The Opposite of Good Leadership

Military structures vary widely in how they empower — or fail to empower — their troops. While some forces cling to rigid, top-down command styles rooted in centralized control, others embrace a decentralized approach that unleashes the initiative of individual soldiers. This contrast is starkly evident when comparing the Soviet-influenced militaries of Russia and Ukraine with the principles of mission command, such as the German Auftragstaktik. The difference isn’t just theoretical — it’s a matter of battlefield outcomes.

Demoralized Ukranian Troops During the Occupation of Crimea
Image from "Ukrainian Troops Speak Out: Russian Roulette in Ukraine" (VICE News, March 16, 2014)

Empowerment is something that is not practiced in all militaries. Consider the Russian military: according to (Bowen, 2024), "the Russian military continues to operate with a Soviet-style centralized command. This command style at the tactical level often has contributed to the types of inflexible operations that contributed to previous failures and casualties."

Ukraine was a satellite of the USSR for years and apparently maintains a similar approach. Oleksandr Syrskyi, the current Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has a "preference for a tightly controlled leadership structure that favors loyalty and personal closeness over purely professional criteria" (n.a., 2024).

The consequences of this centralized command was demonstrated in Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014: interviews (VICE News, March 22, 2014) with Ukrainian sailors (VICE News, March 16, 2014) showed them to be demoralized and directionless when one of their commanders defected to Russia and the government in Ukraine was in disarray.

The opposite of this is mission command or what the Germans call Auftragstaktik (Widder, 2002). These two styles of command are not exactly the same (Klepper, 2024), but in both, the commander specifies the mission and timeframe, and the way to accomplish this is left to the individual troop's initiative. In the absence of orders, the troop knows what to do: locate, close with, and destroy the enemy, and break his stuff. This is the exact opposite of what the Ukrainian sailors were doing.

References

Bowen, A. (2024). "Russian Military Performance and Outlook." Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12606

Klepper, M. (2024). American Mission Command vs German Auftragstaktik. The Other Side of History Blog. https://the-other-side-of-history.blogspot.com/2024/01/american-mission-command-vs-german.html

n.a. (2024). "Oleksandr Syrskyi shifts Ukrainian military leadership to vertical approach." New Voice of Ukraine. https://english.nv.ua/nation/new-ukraine-s-armed-forces-chief-changed-the-command-process-of-the-army-50431480.html

VICE News. (2014, March 16). Ukrainian Troops Speak Out: Russian Roulette in Ukraine [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GH3HGvZlhhk

VICE News. (2014, March 22). Taking over a Ukrainian Base: Russian Roulette in Ukraine [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tBLs_AsBtjg

Widder, W. (2002). “Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung: Trademarks of German leadership” Military Review, September-October 2002. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot-Spots/docs/MC/MR-Sep-Oct-2002-Widder.pdf

Russian Deception Operations in the Annexation of Crimea

Introduction

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 involved a combination of physical deception and propaganda used to trick the Crimeans into accepting Russian occupation, and to mask Russia's intentions from the rest of Ukraine and the world at large. The operation made it appear that a national socialist movement was forming in Kyiv, and that this movement would threaten the Russians living in Crimea. This illusion worked to delegitimize the government in Kyiv as well as to present Russia as saviors to the people of Crimea.

In this essay, a decomposition of data analysis is first performed. Next, the conditions favoring Russian annexation are listed. After that, the physical deception operation and the information campaign are described. Finally, the overall operation is very briefly analyzed into what Russian military analysts call “maskirovka,” meaning “little masquerade.” Unless mentioned otherwise, all information is taken from (Kofman, M., et al., 2017).

Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula. From USMC Quantico

Decomposition of Data Analysis

Actors

People of Crimea - the people of Crimea were passive in the start of the Russian campaign, but later accepted Russian presence.

"Little Green Men" (LGMs) - also called the "polite people," they were Russian troops wearing unmarked uniforms. Before their identity as Russian troops was revealed, their role raised concerns amongst the Crimeans, using FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) about the conditions in Ukraine.

Local militias, biker gangs, Cossacks, and members of special police units - they had Russian backing but were set-up to be opponents of the LGMs.

News outlets in Crimea - spread the narrative of a national socialist movement forming in Kyiv and that this was a threat to the Russians living in Crimea.

Major Actions

Establish a narrative that a national socialist movement was gaining strength in Kyiv, and that this movement will be a threat to Crimeans. This was done by the presence of the LGMs, their manufactured opposition, and the propaganda coming from the news outlets.

