The Problems with Ghost Soldiers

Unethical behavior in the military is criminal, financially ruinous, wastes time through endless training programs, and undermines the "integrity" part of JJDIDTIEBUCKLE. It also degrades readiness and lethality. The most glaring example of how unethical behavior and corruption undermines the operational capability of a military force was the problem of the “ghost soldiers” of the Afghan National Army.

The Afghan National Army (ANA) was created by President Hamid Karzai in December 2001, following the US invasion on 7 October 2001. The ANA was intended to provide security, combat the Taliban insurgency, and support the government's stability. Training for the ANA was split between various NATO countries, including the US, the United Kingdom, and Canada.

U.S. Army Sgt. Kevon Campbell uses a Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment to check the identity of an Afghan villager in southern Ghazni province, Afghanistan, 8 April 2012. Photo by Sgt. Michael J. MacLeod.

The US was the primary source of funding for the ANA, totaling over $88 billion dollars from 2002 to 2021. The size of the ANA in 2019 was approximately 195,000 soldiers but faced the problems of high desertion rates (around 25% in 2009) and high illiteracy rates (approximately 90%).

“Ghost soldiers” were an ongoing problem for the ANA. These were either deserters, deceased individuals, or completely fictitious troops, whose continued presence on the rosters allowed corrupt commanders and other officials to embezzle their salaries and their equipment.

Similar problems existed in the Afghan National Police (ANP) as well as in the education department. One report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) noted that there were not only ghost students but also thousands of ghost teachers and even hundreds of ghost schools. (Sopko, 2017, p. 4-5)

According to the 30 April 2016 report from SIGAR, “neither the United States nor its Afghan allies know how many Afghan soldiers and police actually exist, how many are in fact available for duty, or, by extension, the true nature of their operational capabilities.” (Sopko, 2016, p. 66)

To solve this problem, the U.S. government instituted a biometric ID system starting in 2005. In 2006, a defense contractor named Viisage was granted $10 million to manufacture a device called the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE), and by 2007 the device was used in Afghanistan to eliminate ghost soldiers (Atherton, 2022).

The data collected through HIIDE and paperwork such as enlistment applications captured not only a recruit’s name and date/place of birth, but also “details on the individuals’ military specialty and career trajectory, as well as sensitive relational data such as the names of their father, uncles, and grandfathers, as well as the names of the two tribal elders per recruit who served as guarantors for their enlistment” (Guo & Noori, 2021)

All this information was stored in a database called the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS). Used by both the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense to pay the members of the ANA and ANP, it grew to contain information on half a million members of the army and police forces.

U.S. forces in Afghanistan not only wanted this biometric system to eliminate ghost soldiers but also to identify enemies. “Knowing who belongs in a village—who they are, what they do, to whom they are related, and where they live — all helps to separate the locals from the insurgents” (Branson, 2011, p. 23).

According to (Guo & Noori, 2021), the database came with no deletion or data retention policy, even for extreme contingencies. Such as national takeover by the Taliban.

Even before the American withdrawal in August 2021, the system’s security was compromised. For example, in a series of kidnappings in May 2016, the Taliban captured between over 200 people traveling on the Kunduz-Takhar highway. While being held in a nearby mosque, HIIDE was used on the prisoners, and 20 were killed for being members of the army or police. (TOLOnews, 2016)

When the biometric identification system was used for its intended purpose, it produced staggering results. For example, in 2019 there was a purge of 42,000 ghost soldiers due to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANSDF) switching “to counting only troops validated as existing by biometrics, rather than relying on the numbers reported by field commanders.” (Sisk, 2019)

This purge emphasized the extent that ANSDF commanders were inflating their ranks, and it corroborated findings by SIGAR as well particular instances reported by Helmand’s provincial council. In 2016, for example, in Helmand Province, 40% of the listed troops were nonexistent, with one base of 100 soldiers having only 50 present and another of 300 having just 15 during an attack (Rasmussen, 2016). The purge of 42,000 ghost soldiers showed that the ANA was a far smaller force in reality than on paper.

The rapid takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban in August 2021 was made possible by these inflated numbers. Khalid Payenda, the former finance minister of Afghanistan, stated that “most of the 300,000 troops and police on the government's books did not exist,” and that the numbers may have been inflated more than six times. (BBC, 2021)

The U.S. no longer controls Afghanistan, and there is a real possibility of reprisals by the Taliban against members of the ANSDF. APPS and HIIDE are supposedly secure, but the Afghan government was introducing its own biometrics ID system when it fell. Their system included ANSDF membership information, and there is some evidence that the Taliban have access to it. (Roy, 2021).

In conclusion, unethical behavior and corruption can lead to combat ineffectiveness even to the point of losing a war. The ongoing problems of biometrics systems under Taliban control show that timid leadership and half-hearted solutions rarely achieve solutions.

