring escalation through the application of flexible deterrent options and rapid deterrence response options, and preparing for transition immediately into armed conflict should the adversary attack" (TRADOC, 2017, pp. 21-22). Destabilization campaigns are designed to cause internal strife.

This, along with military training exercises involving other nations in or near the SCS, could be sufficient to prevent a PRC attack.

If, however, kinetic warfare were to begin, the United States would likely pursue multi-domain warfare, hopefully with security measures to protect remote-controlled operations as described above. 

Limiting Factors that US and Allied Forces Would Likely Encounter

For the non-kinetic possibility, the limiting factor (LIMFAC) would primarily be a lack of support from nations involved in the Belt-and-Road Initiative – besides the economic pressure there would also be serious levels of CCP propaganda in those nations.

For the kinetic possibility, the problem of positioning forces in the region should not be considered a major LIMFAC due to the presence of military bases in Japan. Coordination between US and Allied forces should be resolved by Joint Operation protocols. One LIMFAC would be the relative smallness of the militaries in the region. The major LIMFAC would be operational security: many American institutions have been compromised by the CCP, or are sympathetic to socialism, including the US Military as demonstrated by General Mark Milley, West Point student Spenser Rapone, etc. The sheer number of compromised institutions is a powerful weapon (Ferguson, 2019, pp. 3-59) with which we must contend.

References

CSIS. (2025). "China Island Tracker". Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/

Center for Preventative Action. (2025). "Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea". Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea

Council on Foreign Relations. (N/D). “China’s Approach to Global Governance” https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/

Ferguson, N. (2019). The Square and the Tower: Networks and Power, from the Freemasons to Facebook. Penguin Books.

Qiao & Liang. (1999). Unrestricted Warfare. Shadow Lawn Press. https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf

Steil, B. (2022). “Belt and Road Tracker”. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker

TRADOC. (2017). Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040. https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/MDB_Evolutionfor21st.pdf

Zegart, A. (2022). Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence. Princeton University Press.

Starburst Analysis and Information Sources for the Battle of COP Keating

Introduction

This essay attempts to come to an understanding of the major actions, participants, methods, and motives in the 3 October 2009 Battle of COP Keating in eastern Afghanistan. A starburst analysis will be done to achieve this. Further, some of the various information sources/perspectives will be examined to see what they can contribute to an understanding this battle.

Starburst Analysis

Who - The primary actors in the Battle of COP Keating were US and ANA forces versus Taliban insurgents, called AAF in the video. There were approximately 300 Taliban fighters involved. The US and ANA had 73 troops positioned at COP Keating plus 29 troops stationed at OP Fritsche. As the battle progressed, a QRF from FOB Bostic and air support joined the US and ANA side.

What - The key activity was the battle between the US and ANA forces against the Taliban fighters. Planning and observation were performed by Taliban leaders prior to the attack.

When - The battle took place on 3 October 2009, but planning began months prior. The attack was timed to correspond to scheduled closing of COP Keating and OP Fritsche.

Where - COP Keating and OP Fritsche were located near the town of Kamdesh in eastern Afghanistan (which led to another name for the battle, the Battle of Kamdesh). COP Keating was in mountainous terrain, at the bottom of a valley. Two sides of the camp were bounded by the Darreh ye Kushtoz River. The surrounding mountains were unsecured except for the one capped by OP Fritsche. COP Keating and OP Fritsche were not in direct line of sight. These mountains, along with a nearby mosque, would serve as Taliban fire locations.

Why - COP Keating was established in July 2006, positioned to disrupt insurgent supply lines from Pakistan. By dislocating the COP, the flow of weapons and fighters would resume.

How - The Battle of COP Keating was a two-pronged attack, one against COP Keating (the primary target), the other against OP Fritsche. Both targets were engaged simultaneously to prevent one from assisting the other. The nearest air support came from FOB Bostick, 10 minutes away by helicopter.

Information Sources

It is necessary to evaluate information that was available prior to the Battle of COP Keating as well as information generated after the battle occurred. One would expect various after-action reports of the Battle, but they have been repressed, and many details did not become known until the release of WikiLeaks’ Afghan War Diaries. Apparently, there were multiple intelligence failures. Building on (Gertz. 2009), Hershel Smith writes (Smith, 2009):

…defense intelligence had three reports of imminent danger but failed to act on this intelligence. What “smoking gun report” would have convinced them to take action we aren’t told…

Smith goes on to hint that a “smoking gun report” may have been in possession of the CIA.

Population studies (the human domain perspective) of the people living near COP Keating would be useful for determining local attitudes and for building a social network of the people. Adversary media, be it in the form of literature, internet posts, etc., would also help in creating a social network. This social network can then be infiltrated to gather information. The social network can then be analyzed to determine the major Taliban influencers who will then become the major targets for US forces. (Healy. 2013)

Another critical information stream would be a scholarly perspective. Thaler, et. al. (2013, p. 12) sites several academic papers (many published prior to the battle) stating that Afghanistan has a culture of independence and resistance. This is an extremely specific characterization and probably wouldn’t hold for all Afghani. If it applies to the people living near COP Keating, this will determine how Afghani would relate to or tolerate foreign presence, if at all.

Finally, the security practitioners’ perspective would provide a wealth information, not only about the Battle itself but about the conditions that existed prior to it as well as to make predictions about future engagements.

Both the COP and OP were targeted by 45 attacks between May 2009 and October 2009. One question that security practitioners could answer is this: did the insurgency forces display improvement in their operational ability during that time, and if so, in what areas?