Seizure of the Crimean Parliament on February 27, 2014, by fifty operators from Russia's KSO (Special Operations Forces) masquerading as a local militia. This action presented the appearance that Crimeans wanted protection from Russia.

Targets

Being primarily an operation of deception, the target was the beliefs of the Crimeans, to convince them that a nascent national socialist movement in Kyiv would be a threat to their well-being, and that Russia would be able to protect them.

Objectives

Build an air of legitimacy allowing Russia to gain control of the Crimean Peninsula without serious kinetic or non-violent resistance.

Effects

The physical deception operation (the LGMs and their “opponents”) and the information campaign allowed Russia to annex Crimea with little bloodshed, if any.

Preconditions

Russia leveraged several pre-existing conditions to facilitate the annexation. The shared language and history between Crimea and Russia as described by Vladimir Putin in (Putin, 2021) and (Carlson & Putin, 2024) enabled Russian operatives to blend in effortlessly with the local populace, aiding covert operations. Additionally, the long-standing presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet near Crimea meant that the sight of Russian naval forces was routine for Crimeans, reducing immediate suspicion when military activities escalated.

Concurrently, the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, which started just weeks before the annexation, required a heightened security presence from Russia, providing a convenient cover for military maneuvers. On February 26, Russia further masked its intentions with a snap inspection of its forces, using this as a tactic to disguise troop movements towards Crimea.

Adding to the narrative of a growing fascist movement was political turmoil in Kyiv, in which Viktor Yanukovych, the then-president of Ukraine, abandoned Kyiv, leaving Euromaidan protesters in charge.

Physical Deception Operations

In the lead-up to the annexation of Crimea, Russia employed physical deception operations aimed at shaping public perception both within Crimea and internationally. The primary goal was to create the illusion that a national socialist movement was burgeoning in Ukraine, and that this movement posed a significant threat to the Crimean population. This made it appear that Russian intervention was a protective measure against the fascists.

Central to this deception was the presence of the so-called "little green men" (LGMs), unidentified soldiers without insignia who appeared in Crimea. Their sudden and unexplained presence suggested an impending armed takeover, instilling fear and uncertainty among the local populace. This ambiguity was crucial to the narrative of an external threat or a coup in motion.

The operation was not limited to these soldiers alone; it involved a mix of local militias, biker gangs, Cossacks, and former members of the Berkut special police unit. These groups played roles in street-level intimidation and in reinforcing the image of a grassroots resistance movement against supposed Ukrainian nationalists. They thus operated as manufactured opposition.

A significant event in this campaign occurred on 27 February 2014, when fifty operators from Russia's KSO (Special Operations Forces) masqueraded as a local militia and seized the Crimean Parliament. By raising the Russian flag over the parliament building, they visually and symbolically asserted control, further solidifying the narrative of a local shift towards Russian allegiance.

To give a veneer of legitimacy to these actions, a referendum was quickly organized. This vote was presented as a democratic process where the Crimeans could voice their preference for joining Russia. This move was part of the strategy to make the annexation appear as a response to the will of the Crimean people rather than an act of aggression by Russia.

The Information Campaign

Russia launched an extensive propaganda campaign using local Russian-language broadcasters, with three main objectives: to discredit the newly established government in Ukraine, to heighten the sense of peril among Russians living in Ukraine, and to create an illusion of widespread support for Crimea's reunification with Russia. This campaign was strategically timed to precede, accompany, and follow the military operations in Crimea, ensuring a narrative that aligned with the physical actions on the ground.

The primary audience for this propaganda was the Russian public, with Crimean residents as a secondary target. The groundwork for this was already laid due to the popularity of Russian television in Crimea. On 9 March 2014, Russia escalated its control over information by shutting down Ukrainian TV channels, thereby monopolizing the narrative. Russian TV frequently labeled Oleksandr Turchynov’s new Ukrainian government, which had replaced Viktor Yanukovych's government, as a "fascist junta," framing the annexation as a necessary intervention to protect ethnic Russians from this supposed threat.

Conclusion

Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 utilized both pre-existing conditions and sophisticated deception tactics. By exploiting the cultural and historical ties, along with the familiar presence of its naval forces, Russia managed to execute its strategy with stealth and legitimacy in the eyes of those within Crimea, Ukraine, Russian, and international audiences.

The use of physical deception through LGMs and local groups created a perception of imminent threat, justifying intervention under the guise of protection. Further, Russia’s information campaign not only discredited the Ukrainian government but also painted the annexation as a popular and protective move. Thus, Russia secured Crimea before Ukraine and international forces could confront this annexation.

To describe the overall process Russia used to capture Crimea, (Bouwmeester, 2021) uses the term “maskirovka,” a strategy of deception the goal of which is to “destabilize command structures and to create ‘fog of war’” by fabricating “a manageable form of chaos.” He calls the propaganda component “active intelligence” - the “active” part here would be the use of the LGMs and the manufactured resistance against them. Maskirovka has been part of Russian military operations at least since World War 2 (Maier, 2016, p. 4), and the annexation of Crimea shows that it is still part of the Russian Military’s quiver.

References

Bouwmeester, A. J. H. (2021). “The art of deception revisited (part 2): The unexpected annexation of Crimea in 2014.” Militaire Spectator. https://militairespectator.nl/artikelen/art-deception-revisited-part-2-unexpected-annexation-crimea-2014

Carlson, T. & Putin, V. (2024, February 6). Exclusive: Tucker Carlson Interviews Vladimir Putin [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fOCWBhuDdDo

Kofman, M., et al. (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html

Maier, M. (2016). A little masquerade: Russia’s evolving employment of maskirovka. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1022096.pdf

Putin, V. (2021). Article by Vladimir Putin ”On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians“. President of Russia. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181

A Review of David Kilcullen’s The Dragons and the Snakes

Kilcullen’s “Dragons and Snakes,” hereafter abbreviated as “D&S,” is quite ambitious: it describes the evolution of warfare during and following the GWOT, arguing that state and non-state actors have undergone coevolution, with the end result that our adversaries’ warfighting techniques have changed in ways our military is currently unable to match.

D&S begins with a quick overview of the vast hinterland that was the time between the end of the Cold War and the earlier parts of the Global War on Terrorism. The important aspect of this overview is the relative sophistication of five of the dominant politicians of that era: Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Vladimir Putin.

When Putin came into office, he inherited the shambles that was Russia after the fall of the Soviets. To rebuild his country, he proposed to Clinton that Russia be allowed to join NATO. Other than the presidents and the prime minister, politicians at the time regarded that proposal somewhere on the spectrum between absurdity and incredulity. None of those politicians recognized what Putin was really doing: in popular vernacular, he was “trolling.”

Putin was taken seriously, with Tony Blair proposing to create a NATO-Russia Council to have Putin’s representatives meet with NATO leaders before making key decisions. Bush proposed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia. After all, Bush said that he “looked the man [Putin] in the eye. I found him very straightforward and trustworthy – I was able to get a sense of his soul.”

Eleven weeks later, Russia sent tanks into Georgia.

The Obama Administration then suggested a “reset” and created a commission to strengthen and expand security cooperation between us and Russia. Russian special forces were trained by US special forces, Russian officers received NATO training, and so on.

Yes, Putin was indeed trolling, and at a masterful level.

Kilcullen then moves into the period starting with the GWOT and leading up to today. Using a metaphor by former CIA Director James Woolsey, the author divides our enemies into “dragons” and “snakes.” The dragons are state actors (in the Westphalian sense) mainly China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The snakes are either collapsing states or non-state actors, principally Islamic terrorist organizations.

All throughout the GWOT, both the dragons and the snakes were keenly interested in our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they were doing two things: observing and evolving.

Observing other countrys' wars is nothing new: the French, British, and Prussians sent observers to watch the Civil War, with interest in tactics, strategies, and technologies. Currently, everyone is watching the Russia-Ukraine war, with keen attention paid to the use of commercial-quality drones and other tactics.

From these observations, two critical events serve to shape the evolution of military thought amongst both the dragons and the snakes: the US invasion of Iraq in 1992, and America’s difficulties in the asymmetric wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The 1992 invasion proved that the US was masterful at a particular style of war: conventional force-on-force battles with integrated land and air operations. China and Russia observed this and deduced that America cannot be dominated using this form of warfare. They also deduced something else: that Americans, in part due to the smashing success of the invasion, had constrained itself into believing that the type of war demonstrated during that invasion was the only type of warfare.

The second observation was the difficulty the US had in fighting insurgent forces in Afghanistan and Iraq as the GWOT switched from being a symmetric to an asymmetric conflict. This was also nothing new, as Russia saw in its own involvement in Afghanistan and during the Chechen Wars. What made the American experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq different was that it was America that was involved: the insurgents were able to hold their own against the same military that won so easily the pre-insurgent phase of the Iraq war. If Russia had suspicions that their losses in Afghanistan and the First Chechen War were due to military inadequacy, then America’s experience, with its preeminent military, dispelled those suspicions.