 

Bibliography

Atherton, K. (2022, 9 February). The enduring risks posed by biometric identification systems. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-enduring-risks-posed-by-biometric-identification-systems/

BBC. (2021, 10 November). Afghanistan's ghost soldiers undermined fight against Taliban - ex-official. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59230564

Branson, D. (2011, April). The Commander’s Guide to Biometrics in Afghanistan. CJIATF 435. https://info.publicintelligence.net/CALL-AfghanBiometrics.pdf

Guo, E. & Noori, H. (2021, 30 August). This is the real story of the Afghan biometric databases abandoned to the Taliban. MIT Technology Review. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/08/30/1033941/afghanistan-biometric-databases-us-military-40-data-points/

Rasmussen, S. (2016, 17 May). Afghanistan's 'ghost soldiers': thousands enlisted to fight Taliban don't exist. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/17/afghanistan-ghost-soldiers-taliban-babaji

Roy, S. (2021, 26 November). Neo-Taliban Turns Digital: A Reconquest Strategy. The Geopolitics. https://thegeopolitics.com/neo-taliban-turns-digital-a-reconquest-strategy/

Sisk, R. (2019, 2 August). Afghanistan Loses 42,000 Troops in Crackdown on 'Ghost Soldiers'. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/08/02/afghanistan-loses-42000-troops-crackdown-ghost-soldiers.html

Sopko, J. (2016, 30 April). Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. SIGAR-2016-04-30QR. https://www.sigar.mil/Portals/147/Files/Reports/Quarterly-Reports/2016-04-30qr.pdf

Sopko, J. (2017, 28 March). Schools in Balkh Province: Observations from Site Visits at 26 Schools. SIGAR-17-32-SP. https://www.sigar.mil/Portals/147/Files/Reports/Special-Projects/Special-Projects-Review/SIGAR-17-32-SP.pdf

TOLOnews. (5 June 2016). Taliban Used Biometric System During Kunduz Kidnapping. https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/taliban-used-biometric-system-during-kunduz-kidnapping

Starburst Analysis and Information Sources for the Battle of COP Keating

Introduction

This essay attempts to come to an understanding of the major actions, participants, methods, and motives in the 3 October 2009 Battle of COP Keating in eastern Afghanistan. A starburst analysis will be done to achieve this. Further, some of the various information sources/perspectives will be examined to see what they can contribute to an understanding this battle.

Starburst Analysis

Who - The primary actors in the Battle of COP Keating were US and ANA forces versus Taliban insurgents, called AAF in the video. There were approximately 300 Taliban fighters involved. The US and ANA had 73 troops positioned at COP Keating plus 29 troops stationed at OP Fritsche. As the battle progressed, a QRF from FOB Bostic and air support joined the US and ANA side.

What - The key activity was the battle between the US and ANA forces against the Taliban fighters. Planning and observation were performed by Taliban leaders prior to the attack.

When - The battle took place on 3 October 2009, but planning began months prior. The attack was timed to correspond to scheduled closing of COP Keating and OP Fritsche.

Where - COP Keating and OP Fritsche were located near the town of Kamdesh in eastern Afghanistan (which led to another name for the battle, the Battle of Kamdesh). COP Keating was in mountainous terrain, at the bottom of a valley. Two sides of the camp were bounded by the Darreh ye Kushtoz River. The surrounding mountains were unsecured except for the one capped by OP Fritsche. COP Keating and OP Fritsche were not in direct line of sight. These mountains, along with a nearby mosque, would serve as Taliban fire locations.

Why - COP Keating was established in July 2006, positioned to disrupt insurgent supply lines from Pakistan. By dislocating the COP, the flow of weapons and fighters would resume.

How - The Battle of COP Keating was a two-pronged attack, one against COP Keating (the primary target), the other against OP Fritsche. Both targets were engaged simultaneously to prevent one from assisting the other. The nearest air support came from FOB Bostick, 10 minutes away by helicopter.

Information Sources

It is necessary to evaluate information that was available prior to the Battle of COP Keating as well as information generated after the battle occurred. One would expect various after-action reports of the Battle, but they have been repressed, and many details did not become known until the release of WikiLeaks’ Afghan War Diaries. Apparently, there were multiple intelligence failures. Building on (Gertz. 2009), Hershel Smith writes (Smith, 2009):

…defense intelligence had three reports of imminent danger but failed to act on this intelligence. What “smoking gun report” would have convinced them to take action we aren’t told…

Smith goes on to hint that a “smoking gun report” may have been in possession of the CIA.

Population studies (the human domain perspective) of the people living near COP Keating would be useful for determining local attitudes and for building a social network of the people. Adversary media, be it in the form of literature, internet posts, etc., would also help in creating a social network. This social network can then be infiltrated to gather information. The social network can then be analyzed to determine the major Taliban influencers who will then become the major targets for US forces. (Healy. 2013)

Another critical information stream would be a scholarly perspective. Thaler, et. al. (2013, p. 12) sites several academic papers (many published prior to the battle) stating that Afghanistan has a culture of independence and resistance. This is an extremely specific characterization and probably wouldn’t hold for all Afghani. If it applies to the people living near COP Keating, this will determine how Afghani would relate to or tolerate foreign presence, if at all.

Finally, the security practitioners’ perspective would provide a wealth information, not only about the Battle itself but about the conditions that existed prior to it as well as to make predictions about future engagements.

Both the COP and OP were targeted by 45 attacks between May 2009 and October 2009. One question that security practitioners could answer is this: did the insurgency forces display improvement in their operational ability during that time, and if so, in what areas?

An insurgency does not spring fully-formed from the forehead of Saint Mattis of the Blessed Order of the Knife Hands. It must have meager beginnings and, unless extinguished, will improve by becoming confident, learning new 4GW techniques, making use of changing logistics opportunities, etc. Once the baseline and trajectory are established, the insurgency’s future operations can be predicted.

Conclusion

The starburst analysis technique, combined with various information perspectives, helps us come to an understanding of the Battle of COP Keating. Until a comprehensive AAR, similar to the one performed for the similar Battle at Wanar (Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 2010) becomes available, there will always be questions.

References

ABC News. (5 February 2010). “Camp Keating officers disciplined for attack that killed 8 U. S. troops.” Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://abcnews.go.com/WN/Afghanistan/camp-keating-commanders-disciplined-attack-killed-22-us/story?id=9761160

Gertz, B. (29 October 2009). “DIA on Afghan intel” Washington Times. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/29/inside-the-ring-58944275/

Healy, K. (2013). Using metadada to find Paul Revere. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from: https://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-metadata-to-find-paul-revere/

Smith, H. (2 November 2009). “Systematic defense intelligence failures”. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/11/02/systemic-defense-intelligence-failures/

Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. (2010). “Wanat: Combat action in Afghanistan, 2008”. Combat Studies Institute Press. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Wanat.pdf

Steeb, Matsumura, Herbert, Gordon IV, & Horn. (2011). “Perspectives on the Battle of Wanat”. Rand Corporation. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP329z1.pdf

Thaler, Brown, Gonzalez, Mobley, & Roshan. (2013). “Improving the U.S. Military’s understanding of unstable environments vulnerable to violent extremist groups”. RAND Corporation. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR298.html

TRADOC G2 OE Enterprise G&V. (10 August 2012). “The battle of COP Keating - October 3rd, 2009”. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylUzySZb3L8

WikiLeaks War Diary. Retrieved 17 January 2025 from https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/search/?q=cop+keating∓sort=date∓release=Afghanistan∓date__gte=2009-10-03∓date__lte=2009-10-09

Battle of COP Keating

Geographic Analysis

Combat Outpost (COP) Keating was positioned in the Kamdesh District of Afghanistan, 25 km away from the Pakistan border. It was located in mountainous terrain, at the bottom of a valley, along an unimproved road which ran alongside the Darreh ye Kushtoz River. The village of Urmal was located 200 meters west of the COP.

COP Keating, located at the bottom of a valley in the Kamdesh District of Afghanistan. Photo by Brad Larson.

The surrounding mountains were not secured, except for the one capped by OP Fritsche, located 2.2 miles south of COP Keating with a 2144 ft difference in elevation. COP Keating and OP Fritsche were not in line of sight of each other.

Close to COP Keating was a mosque located on a ridgeline that would serve as an enemy fire position.

This area - the COP, the OP, the mosque, and surrounding mountains – would be the location of the Battle of Kamdesh, also called the Battle of COP Keating. Taliban insurgents had engaged the ground unit assigned to COP Keating and OP Fritsche over 45 times since May 2009.

Squadron HQ was located at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Bostick, 30 km southeast of COP Keating, or 10 minutes flight time by helicopter. Task force and brigade headquarters were both located at FOB Fenty in Jalalabad, 137 km southwest of COP Keating, or 40 minutes flight time by helicopter. These bases would supply air and artillery support during the battle.

The Battle

At the time of the attack, COP Keating had 73 troops (53 US troops and 20 Afghan National Army (ANA)), and OP Fritsche had 29 troops (19 US and 10 ANA) stationed there.

Immediately prior to the attack, insurgents occupied the mosque and five nearby support by fire (SBF) positions. These positions were overlooking COP Keating and would also interfere with air support.

The attacks on FOB Keating and OP Fritsche began simultaneously on the morning of 3 October 2009. The mortar pit at COP Keating was pinned-down and soldiers were unable to return fire. Meanwhile, the men at OP Fritsche were pinned-down by other insurgents. Thus, the two OPs were unable to support each other.

FOB Bostick began indirect fire in support of COP Keating. Two F-15s arrived at COP Keating and began engaging insurgents. The insurgents continued attacking FOB Keating from three different directions, forcing the US and ANA troops to collapse into a defensive position within COP Keating.

OP Fritsche repulsed the insurgents and provided mortar fire in support of COP Keating.

Most of the buildings were on fire by this time and the base was partially overran by the insurgents. US forces pushed outwards to retake lost positions within COP Keating.

Part of a quick reaction force (QRF) from FOB Bostic arrived by helicopter at OP Fritsche, but weather delayed the rest of the QRF from arriving by one hour.

As fire continued to engulf COP Keating, the QRF departed OP Fritsche on foot towards COP Keating. Two hours into their descent, the QRF called-in close air support and engaged the insurgents. This forced the QRF to move using bounding overwatch, slowing their advance to COP Keating.