An insurgency does not spring fully-formed from the forehead of Saint Mattis of the Blessed Order of the Knife Hands. It must have meager beginnings and, unless extinguished, will improve by becoming confident, learning new 4GW techniques, making use of changing logistics opportunities, etc. Once the baseline and trajectory are established, the insurgency’s future operations can be predicted.

Conclusion

The starburst analysis technique, combined with various information perspectives, helps us come to an understanding of the Battle of COP Keating. Until a comprehensive AAR, similar to the one performed for the similar Battle at Wanar (Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 2010) becomes available, there will always be questions.

References

ABC News. (5 February 2010). “Camp Keating officers disciplined for attack that killed 8 U. S. troops.” Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://abcnews.go.com/WN/Afghanistan/camp-keating-commanders-disciplined-attack-killed-22-us/story?id=9761160

Gertz, B. (29 October 2009). “DIA on Afghan intel” Washington Times. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/29/inside-the-ring-58944275/

Healy, K. (2013). Using metadada to find Paul Revere. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from: https://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-metadata-to-find-paul-revere/

Smith, H. (2 November 2009). “Systematic defense intelligence failures”. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/11/02/systemic-defense-intelligence-failures/

Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. (2010). “Wanat: Combat action in Afghanistan, 2008”. Combat Studies Institute Press. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Wanat.pdf

Steeb, Matsumura, Herbert, Gordon IV, & Horn. (2011). “Perspectives on the Battle of Wanat”. Rand Corporation. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP329z1.pdf

Thaler, Brown, Gonzalez, Mobley, & Roshan. (2013). “Improving the U.S. Military’s understanding of unstable environments vulnerable to violent extremist groups”. RAND Corporation. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR298.html

TRADOC G2 OE Enterprise G&V. (10 August 2012). “The battle of COP Keating - October 3rd, 2009”. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylUzySZb3L8

WikiLeaks War Diary. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/search/?q=cop+keating∓sort=date∓release=Afghanistan∓date__gte=2009-10-03∓date__lte=2009-10-09

Utilizing Religion as a Foreign Policy Tool

Introduction

Prior to entering the great power competition (GPC) with China and Russia, the United States was embroiled in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and before that was the Cold War. Now that the GWOT is over, America has returned to a situation similar to the Cold War, but with a difference: China and Russia are now far more sophisticated in their approach to international relations.

Instead of just using military power (hard power), China and Russia are using all the instruments of foreign power: diplomacy, information, military, economic, and cultural, which includes religion. China is especially adept at this, combining these instruments and coordinating their using their usage.

In this paper, certain methods of China’s approach to GPC are considered, in particular the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The operation and the motivations of the BRI are described. Next, the BRI is fitted into Nye’s framework of hard/sharp/soft/smart power. The consequences a country faces when it decides to enter partnership with China are listed. Finally, the role of religion in combatting the BRI is explored.

Sharp, Hard, Soft, and Smart Power

During the Clinton Administration, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report entitled “CSIS Commission on Smart Power” coauthored by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.¹ He was one of the first people to use the term “smart power”, and a four-fold classification of styles of implementing foreign policy was described: sharp, hard, soft, and smart power.

Hard power is the overt use of coercion to influence the actions of other nations. Here, “coercion” can include economic sanctions, coercive diplomacy, and military threats.

Sharp power uses subtle means to influence or manipulate through deceptive means including propaganda and information warfare. The goal is to not so much to change behavior but rather to change perception to cause political instability, change the opinion of the target nation towards the nation using the sharp power, etc. It is typically used by totalitarian countries like China to influence free(er) nations, taking “advantage of the one-sided openness of Western states and societies to Chinese capital, ideas, and actors. C.C.P. influence has entered through the open front door, eagerly courted by those in the West hungry for a large slice of the growing China cake.”²

Soft power can be defined as “the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals.”³. It involves getting a nation to behave in a certain way using culture, political values, and foreign policy. Soft power co-opts a nation by getting them to want what you want. It is difficult to wield since the needed tools (such as cultural tools) are not under government control, and that it does not produce immediate results since using cultural and political values need time to shape the diplomatic process.

Smart power is the use of sharp and soft power in combination to achieve America’s foreign policy goals. “Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power.”⁴ The CSIS report recommended four broad strategies for implementing smart power: invest in a “new multilateralism,” global development, public diplomacy, and economic integration. From today’s standpoint the goal of these strategies might be called “pre-globalism,” and was the driving foreign policy of both Clinton and Obama.

The Belt and Road Initiative

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China's global economic development strategy. It was advocated by Xi Jinping and adopted by China in 2013. BRI is implemented by heavily investing in a country's infrastructure projects which can include railways, highways, hospitals, port facilities, logistic hubs, real estate, power grids, etc.⁵ The BRI in called "One Belt Road" in China and is sometimes called the "New Silk Road." Transnational networks of highways and railways have been built, but the BRI is not simply a physical infrastructure program - it also includes trade agreements and streamlined border crossings as well as the creation of economic zones that favor adoption of Chinese technology. This network expands the use of Chinese currency and thus the political influence of China.

The BRI: China in Red, the members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in orange. The proposed corridors in black (Land Silk Road) and blue (Maritime Silk Road).

In 2024 there are 149 countries involved in BRI projects.