Faced with this, Russia and China had to evolve, to discover new types of warfare.

The route taken by Russia was to pursue “liminal warfare,” which adds cyber, economic, and psychological tools to the kinetic weapons endemic to conventional warfare. The idea is to operate using those new tools below a threshold (what Kilcullen calls the “response threshold”) that America and other Western nations would resort to conventional warfare. The bulk of the desired outcomes are achieved below this threshold (the luminal stages), and these desired goals are primarily to “shape” not only particular actions of the Unites States but also to provide cover or at least plausible deniability should the response threshold be crossed.

Kilcullen provides numerous examples of liminal warfare in action, the most important one being Russia’s capture of the Crimea in February 2014 – the world didn’t know what Russia was doing until it was too late.

Russia’s new approach to warfare is “vertical” in that the stages of war are cumulative, determined by the extent the US recognizes that clandestine activities occurring and our ability to determine who is performing these acts; Russia attempts to minimize the operational signatures of their operations, move the thresholds, and so on.

In contrast, Kilcullen portrays China’s approach as “horizontal.” China’s approach is to use “unrestricted warfare” as described by Qiao and Liang in their book with the same name. (Kilcullen notes that the title “Unrestricted Warfare” would be better translated as “Warfare Beyond Rules”). Unrestricted warfare uses several non-lethal tactics including international lawfare, economic aid warfare (think Belt and Road Initiative), drug war (fentanyl in particular) and so on. These tactics aren’t used in isolation, instead they use a “diversity of tactics” as Antifa would say. The number of available tactics is what gives unrestricted warfare its horizontal quality.

It is interesting to compare luminal and unrestricted warfare, but it is more illuminating to compare those forms of warfare with the way warfare is conceived in the West. The primary difference is that the West considers warfare to be strictly one involving military action, whereas liminal and unrestricted warfare involve both military and non-military forms of action.

We essentially have a mismatch in the concepts of warfare. There are three consequences to this mismatch:

1. Many of our actions (in particular, economic policies related to international trade) we think of as peace time competition but are considered to be warfare, especially in unrestricted warfare.
2. China and Russia can be engaging in warfare, but we don’t know it and we cannot respond militarily.
3. Because we don’t know we’re being attacked, we cannot predict escalation.

What can be done about all this? How do we fight the ascension of these dragons? With regards to foreign policy, Kilcullen offers several options:

1. Double down - continue interventionalist foreign policy, strengthen our military accordingly, and incorporate new technology along the lines of the Pentagon’s “Third Offset Strategy.”
2. Go with a “managed decline” approach (presumably only regarding foreign policy).
3. Take a Byzantine approach, meaning, delay until something better comes along.

Kilcullen’s recommendations on foreign policy are as follows:

“…return to offshore balancing, disengaging from permanent wars of occupation, ceasing any attempt to dominate rivals or spread democracy by force, and focusing instead on preserving and defending our long-term viability.”

This is very reasonable, except the part about “offshore rebalancing.” Continuing with his recommendations:

“Rather than dominating potential adversaries, our objectives can and should be much more modest: to prevent them from dominating us, to do so at an acceptable and sustainable long-term cost, and to avoid any action that harms the prosperity of and civilizational values that make our societies worth living in.”

Thus, by quitting our “forever wars,” we get a type of peace dividend: we get a chance to focus on societal resilience and attempt to reconcile our current domestic political differences.

D&S is extremely readable, even by someone lacking deep knowledge of foreign policy. The most valuable part for me was the discussion of liminal warfare. My only criticism is that it didn’t go into sufficient depth on liminal maneuvers. This is a minor complaint, and quite understandable given the text’s wide scope.

 

Bibliography

Chase, S. “Marketing Violence: A Closer Look at the “Diversity of Tactics” Slogan.” Minds of the Movement Blog, 2017. Retrieved 28 April 2024 from https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/blog_post/marketing-violence-closer-look-diversity-tactics-slogan/

Kilcullen, D. “The Evolution of Unconventional Warfare.” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 2 (no. 1), 2019.

Kilcullen, D. The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West. Oxford University Press, 2020.

Nadeau, R. "Justus Scheibert and International Observation of the Civil War". The Gettysburg Compiler, 2014. Retrieved 28 April 2024 from https://gettysburgcompiler.org/2014/12/12/justus-scheibert-and-international-observation-of-the-civil-war/

Qiao & Liang. Unrestricted Warfare. Shadow Lawn Press, 1999. Retrieved 28 April 2024 from https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf