Russian Deception Operations in the Annexation of Crimea

Introduction

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 involved a combination of physical deception and propaganda used to trick the Crimeans into accepting Russian occupation, and to mask Russia's intentions from the rest of Ukraine and the world at large. The operation made it appear that a national socialist movement was forming in Kyiv, and that this movement would threaten the Russians living in Crimea. This illusion worked to delegitimize the government in Kyiv as well as to present Russia as saviors to the people of Crimea.

In this essay, a decomposition of data analysis is first performed. Next, the conditions favoring Russian annexation are listed. After that, the physical deception operation and the information campaign are described. Finally, the overall operation is very briefly analyzed into what Russian military analysts call “maskirovka,” meaning “little masquerade.” Unless mentioned otherwise, all information is taken from (Kofman, M., et al., 2017).

Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula. From USMC Quantico

Decomposition of Data Analysis

Actors

People of Crimea - the people of Crimea were passive in the start of the Russian campaign, but later accepted Russian presence.

"Little Green Men" (LGMs) - also called the "polite people," they were Russian troops wearing unmarked uniforms. Before their identity as Russian troops was revealed, their role raised concerns amongst the Crimeans, using FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) about the conditions in Ukraine.

Local militias, biker gangs, Cossacks, and members of special police units - they had Russian backing but were set-up to be opponents of the LGMs.

News outlets in Crimea - spread the narrative of a national socialist movement forming in Kyiv and that this was a threat to the Russians living in Crimea.

Major Actions

Establish a narrative that a national socialist movement was gaining strength in Kyiv, and that this movement will be a threat to Crimeans. This was done by the presence of the LGMs, their manufactured opposition, and the propaganda coming from the news outlets.

Seizure of the Crimean Parliament on February 27, 2014, by fifty operators from Russia's KSO (Special Operations Forces) masquerading as a local militia. This action presented the appearance that Crimeans wanted protection from Russia.

Targets

Being primarily an operation of deception, the target was the beliefs of the Crimeans, to convince them that a nascent national socialist movement in Kyiv would be a threat to their well-being, and that Russia would be able to protect them.

Objectives

Build an air of legitimacy allowing Russia to gain control of the Crimean Peninsula without serious kinetic or non-violent resistance.

Effects

The physical deception operation (the LGMs and their “opponents”) and the information campaign allowed Russia to annex Crimea with little bloodshed, if any.

Preconditions

Russia leveraged several pre-existing conditions to facilitate the annexation. The shared language and history between Crimea and Russia as described by Vladimir Putin in (Putin, 2021) and (Carlson & Putin, 2024) enabled Russian operatives to blend in effortlessly with the local populace, aiding covert operations. Additionally, the long-standing presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet near Crimea meant that the sight of Russian naval forces was routine for Crimeans, reducing immediate suspicion when military activities escalated.

Concurrently, the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, which started just weeks before the annexation, required a heightened security presence from Russia, providing a convenient cover for military maneuvers. On February 26, Russia further masked its intentions with a snap inspection of its forces, using this as a tactic to disguise troop movements towards Crimea.

Adding to the narrative of a growing fascist movement was political turmoil in Kyiv, in which Viktor Yanukovych, the then-president of Ukraine, abandoned Kyiv, leaving Euromaidan protesters in charge.

Physical Deception Operations

In the lead-up to the annexation of Crimea, Russia employed physical deception operations aimed at shaping public perception both within Crimea and internationally. The primary goal was to create the illusion that a national socialist movement was burgeoning in Ukraine, and that this movement posed a significant threat to the Crimean population. This made it appear that Russian intervention was a protective measure against the fascists.

Central to this deception was the presence of the so-called "little green men" (LGMs), unidentified soldiers without insignia who appeared in Crimea. Their sudden and unexplained presence suggested an impending armed takeover, instilling fear and uncertainty among the local populace. This ambiguity was crucial to the narrative of an external threat or a coup in motion.

The operation was not limited to these soldiers alone; it involved a mix of local militias, biker gangs, Cossacks, and former members of the Berkut special police unit. These groups played roles in street-level intimidation and in reinforcing the image of a grassroots resistance movement against supposed Ukrainian nationalists. They thus operated as manufactured opposition.

A significant event in this campaign occurred on 27 February 2014, when fifty operators from Russia's KSO (Special Operations Forces) masqueraded as a local militia and seized the Crimean Parliament. By raising the Russian flag over the parliament building, they visually and symbolically asserted control, further solidifying the narrative of a local shift towards Russian allegiance.