Should an infrastructure project be successfully completed in a country, China or state-owned businesses maintain a significant share in the project. Operation of that project entails that funds go to China, so that country becomes a vassal state to China. Further, requiring that transactions between the Chinese and the target county’s companies take place using Chinese yuan renminbi freezes the foreign company into a relationship with the Chinese one, since China’s yuan is a non-convertible currency.

When economic factors force a country to default on BRI loans, China could nationalize foreign assets and return them only should their “owner” perform certain actions. This results in the country going sovereign default, which happened in Ghana and Zambia. When Pakistan defaulted, they were bailed out by the International Monetary Fund. When Sri Lanka defaulted on a $435 million BRI loan to build a harbor there, China enforced a debt-for-equity swap giving China 70% stake in the harbor.

The Council on Foreign Relations maintains a "Belt and Road Tracker" website⁶ (unfortunately it has records only up to 2017) which shows the imports from China as a percentage of GDP, foreign direct investment from China, and the external debt owed to China. Foreign direct investment is the percentage of the country's incoming investment and is indicative of the control China has over the internal politics of that country.

Some examples...

• Imports from China constitutes 4.9% of Egypt's GDP
• 10.4% of Sri Lanka's inward foreign direct investment comes from China.
• 7.0% of Sri Lanka's inward foreign direct investment comes from China.
• 17.2% of Ethiopia’s GDP is debt to China.

These are the economic consequences to becoming involved in the BRI. BRI thus includes elements of soft power and smart power.

BRI’s Relation to China’s General Model of Unrestricted Warfare

The BRI is part of China’s general approach to warfare, called “unrestricted warfare” by its inventors. The Chinese colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui developed and wrote Unrestricted Warfare⁷ in response to lessons learned from America’s victory in the First Gulf War. Qiao and Wang realized that China would be unable to match the United States’ technical virtuosity in kinetic warfare. Unrestricted warfare is an elaborate system involving redefinitions of terms such as “warfare” and “weapons.” For them, a weapon is not just a tool to kill or destroy. Instead, they realize that “everything that can benefit mankind can also harm him… The new concept of weapons will cause ordinary people and military men alike to be greatly astonished at the fact that commonplace things that are close to them can also become weapons with which to engage in war.” These weapons include:

• Financial
• Ecological
• Psychological
• Smuggling
• Media warfare
• Drug warfare
• Network warfare
• Technological warfare
• Fabrication
• Resources
• Economic aid warfare
• Cultural warfare
• International lawfare

Most importantly, unrestricted warfare redefines “victory” to mean that the enemy nation is forced to serve one’s own interest. “The best way to achieve victory is to control, not to kill,” they wrote.

The BRI would fit within financial, economic aid, and cultural warfare. This is explicitly stated in a 2015 paper written by Colonel Qiao⁸. Indeed, BRI forces the aid recipient to serve one’s own interest.

How the United States Builds Relationships with Non-Secular Countries

The relationships the United States has with other countries (except China, Russia, Iran, and DPRK) are based on trade agreements and mutual self-defense. Examples of the international trade organizations and agreements include the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Agreement, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. The US has Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with numerous countries including ones in Central and South America, Israel, Jordan, etc. The US also has Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) with nations on six continents.

Examples of military alliances of which the United States is a member include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and the Australia, New Zealand, and US Security Treaty (ANZUS).

The relationships we make with nations that are strongly religious are usually covered under either trade agreements or military alliances. For example, many religious countries in Eastern Europe including Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Latvia, and Slovakia are members of NATO.

Using Religion as a Tool in Support of US Strategic Interests

Religion is about exploring and strengthening the relationship between individuals and God, so religion should not be used directly as a political tool. To further complicate this, a wide variety of religions are practiced in the Indo-Pacific Area of Operations. Here are some examples:

• Australia - Christianity
• Bangladesh - Islam
• Brunei - Sunni Islam
• Cambodia - Buddhism
• Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) - None
• India - Hinduism
• Indonesia - Islam
• Japan - Shinto and Buddhism
• Korea - Christianity or Buddhism
• Laos - Buddhism
• Malaysia - Sunni Islam
• Maldives - Sunni Islam
• Philippines - Christianity
• Thailand – Buddhism

Because of this variety of faiths, the United States cannot use a single approach to defend against Chinese influence in those nations. But there are alternatives that would appeal to the variety of faiths while staying true to the nature of religion.

Missionary work can spread American ideals to individuals of other nations, and in that way they would work to advance those ideals, and so US strategic interests would be served because the US embodies those ideals. However, many contemporary American churches or religions work against or subvert traditional American cultural values (such as individualism, freedom, honesty, decency, family, optimism, equality, generosity, charity, etc.) so those should certainly not be involved in any overseas work.

Another approach that doesn’t turn religion into a political tool is to inform a nation of the consequences of accepting BRI. These consequences involve decreased sovereignty for that nation including economic servitude and cultural replacement.

Religion is forbidden in Communist countries if for any other reason the government sees religion as a competitor. Presumably, China does not explicitly mention its suppression of Christians or Muslim Uyghurs within China or the suppression of Buddhists in Mongolia when it invites a country to join the BRI.

As China gains control over a country via BRI, it should be expected that religion would be suppressed in that country either through direct repression or advocacy of anti-religions secular ideas. Within China itself, believers are painted as enemies of the state, enemies of social order, anti-scientific, or members of cults. It would be expected that propaganda of this form would be used in BRI member countries, but gradually, at least at first.

How can the US counter China’s use of Religion as a Sharp Power?