The QRF arrived 13 hours after the attack started. They began clearing operations and established a landing zone to allow for medical evacuation (MEDIVAC). Enemy fire prevented MEDIVAC fights from using that landing zone, but additional air support allowed the flights to commence.

Sixteen hours after the attack began, the last MEDIVAC flight left COP Keating. Eight U.S. soldiers were killed and 27 wounded; eight ANA soldiers were wounded. Approximately twenty-seven insurgents were killed. Only one of the buildings remained intact. The munitions depot was abandoned following US departure, which was then looted by the Taliban. The depot was bombed by Americans on 6 October to destroy any remaining munitions. Four officers were disciplined because of the attack. (ABC News, 2010).

Starburst Analysis

Starburst analysis is a structured analytic technique (SAT) that seeks to ensure that analysists have a grasp of the situation they’re investigating. It allows them to enumerate the actors, to handle information overload, and to differentiate and isolate root causes from symptoms. It allows analysts to identify gaps in their intelligence.

Who are the Primary Actors?

The primary actors consisted of US and ANA forces fighting against Taliban insurgents. The US and ANA forces had 73 troops stationed at COP Keating and 29 troops stationed at OP Fritsche. The QRF from FOB Bostic and air support reinforced COP Keating. Approximately 300 Taliban insurgents were involved.

What were the Key Activities?

The key activity was the battle between US/ANA troops and the Taliban fighters at COP Keating and OP Fritsche. This was preceded by planning and observation by the Taliban.

When

The battle itself took place on 3 October 2009 but planning by the Taliban and village elders started months prior.

Where

The battle took place at COP Keating (located at the bottom of a valley) and the nearby OP Fritsche, located at a higher elevation but not within direct line of sight. The Taliban attack made use of the mountains surrounding COP Keating to not only rain fire down upon the camp but also attack any incoming air support. In addition, the insurgent attack on OP Fritsche pinned-down the forces located there. The insurgents made use of a local mosque as a firing position, which the Americans would be loathe to attack.

Why

COP Keating was established in July 2006 and was left in place to prevent weapon shipments and insurgent movements across the Pakistan border. The Taliban attack was designed to dislocate the COP, presumably to allow the flow of weapons and fighters to continue.

How

The Battle of COP Keating was a two-pronged attack, one against COP Keating (presumably the primary target), the other against OP Fritsche. Both targets were engaged simultaneously to prevent one from assisting the other. Kept isolated, the nearest air support to the COP and OP was 10 minutes away by helicopter from FOB Bostick.

Information Sources

It is necessary to evaluate information that was available prior to the Battle of COP Keating as well as information sources generated after the battle took place.

Hindsight is 20/20 and one would expect to find analyses of the Battle of COP Keating. Beyond one TRADOC video, not much information is available besides personal accounts, popular books, as well as the 2020 movie called “The Outpost.” Many of the details of the battle did not come to light until the WikiLeaks Afghan War Diaries. Analysis of the battles were no doubt performed, but it may have been the case that analysts found some fundamental security flaw that was best kept secret.

Apparently, there were multiple intelligence failures. Building on (Gertz. 2009), Hershel Smith writes (Smith, 2009):

…defense intelligence had three reports of imminent danger but failed to act on this intelligence. What “smoking gun report” would have convinced them to take action we aren’t told…

Smith goes on to hint that a “smoking gun report” may have been in possession of the CIA.

Prior to the battle, there are the lessons learned from the 45 times that US forces engaged the Taliban since May 2009. Each engagement would be amenable to Starburst Analysis; in particular, information about the names and numbers of insurgents involved, the weapons and tactics they used, as well as the kinds of information they used in formulating their attacks. The troops involved could all be interviewed. All of this information would be local to the area of COP Keating of course.

The Battle of Wanat, which occurred on 13 July 2008, could also serve as a source of information. This battle was similar to the Battle of COP Keating in many ways, including the number of fighters on each side, geography, the distance from FOBs, etc. Unlike COP Keating, analyses of the Battle of Wanat are publicly available. (Steeb, et. al., 2011), (Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 2010).

The battle sites are separated by straight line distance of 56 km, so a different set of Taliban fighters may have been involved. Starburst Analysis of the Battle of Wanat could indicate common actors, tactics, and weapons when compared to the Battle of COP Keating, however. These commonalities would allow analysts to figure out the hierarchical structure of the Taliban as well as to observe the evolution of their weapons and tactics. Final analyses of the Battle of Wanat were completed after the Battle of COP Keating, but preliminary studies must have been available.

Population studies of the people living near COP Keating would be useful for determining local attitudes and for building a social network of the people.

Another critical information stream would be a scholarly perspective. Thaler, et. al. (2013, p. 12) sites several academic papers (many published prior to the battle) stating that Afghanistan has a culture of independence and resistance. This is a very specific characterization and probably wouldn’t hold for all Afghani. If it applies to the people living near COP Keating, this will determine how Afghani would relate to or tolerate foreign presence, if at all.