To give a veneer of legitimacy to these actions, a referendum was quickly organized. This vote was presented as a democratic process where the Crimeans could voice their preference for joining Russia. This move was part of the strategy to make the annexation appear as a response to the will of the Crimean people rather than an act of aggression by Russia.

The Information Campaign

Russia launched an extensive propaganda campaign using local Russian-language broadcasters, with three main objectives: to discredit the newly established government in Ukraine, to heighten the sense of peril among Russians living in Ukraine, and to create an illusion of widespread support for Crimea's reunification with Russia. This campaign was strategically timed to precede, accompany, and follow the military operations in Crimea, ensuring a narrative that aligned with the physical actions on the ground.

The primary audience for this propaganda was the Russian public, with Crimean residents as a secondary target. The groundwork for this was already laid due to the popularity of Russian television in Crimea. On 9 March 2014, Russia escalated its control over information by shutting down Ukrainian TV channels, thereby monopolizing the narrative. Russian TV frequently labeled Oleksandr Turchynov’s new Ukrainian government, which had replaced Viktor Yanukovych's government, as a "fascist junta," framing the annexation as a necessary intervention to protect ethnic Russians from this supposed threat.

Conclusion

Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 utilized both pre-existing conditions and sophisticated deception tactics. By exploiting the cultural and historical ties, along with the familiar presence of its naval forces, Russia managed to execute its strategy with stealth and legitimacy in the eyes of those within Crimea, Ukraine, Russian, and international audiences.

The use of physical deception through LGMs and local groups created a perception of imminent threat, justifying intervention under the guise of protection. Further, Russia’s information campaign not only discredited the Ukrainian government but also painted the annexation as a popular and protective move. Thus, Russia secured Crimea before Ukraine and international forces could confront this annexation.

To describe the overall process Russia used to capture Crimea, (Bouwmeester, 2021) uses the term “maskirovka,” a strategy of deception the goal of which is to “destabilize command structures and to create ‘fog of war’” by fabricating “a manageable form of chaos.” He calls the propaganda component “active intelligence” - the “active” part here would be the use of the LGMs and the manufactured resistance against them. Maskirovka has been part of Russian military operations at least since World War 2 (Maier, 2016, p. 4), and the annexation of Crimea shows that it is still part of the Russian Military’s quiver.

References

Bouwmeester, A. J. H. (2021). “The art of deception revisited (part 2): The unexpected annexation of Crimea in 2014.” Militaire Spectator. https://militairespectator.nl/artikelen/art-deception-revisited-part-2-unexpected-annexation-crimea-2014

Carlson, T. & Putin, V. (2024, February 6). Exclusive: Tucker Carlson Interviews Vladimir Putin [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fOCWBhuDdDo

Kofman, M., et al. (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html

Maier, M. (2016). A little masquerade: Russia’s evolving employment of maskirovka. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1022096.pdf

Putin, V. (2021). Article by Vladimir Putin ”On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians“. President of Russia. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181

War in the South China Sea

Introduction

There is no absence of targets for China in the South China Sea (SCS) - Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan in particular. China certainly has the ability to wage conventional war in the SCS, but the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also been pursuing "unrestricted warfare," (Qiao & Liang, 1999) wherein different types of non-kinetic actions (economic, psychological, cultural, international lawfare) are used to affect target nations, either to destabilize them or to turn them into client states. The fundamental concepts of unrestricted warfare are not limited to that type of warfare but also carry-over into conventional warfare as described below.

How the PRC Could Attack Nations in or Close to The South China Sea

China has claimed several islands in the SCS, in particular the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and have constructed airfields and ports on many of them. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies' "China Island Tracker" (CSIS, 2025), the CCP has built 20 outposts in the Paracel Islands and 7 in the Spratly Islands. In addition, the CCP has been creating artificial islands.

Each of these islands must be considered in the context of the PRC’s military: they can be used as airstrips, listening outposts, logistics sites, etc. (Center for Preventative Action, 2025)

China would use multi-domain warfare in any military operation in the SCS, but they will expand on the doctrine according to the concepts of unrestricted warfare. The authors of the unrestricted warfare doctrine asked the question "where is the battlefield" - and they answered "everywhere." (Qiao & Liang, 1999) This is relevant to kinetic warfare as follows: US military operations, in particular drone operations, are controlled remotely. For example, the drone strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki in 2011 was controlled from Creech Air Force Base outside Las Vegas, Nevada. (Zegart, 2022) That means that Las Vegas is a legitimate military target. The document defining multi-domain battle (TRADOC, 2017) explicitly states that we must think of the battlefield as “expanded” (TRADOC, 2017, p.6), so conflict with China would not be restricted to SCS, but it is not clear if the “remote control” situation was considered. If this is indeed the case, this represents a flaw in the multi-domain warfare doctrine.

China already is employing unrestricted warfare in the SCS. For example, the Belt and Road Initiative has been used to establish "hooks" into other countries' infrastructures, and the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia are all considered part of the Belt-and-Road Initiative, as is Indonesia (Council on Foreign Relations, N/D). The infrastructure constructed in those nations represents anywhere from 2% to 8% of their GDP (Steil, 2022).

Extent of the Belt and Road Initiative as of 2107. From (Steil, 2022)

An Effective Counter Strategy

As described in Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040 (TRADOC, 2017), the multi-domain battle (MDB) doctrine is applicable during pre-conflict competition stage, during armed conflict stage, and return-to-competition stage where the competitor is a "still-capable peer adversary" (TRADOC, 2017, p. 21). There are two things we can learn: First, MDB is applicable to the time before the start of armed conflict; second, the competitor is still capable after the conclusion of armed conflict. (?!?)

The second point is genuinely concerning since it explicitly allows for "endless wars", but that will not be examined here.

For the first point, MDB during the pre-conflict stage involves "conducting proactive stabilization campaigns, contesting destabilization campaigns, deterring escalation through the application of flexible deterrent options and rapid deterrence response options, and preparing for transition immediately into armed conflict should the adversary attack" (TRADOC, 2017, pp. 21-22). Destabilization campaigns are designed to cause internal strife.

This, along with military training exercises involving other nations in or near the SCS, could be sufficient to prevent a PRC attack.

If, however, kinetic warfare were to begin, the United States would likely pursue multi-domain warfare, hopefully with security measures to protect remote-controlled operations as described above. 

Limiting Factors that US and Allied Forces Would Likely Encounter

For the non-kinetic possibility, the limiting factor (LIMFAC) would primarily be a lack of support from nations involved in the Belt-and-Road Initiative – besides the economic pressure there would also be serious levels of CCP propaganda in those nations.

For the kinetic possibility, the problem of positioning forces in the region should not be considered a major LIMFAC due to the presence of military bases in Japan. Coordination between US and Allied forces should be resolved by Joint Operation protocols. One LIMFAC would be the relative smallness of the militaries in the region. The major LIMFAC would be operational security: many American institutions have been compromised by the CCP, or are sympathetic to socialism, including the US Military as demonstrated by General Mark Milley, West Point student Spenser Rapone, etc. The sheer number of compromised institutions is a powerful weapon (Ferguson, 2019, pp. 3-59) with which we must contend.

References

CSIS. (2025). "China Island Tracker". Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/

Center for Preventative Action. (2025). "Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea". Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea

Council on Foreign Relations. (N/D). “China’s Approach to Global Governance” https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/

Ferguson, N. (2019). The Square and the Tower: Networks and Power, from the Freemasons to Facebook. Penguin Books.

Qiao & Liang. (1999). Unrestricted Warfare. Shadow Lawn Press. https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf

Steil, B. (2022). “Belt and Road Tracker”. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker

TRADOC. (2017). Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040. https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/MDB_Evolutionfor21st.pdf

Zegart, A. (2022). Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence. Princeton University Press.

Starburst Analysis and Information Sources for the Battle of COP Keating

Introduction

This essay attempts to come to an understanding of the major actions, participants, methods, and motives in the 3 October 2009 Battle of COP Keating in eastern Afghanistan. A starburst analysis will be done to achieve this. Further, some of the various information sources/perspectives will be examined to see what they can contribute to an understanding this battle.

Starburst Analysis

Who - The primary actors in the Battle of COP Keating were US and ANA forces versus Taliban insurgents, called AAF in the video. There were approximately 300 Taliban fighters involved. The US and ANA had 73 troops positioned at COP Keating plus 29 troops stationed at OP Fritsche. As the battle progressed, a QRF from FOB Bostic and air support joined the US and ANA side.

What - The key activity was the battle between the US and ANA forces against the Taliban fighters. Planning and observation were performed by Taliban leaders prior to the attack.

When - The battle took place on 3 October 2009, but planning began months prior. The attack was timed to correspond to scheduled closing of COP Keating and OP Fritsche.

Where - COP Keating and OP Fritsche were located near the town of Kamdesh in eastern Afghanistan (which led to another name for the battle, the Battle of Kamdesh). COP Keating was in mountainous terrain, at the bottom of a valley. Two sides of the camp were bounded by the Darreh ye Kushtoz River. The surrounding mountains were unsecured except for the one capped by OP Fritsche. COP Keating and OP Fritsche were not in direct line of sight. These mountains, along with a nearby mosque, would serve as Taliban fire locations.

Why - COP Keating was established in July 2006, positioned to disrupt insurgent supply lines from Pakistan. By dislocating the COP, the flow of weapons and fighters would resume.

How - The Battle of COP Keating was a two-pronged attack, one against COP Keating (the primary target), the other against OP Fritsche. Both targets were engaged simultaneously to prevent one from assisting the other. The nearest air support came from FOB Bostick, 10 minutes away by helicopter.

Information Sources

It is necessary to evaluate information that was available prior to the Battle of COP Keating as well as information generated after the battle occurred. One would expect various after-action reports of the Battle, but they have been repressed, and many details did not become known until the release of WikiLeaks’ Afghan War Diaries. Apparently, there were multiple intelligence failures. Building on (Gertz. 2009), Hershel Smith writes (Smith, 2009):

…defense intelligence had three reports of imminent danger but failed to act on this intelligence. What “smoking gun report” would have convinced them to take action we aren’t told…

Smith goes on to hint that a “smoking gun report” may have been in possession of the CIA.

Population studies (the human domain perspective) of the people living near COP Keating would be useful for determining local attitudes and for building a social network of the people. Adversary media, be it in the form of literature, internet posts, etc., would also help in creating a social network. This social network can then be infiltrated to gather information. The social network can then be analyzed to determine the major Taliban influencers who will then become the major targets for US forces. (Healy. 2013)

Another critical information stream would be a scholarly perspective. Thaler, et. al. (2013, p. 12) sites several academic papers (many published prior to the battle) stating that Afghanistan has a culture of independence and resistance. This is an extremely specific characterization and probably wouldn’t hold for all Afghani. If it applies to the people living near COP Keating, this will determine how Afghani would relate to or tolerate foreign presence, if at all.

Finally, the security practitioners’ perspective would provide a wealth information, not only about the Battle itself but about the conditions that existed prior to it as well as to make predictions about future engagements.

Both the COP and OP were targeted by 45 attacks between May 2009 and October 2009. One question that security practitioners could answer is this: did the insurgency forces display improvement in their operational ability during that time, and if so, in what areas?

An insurgency does not spring fully-formed from the forehead of Saint Mattis of the Blessed Order of the Knife Hands. It must have meager beginnings and, unless extinguished, will improve by becoming confident, learning new 4GW techniques, making use of changing logistics opportunities, etc. Once the baseline and trajectory are established, the insurgency’s future operations can be predicted.

Conclusion

The starburst analysis technique, combined with various information perspectives, helps us come to an understanding of the Battle of COP Keating. Until a comprehensive AAR, similar to the one performed for the similar Battle at Wanar (Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 2010) becomes available, there will always be questions.

References

ABC News. (5 February 2010). “Camp Keating officers disciplined for attack that killed 8 U. S. troops.” Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://abcnews.go.com/WN/Afghanistan/camp-keating-commanders-disciplined-attack-killed-22-us/story?id=9761160

Gertz, B. (29 October 2009). “DIA on Afghan intel” Washington Times. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/29/inside-the-ring-58944275/

Healy, K. (2013). Using metadada to find Paul Revere. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from: https://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-metadata-to-find-paul-revere/

Smith, H. (2 November 2009). “Systematic defense intelligence failures”. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/11/02/systemic-defense-intelligence-failures/

Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. (2010). “Wanat: Combat action in Afghanistan, 2008”. Combat Studies Institute Press. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Wanat.pdf

Steeb, Matsumura, Herbert, Gordon IV, & Horn. (2011). “Perspectives on the Battle of Wanat”. Rand Corporation. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP329z1.pdf

Thaler, Brown, Gonzalez, Mobley, & Roshan. (2013). “Improving the U.S. Military’s understanding of unstable environments vulnerable to violent extremist groups”. RAND Corporation. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR298.html

TRADOC G2 OE Enterprise G&V. (10 August 2012). “The battle of COP Keating - October 3rd, 2009”. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylUzySZb3L8

WikiLeaks War Diary. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/search/?q=cop+keating∓sort=date∓release=Afghanistan∓date__gte=2009-10-03∓date__lte=2009-10-09