As a nation that enforces atheism, China would not directly use religion as a sharp power. Religion there has been co-opted and exists there only in "approved" form. However, China would certainly use the religions of another country against that country by fomenting division between those religions.

Another way of stating this is that if China is indeed using religion as a sharp power, it will be in the form of a “package deal” – atheism will be only one part of their propaganda, and religion will be only one target.

Seen in this way, the question can be reformulated as follows: how might the US counter Chinese use of propaganda and other forms of sharp power? “The C.C.P. elites understood that almost anything in Western capitalist societies can be bought. There was hardly any protective layer that Chinese would-be “sharp power” had to pierce.”⁹

Some recommendations in Benner et al, 2018¹⁰, include restricting foreign funding of political parties and limiting certain investments. More is necessary, however.

Politicians and administrators must be made aware of the symbolic and economic significance of interacting with the Chinese Communist Party. In another paper¹¹, Benner gives two examples of how Germany failed in this aspect.

First was the acceptance of a statue of Karl Marx by the German city of Tier – this statue was a gift from China.¹² Second allowance by the mayor of Duisburg to install or expand various technologies such as the city-wide WLAN network, broadband connections in Duisburg public schools, streetlamps, and eGovernment solutions.¹³

In the United States, a massive number of residential properties were purchased by China, including 40,600 properties purchased in 2017¹⁴. There have been commercial properties purchased as well, but exact number of such properties is unknown. A large amount of agricultural land was also purchased, but the relevant law for tracking this, the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA) of 1978, is not being enforced¹⁵.

In addition, there have been attempts to purchase land or place structures close to US military bases and other secure locations. For example, China attempted to donate a pagoda to the National Arboretum which could gather signal intelligence from the US Capitol and federal agencies. The FBI stopped the donation¹⁶. China has also purchased meat production plants such as Smithfield Foods, the nation’s largest pork producer¹⁷.

China also ran police stations in major US cities¹⁸ in order to monitor Chinese nationals and have positioned Confucius Institutes on university campuses to spread propaganda¹⁹.

China also has considerable influence over American popular media. Consider how the plots or characters of Hollywood films are altered to present China in a positive light, or at least in a non-threatening manner²⁰. An example of this is with the movie called “Red Dawn”. In the 1984 version, the US is invaded by the Soviets. The original script to the 2012 remake involved the Chinese invading the US. In the final release of “Red Dawn”, it was the North Koreans who did the invading.

 

Conclusion

As shown above, China is using economic means such as the BRI to extend its control to a global scale, but the BRI is not the only method it uses. China is also using a whole spectrum of approaches to extend its ideals of communism and atheism – this spectrum includes media warfare, land purchase, purchase of food production facilities, etc. There are ways of fighting this operation, but doing so involves engaging the interest of politicians and revitalizing the relevant federal agencies.

Footnotes

1. Armitage & Nye, Jr., CSIS Commission on Smart Power.
2. Benner, Ewert, Fulda, Siemons & Shi-Kupfer, “How to Fight China’s Sharp Power.”
3. Nye, “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power.”
4. Armitage & Nye, Jr., CSIS Commission on Smart Power.
5. Lew & Roughead, “China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States.”
6. Steil, “Belt and Road Tracker.”
7. Qiao & Liang, Unrestricted Warfare.
8. Qiao, "One Belt, One Road."
9. Benner, Ewert, Fulda, Siemons & Shi-Kupfer, “How to Fight China’s Sharp Power.”
10. Ibid.
11. Benner, Gaspers, Ohlberg, Poggetti & Shi-Kupfer, “Responding to China’s Growing Political Influence in Europe.”
12. Carrel, “Marx's German birthplace unveils controversial statue of him.”
13. N/A. “Huawei Deepens Cooperation with Duisburg to Transform Germany’s Industrial Heartland into a Smart City.”
14. N/A, “Total number of residential properties purchased by Chinese buyers in the United States from 2010 to 2024.”
15. Burack, “China’s Land Grab.”
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Office of Public Affairs - DoJ, “Two Arrested for Operating Illegal Overseas Police Station of the Chinese Government.”
19. Yang, “Controversial Confucius Institutes Returning to U.S. Schools Under New Name.”
20. Martin & Williamson, “Mapping Chinese Influence in Hollywood.”

Bibliography

Adelman, K. “Not-So-Smart Power.” Foreign Policy, 18 April 2011. Retrieved 8 October 2024 from https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/18/not-so-smart-power/

Armitage, R. & Nye, Jr., J. CSIS Commission on Smart Power. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2007. Retrieved 11 October 2024 from https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/csissmartpowerreport.pdf

Benner, T., Gaspers, J., Ohlberg, M., Poggetti, L. & Shi-Kupfer, K. Responding to China’s Growing Political Influence in Europe. Mercator Institute for China Studies, February 2018. Retrieved 10 October 2024 from https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/GPPi_MERICS_Authoritarian_Advance_2018_1.pdf

Benner, T., Ewert, I., Fulda, A., Siemons, M., & Shi-Kupfer, K. “How To Fight China’s Sharp Power.” ChinaFile, 20 August 2018. Retrieved 10 October 2024 from https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/how-fight-chinas-sharp-power

Burack, B. “China’s Land Grab: The Sale of U.S. Real Estate to Foreign Adversaries Threatens National Security.” Heritage Foundation, 9 May 2024. Retrieved 10 October 2024 from https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2024-05/BG3825.pdf