 

References

ABC News. (5 February 2010). “Camp Keating officers disciplined for attack that killed 8 U. S. troops.” Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://abcnews.go.com/WN/Afghanistan/camp-keating-commanders-disciplined-attack-killed-22-us/story?id=9761160

Gertz, B. (29 October 2009). “DIA on Afghan intel” Washington Times. Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/29/inside-the-ring-58944275/

Smith, H. (2 November 2009). “Systematic defense intelligence failures”. Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/11/02/systemic-defense-intelligence-failures/

Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. (2010). “Wanat: Combat action in Afghanistan, 2008”. Combat Studies Institute Press. Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Wanat.pdf

Steeb, Matsumura, Herbert, Gordon IV, & Horn. (2011). “Perspectives on the Battle of Wanat”. Rand Corporation. Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP329z1.pdf

Thaler, Brown, Gonzalez, Mobley, & Roshan. (2013). “Improving the U.S. Military’s understanding of unstable environments vulnerable to violent extremist groups”. RAND Corporation. Retrieved 29 June 2024 from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR298.html

TRADOC G2 OE Enterprise G&V. (10 August 2012). “The battle of COP Keating - October 3rd, 2009”. Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylUzySZb3L8

WikiLeaks War Diary. Retrieved 30 June 2024 from https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/search/?q=cop+keating∓sort=date∓release=Afghanistan∓date__gte=2009-10-03∓date__lte=2009-10-09

Invasion Phase of the War in Afghanistan: A Jus post Bellum Analysis

Introduction

The War in Afghanistan occurred in two stages: the first was the invasion in 2001, the second was the insurgency phase which lasted from the end of the invasion until American withdrawal in 2021. The difference (besides switching from symmetric to asymmetric warfare) is usually accounted for by a change of enemy: during the invasion-phase the enemy was the Islamic Emirate’s military, and afterwards it was the Taliban.

This paper begins with a review of modern (“maximalist”) jus post bellum theory as exposed by Brian Orend. The theory is then critically examined both independent of the rest of Just War Theory as well as how jus post bellum relates to jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Finally, it is applied to the end of the invasion phase of the War in Afghanistan.

Jus post Bellum, Old and New

Frowe distinguishes¹ between a minimalist and maximalist approach to jus post bellum.

The minimalist approach, advocated by the diplomat and legal theorist Hugo Grotius, is designed to rein-in the zeal of the victor. It considers jus post bellum criteria as permissions: what the victors are allowed to do in victory. The minimalist theory allows the victors to take actions that “protect themselves, recover that which was illicitly taken, [and] punish the perpetrators.” Temporary occupation is acceptable, colonization is not. Further, it is unacceptable to force the inhabitants of the defeated nation into slavery.

The maximalist approach imposes obligations on the victors instead of granting them permissions. The concern is not that the victor’s actions must be limited, but rather that the victor will do too little, leaving the defeated nation a failed and dysfunctional state.

Orend’s Jus post Bellum Criteria

Orend claims² that a just peace must satisfy all of the following criteria:

Rights vindication – “The settlement should secure those basic rights whose violation triggered the justified war. The relevant rights include human rights to life and liberty and community entitlements to territory and sovereignty.”³

Proportionality and publicity – Conditions stipulated by the peace treaty should not be vengeful and should be publicly available.

Discrimination – Isolate civilians from punitive measures.

Punishment of leaders – Leaders of the defeated nation must be punished, as a deterrence to future aggression, to spur atonement, and “failing to punish the aggressor degrades and disrespects the worth, status, and suffering of the victim.”⁴

Punishment for war crimes – Combatants on all sides must be held accountable for any war crimes.

Compensation – Subject to proportionality and discrimination.

Rehabilitation – Aggressor state may require demilitarization and political rehabilitation (regime change).

Problems with Jus post Bellum Criteria by Itself

The main problem with jus post bellum criteria is that it commits the victor to nation-building. Orend requires that we restore rights, including “community entitlements to territory and sovereignty,” not just individual rights. He goes on to require that the victorious nation must⁵:

• “Provide effective military and police security for the whole country.”
• “Revamp educational curricula to purge past propaganda and cement new values.”
• “Ensure that the benefits of the new order will be (i) concrete, and (ii) widely – not narrowly – distributed.”

We must provide military defense, police, an educational system, and a distributive economic system for the defeated nation. We’re responsible for their long-term care, well-being, and protection. We’re not just stopping a war; we’re exporting a progressive’s conception of democracy. Orend explicitly acknowledges this, summoning the spirit of Immanuel Kant and stating that for the defeated nation, “the utmost which can be done to it in vindication of international law and order is the establishment of a more peaceable and progressive social order within it.”⁶

Frowe notes that the maximalist jus post bellum as espoused by Orend is grounded in liberal theory and international law⁷; she is being literal here, and the foreign policy required by Orend (and Kant) is best described as “liberal imperialism”⁸ and commits us to being not only the world’s policemen but also the world’s social workers.

Relationship to the Rest of Just War Theory

Other than the Doctrine of Discrimination, discussed in next section, the maximalist approach to jus post bellum interacts with at least two other criteria from Just War Theory: the “reasonable chance of success” criterion from jus ad bellum and the proportionality requirement from jus in bello.

If a likelihood of success is required before entering into war, then the nation building described above must be part of the calculation. Rebuilding a whole nation in the way described by Orend is a truly massive undertaking that is unlikely to succeed, as illustrated by the insurgency stage of the War in Afghanistan. Thus, the probability of success is lowered.

The type and amount of collateral damage inflicted must also be considered, as the victor nation is responsible for rebuilding the infrastructure damaged during the war. Under this, the cost of reconstruction must play a role in determining whether to attack a specific target, and not just military benefit. The evaluation of proportional response is thus distorted by economic concerns.

The Doctrine of Discrimination

The Doctrine of Discrimination, usually considered part of jus in bello, arises again in Orend’s jus post bellum criteria: the civilians⁹ of the defeated nation must be isolated from punitive economic measures enforced by the victor. The doctrine thus plays the same role in both jus post bellum and jus in bello theories: avoid harming the civilians. The Doctrine of Discrimination is problematic in both theories because it makes a crucial assumption about the civilians of the enemy nation: that they are “innocent.”

How do civilians get along in a totalitarian regime? It is popularly assumed that they have no choice in the matter, that they (as a whole) were forced to live in a dictatorship. Is this really the truth? There are numerous examples of dictators who won office through popular election.

Further, members of the populace frequently act as informants, collaborators, or private enforcers of the government edicts. A good example of this came after the fall of the Berlin Wall: once Germany was reunited, lists of collaborators with the East German Stasi were released, and it has been calculated that 18% of the population of the city of Rostock were informers.¹⁰

A more recent and close-to-home example of private individuals and companies taking on the role of law enforcement happened during the lockdowns, vaccine mandates, and mask mandates in 2020 – 2023: examples of government enforcement of these mandates (for example, discharging military members for refusing vaccination) did occur, but it was far more common to have private people and institutions act as enforcers¹¹.

No, private individuals and non-combatants are far from innocent, and this undercuts the Doctrine of Proportionality. This will become extremely relevant in the next section.

Conclusion - Application of Jus post Bellum to the War in Afghanistan

During both phases of the war, the United States clearly distinguished the military vs. civilian parts of Afghani culture and endeavored to avoid or at least limit the use of force against civilians as much as possible. In that, we followed the Doctrine of Discrimination, taking no punitive actions against non-combatants and requiring almost no cultural changes. In fact, we went out of our way to leave as little of an “American culture footprint”¹² as possible.

Examples of this were the so-called “Cultural Support Teams”¹³ and the “Female Engagement Teams.”¹⁴ The goals of both programs were to build relationships with Afghani women by sending female soldiers or Marines to meet with them and earn their trust. They were initially controversial because they involved placing females into combat situations. The real controversy should have been the extent that the teams kowtowed to the misogynistic aspects of Afghani culture: female soldiers and Marines were required to always wear head coverings and always have male escorts, even when security was not a major concern. Both CSTs and FETs were considered failures.

More egregious examples of this “cultural support” were the continuation of child marriages and bacha bazi, the latter being the purchase and use of adolescent and pre-adolescent boys for sex by mature male adults. Bacha bazi was outlawed by occupation forces¹⁵ as well as by the Taliban (both before and after American withdraw). However, U.S. forces were explicitly instructed to ignore instances of such sexual abuse. According to the father of one Marine in Afghanistan, “my son said that his officers told him to look the other way because it’s their culture.”¹⁶ A Special Forces soldier was relieved of his command after acting against an Afghan perpetrator.¹⁷ The practice continues unabated.

Bacha Bazi in Afghanstan. Photo from the Indian Times

While all this was happening, foreign policy experts were arguing for “the separation of mosque and state.”¹⁸ It was clear that the Americans thought it was sufficient to replace the Islamic Emirate with the Islamic Republic, substituting one system of government with another.

Was the period following the end of the combat phase of the War in Afghanistan a just peace? In one sense it was, because we undertook the process of rebuilding that nation. In another sense it was not, because we never defeated the real enemy, the “innocent” Afghan civilians.

Footnotes

1. Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace. Routledge, 2022.
2. Brian Orend, “Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective of a Just-War Theorist.”
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. All quotes from ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace. Routledge, 2022.
8. Dan Cox, “The Age of Liberal Imperialism: Twenty-Five Years of a Flawed U.S. Foreign Policy.”
9. Orend specifies “civilians” and avoids discussion of non-combatants and other edge-cases.
10. Peter Wensierski, "East Germany thrived on snitching lovers, fickle friends and envious schoolkids."
11. Madeline Chambers, “Germans snitch on neighbours flouting virus rules, in echo of the Stasi past.”
12. Ben Connable. “Human Terrain System is Dead, Long Live … What?”
13. Megan Katt, “Blurred Lines: Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan.”
14. Anna Coll, “Evaluating Female Engagement Team Effectiveness in Afghanistan.”
15. Chris Mondloch, “Bacha Bazi: An Afghan Tragedy.”
16. Joseph Goldstein, “U.S. Soldiers Told to Ignore Sexual Abuse of Boys by Afghan Allies.”
17. Ibid.
18. Alexander Bernard, “The Advantage to Islam of Mosque-State Separation: What the American Founders can teach.”

Bibliography

Bernard, A. “The Advantage to Islam of Mosque-State Separation: What the American Founders can teach.” Hoover Institution, 29 January 2008. Retrieved 4 May 2024 from https://www.hoover.org/research/advantage-islam-mosque-state-separation

Chambers, M. “Germans snitch on neighbours flouting virus rules, in echo of the Stasi past.” Reuters, 2 April 2020. Retrieved 4 May 2024 from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN21K2RD/

Coll, A. “Evaluating Female Engagement Team Effectiveness in Afghanistan.” Wellesley College Honors Thesis Collection, April 2012. Retrieved 5 May 2024 from https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/217003814.pdf

Connable, B. “Human Terrain System is Dead, Long Live … What?” Military Review, January-February 2018. Retrieved 5 May 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/Human-Terrain-System-is-Dead-Long-Live-What

Cox, D. “The Age of Liberal Imperialism: Twenty-Five Years of a Flawed U.S. Foreign Policy.” Orbis 57 no. 4, Autumn 2013. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.08.010

Frowe, H. The Ethics of War and Peace. Routledge, 2022.

Goldstein, J. “U.S. Soldiers Told to Ignore Sexual Abuse of Boys by Afghan Allies.” New York Times, 20 September 2015. Retrieved 5 May 2024 from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/world/asia/us-soldiers-told-to-ignore-afghan-allies-abuse-of-boys.html

Katt, M. “Blurred Lines: Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan.” Joint Force Quarterly 75, no. 4. October 2014. Retrieved 5 May 2024 from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-75/Article/577569/blurred-lines-cultural-support-teams-in-afghanistan/

Mondloch, C. “Bacha Bazi: An Afghan Tragedy.” Foreign Policy, 28 October 2013. Last retrieved on 4 May 2024 from https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/28/bacha-bazi-an-afghan-tragedy/

Orend, Brian. “Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective of a Just-War Theorist.” Leiden Journal of International Law 20, no. 3, September 2007. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156507004268

Wensierski, P. "East Germany thrived on snitching lovers, fickle friends and envious schoolkids." Australian Financial Review, 23 December 2015. Last retrieved 5 May 2024 from https://www.afr.com/life-and-luxury/arts-and-culture/stasi-snitches-all-around-records-reveal-true-extent-of-telling-on-others-20151116-gkzu44

A Review of David Kilcullen’s The Dragons and the Snakes

Kilcullen’s “Dragons and Snakes,” hereafter abbreviated as “D&S,” is quite ambitious: it describes the evolution of warfare during and following the GWOT, arguing that state and non-state actors have undergone coevolution, with the end result that our adversaries’ warfighting techniques have changed in ways our military is currently unable to match.

D&S begins with a quick overview of the vast hinterland that was the time between the end of the Cold War and the earlier parts of the Global War on Terrorism. The important aspect of this overview is the relative sophistication of five of the dominant politicians of that era: Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Vladimir Putin.

When Putin came into office, he inherited the shambles that was Russia after the fall of the Soviets. To rebuild his country, he proposed to Clinton that Russia be allowed to join NATO. Other than the presidents and the prime minister, politicians at the time regarded that proposal somewhere on the spectrum between absurdity and incredulity. None of those politicians recognized what Putin was really doing: in popular vernacular, he was “trolling.”

Putin was taken seriously, with Tony Blair proposing to create a NATO-Russia Council to have Putin’s representatives meet with NATO leaders before making key decisions. Bush proposed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia. After all, Bush said that he “looked the man [Putin] in the eye. I found him very straightforward and trustworthy – I was able to get a sense of his soul.”

Eleven weeks later, Russia sent tanks into Georgia.

The Obama Administration then suggested a “reset” and created a commission to strengthen and expand security cooperation between us and Russia. Russian special forces were trained by US special forces, Russian officers received NATO training, and so on.

Yes, Putin was indeed trolling, and at a masterful level.

Kilcullen then moves into the period starting with the GWOT and leading up to today. Using a metaphor by former CIA Director James Woolsey, the author divides our enemies into “dragons” and “snakes.” The dragons are state actors (in the Westphalian sense) mainly China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The snakes are either collapsing states or non-state actors, principally Islamic terrorist organizations.

All throughout the GWOT, both the dragons and the snakes were keenly interested in our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they were doing two things: observing and evolving.

Observing other countrys' wars is nothing new: the French, British, and Prussians sent observers to watch the Civil War, with interest in tactics, strategies, and technologies. Currently, everyone is watching the Russia-Ukraine war, with keen attention paid to the use of commercial-quality drones and other tactics.

From these observations, two critical events serve to shape the evolution of military thought amongst both the dragons and the snakes: the US invasion of Iraq in 1992, and America’s difficulties in the asymmetric wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The 1992 invasion proved that the US was masterful at a particular style of war: conventional force-on-force battles with integrated land and air operations. China and Russia observed this and deduced that America cannot be dominated using this form of warfare. They also deduced something else: that Americans, in part due to the smashing success of the invasion, had constrained itself into believing that the type of war demonstrated during that invasion was the only type of warfare.

The second observation was the difficulty the US had in fighting insurgent forces in Afghanistan and Iraq as the GWOT switched from being a symmetric to an asymmetric conflict. This was also nothing new, as Russia saw in its own involvement in Afghanistan and during the Chechen Wars. What made the American experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq different was that it was America that was involved: the insurgents were able to hold their own against the same military that won so easily the pre-insurgent phase of the Iraq war. If Russia had suspicions that their losses in Afghanistan and the First Chechen War were due to military inadequacy, then America’s experience, with its preeminent military, dispelled those suspicions.

Faced with this, Russia and China had to evolve, to discover new types of warfare.

The route taken by Russia was to pursue “liminal warfare,” which adds cyber, economic, and psychological tools to the kinetic weapons endemic to conventional warfare. The idea is to operate using those new tools below a threshold (what Kilcullen calls the “response threshold”) that America and other Western nations would resort to conventional warfare. The bulk of the desired outcomes are achieved below this threshold (the luminal stages), and these desired goals are primarily to “shape” not only particular actions of the Unites States but also to provide cover or at least plausible deniability should the response threshold be crossed.

Kilcullen provides numerous examples of liminal warfare in action, the most important one being Russia’s capture of the Crimea in February 2014 – the world didn’t know what Russia was doing until it was too late.

Russia’s new approach to warfare is “vertical” in that the stages of war are cumulative, determined by the extent the US recognizes that clandestine activities occurring and our ability to determine who is performing these acts; Russia attempts to minimize the operational signatures of their operations, move the thresholds, and so on.

In contrast, Kilcullen portrays China’s approach as “horizontal.” China’s approach is to use “unrestricted warfare” as described by Qiao and Liang in their book with the same name. (Kilcullen notes that the title “Unrestricted Warfare” would be better translated as “Warfare Beyond Rules”). Unrestricted warfare uses several non-lethal tactics including international lawfare, economic aid warfare (think Belt and Road Initiative), drug war (fentanyl in particular) and so on. These tactics aren’t used in isolation, instead they use a “diversity of tactics” as Antifa would say. The number of available tactics is what gives unrestricted warfare its horizontal quality.

It is interesting to compare luminal and unrestricted warfare, but it is more illuminating to compare those forms of warfare with the way warfare is conceived in the West. The primary difference is that the West considers warfare to be strictly one involving military action, whereas liminal and unrestricted warfare involve both military and non-military forms of action.

We essentially have a mismatch in the concepts of warfare. There are three consequences to this mismatch:

1. Many of our actions (in particular, economic policies related to international trade) we think of as peace time competition but are considered to be warfare, especially in unrestricted warfare.
2. China and Russia can be engaging in warfare, but we don’t know it and we cannot respond militarily.
3. Because we don’t know we’re being attacked, we cannot predict escalation.

What can be done about all this? How do we fight the ascension of these dragons? With regards to foreign policy, Kilcullen offers several options:

1. Double down - continue interventionalist foreign policy, strengthen our military accordingly, and incorporate new technology along the lines of the Pentagon’s “Third Offset Strategy.”
2. Go with a “managed decline” approach (presumably only regarding foreign policy).
3. Take a Byzantine approach, meaning, delay until something better comes along.

Kilcullen’s recommendations on foreign policy are as follows:

“…return to offshore balancing, disengaging from permanent wars of occupation, ceasing any attempt to dominate rivals or spread democracy by force, and focusing instead on preserving and defending our long-term viability.”

This is very reasonable, except the part about “offshore rebalancing.” Continuing with his recommendations:

“Rather than dominating potential adversaries, our objectives can and should be much more modest: to prevent them from dominating us, to do so at an acceptable and sustainable long-term cost, and to avoid any action that harms the prosperity of and civilizational values that make our societies worth living in.”

Thus, by quitting our “forever wars,” we get a type of peace dividend: we get a chance to focus on societal resilience and attempt to reconcile our current domestic political differences.

D&S is extremely readable, even by someone lacking deep knowledge of foreign policy. The most valuable part for me was the discussion of liminal warfare. My only criticism is that it didn’t go into sufficient depth on liminal maneuvers. This is a minor complaint, and quite understandable given the text’s wide scope.

 

Bibliography

Chase, S. “Marketing Violence: A Closer Look at the “Diversity of Tactics” Slogan.” Minds of the Movement Blog, 2017. Retrieved 28 April 2024 from https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/blog_post/marketing-violence-closer-look-diversity-tactics-slogan/

Kilcullen, D. “The Evolution of Unconventional Warfare.” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 2 (no. 1), 2019.

Kilcullen, D. The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West. Oxford University Press, 2020.

Nadeau, R. "Justus Scheibert and International Observation of the Civil War". The Gettysburg Compiler, 2014. Retrieved 28 April 2024 from https://gettysburgcompiler.org/2014/12/12/justus-scheibert-and-international-observation-of-the-civil-war/

Qiao & Liang. Unrestricted Warfare. Shadow Lawn Press, 1999. Retrieved 28 April 2024 from https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf