Russia's Private Military Companies

Introduction

There is no doubt that the Russian Federation should be considered a near-peer competitor of the United States – they have a nuclear arsenal and a strong conventional military force that includes modern weapon systems such as UAVs and robotics (Grau & Bartles, 2016, pp. 371-380); they have considerable economic strength, and they exercise political influence on a global scale. Something missing from this list - and mostly from (Grau & Bartles, 2016) - are the methods and tools they use to achieve their political influence. Russia’s use of psychological operations to ideologically subvert their enemies is well known (Bezmenov, 2020), but they have a very potent tool in their asymmetric warfare arsenal: private military companies (PMCs).

This paper is roughly divided into two parts. The first part examines PMCs from a historical and economic perspective, showing that their ongoing existence makes sound financial sense. The second part counters this theoretical understanding with a description of how the Russians use PMCs. These usage patterns apply to all the PMCs employed by Russia, but the examples cited (mostly) refer to what was once Russia's premier PMC - the Wagner Group. This is followed by a description of a problem that can arise with PMCs: rebellion. We conclude with an attempt to synthesize the disparities between the economic ideals and the gritty reality of PMCs as encountered by the Russians.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the Wagner Group PMC

Characteristics of the Modern PMC

PMCs are nothing new on the world’s stage: in the form of mercenary armies, they date back at least to the First Punic War (264–241 BC) and have been in continuous use to the present day. In his classification and analysis of PMCs, P. W. Singer (2001) recognized the long history of mercenary forces, noting that the Dutch and English East Indies Companies commanded armies and navies larger than those in Europe - they were companies that had military departments. As time went on, this relation became inverted.

The crucial difference between modern PMCs and their mercenary ancestors is their organization: mercenary groups are loosely organized whereas modern PMCs are organized into corporations in part due to the privatization rush following the fall of the Soviet Union (Pałka, 2020). According to Singer (who uses privatized military firms (PMFs) instead of PMCs):

PMFs are hierarchically organized into incorporated and registered businesses that trade and compete openly on the international market, link to outside financial holdings, recruit more proficiently than their predecessors, and provide a wider range of military services to a greater variety and number of clients. Corporatization not only distinguishes PMFs from mercenaries and other past private military ventures, but it also offers certain advantages in both efficiency and effectiveness. (Singer, 2001, pp. 191)

One of the consequences of this is that PMCs compete on the open market, and they gain or lose customers based on their efficiency and effectiveness. This means that it is possible for them to advertise on the Internet, and it is possible for them to go out of business. For example, Singer (2001, p. 192) gives five examples of PMCs that have their own websites. Of these, four are apparently no longer in business and the fifth (Vinnell Corporation) is now a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman.

As of 2021, the Russian PMC industries consisted of somewhere between 10 and 15 known companies (Østensen & Bukkvoll, 2022, p. 133), and the resulting competition is extremely profitable for the individuals who work for these companies. For example (Østensen & Bukkvoll, 2022, p. 136, Table 1), a low-ranking regular contract soldier is paid 76,000 rubles (US $951) per month while stationed in Syria, and 30,000 rubles (US $376) per month at home. Compare this with a low-ranking Wagner soldier who is paid 120,000 rubles (US $1502) per month in Syria and 80,000 rubles (US $1001) per month while at home. There doesn't seem to be any reports of Wagner soldiers going unpaid, but there is a report of a woman who lost her husband in Syria having difficulty getting compensation (Roth, 2019).

The legitimacy of Russian PMCs and their fighters must be considered. For example, Wagner emerged during the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Initially, the name of this secretive group was unknown, but it was known that it was funded by a wealthy oligarch named Pavel Prigozhin.

As time went on, Wagner began training at two Russian military bases ordinarily used by the 10th Special Mission Brigade of GRU Spetsnaz (Katz, et. al., 2020). They were travelling on Russian Air Force transport aircraft (Rácz, 2020). Soon they were fighting alongside the Russian Army in Syria and Ukraine (Bowen, 2023, August 1), and their injuries were treated in Russian hospitals (Rácz, 2020).

By 4 November 2022, Wagner opened its headquarters at the PMC Wagner Center in Saint Petersburg. Larsen (2003) describes this evolution as a "normalization of discourse": what started as a shadowy organization ended with a Gazprom-built skyscraper (Altınbaş, 7 June 2023) whose purpose is to create “a comfortable environment for generating new ideas that would improve Russia’s defensive capacity” (Larsen, 2023, p. 420) - a description reminiscent of any number of Silicon Valley startups.

The PMC Wagner Center located in Saint Petersburg

Classification of PMCs

As mentioned in the above quote from Singer, PMCs are not limited to kinetic operations but have expanded their service offerings into logistics and support, intelligence, training, and advising. Building on a typology devised by Singer (2001), Arnold (2019) proposes the following four-fold classification of PMCs: first, there are military support firms (MSFs) that offer logistics and sustainment. Next, there are military consulting firms (MCFs) that offer training and advising. Private security companies (PSCs) offer defense and protection services. Finally, PMCs are offensive forces.

This spectrum makes PMCs in the broad sense extremely attractive from a business standpoint, assuming that these services can be offered in a cost-effective manner. PMCs can provide support to a country’s military (like the way the US military outsources some support, sustainment, and intelligence functions), they can supplement the defensive operations, or they even supplement or replace the offensive capabilities of a country’s military.

Up to this point, PMCs are presented as legitimate and cost-effective corporations that pay their soldiers well. This is all very rosy, to the point of being something out of Murray Rothbard’s libertarian utopia (Rothbard, 1973) or Robert Nozick’s night-watchman state (Nozick, 1974). A much more accurate understanding of PMCs comes when we examine their strategic use.

Usage Patterns

The typology of private military forces outlined above explains the capabilities of PMCs. This does not address the ways PMCs are employed by the countries using them, however. Russia uses PMCs to project power with plausible deniability, to secure economic interests, and to expand their geopolitical interests. The PMCs provide training to the local military and build their capacity. The Kremlin uses PMCs to manipulate domestic and elite dynamics, and even magnify Russia’s interests in international organizations.

Power Projection with Plausible Deniability
One of the primary roles of Russian PMCs is to extend Moscow’s military reach into regions where direct involvement would provoke international outrage or escalate tensions with the U.S. and NATO. From their nature as corporations, PMCs are economically conservative, therefore have a “low footprint.” On paper, PMCs can be hidden inside shell companies and complex contractual agreements. Through this, Russia maintains plausible deniability, allowing it to pursue its foreign policy objectives without implicating the Kremlin.