Carrel, P. “Marx's German birthplace unveils controversial statue of him.” Reuters, 5 May 2018. Retrieved 10 October 2024 from https://www.reuters.com/article/world/marxs-german-birthplace-unveils-controversial-statue-of-him-idUSKBN1I60J0/

Lew, J. & Roughead, G. “China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States.” Council on Foreign Relations, 2021. Retrieved 9 October 2024 from https://live-tfr-cdn.cfr.org/cdn/ff/ocjY82x697hFr2wwfpEShIemYoUoRHQjGedMutfvyis/1617323169/public/2021-04/TFR%20%2379_China%27s%20Belt%20and%20Road_Implications%20for%20the%20United%20States_FINAL.pdf

Liu, X., “What Sharp Power? It’s Nothing but “Unsmart” Power.” USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 15 November 2018. Retrieved 11 October 2024 from https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/what-sharp-power-it%E2%80%99s-nothing-%E2%80%9Cunsmart%E2%80%9D-power

Martin, M. & Williamson, C. “Mapping Chinese Influence in Hollywood” Kennedy Papers on Indo-Pacific Security Studies 4, January 2023. Retrieved 7 October 2024 from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/KP_04_Martin_Mapping_Chinese_Influence_in_Hollywood.pdf

N/A. “Huawei Deepens Cooperation with Duisburg to Transform Germany’s Industrial Heartland into a Smart City.” Retrieved 12 October 2024 from https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2018/9/huawei-duisburg-germany-smartcity

N/A, “Total number of residential properties purchased by Chinese buyers in the United States from 2010 to 2024.” Statista. Retrieved 11 October 2024 from https://www.statista.com/statistics/611020/total-number-of-properties-purchased-by-chinese-buyers-in-the-us/

Nye, J. “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 10 January 2003. Retrieved 11 October 2024 from https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/propaganda-isnt-way-soft-power

Office of Public Affairs – US Department of Justice. “Two Arrested for Operating Illegal Overseas Police Station of the Chinese Government.” 17 April 2023. Retrieved 12 October 2024 from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-arrested-operating-illegal-overseas-police-station-chinese-government

Qiao L. "One Belt, One Road." LimesOnline.com, 17 July 2015. Last retrieved 10 October 2024 from https://www.limesonline.com/en/regions/one-belt-one-road-14720766/

Qiao & Liang. Unrestricted Warfare. Shadow Lawn Press, 1999. Retrieved 8 October 2024 from https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf

Spalding, R. War Without Rules: China's Playbook for Global Domination. Sentinel Press, 2022.

Steil, B. “Belt and Road Tracker.” Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, 1 June 2022. Retrieved 8 October 2024 from https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker

Wilson III, E. “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2008; 616; 110. https://doi/10.1177/0002716207312618

Yang, L. “Controversial Confucius Institutes Returning to U.S. Schools Under New Name.” Voice of America News, 27 June 2022. Retrieved 12 October 2024 from https://www.voanews.com/a/controversial-confucius-institutes-returning-to-u-s-schools-under-new-name/6635906.html

Joseph as a Supply Chain Manager

Introduction

The overall theme of the story of Joseph as found in Genesis 37-50 is that of forgiveness: Joseph’s brothers threw him down a cistern then sold him into slavery, then convinced their father that Joseph was eaten by a wild animal. Later, after Joseph rises to power in Egypt, he invites his brothers and the rest of the family to live there. This was not unlimited forgiveness, however: he verified that the brothers were indeed remorseful before inviting them to Egypt. For purposes of this paper, the story of Joseph and how he overcame famine in Egypt will be interpreted through the lens of supply chain management.

Joseph's Coat Brought to Jacob
by Domenico Fiasella, c. 1640

Story of Joseph from the Book of Genesis

Joseph, son of Jacob, lived in Canaan with ten half-brothers, one full brother, and at least one half-sister. Joseph was Jacob’s favorite son, and two things made his brothers jealous. First, Joseph told them about two dreams he had that suggest his brothers will bow down to him. Second, Jacob gives him a "coat of many colors."

Joseph's brothers are mad enough to kill him when he comes looking for them in Dothan. The eldest brother, Reuben, instead suggests that they throw him into a cistern, with intentions to come back for him later. They follow through with this plan: they take his coat of many colors and then throw him down one of the cisterns.

The brothers see a caravan of Ishmaelites carrying spices and oils en route to Egypt. Judah (one of the brothers) says "we could kill our brother and hide his body. But then we will not get anything for ourselves." The brothers agree to this plan. They pull Joseph out of the cistern and sell him to the Ishmaelites for twenty silver coins (Genesis 37:28). The Ishmaelites took Joseph with them to Egypt.

Reuben returns to the cistern and sees that Joseph was not there - he's very upset. Reuben finds his other brothers and says: "Joseph is not in the well! What can I do now?" The brothers kill a goat and put its blood over the coat of many colors. They take the coat back to Jacob. Upon seeing the coat Jacob says: “It is my son's coat! A wild animal must have eaten him! The animal has torn Joseph's body into pieces.” His children tried to comfort Jacob, but he was inconsolable: “I will be sad until the day that I die, because my son is dead.”

Meanwhile, the caravan took Joseph into Egypt, where he was sold to Potiphar, captain of the Pharaoh's guards. Joseph eventually becomes the superintendent of Potiphar’s house.

Potiphar’s wife falsely accuses Joseph of sexual harassment, and he is imprisoned. God is with Joseph even while he's in prison, and as such the warden puts him in charge of all the other prisoners.

Joseph meets the Pharaoh's cupbearer and chef, both imprisoned for offending the Pharaoh. Both the cupbearer and the baker have disturbing dreams on the same night. Joseph interprets the cupbearer’s dream, learning that in three days the cupbearer will be released from prison and the Pharaoh will restore him to his former position. Joseph asks the cupbearer to remember him to the Pharaoh to get him out of prison. Joseph next interprets the baker’s dream, but the interpretation is grim: in three days, the Pharaoh will have the baker executed.

Three days later, on the Pharaoh's birthday, the events foretold by Joseph occur: the baker is executed, and the cupbearer is released and regains his position in the court. Unfortunately, the cupbearer forgets to ask the Pharaoh to release Joseph.

Two years after that, the Pharaoh has two disturbing dreams. In the first, seven lean cows eat seven fat cows. In the second, seven healthy heads of grain are devoured by seven thin, scorched heads of grain. The Pharaoh's wise men cannot interpret the dreams. The cupbearer then remembers Joseph and how he correctly interpreted the dreams while in prison.

Joseph is released from prison and credits God for his ability to interpret dreams. The Pharaoh's dreams, Joseph explains, mean the same thing: there will be seven years of abundance followed by seven years of famine. Joseph recommends that the Pharaoh appoint someone to oversee the collection of a fifth of the produce produced all throughout Egypt and store it for the famine. Joseph is recommending emergency preparedness (Martinez, 2022, p. 177-181).

Impressed with Joseph’s interpretations, the Pharaoh gives Joseph the role, making him second in command of Egypt: “I hereby put you in charge of the whole land of Egypt” (Genesis 41:41). Joseph, who is now 30, travels throughout Egypt, organizing the collection and storage of food during the seven plentiful years. Egypt is thus prepared for the famine.

When the famine strikes, Joseph opens the storehouses and sells grain back to the Egyptians. The famine was so severe that people from other countries came to Egypt to purchase grain, too. The inhabitants of Egypt, except the Egyptian priests, run out of money. “Then bring your livestock,” said Joseph. “I will sell you food in exchange for your livestock, since your money is gone.” (Genesis 47:16). The result was that the people sold their properties and themselves into slavery to Joseph for food. As the famine ended, Joseph mandated that 20% of all the food that the people grow will go to the Pharaoh. This condition will last until the time of Moses.

Lessons Learned from Joseph

First, Joseph based his plans upon forecasts – in this case, forecasts based on dreams interpreted through Divine knowledge. This continues to the present day, except that historical records, data science, and machine learning are potential sources of information. The important part is that the plans were knowledge-based, and following those plans would today be called “strategic planning” and “emergency preparedness.” Joseph’s overall approach was similar to what would now be called an anticipatory business model (Quigg, 2022, p. 16), except that instead of buying components and materials then manufacturing products from them. The food or grain was sent to storage for later sale.

Anticipatory Business Model (Quigg, 2022, p. 16)

Second, Joseph used storage to overcome the seven years of famine. This was done by collecting 20% of the people of Egypt’s grain during the previous seven plentiful years. The impact of this is to “smooth out” the available supply of grain, decreasing it during times of plenty and increasing it during the famine.

Third, Joseph used what we would now call warehouses to store the grain. This is important because warehouses are not just places of storage, but they are buildings that can be defended from looters as well as rodents.

Fourth, the warehouses were distributed throughout Egypt. This reduced the distance that people would have to travel to get their grain, but also minimized the risks of fires or floods to the overall food supply.

Joseph thus took a very rational, very modern, approach. By planning for the long term and executing those plans in a continuous and incremental manner (Parris & Pope, 2020, p. 29), he was able to get the people of Egypt through the seven-year famine.

References

Martinez, J. (2022). “Developing a resilience mindset: Joseph and his coat of many sufferings.” In B. E. Winston (Ed.), The mind of a leader: A Christian perspective of the thoughts, mental, and perceptions that shape leadership behavior. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 175-198. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07206-2_12

Parris, A. & Pope, D. (2020). “What Christian leaders can learn from lean.” Management Sciences 21, pp. 26-34. https://digitalcommons.acu.edu/mgt_sciences/21

Quigg, B. (2022). Supply Chain Management (1st ed). McGraw-Hill Create. https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781307866025

Review of "Effect of Supply Chain Integration on the Ppuri Industry"

Abstract

This is a review of “The Effect of Supply Chain Integration on Supply Chain Risk Management Capability and Firm Performance in the Ppuri Industry” (Jung et al, 2022). The background concepts as well as the relevant concepts from supply chain management necessary to explain this research are defined. The research model they study is described, a research model they are unable to verify. Some of the reasons the authors give for this failure are listed. The managerial applications (or lack thereof) are described. We conclude with comments about the follow-up research they expect to conduct.

Authors’ Purpose

The ppuri industry is a niche industry in South Korea (Dongki, 2021) involved in creating or finishing metal parts used in the making of automobiles, industrial machinery, household appliances, etc. The ppuri industry is also in trouble: ppuri companies have not expanded in any significant manner in recent times, and in fact many of the companies investigated by the authors in this paper went out of business during their research. The authors attempt to explain this by looking at the operation of the supply chain of ppuri companies. They examine the relationship between supply chain integration, supply chain risk management capability, and firm performance. The expected relationships do not hold, and the authors interpret why this happens.

Summary of the Article and its Context

This paper is a study of the ppuri industry in South Korea, an industry that produces or finishes metal parts for large manufacturers. The industry has been struggling in recent years, and the authors attempt to understand the cause of this in terms of supply chain operation. In their study, they find that the relation between supply chain integration and firm performance is not what the authors expected.

They admit that their study suffered from some problems (it used a small sample size and was conducted during COVID-19) but are unable to explain this counterintuitive situation. They make some observations about the conditions in the ppuri industry that may explain this, the most striking one involves the significant difference in size between ppuri companies and the manufacturers they supply. They leave this investigation for future research.

Background of the Issue

The ppuri industry, also called the "root industry," in South Korea is the industry of making metal parts using casting, molding, plastic working, and welding, or finishing those parts using heat or surface treatment (Jung et al, 2022, p. 32-33). These parts are then assembled by manufacturers into automobiles, appliances, industrial or restaurant equipment, etc. (Dongki, 2021). It is called "root" because those parts are of fundamental importance to the manufacturers, and that the parts find their way into many industrial and consumer products.

The ppuri industry has been struggling as illustrated by the facts that ppuri companies are small companies that remain small, that companies have difficulties in finding employees, and that the companies are unable to be competitive due to lack of R&D activities. A South Korea-Japan trade dispute in July 2019 only intensified these problems (Yung et al, 2022, p. 33).

Attempts have been made to strengthen the competitiveness of this industry using strategies that involve increasing supply chain integration. It is expected that tightening SC integration would improve the performance of ppuri companies. But does it?

The authors attempt to investigate the relationship between supply chain integration, the capacity to manage supply chain risk, and overall firm performance. They do this by surveying managers working in ppuri companies and arrive at some counterintuitive observations.

Application of Relevant Supply Chain Management Theory

Modern supply chain management (SCM) has long recognized the fundamental importance of supply chains in company operation, and SC managers understand how well-run supply chains can add value to the products that customers purchase. Because of this, risks to the supply chain must be well understood.

A supply chain risk (Son, 2018, p. 2296-2297) is any event that diminishes the operation of the supply chain. These risks can include buyer-related risks (distortion of demand information or demand volatility), supplier-related risks (poor raw material quality or supplier bankruptcy). Finally, there are internal-process risks such as change in production costs. Supply chain risk management (SCRM) (Son, 2018, p. 2297-2300) are the steps needed to reduce risks or vulnerabilities to the supply chain.

Supply chain integration, one of the holy grails of contemporary supply chain management (Quigg, 2022, p. 24-52), is the degree of cooperation within and between participating organizations. The authors classify integration as being internal or external, and external integration is further broken down into supplier integration and buyer integration.

Supplier integration is an organization’s ability to develop, maintain, and manage long-term relationships with suppliers (Jung, 2022, p. 35). Buyer integration is the practice of managing customer relationships and improving overall customer satisfaction.

External integration allows for cost reduction, productivity and agility improvements, and ease of obtaining resources (Quigg, 2022, p. 373). It also improves operational performance measured by quality, cost, delivery, and flexibility. This improved operational performance should eventually lead to increased company performance (Jung, 2022, p. 35).

In contrast, internal integration are organizational practices that encourage various departments to share knowledge (Jung, 2022, p. 35-36). This knowledge supports external integration and allows the company to achieve company goals. It also allows sharing and cooperation among departments thereby reducing conflict and promoting corporate stability.

Managerial Implications of Article Findings

Based off all this, the authors propose the following hypotheses about the relationships between the above types of integration and overall company performance:

H1a: Supplier integration improves firm performance.
H1b: Buyer integration improves firm performance.
H1c: Internal integration improves firm performance.

Internal integration also makes the supply chain more agile, enabling faster and more effective responses to environmental changes. Further, it also improves the company’s ability to identify internal risks in the supply chain. Integration is thus expected to improve SCRM capability, and the following hypotheses are posited by the authors:

H2a: Supplier integration improves SCRM capability.
H2b: Buyer integration improves SCRM capability.
H2c: Internal integration improves SCRM capability.

Finally, improvement of SCRM capability should have a positive impact on corporate performance, so the authors propose one final hypothesis:

H3: SCRM capability improves firm performance.

Combining these hypotheses together generates a research model where each of the three types of integration (supplier, buyer, and internal) positively bolster firm performance and SCRM capability, and that SCRM capability improves firm performance.

Research Model from (Jung et al, 2022)

The authors are unable to verify this research model, however common-sensical it may seem. In particular, supply chain integration does not improve firm performance, at least when it comes to supplier and buyer integration. Supplier and internal supply chain integration were shown to have a positive impact on SCRM capability, but buyer integration was not. Finally, SCRM capability was shown to positively impact firm performance.

The authors were thus unable to verify three of the seven hypotheses stipulated above. In summary:

H1a: Supplier integration → firm performance – not supported.
H1b: Buyer integration → firm performance – not supported.
H1c: Internal integration → firm performance – supported.
H2a: Supplier integration → SCRM capability – supported.
H2b: Buyer integration → SCRM capability – not supported.
H2c: Internal integration → SCRM capability – supported.
H3: SCRM capability → firm performance – supported.

How can this be explained? The authors specifically note that their study may suffer from a small sample size: surveys were sent to 928 ppuri companies, seventy-five responded, but one was rejected because it was incomplete. The authors used the remaining seventy-four responses as the base of this study. They also state that many of the unreturned responses were caused by the ppuri companies going out of business.

Another flaw in their study noted by the authors is that it was conducted during the COVID-19 plague. They did not investigate how the plague specifically hampered their investigation.

The authors do propose an explanation for the unexpected relationships between supply chain integration, firm performance, and SCRM capability:

Firms in the Ppuri industry play a role as suppliers of large companies in the supply chain, and most of them perform simple manufacturing and processing tasks at the request of buying companies. Therefore, even if the level of buyer integration increases, firms in the Ppuri industry might not fully achieve the advantages of buyer integration, including cost reduction, productivity improvement, and ease of securing resources, due to the power imbalance between supply chain partners. (Jung et al, 2022, p. 43)

In other words, the great difference in size between ppuri companies and the manufacturers they supply somehow explains the lack of expected relationships. They do not investigate this explanation, either statistically or through deductive logic. If they do investigate it in a future paper, they should check to see if a similar phenomenon occurs in other situations where this “power imbalance” is in effect.

The authors recommend that ppuri companies do take steps needed to integrate suppliers and buyers into their supply chain, and they expect that this will improve SCRM capability and firm performance. These recommendations are not borne out in this paper, and verifying their recommendations would require A/B testing.

Because of the quality of the research and the very niche nature of the ppuri industry, implementing their unproven recommendations in another industry is justified only because having an integrated supply chain makes sense.

Conclusion

The authors have established that supply chain integration doesn’t necessarily improve supply chain risk management capabilities nor firm performance. Because of the counterintuitive nature of that statement – as well as problems executing this study – further research is certainly needed.

References

Bax, J. & Ruel, S. (2021). “Can supply chain risk management practices mitigate the disruption impacts on supply chains’ resilience and robustness? Evidence from an empirical survey in a COVID-19 outbreak era.” International journal of production economics, 233, 107972. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2020.107972

Dongki, L. (2021). “What is PPURI industry?” Korea National PPURI Industry Center. Retrieved 8 October 2021 from https://www.techconnect.kr/html/?pmode=UserAddon&smode=ajax&fn=ViewFile&fileSeq=6724

Jung, J., Shin, J., & Yang, H. (2022). “The effect of supply chain integration on supply chain risk management capability and firm performance in the ppuri industry.” Seoul Journal of Business, 28 (2), 31-48. https://doi.org/10.35152/snusjb.2022.28.2.002

Quigg, B. (2022). Supply Chain Management (1st ed). McGraw-Hill Create. https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781307866025

Son, C. (2018). “Supply chain risk management: A review of thirteen years of research.” American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 8 (12), 2294-2320. https://10.4236/ajibm.2018.812154

Longshoremen, Automation, and Obsolete Machines

Robots have replaced many workers in supply chains positions, and this was one of the issues for which the International Longshoremen's Association went on strike. In fact, ILA president Harold Daggett demanded “absolute airtight language that there will be no automation or semiautomation” in the contract they want to get with the United States Maritime Alliance (USMA) (Lynch & Weil, 2024). It is interesting that Daggett did not call for retraining of dockworkers, and he is doing nothing ameliorate the effects of automation on dock workers. Any good leader would do all he can for his men, and there are things that he can be doing: retraining, transferring his men to areas less likely to be automated, etc. Otherwise, Daggett's men will soon be nothing more than obsolete equipment.

They did go on strike, and one of the strikers' signs read "robots don't pay taxes." This only adds to the problem - most people not in a union would read this and deduce that people are paying too much in taxes.

Then there's Daggett's statement that "I will cripple you, and you have no idea what that means." This came at the end of an interview with him on the YouTube channel ran by the International Longshoresmen's Association:

Guys who sell cars can’t sell cars, because the cars ain’t coming in off the ships. They get laid off. Third week, malls are closing down. They can’t get the goods from China. They can’t sell clothes. They can’t do this. Everything in the United States comes on a ship, they go out of business. Construction workers get laid off because the materials aren’t coming in. The steel’s not coming in. The lumber’s not coming in. They lose their job. Everybody’s hating the longshoremen now because now they realize how important our jobs are… In today’s world I’ll cripple you. I will cripple you, and you have no idea what that means, nobody does. (ILA, 2024)

This is more than bluster, it is an out-and-out threat aimed not at the USMA but at American society as a whole.

ILA President Harold J. Daggett

These three things - bad leadership, the calls to be tax chattel, and the leader's threat against America - are arguments in favor of automation, or at least reasons for the ILA to replace Daggett.

The ILA strike began on 1 October 2024 and ended three days later. The ILA and the USMA agreed to a 62% wage increase for the dock workers over the six year tentative deal. The issue of automation will be addressed in approximately 100 days, on 15 January 2025, after the election.

Automation of the type that ILA is rightfully concerned is limited to businesses large enough to afford robotics: Amazon, auto manufacturers, companies requiring large warehouses, etc. Smaller companies are immune to this form of automation, at least at present. Daggett can position his men at these smaller companies. Daggett can also have his men trained to repair the same automation systems the USMA so desperately wants. Irony, though, is something lost on Daggett.

References

International Longshoremen's Association. (2024, 5 September). A Candid Conversation With ILA President Harold J. Daggett On Wide Range of Important Topics [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=822WNvhQHKI

Lynch, D. & Weil, J. (2024). The Washington Post, 5 October 2024. Retrieved 6 October 2024 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/10/05/port-strike-workers-jobs-automation-union/