The best example of this is the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014: the use of “little green men” (LGMs) - which later turned out to be Wagner operatives - allowed Russia to wage an undeclared war while officially denying involvement. Combined with the power vacuum following the Revolution of Dignity, Wagner’s operations were so quick and so subtle that Crimea was captured in about 4 weeks with only a handful of causalities. Internationally, it was not known who was behind the operation, until it was too late.

Securing Economic Interests
Moscow uses PMCs to expand its economic footprint, especially in resource-rich but politically unstable regions. The PMCs stabilize a region in return for access to oil and mineral rights. For example, in the Central African Republic, Wagner has protected mining operations and trained local forces since 2018. In return, Russian firms were able to access gold and diamond deposits. Similarly, PMCs supported Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in return for gold mining rights.

Expanding Geopolitical Influence
In regions where Western influence has waned, Russia uses PMCs to position itself as a viable alternative to Western security partnerships. Russia has deployed PMCs to Mali, Mozambique, Madagascar, and other African countries, stepping-in where U.S. or French influence has declined. In Mali, for example, Wagner replaced French counterterrorist forces in 2021, opposing Islamist forces while obtaining to mineral resources.

Training and Capacity Building
Russia uses PMCs as force multipliers by training local militaries, thereby extending Russia’s influence without a large troop presence. This strengthens the local government while embedding Russian interests into the local security apparatus.

Conducting Hybrid Warfare and Psychological Operations
PMCs engage in intelligence gathering, political manipulation, and psychological operations. The goal here is to destabilize countries, flame discord among adversaries, and push pro-Russian narratives.

Managing Domestic, Elite, and Global Dynamics
PMCs like Wagner frequently recruit foreign troops or prisoners. By doing this, the domestic repercussions of high causalities or a failed operation are minimized. Lucrative contracts to PMCs are given to loyal oligarchs, thereby rewarding them while ensuring that their actions are aligned with Russia’s agenda. Finally, by supporting allies or destabilizing adversaries, PMCs magnify Russia’s voice in the UN and other international organizations.

The Wagner Rebellion

The above-listed usage patterns all come from the PMCs' employers. There are, in addition, problems that come from within the PMCs themselves. Some of those issues (allegations of human rights violations, war crimes, etc.) are not limited to PMCs by any means. One problem specific to PMCs is how they relate to their employers.

The relation between Russia's military and PMCs such as Wagner has always been nebulous. Russia has allowed Wagner to train using its military bases, some military decorations have been awarded to Wagner employees, and so on. The real problems with PMCs come from questions over their effectiveness and their loyalty. Most famously, Niccolò Machiavelli wrote in The Prince:

Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. (Machiavelli, 2024)

This “destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is [deferred]” is demonstrated in Wagner’s role in the annexation of Crimea: there was no wanton destruction, and the operation succeeded with very minimal fatalities. Modern eyes see this as a feature, while Machiavelli perceives this as a bug, but it must be remembered that he was penning advice to new princes.

What certainly is a bug is the potential for disloyalty on the part of mercenary armies, or modern PMCs, implied by that quote. These “armies for hire” have a mixed record when it comes to rebellions. The First Punic War immediately transitioned into the Mercenary War (241 - 237 BC), where the mercenaries employed by Carthage mutinied over unpaid wages (Hoyos, 2000). Other mercenary forces have magnificent histories, such as the Hessians during the American Revolutionary War; others had sometimes mutinied, such as the condottieri leading mercenary armies of the Middle Ages that Machiavelli was (perhaps) denouncing. Wagner fell into the latter category with its rebellion in 2023. The following description comes from the reporting of Darya Korsunskaya and Guy Faulconbridge (2023) and Mikael Pir-Budagyan and the RM Staff (2023).

The Wagner Rebellion was a dispute between Yevgeny Prigozhin (Wagner’s founder and leader), Sergei Shoigu (Russian Defense Minister), and Valery Gerasimov (Chief of the General Staff). Prigozhin accused Shoigu and Gerasimov of corruption, incompetence, and withholding ammunition and artillery from Wagner. Criticisms of this form may be common inside the Russian military, but what was uncommon was the way Prigozhin leveled these charges: he used social media, in particular Telegram.

The dispute came to a head when the Russian Ministry of Defense required all PMC fighters to sign contracts directly with the Russian military, placing them under the command of Shoigu. Prigozhin saw this as an attempt to dismantle Wagner.

Prigozhin announced on 23 June 2023 via Telegram that he was launching a “march for justice” against Russian military leadership. He claimed it was not a coup against Vladimir Putin but rather a protest against the Ministry of Defense’s mismanagement of the war in Ukraine. An estimated 25,000 Wagner fighters began moving from eastern Ukraine into Russia.

That night, Wagner forces seized control of military facilities in Rostov-on-Don, a major logistical hub for the Ukraine war. They did this without significant resistance. It was unclear whether the Russian Federal Security Service was aware of this plot (Bowen, 2023, June 28).

The next morning, an armed Wagner convoy began advancing towards Moscow, again encountering little resistance. Security forces set-up roadblocks, and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov – a Putin loyalist – deployed his own forces to confront Prigozhin's. Moscow was placed on heightened alert. Prigozhin again claimed that his goal was to hold Shoigu and Gerasimov accountable, but Prigozhin’s actions suggested a challenge to Putin.

By the afternoon of 24 June, President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus had negotiated a deal with Prigozhin. Under this agreement, Prigozhin would stand down and withdraw in exchange for amnesty for himself and his fighters. Further, Prigozhin would relocate to Belarus, and the fighters who joined him on this march could either join the Russian military, return to civilian life, or follow him into exile.

Prigozhin went to Belarus but returned to Russia within weeks. Two months after the start of the mutiny, on 23 August 2023, Prigozhin died in a mysterious plane crash along with several Wagner commanders. This event decapitated Wagner, and Russia quickly moved to dismantle it: heavy military equipment was transferred to the Russian armed forces, and Wagner fighters were absorbed into the Russian military and redeployed to Ukraine under new command, led by individuals like Andrei Troshev, a former Wagner employee appointed by Putin.

Wagner's presence in Africa has been replaced by Africa Corps (Faulkner, 2024), which has been called “a rebranded Wagner Group” (Lechner & Eledinov, 2024). As with Ukraine, this could simply be a nationalization of Wagner's activities, but Africa Corps was certainly on a short leash. Wagner is no longer an independent force, and now exists only as a reminder that Russia is willing to use PMCs as proxy forces.

Conclusion

PMCs represent an economically attractive way to project power, and the Russian Federation isn't afraid to use them. Their actions in Crimea and various African nations prove that they can be effective foreign policy tools, if used correctly. The Wagner Rebellion shows that success is not guaranteed, and that PMCs can be dangerous to the countries that hire them: the Russians fed Wagner, yet they still bit the hand.

Still, PMCs are too valuable to be abandoned (Jefferies, 2002), and Russia continues sponsoring PMCs in the Middle East and Africa (Bryjka, 2023). This would suggest that Russia – and indeed all nations – devise criteria under which PMCs should be employed. If anything is to be learned from Russia's experience with Wagner, it is that like any military or quasi-military force, an understanding of that force’s tactics, operations, and strategies are not sufficient – the way that force is used politically must be considered.

 

Bibliography

Altınbaş, Ö. (7 June 2023). “Inside the Wagner Center.” United World International. https://unitedworldint.com/30305-inside-the-wagner-center/

Arnold, T. (2019). “The Geoeconomic Dimensions of Russian Private Military and Security Companies.” Military Review, November-December 2019. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/ND-19/Arnold-Geoeconomic-Dimensions.pdf

Bezmenov, Y. (2020). “Former KGB Agent, Yuri Bezmenov, Warns America About Socialist Subversion.” [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z1EA2ohrt5Q

Bowen, A. (2023, June 28). “Wagner Group Mutiny in Russia.” Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12186

Bowen, A. (2023, August 1). "Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC)." Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12344

Bryjka, F. (2023). “Not just Wagner: Russia Backing a Host of Semi-Private Military Companies.” PISM. https://pism.pl/publications/not-just-wagner-russia-backing-a-host-of-semi-private-military-companies

Faulkner, C., et. al. (2024). “Africa Faces the Unintended Consequences of Relying on Russian PMCs.” Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/05/africa-russian-pmcs/

Grau, L. & Bartles, C. (2016). The Russian Way of War. Foreign Military Studies Office. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf

Hoyos, D. (2000). “Towards a Chronology of the ‘Truceless War,’ 241-237 B.C.” Rheinisches Museum Für Philologie, 143(3/4), 369–380. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41234468

Jefferies, I. (2002). “Military Companies – A Positive Role to Play in Today's International System.” Connections, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 2002), pp. 103-125. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26322969

Katz, B. et. al. (2020). “Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. https://russianpmcs.csis.org/

Korsunskaya, D. & Guy Faulconbridge, G. (2023, June 26). “Russia's Prigozhin in his own words on the 'mutiny'.” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-prigozhin-his-own-words-mutiny-2023-06-26/

Lechner, J. & Eledinov, S. (2024). “Is Africa Corps a Rebranded Wagner Group?” Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/

Machiavelli, M. (2024). The Prince. Translated by W. K. Marriott. https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1232/pg1232.txt

Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books.

Østensen, Å. G., & Bukkvoll, T. (2022). “Private military companies – Russian great power politics on the cheap?” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 33(1–2), 130–151. 29 September 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1984709

Pałka, W. (2020). “The Awakening of Private Military Companies.” Warsaw Institute. https://warsawinstitute.org/awakening-private-military-companies/

Pir-Budagyan, M. & the RM Staff. (2023). “Prigozhin’s Mutiny by the Hour.” Russia Matters. https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/prigozhins-mutiny-hour

Rácz, A. (2020). “Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State.” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 21 September 2020. https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state

Roth, A. (2019). “’There’s no one to help’: Russian mercenary industry’s toll on families.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/26/russia-drive-into-africa-shines-light-on-mercenary-industry

Rothbard, M. (1973). For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto. Collier Books.

Singer, P. (2001). “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security,” International Security 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001-2002): 186–220. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3092094

Yuri Bezmenov on Ideological Subversion

KGB defector Yuri Bezmenov (Barrera, 2022) recorded a video (Bezmenov, 2020) in which he outlined the process of ideological subversion the KGB used to destabilize a nation. This process allows for the subversion of a nation from within, without the need for military conflict. It is a slow process that involves four stages.

Screen capture from the video. Yuri Bezmenov is on the left.

The first stage is demoralization. It takes 15 to 20 years and aims to erode the values and principles of a nation’s population. This begins with re-educating a generation, then waiting for that generation to take positions in civil service, universities, business, and media. The propaganda is so extreme that the indoctrinated will reject the evidence of their senses and will be unable to act in their own best interest. Bezmenov recorded this video in 1984, and states that the demoralization stage is complete.

The next stage is destabilization in which core institutions such as the economy, the military, and foreign relations, are undermined. This phase lasts from 2-5 years and disrupts the nation’s ability to function effectively.

This is followed by a crisis stage which lasts from 6 weeks to a few months. During this crisis, a major event or series of events triggers a period of severe dysfunction in the country’s systems, leading to confusion and disorder.

The last stage is “normalization” in which adversarial forces step in to “restore order.” These forces take control of the nation and institute new ideologies. This phase solidifies control and allows the new rulers to enforce the new order. Once the adversarial forces complete their takeover, their early supporters are eliminated, as these useful idiots are no longer useful. This would be a repeat of the Kronstadt Uprising, in which early supporters of the Bolsheviks were “shot like partridges.” (Chapple, 2021)

Bezmenov believed that to reverse this process will require a national effort to reform the education system, focusing on patriotism and the history and civics that makes patriotism reasonable. He recommended that the U.S. must stop aiding communism: supply them with no credit, no money, no grain deals, and no recognition.

The KGB no longer exists in the form Bezmenov knew, and the Soviet Union has collapsed, but ideological subversion described by Bezmenov is still an effective process – the names of the players have simply changed. This process is certainly playing out in current American politics, with woke ideologues taking the place of the KGB, and the deep state replacing Soviet Russia.

 

References

Barrera, J. (2022). “Chaos Agent.” CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/newsinteractives/features/yuri-bezmenov-soviet-defector-canada

Bezmenov, Y. (2020). “Former KGB Agent, Yuri Bezmenov, Warns America About Socialist Subversion.” [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z1EA2ohrt5Q

Chapple, A. (2021). “'Shot Like Partridges': The Crushing of The Kronstadt Uprising.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/crushing-of-kronstadt-uprising-lenin/31102658.html

ODNI's Future Scenarios

Introduction

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has developed five scenarios on how the world will unfold by 2040 (Strategic Futures Group, 2021). The first three revolve around the form and level of US-China rivalry. The remaining two assume that globalization has broken down and been replaced by either separate security and economic blocs, or by some form of revolutionary change.

All these scenarios have one thing in common: they all assume that climate change is a real thing. Further, the authors of most of the scenarios have misunderstood the popular interpretation of COVID-related actions, and they assume that communist or socialist forms of government are economically self-sustaining as long as they’re not too authoritarian. This is highly indicative of the political state within the DNI.

This paper describes and analyzes two of these scenarios that seem likely – or rather least unlikely. The underlying assumptions of each are described, and a PESTLIED (political – economic – social – technological – legal – international – environmental – demographics) analysis (Eaton Business School, n.d.) is performed on those scenarios. Next, one of the scenarios is compared to Fukuyama’s “end of history” theory. Finally, an alternative scenario that seems more likely is described.

AfD support is highest in East Germany during 23 February 2025 Election
Map from Alicja Hagopian of The Independent

Scenario 4: Separate Silos

In this scenario, the world fragments into economic and security blocs centered around the US, China, the EU, Russia, and India. These blocs are “inward looking,” focusing on self-sufficiency and defense. Developing countries that are not aligned with one of these blocs are on the verge of becoming failed states. Climate change is ignored.

Viewing this scenario through the lens of PESTLIED analysis, we see that politically, the blocs avoid direct armed conflict but do use small wars to divert attention from domestic political problems. Smaller countries that are not part of these blocs become unstable.

Separating economies results in massive financial losses and inefficient supply chains, according to the DNI. Prices for consumer goods rose dramatically, presumably due to inability to outsource. Because of limited travel, the travel and tourism sectors collapse. Because of reduced offshoring and inability to recruit from other nations, countries devote resources to domestic education. Nations not aligned with any of these blocs are expected to be abandoned economically, which can lead to radicalization and civil unrest (TRADOC, 2007, 3-4).

Technological advances within the blocs include energy technologies, AI, and additive manufacturing. Technology, however, is restricted to within the individual blocs, and states not in one of the blocs are left behind. Progress in technologies flounder because separate blocs cannot recruit global talent.

States adopt legal systems that are mixtures of authoritarianism and democracy, adopting surveillance and repression. On the international stage, these political blocs are the major players. Small wars occur along the borders of the blocs. Nuclear weapons proliferate.

Due to the self-sufficiency of the blocs, there is no joint effort to protect the environment and fight climate change. Similarly, other leftist causes such as poverty or healthcare discrepancies are not addressed.

Waves of immigrants attempt to enter wealthier countries but are rejected. Between this and the inability to recruit globally, the demographics of each bloc remain stable.

The DNI faults this scenario because climate change is not addressed. The authors also assume that economic success is not sustainable without outsourcing or importing foreign talent. The prediction that small wars (or proxy wars) would be common does seem like a reasonable prediction. The declining population of many first world countries is not factored into this scenario.

Scenario 1: Renaissance of Democracies

The “Renaissance of Democracies” scenario predicts extreme economic and technological growth in western nations. The rise of China is no longer seen as inevitable. China, Russia, and other authoritarian regimes become less predictable and more aggressive. Within the democracies, though, free speech is a secondary concern, taking a back seat to social tranquility.

Applying PESTLIED analysis to this, we see that countries become either democracies or more authoritarian. China becomes more authoritarian, and as mentioned above, the rise of China is no longer seen as inevitable. Russia continues to be authoritarian and invades Soviet-bloc countries. The DNI describes this as being done to divert attention away from internal problems.

For the countries that shift to democracy, their economies open, allowing for innovation and growth. Russia and China remain authoritarian, and their economies stagnate as a result.

Education is more widely available due to remote learning platforms developed in response to COVID-19. Civic nationalism is reinvigorated by increased transparency and improved accountability. This comes with the price of rejecting freedom of speech.

Innovation is occurring, especially in robotics, AI, the Internet of Things, energy storage, biotech, and additive manufacturing. Unfortunately, some of this technology is applied to censorship.

Laws and international agreements are put in place to limit the harmful effects of technologies… and disinformation. Multilateral cooperation on issues such as climate change, rules for managing space, the seabed, and the Arctic. Environmental and climate issues are seen as solvable due to innovation, economic strength, and societal cohesion.

In Russia and China there is an aging population, which entails population collapse. This, together with debt and the inefficiencies of their state-directed economy, lead to internal discontent. Any change in the demographics of other countries is not mentioned.

One thing that the DNI gets right is that Russia would invade former satellite countries. The reason that is given – to divert attention away from political infighting and other forms of internal strife – is not completely plausible. A better explanation is that they invade in order to collect resources and drain the invaded country’s economy.

Fukuyama and the Renaissance of Democracies

The global resurgence in democracies described in Scenario 1 is eerily similar to the outcome predicted in Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History and the Last Man” (Fukuyama, 1992). According to Fukuyama, a perfect democratic utopia emerges on a global scale, and political-historic evolution ends. This is forward-looking, as opposed to the historical analysis presented in Bradford DeLong’s "Slouching Towards Utopia" (DeLong, 2022). DeLong reviews the history of the 20th Century and how technology has impacted the global economy, whereas Fukuyama is concerned with the end-state of society. Even China and Russia are expected to reject communism in favor of democracy, according to Fukuyama.

Not mentioned in DNI’s Scenario 1 but alluded to in Fukuyama is a way where a "renaissance of democracies" can occur. Let's call it "convergence to acceptable levels of socialism" (CALS). The idea is that governments will impose only so much socialism as the populace is willing to tolerate. This can go in two ways: liberalization of communist countries (demonstrated by China and by Russia after the fall of the Soviets), or creeping socialism (as seen in the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and other countries).

Fascism and communism cannot satisfy human needs, and the only alternative end state is democracy in the misty-eyed and soppy sense of the word used by Fukuyama (and apparently by the DNI). The core problem with DNI's scenario, Fukuyama's plan, and this CALS theory is that "democracy" is confused with "republic" - democracy is tyranny of the majority and as such there are no individual rights.

Besides this confusion of democracy with limited republics, there is another problem: democracies can fail. Examples include the French Revolution, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, the Arab Spring, etc. Indeed, the last two revolutions are seen by Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1996) as direct counterexamples to Fukuyama's "end of history" theory. Why should we even imagine democracies as something that could fail? In the case of the Arab Spring, Samuel Huntington explained this by noting that allegiance to political theory is mostly a Western concept, but other cultures adhere to tribal, racial, or religious allegiance, Islam in particular.

Conclusion

The five scenarios presented in “Global Trends 2040” are interesting future histories, but none are terribly convincing. The two considered here can be considered the “least wrong.” The DNI assumes that self-sufficient economies are unworkable, thereby rejecting Scenario 4. Recent history shows that a “renaissance of democracies” – described either by Scenario 1, Fukuyama’s “end of history,” or the CALS theory – are very prone to failure.

A scenario that seems more likely begins with the US adapting a populist nationalism blueprint, adjusting military and economic policies accordingly. This is duplicated in Argentina, East Germany (see above map), Romania, and some others. The resulting economic strength gives to the US a “bargaining chip” against the leftward swing in allies such as Canada, the UK, Germany, and Australia. We cannot predict that the US can halt this creeping socialism, but we can predict that our relationships with those allies will be reevaluated.

References

DeLong, B. (2022). Slouching Towards Utopia: An Economic History of the Twentieth Century. Basic Books.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). End of History and the Last Man. Free Press.

Huntington, S. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster.

Eaton Business School. (n.d.). "The PESTLIED model that matters in the 21st Century." Eaton Business School. https://ebsedu.org/blog/pestlied-model-in-21st-century

The Strategic Futures Group. (March 2021). "Scenarios for 2040: Charting the Future Amid Uncertainty". Office of the Director of National Intelligence. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/introduction

TRADOC. (2007). Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terrorism. https://irp.fas.org/threat/terrorism/sup1.pdf

The Opposite of Good Leadership

Military structures vary widely in how they empower — or fail to empower — their troops. While some forces cling to rigid, top-down command styles rooted in centralized control, others embrace a decentralized approach that unleashes the initiative of individual soldiers. This contrast is starkly evident when comparing the Soviet-influenced militaries of Russia and Ukraine with the principles of mission command, such as the German Auftragstaktik. The difference isn’t just theoretical — it’s a matter of battlefield outcomes.

Demoralized Ukranian Troops During the Occupation of Crimea
Image from "Ukrainian Troops Speak Out: Russian Roulette in Ukraine" (VICE News, March 16, 2014)

Empowerment is something that is not practiced in all militaries. Consider the Russian military: according to (Bowen, 2024), "the Russian military continues to operate with a Soviet-style centralized command. This command style at the tactical level often has contributed to the types of inflexible operations that contributed to previous failures and casualties."

Ukraine was a satellite of the USSR for years and apparently maintains a similar approach. Oleksandr Syrskyi, the current Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has a "preference for a tightly controlled leadership structure that favors loyalty and personal closeness over purely professional criteria" (n.a., 2024).

The consequences of this centralized command was demonstrated in Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014: interviews (VICE News, March 22, 2014) with Ukrainian sailors (VICE News, March 16, 2014) showed them to be demoralized and directionless when one of their commanders defected to Russia and the government in Ukraine was in disarray.

The opposite of this is mission command or what the Germans call Auftragstaktik (Widder, 2002). These two styles of command are not exactly the same (Klepper, 2024), but in both, the commander specifies the mission and timeframe, and the way to accomplish this is left to the individual troop's initiative. In the absence of orders, the troop knows what to do: locate, close with, and destroy the enemy, and break his stuff. This is the exact opposite of what the Ukrainian sailors were doing.

References

Bowen, A. (2024). "Russian Military Performance and Outlook." Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12606

Klepper, M. (2024). American Mission Command vs German Auftragstaktik. The Other Side of History Blog. https://the-other-side-of-history.blogspot.com/2024/01/american-mission-command-vs-german.html

n.a. (2024). "Oleksandr Syrskyi shifts Ukrainian military leadership to vertical approach." New Voice of Ukraine. https://english.nv.ua/nation/new-ukraine-s-armed-forces-chief-changed-the-command-process-of-the-army-50431480.html

VICE News. (2014, March 16). Ukrainian Troops Speak Out: Russian Roulette in Ukraine [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GH3HGvZlhhk

VICE News. (2014, March 22). Taking over a Ukrainian Base: Russian Roulette in Ukraine [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tBLs_AsBtjg

Widder, W. (2002). “Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung: Trademarks of German leadership” Military Review, September-October 2002. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot-Spots/docs/MC/MR-Sep-Oct-2002-Widder.pdf

On a Conceptual Model of Military Leadership

Introduction

A conceptual model is an abstract representation of a complex idea stripped of inessential details so that key elements are revealed. This paper looks at a conceptual model of military leadership proposed in (Catino, n.d.). We begin by attempting to define leadership at an appropriate level of abstraction. Next, four traits that a military leader should have according to this conceptual model are examined. Finally, we describe a situation containing an ineffable quality missed by conceptual models.

Definitions of Leadership

Some partial definitions of leadership at a level of abstraction appropriate for a conceptual model include:

1. "Leadership is to give purpose." This is overly broad, and the connection to a mission is not clear.
2. “I need living companions, who will follow me because they want to follow themselves — and to the place where I will.” This is from Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 1883). The part about "following themselves" means that those being led have certain abilities they want to exercise – just as a painter wants to paint or a boxer wants to box, a warrior wants to fight. Following a leader allows them to exercise that ability.
3. "To influence or direct others to accomplish a mission that is set before you." This is better but requires the leader to accomplish only one goal.
4. To correct this deficiency, this can be modified as follows: "To influence or direct others to complete a mission that is set before you, and then build upon the results of that accomplishment."

Essential Traits from a Conceptual Model

The “7-C” conceptual model of military leadership from (Catino, n.d.) lists the following traits: Christ, conviction, competency, community, conflict, communication, and character. While all these are important, I believe that the four most essential traits for a leadership model are character, competency, communication, and conviction.

Character - these are virtues that a leader must possess. The USMC lists 14 leadership virtues in their "JJ DID TIE BUCKLE" acronym: justice, judgement, dependability, initiative, decisiveness, tact, integrity, enthusiasm, bearing, unselfishness, courage, knowledge, loyalty, and endurance (USMC, 2016, p. 2-4). By having these virtues, an individual becomes a leader worth following.

Competency - competency in a leader is not just mastery of relevant technical skills but also the ability to rapidly make decisions in high-stress situations. This instills trust in leadership. Further, the leader expects his followers to be competent and will mentor the followers, teaching and transferring those skills to the followers. All this is covered under USMC's traits of knowledge, judgement, integrity, bearing, decisiveness, and initiative.

Communication – communication is the ability to clearly and concisely express intent and objectives to those being led. Communication works in both directions, and it is necessary for a leader to understand what his followers report, resolve any ambiguities, and other purposes. Communication extends beyond immediate subordinates since communication is necessary to report status and progress to people higher in the chain of command. This allows for coordinated action and unity of effort.

Conviction - conviction is a firmly held belief or faith that a goal or mission is justified, and that the leader’s team can accomplish it. Conviction in a leader rallies the followers and fosters a sense of unity. Conviction is different from stubbornness since conviction can change with compelling evidence and can adapt to evolving conditions. Conviction would fall under the USMC's courage, justice, knowledge, and endurance virtues.

Conclusion - The Man in the Arena

Those traits are necessary but not sufficient for a complete conceptual model of military leadership, I believe.

Consider Teddy Roosevelt's "man in the arena" metaphor (Roosevelt, 1910). Character and competency are necessary to inspire men to follow you. Communication is what is needed to tell them they're about to enter the arena and what their mission is. Conviction is the belief that it is worthwhile to enter the arena and that there's a reasonable chance of success.

Entering the arena requires courage, but what about conduct within that arena?

From limited personal experience it is as if a switch has been flipped, and confidence and habit are replaced by mastery and aggression; the desire for success is replaced by the need to dominate. It's not clear whether or how this joie de guerre is covered by the enthusiasm listed in the JJ DID TIE BUCKLE acronym.

References

Catino, M. S. (n. d.). Military Leadership: A Conceptual Model. [Video] https://libertyuniversity.instructure.com/courses/743862/pages/watch-military-leadership-a-conceptual-model

Nietzsche, F. (1883). Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. (T. Common, tr.) https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1998/pg1998-images.html

Roosevelt, T. (1910, April 23). "Citizenship in a Republic." Theodore Roosevelt Center at Dickinson State University. https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Learn-About-TR/TR-Encyclopedia/Culture-and-Society/Man-in-the-Arena.aspx

U.S. Marine Corps. (2016). Leading Marines. (MCWP 6-10) https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/LLI/MLD/Fidelity/Leading%20Marines%20MCWP%206-10.pdf?ver=2018-09-26-095807-367

Russian Deception Operations in the Annexation of Crimea

Introduction

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 involved a combination of physical deception and propaganda used to trick the Crimeans into accepting Russian occupation, and to mask Russia's intentions from the rest of Ukraine and the world at large. The operation made it appear that a national socialist movement was forming in Kyiv, and that this movement would threaten the Russians living in Crimea. This illusion worked to delegitimize the government in Kyiv as well as to present Russia as saviors to the people of Crimea.

In this essay, a decomposition of data analysis is first performed. Next, the conditions favoring Russian annexation are listed. After that, the physical deception operation and the information campaign are described. Finally, the overall operation is very briefly analyzed into what Russian military analysts call “maskirovka,” meaning “little masquerade.” Unless mentioned otherwise, all information is taken from (Kofman, M., et al., 2017).

Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula. From USMC Quantico

Decomposition of Data Analysis

Actors

People of Crimea - the people of Crimea were passive in the start of the Russian campaign, but later accepted Russian presence.

"Little Green Men" (LGMs) - also called the "polite people," they were Russian troops wearing unmarked uniforms. Before their identity as Russian troops was revealed, their role raised concerns amongst the Crimeans, using FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) about the conditions in Ukraine.

Local militias, biker gangs, Cossacks, and members of special police units - they had Russian backing but were set-up to be opponents of the LGMs.

News outlets in Crimea - spread the narrative of a national socialist movement forming in Kyiv and that this was a threat to the Russians living in Crimea.

Major Actions

Establish a narrative that a national socialist movement was gaining strength in Kyiv, and that this movement will be a threat to Crimeans. This was done by the presence of the LGMs, their manufactured opposition, and the propaganda coming from the news outlets.

Seizure of the Crimean Parliament on February 27, 2014, by fifty operators from Russia's KSO (Special Operations Forces) masquerading as a local militia. This action presented the appearance that Crimeans wanted protection from Russia.

Targets

Being primarily an operation of deception, the target was the beliefs of the Crimeans, to convince them that a nascent national socialist movement in Kyiv would be a threat to their well-being, and that Russia would be able to protect them.

Objectives

Build an air of legitimacy allowing Russia to gain control of the Crimean Peninsula without serious kinetic or non-violent resistance.

Effects

The physical deception operation (the LGMs and their “opponents”) and the information campaign allowed Russia to annex Crimea with little bloodshed, if any.

Preconditions

Russia leveraged several pre-existing conditions to facilitate the annexation. The shared language and history between Crimea and Russia as described by Vladimir Putin in (Putin, 2021) and (Carlson & Putin, 2024) enabled Russian operatives to blend in effortlessly with the local populace, aiding covert operations. Additionally, the long-standing presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet near Crimea meant that the sight of Russian naval forces was routine for Crimeans, reducing immediate suspicion when military activities escalated.

Concurrently, the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, which started just weeks before the annexation, required a heightened security presence from Russia, providing a convenient cover for military maneuvers. On February 26, Russia further masked its intentions with a snap inspection of its forces, using this as a tactic to disguise troop movements towards Crimea.

Adding to the narrative of a growing fascist movement was political turmoil in Kyiv, in which Viktor Yanukovych, the then-president of Ukraine, abandoned Kyiv, leaving Euromaidan protesters in charge.

Physical Deception Operations

In the lead-up to the annexation of Crimea, Russia employed physical deception operations aimed at shaping public perception both within Crimea and internationally. The primary goal was to create the illusion that a national socialist movement was burgeoning in Ukraine, and that this movement posed a significant threat to the Crimean population. This made it appear that Russian intervention was a protective measure against the fascists.

Central to this deception was the presence of the so-called "little green men" (LGMs), unidentified soldiers without insignia who appeared in Crimea. Their sudden and unexplained presence suggested an impending armed takeover, instilling fear and uncertainty among the local populace. This ambiguity was crucial to the narrative of an external threat or a coup in motion.

The operation was not limited to these soldiers alone; it involved a mix of local militias, biker gangs, Cossacks, and former members of the Berkut special police unit. These groups played roles in street-level intimidation and in reinforcing the image of a grassroots resistance movement against supposed Ukrainian nationalists. They thus operated as manufactured opposition.

A significant event in this campaign occurred on 27 February 2014, when fifty operators from Russia's KSO (Special Operations Forces) masqueraded as a local militia and seized the Crimean Parliament. By raising the Russian flag over the parliament building, they visually and symbolically asserted control, further solidifying the narrative of a local shift towards Russian allegiance.

To give a veneer of legitimacy to these actions, a referendum was quickly organized. This vote was presented as a democratic process where the Crimeans could voice their preference for joining Russia. This move was part of the strategy to make the annexation appear as a response to the will of the Crimean people rather than an act of aggression by Russia.

The Information Campaign

Russia launched an extensive propaganda campaign using local Russian-language broadcasters, with three main objectives: to discredit the newly established government in Ukraine, to heighten the sense of peril among Russians living in Ukraine, and to create an illusion of widespread support for Crimea's reunification with Russia. This campaign was strategically timed to precede, accompany, and follow the military operations in Crimea, ensuring a narrative that aligned with the physical actions on the ground.

The primary audience for this propaganda was the Russian public, with Crimean residents as a secondary target. The groundwork for this was already laid due to the popularity of Russian television in Crimea. On 9 March 2014, Russia escalated its control over information by shutting down Ukrainian TV channels, thereby monopolizing the narrative. Russian TV frequently labeled Oleksandr Turchynov’s new Ukrainian government, which had replaced Viktor Yanukovych's government, as a "fascist junta," framing the annexation as a necessary intervention to protect ethnic Russians from this supposed threat.

Conclusion

Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 utilized both pre-existing conditions and sophisticated deception tactics. By exploiting the cultural and historical ties, along with the familiar presence of its naval forces, Russia managed to execute its strategy with stealth and legitimacy in the eyes of those within Crimea, Ukraine, Russian, and international audiences.

The use of physical deception through LGMs and local groups created a perception of imminent threat, justifying intervention under the guise of protection. Further, Russia’s information campaign not only discredited the Ukrainian government but also painted the annexation as a popular and protective move. Thus, Russia secured Crimea before Ukraine and international forces could confront this annexation.

To describe the overall process Russia used to capture Crimea, (Bouwmeester, 2021) uses the term “maskirovka,” a strategy of deception the goal of which is to “destabilize command structures and to create ‘fog of war’” by fabricating “a manageable form of chaos.” He calls the propaganda component “active intelligence” - the “active” part here would be the use of the LGMs and the manufactured resistance against them. Maskirovka has been part of Russian military operations at least since World War 2 (Maier, 2016, p. 4), and the annexation of Crimea shows that it is still part of the Russian Military’s quiver.

References

Bouwmeester, A. J. H. (2021). “The art of deception revisited (part 2): The unexpected annexation of Crimea in 2014.” Militaire Spectator. https://militairespectator.nl/artikelen/art-deception-revisited-part-2-unexpected-annexation-crimea-2014

Carlson, T. & Putin, V. (2024, February 6). Exclusive: Tucker Carlson Interviews Vladimir Putin [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fOCWBhuDdDo

Kofman, M., et al. (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html

Maier, M. (2016). A little masquerade: Russia’s evolving employment of maskirovka. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1022096.pdf

Putin, V. (2021). Article by Vladimir Putin ”On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians“. President of Russia. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181

War in the South China Sea

Introduction

There is no absence of targets for China in the South China Sea (SCS) - Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan in particular. China certainly has the ability to wage conventional war in the SCS, but the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also been pursuing "unrestricted warfare," (Qiao & Liang, 1999) wherein different types of non-kinetic actions (economic, psychological, cultural, international lawfare) are used to affect target nations, either to destabilize them or to turn them into client states. The fundamental concepts of unrestricted warfare are not limited to that type of warfare but also carry-over into conventional warfare as described below.

How the PRC Could Attack Nations in or Close to The South China Sea

China has claimed several islands in the SCS, in particular the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and have constructed airfields and ports on many of them. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies' "China Island Tracker" (CSIS, 2025), the CCP has built 20 outposts in the Paracel Islands and 7 in the Spratly Islands. In addition, the CCP has been creating artificial islands.

Each of these islands must be considered in the context of the PRC’s military: they can be used as airstrips, listening outposts, logistics sites, etc. (Center for Preventative Action, 2025)

China would use multi-domain warfare in any military operation in the SCS, but they will expand on the doctrine according to the concepts of unrestricted warfare. The authors of the unrestricted warfare doctrine asked the question "where is the battlefield" - and they answered "everywhere." (Qiao & Liang, 1999) This is relevant to kinetic warfare as follows: US military operations, in particular drone operations, are controlled remotely. For example, the drone strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki in 2011 was controlled from Creech Air Force Base outside Las Vegas, Nevada. (Zegart, 2022) That means that Las Vegas is a legitimate military target. The document defining multi-domain battle (TRADOC, 2017) explicitly states that we must think of the battlefield as “expanded” (TRADOC, 2017, p.6), so conflict with China would not be restricted to SCS, but it is not clear if the “remote control” situation was considered. If this is indeed the case, this represents a flaw in the multi-domain warfare doctrine.

China already is employing unrestricted warfare in the SCS. For example, the Belt and Road Initiative has been used to establish "hooks" into other countries' infrastructures, and the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia are all considered part of the Belt-and-Road Initiative, as is Indonesia (Council on Foreign Relations, N/D). The infrastructure constructed in those nations represents anywhere from 2% to 8% of their GDP (Steil, 2022).

Extent of the Belt and Road Initiative as of 2107. From (Steil, 2022)

An Effective Counter Strategy

As described in Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040 (TRADOC, 2017), the multi-domain battle (MDB) doctrine is applicable during pre-conflict competition stage, during armed conflict stage, and return-to-competition stage where the competitor is a "still-capable peer adversary" (TRADOC, 2017, p. 21). There are two things we can learn: First, MDB is applicable to the time before the start of armed conflict; second, the competitor is still capable after the conclusion of armed conflict. (?!?)

The second point is genuinely concerning since it explicitly allows for "endless wars", but that will not be examined here.

For the first point, MDB during the pre-conflict stage involves "conducting proactive stabilization campaigns, contesting destabilization campaigns, deterring escalation through the application of flexible deterrent options and rapid deterrence response options, and preparing for transition immediately into armed conflict should the adversary attack" (TRADOC, 2017, pp. 21-22). Destabilization campaigns are designed to cause internal strife.

This, along with military training exercises involving other nations in or near the SCS, could be sufficient to prevent a PRC attack.

If, however, kinetic warfare were to begin, the United States would likely pursue multi-domain warfare, hopefully with security measures to protect remote-controlled operations as described above. 

Limiting Factors that US and Allied Forces Would Likely Encounter

For the non-kinetic possibility, the limiting factor (LIMFAC) would primarily be a lack of support from nations involved in the Belt-and-Road Initiative – besides the economic pressure there would also be serious levels of CCP propaganda in those nations.

For the kinetic possibility, the problem of positioning forces in the region should not be considered a major LIMFAC due to the presence of military bases in Japan. Coordination between US and Allied forces should be resolved by Joint Operation protocols. One LIMFAC would be the relative smallness of the militaries in the region. The major LIMFAC would be operational security: many American institutions have been compromised by the CCP, or are sympathetic to socialism, including the US Military as demonstrated by General Mark Milley, West Point student Spenser Rapone, etc. The sheer number of compromised institutions is a powerful weapon (Ferguson, 2019, pp. 3-59) with which we must contend.

References

CSIS. (2025). "China Island Tracker". Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/

Center for Preventative Action. (2025). "Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea". Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea

Council on Foreign Relations. (N/D). “China’s Approach to Global Governance” https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/

Ferguson, N. (2019). The Square and the Tower: Networks and Power, from the Freemasons to Facebook. Penguin Books.

Qiao & Liang. (1999). Unrestricted Warfare. Shadow Lawn Press. https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf

Steil, B. (2022). “Belt and Road Tracker”. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker

TRADOC. (2017). Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040. https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/MDB_Evolutionfor21st.pdf

Zegart, A. (2022). Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence. Princeton University Press.

Starburst Analysis and Information Sources for the Battle of COP Keating

Introduction

This essay attempts to come to an understanding of the major actions, participants, methods, and motives in the 3 October 2009 Battle of COP Keating in eastern Afghanistan. A starburst analysis will be done to achieve this. Further, some of the various information sources/perspectives will be examined to see what they can contribute to an understanding this battle.

Starburst Analysis

Who - The primary actors in the Battle of COP Keating were US and ANA forces versus Taliban insurgents, called AAF in the video. There were approximately 300 Taliban fighters involved. The US and ANA had 73 troops positioned at COP Keating plus 29 troops stationed at OP Fritsche. As the battle progressed, a QRF from FOB Bostic and air support joined the US and ANA side.

What - The key activity was the battle between the US and ANA forces against the Taliban fighters. Planning and observation were performed by Taliban leaders prior to the attack.

When - The battle took place on 3 October 2009, but planning began months prior. The attack was timed to correspond to scheduled closing of COP Keating and OP Fritsche.

Where - COP Keating and OP Fritsche were located near the town of Kamdesh in eastern Afghanistan (which led to another name for the battle, the Battle of Kamdesh). COP Keating was in mountainous terrain, at the bottom of a valley. Two sides of the camp were bounded by the Darreh ye Kushtoz River. The surrounding mountains were unsecured except for the one capped by OP Fritsche. COP Keating and OP Fritsche were not in direct line of sight. These mountains, along with a nearby mosque, would serve as Taliban fire locations.

Why - COP Keating was established in July 2006, positioned to disrupt insurgent supply lines from Pakistan. By dislocating the COP, the flow of weapons and fighters would resume.

How - The Battle of COP Keating was a two-pronged attack, one against COP Keating (the primary target), the other against OP Fritsche. Both targets were engaged simultaneously to prevent one from assisting the other. The nearest air support came from FOB Bostick, 10 minutes away by helicopter.

Information Sources

It is necessary to evaluate information that was available prior to the Battle of COP Keating as well as information generated after the battle occurred. One would expect various after-action reports of the Battle, but they have been repressed, and many details did not become known until the release of WikiLeaks’ Afghan War Diaries. Apparently, there were multiple intelligence failures. Building on (Gertz. 2009), Hershel Smith writes (Smith, 2009):

…defense intelligence had three reports of imminent danger but failed to act on this intelligence. What “smoking gun report” would have convinced them to take action we aren’t told…

Smith goes on to hint that a “smoking gun report” may have been in possession of the CIA.

Population studies (the human domain perspective) of the people living near COP Keating would be useful for determining local attitudes and for building a social network of the people. Adversary media, be it in the form of literature, internet posts, etc., would also help in creating a social network. This social network can then be infiltrated to gather information. The social network can then be analyzed to determine the major Taliban influencers who will then become the major targets for US forces. (Healy. 2013)

Another critical information stream would be a scholarly perspective. Thaler, et. al. (2013, p. 12) sites several academic papers (many published prior to the battle) stating that Afghanistan has a culture of independence and resistance. This is an extremely specific characterization and probably wouldn’t hold for all Afghani. If it applies to the people living near COP Keating, this will determine how Afghani would relate to or tolerate foreign presence, if at all.

Finally, the security practitioners’ perspective would provide a wealth information, not only about the Battle itself but about the conditions that existed prior to it as well as to make predictions about future engagements.

Both the COP and OP were targeted by 45 attacks between May 2009 and October 2009. One question that security practitioners could answer is this: did the insurgency forces display improvement in their operational ability during that time, and if so, in what areas?

An insurgency does not spring fully-formed from the forehead of Saint Mattis of the Blessed Order of the Knife Hands. It must have meager beginnings and, unless extinguished, will improve by becoming confident, learning new 4GW techniques, making use of changing logistics opportunities, etc. Once the baseline and trajectory are established, the insurgency’s future operations can be predicted.

Conclusion

The starburst analysis technique, combined with various information perspectives, helps us come to an understanding of the Battle of COP Keating. Until a comprehensive AAR, similar to the one performed for the similar Battle at Wanar (Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 2010) becomes available, there will always be questions.

References

ABC News. (5 February 2010). “Camp Keating officers disciplined for attack that killed 8 U. S. troops.” Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://abcnews.go.com/WN/Afghanistan/camp-keating-commanders-disciplined-attack-killed-22-us/story?id=9761160

Gertz, B. (29 October 2009). “DIA on Afghan intel” Washington Times. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/29/inside-the-ring-58944275/

Healy, K. (2013). Using metadada to find Paul Revere. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from: https://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-metadata-to-find-paul-revere/

Smith, H. (2 November 2009). “Systematic defense intelligence failures”. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/11/02/systemic-defense-intelligence-failures/

Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. (2010). “Wanat: Combat action in Afghanistan, 2008”. Combat Studies Institute Press. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Wanat.pdf

Steeb, Matsumura, Herbert, Gordon IV, & Horn. (2011). “Perspectives on the Battle of Wanat”. Rand Corporation. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP329z1.pdf

Thaler, Brown, Gonzalez, Mobley, & Roshan. (2013). “Improving the U.S. Military’s understanding of unstable environments vulnerable to violent extremist groups”. RAND Corporation. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR298.html

TRADOC G2 OE Enterprise G&V. (10 August 2012). “The battle of COP Keating - October 3rd, 2009”. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylUzySZb3L8

WikiLeaks War Diary. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/search/?q=cop+keating∓sort=date∓release=Afghanistan∓date__gte=2009-10-03∓date__lte=2009-10-09