Introduction
There is no doubt that the Russian Federation should be considered a near-peer competitor of the United States – they have a nuclear arsenal and a strong conventional military force that includes modern weapon systems such as UAVs and robotics (Grau & Bartles, 2016, pp. 371-380); they have considerable economic strength, and they exercise political influence on a global scale. Something missing from this list - and mostly from (Grau & Bartles, 2016) - are the methods and tools they use to achieve their political influence. Russia’s use of psychological operations to ideologically subvert their enemies is well known (Bezmenov, 2020), but they have a very potent tool in their asymmetric warfare arsenal: private military companies (PMCs).
This paper is roughly divided into two parts. The first part examines PMCs from a historical and economic perspective, showing that their ongoing existence makes sound financial sense. The second part counters this theoretical understanding with a description of how the Russians use PMCs. These usage patterns apply to all the PMCs employed by Russia, but the examples cited (mostly) refer to what was once Russia's premier PMC - the Wagner Group. This is followed by a description of a problem that can arise with PMCs: rebellion. We conclude with an attempt to synthesize the disparities between the economic ideals and the gritty reality of PMCs as encountered by the Russians.
Characteristics of the Modern PMC
PMCs are nothing new on the world’s stage: in the form of mercenary armies, they date back at least to the First Punic War (264–241 BC) and have been in continuous use to the present day. In his classification and analysis of PMCs, P. W. Singer (2001) recognized the long history of mercenary forces, noting that the Dutch and English East Indies Companies commanded armies and navies larger than those in Europe - they were companies that had military departments. As time went on, this relation became inverted.
The crucial difference between modern PMCs and their mercenary ancestors is their organization: mercenary groups are loosely organized whereas modern PMCs are organized into corporations in part due to the privatization rush following the fall of the Soviet Union (Pałka, 2020). According to Singer (who uses privatized military firms (PMFs) instead of PMCs):
PMFs are hierarchically organized into incorporated and registered businesses that trade and compete openly on the international market, link to outside financial holdings, recruit more proficiently than their predecessors, and provide a wider range of military services to a greater variety and number of clients. Corporatization not only distinguishes PMFs from mercenaries and other past private military ventures, but it also offers certain advantages in both efficiency and effectiveness. (Singer, 2001, pp. 191)
One of the consequences of this is that PMCs compete on the open market, and they gain or lose customers based on their efficiency and effectiveness. This means that it is possible for them to advertise on the Internet, and it is possible for them to go out of business. For example, Singer (2001, p. 192) gives five examples of PMCs that have their own websites. Of these, four are apparently no longer in business and the fifth (Vinnell Corporation) is now a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman.
As of 2021, the Russian PMC industries consisted of somewhere between 10 and 15 known companies (Østensen & Bukkvoll, 2022, p. 133), and the resulting competition is extremely profitable for the individuals who work for these companies. For example (Østensen & Bukkvoll, 2022, p. 136, Table 1), a low-ranking regular contract soldier is paid 76,000 rubles (US $951) per month while stationed in Syria, and 30,000 rubles (US $376) per month at home. Compare this with a low-ranking Wagner soldier who is paid 120,000 rubles (US $1502) per month in Syria and 80,000 rubles (US $1001) per month while at home. There doesn't seem to be any reports of Wagner soldiers going unpaid, but there is a report of a woman who lost her husband in Syria having difficulty getting compensation (Roth, 2019).
The legitimacy of Russian PMCs and their fighters must be considered. For example, Wagner emerged during the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Initially, the name of this secretive group was unknown, but it was known that it was funded by a wealthy oligarch named Pavel Prigozhin.
As time went on, Wagner began training at two Russian military bases ordinarily used by the 10th Special Mission Brigade of GRU Spetsnaz (Katz, et. al., 2020). They were travelling on Russian Air Force transport aircraft (Rácz, 2020). Soon they were fighting alongside the Russian Army in Syria and Ukraine (Bowen, 2023, August 1), and their injuries were treated in Russian hospitals (Rácz, 2020).
By 4 November 2022, Wagner opened its headquarters at the PMC Wagner Center in Saint Petersburg. Larsen (2003) describes this evolution as a "normalization of discourse": what started as a shadowy organization ended with a Gazprom-built skyscraper (Altınbaş, 7 June 2023) whose purpose is to create “a comfortable environment for generating new ideas that would improve Russia’s defensive capacity” (Larsen, 2023, p. 420) - a description reminiscent of any number of Silicon Valley startups.
Classification of PMCs
As mentioned in the above quote from Singer, PMCs are not limited to kinetic operations but have expanded their service offerings into logistics and support, intelligence, training, and advising. Building on a typology devised by Singer (2001), Arnold (2019) proposes the following four-fold classification of PMCs: first, there are military support firms (MSFs) that offer logistics and sustainment. Next, there are military consulting firms (MCFs) that offer training and advising. Private security companies (PSCs) offer defense and protection services. Finally, PMCs are offensive forces.
This spectrum makes PMCs in the broad sense extremely attractive from a business standpoint, assuming that these services can be offered in a cost-effective manner. PMCs can provide support to a country’s military (like the way the US military outsources some support, sustainment, and intelligence functions), they can supplement the defensive operations, or they even supplement or replace the offensive capabilities of a country’s military.
Up to this point, PMCs are presented as legitimate and cost-effective corporations that pay their soldiers well. This is all very rosy, to the point of being something out of Murray Rothbard’s libertarian utopia (Rothbard, 1973) or Robert Nozick’s night-watchman state (Nozick, 1974). A much more accurate understanding of PMCs comes when we examine their strategic use.
Usage Patterns
The typology of private military forces outlined above explains the capabilities of PMCs. This does not address the ways PMCs are employed by the countries using them, however. Russia uses PMCs to project power with plausible deniability, to secure economic interests, and to expand their geopolitical interests. The PMCs provide training to the local military and build their capacity. The Kremlin uses PMCs to manipulate domestic and elite dynamics, and even magnify Russia’s interests in international organizations.
Power Projection with Plausible Deniability One of the primary roles of Russian PMCs is to extend Moscow’s military reach into regions where direct involvement would provoke international outrage or escalate tensions with the U.S. and NATO. From their nature as corporations, PMCs are economically conservative, therefore have a “low footprint.” On paper, PMCs can be hidden inside shell companies and complex contractual agreements. Through this, Russia maintains plausible deniability, allowing it to pursue its foreign policy objectives without implicating the Kremlin.
The best example of this is the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014: the use of “little green men” (LGMs) - which later turned out to be Wagner operatives - allowed Russia to wage an undeclared war while officially denying involvement. Combined with the power vacuum following the Revolution of Dignity, Wagner’s operations were so quick and so subtle that Crimea was captured in about 4 weeks with only a handful of causalities. Internationally, it was not known who was behind the operation, until it was too late.
Securing Economic Interests Moscow uses PMCs to expand its economic footprint, especially in resource-rich but politically unstable regions. The PMCs stabilize a region in return for access to oil and mineral rights. For example, in the Central African Republic, Wagner has protected mining operations and trained local forces since 2018. In return, Russian firms were able to access gold and diamond deposits. Similarly, PMCs supported Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in return for gold mining rights.
Expanding Geopolitical Influence In regions where Western influence has waned, Russia uses PMCs to position itself as a viable alternative to Western security partnerships. Russia has deployed PMCs to Mali, Mozambique, Madagascar, and other African countries, stepping-in where U.S. or French influence has declined. In Mali, for example, Wagner replaced French counterterrorist forces in 2021, opposing Islamist forces while obtaining to mineral resources.
Training and Capacity Building Russia uses PMCs as force multipliers by training local militaries, thereby extending Russia’s influence without a large troop presence. This strengthens the local government while embedding Russian interests into the local security apparatus.
Conducting Hybrid Warfare and Psychological Operations PMCs engage in intelligence gathering, political manipulation, and psychological operations. The goal here is to destabilize countries, flame discord among adversaries, and push pro-Russian narratives.
Managing Domestic, Elite, and Global Dynamics PMCs like Wagner frequently recruit foreign troops or prisoners. By doing this, the domestic repercussions of high causalities or a failed operation are minimized. Lucrative contracts to PMCs are given to loyal oligarchs, thereby rewarding them while ensuring that their actions are aligned with Russia’s agenda. Finally, by supporting allies or destabilizing adversaries, PMCs magnify Russia’s voice in the UN and other international organizations.
The Wagner Rebellion
The above-listed usage patterns all come from the PMCs' employers. There are, in addition, problems that come from within the PMCs themselves. Some of those issues (allegations of human rights violations, war crimes, etc.) are not limited to PMCs by any means. One problem specific to PMCs is how they relate to their employers.
The relation between Russia's military and PMCs such as Wagner has always been nebulous. Russia has allowed Wagner to train using its military bases, some military decorations have been awarded to Wagner employees, and so on. The real problems with PMCs come from questions over their effectiveness and their loyalty. Most famously, Niccolò Machiavelli wrote in The Prince:
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. (Machiavelli, 2024)
This “destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is [deferred]” is demonstrated in Wagner’s role in the annexation of Crimea: there was no wanton destruction, and the operation succeeded with very minimal fatalities. Modern eyes see this as a feature, while Machiavelli perceives this as a bug, but it must be remembered that he was penning advice to new princes.
What certainly is a bug is the potential for disloyalty on the part of mercenary armies, or modern PMCs, implied by that quote. These “armies for hire” have a mixed record when it comes to rebellions. The First Punic War immediately transitioned into the Mercenary War (241 - 237 BC), where the mercenaries employed by Carthage mutinied over unpaid wages (Hoyos, 2000). Other mercenary forces have magnificent histories, such as the Hessians during the American Revolutionary War; others had sometimes mutinied, such as the condottieri leading mercenary armies of the Middle Ages that Machiavelli was (perhaps) denouncing. Wagner fell into the latter category with its rebellion in 2023. The following description comes from the reporting of Darya Korsunskaya and Guy Faulconbridge (2023) and Mikael Pir-Budagyan and the RM Staff (2023).
The Wagner Rebellion was a dispute between Yevgeny Prigozhin (Wagner’s founder and leader), Sergei Shoigu (Russian Defense Minister), and Valery Gerasimov (Chief of the General Staff). Prigozhin accused Shoigu and Gerasimov of corruption, incompetence, and withholding ammunition and artillery from Wagner. Criticisms of this form may be common inside the Russian military, but what was uncommon was the way Prigozhin leveled these charges: he used social media, in particular Telegram.
The dispute came to a head when the Russian Ministry of Defense required all PMC fighters to sign contracts directly with the Russian military, placing them under the command of Shoigu. Prigozhin saw this as an attempt to dismantle Wagner.
Prigozhin announced on 23 June 2023 via Telegram that he was launching a “march for justice” against Russian military leadership. He claimed it was not a coup against Vladimir Putin but rather a protest against the Ministry of Defense’s mismanagement of the war in Ukraine. An estimated 25,000 Wagner fighters began moving from eastern Ukraine into Russia.
That night, Wagner forces seized control of military facilities in Rostov-on-Don, a major logistical hub for the Ukraine war. They did this without significant resistance. It was unclear whether the Russian Federal Security Service was aware of this plot (Bowen, 2023, June 28).
The next morning, an armed Wagner convoy began advancing towards Moscow, again encountering little resistance. Security forces set-up roadblocks, and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov – a Putin loyalist – deployed his own forces to confront Prigozhin's. Moscow was placed on heightened alert. Prigozhin again claimed that his goal was to hold Shoigu and Gerasimov accountable, but Prigozhin’s actions suggested a challenge to Putin.
By the afternoon of 24 June, President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus had negotiated a deal with Prigozhin. Under this agreement, Prigozhin would stand down and withdraw in exchange for amnesty for himself and his fighters. Further, Prigozhin would relocate to Belarus, and the fighters who joined him on this march could either join the Russian military, return to civilian life, or follow him into exile.
Prigozhin went to Belarus but returned to Russia within weeks. Two months after the start of the mutiny, on 23 August 2023, Prigozhin died in a mysterious plane crash along with several Wagner commanders. This event decapitated Wagner, and Russia quickly moved to dismantle it: heavy military equipment was transferred to the Russian armed forces, and Wagner fighters were absorbed into the Russian military and redeployed to Ukraine under new command, led by individuals like Andrei Troshev, a former Wagner employee appointed by Putin.
Wagner's presence in Africa has been replaced by Africa Corps (Faulkner, 2024), which has been called “a rebranded Wagner Group” (Lechner & Eledinov, 2024). As with Ukraine, this could simply be a nationalization of Wagner's activities, but Africa Corps was certainly on a short leash. Wagner is no longer an independent force, and now exists only as a reminder that Russia is willing to use PMCs as proxy forces.
Conclusion
PMCs represent an economically attractive way to project power, and the Russian Federation isn't afraid to use them. Their actions in Crimea and various African nations prove that they can be effective foreign policy tools, if used correctly. The Wagner Rebellion shows that success is not guaranteed, and that PMCs can be dangerous to the countries that hire them: the Russians fed Wagner, yet they still bit the hand.
Still, PMCs are too valuable to be abandoned (Jefferies, 2002), and Russia continues sponsoring PMCs in the Middle East and Africa (Bryjka, 2023). This would suggest that Russia – and indeed all nations – devise criteria under which PMCs should be employed. If anything is to be learned from Russia's experience with Wagner, it is that like any military or quasi-military force, an understanding of that force’s tactics, operations, and strategies are not sufficient – the way that force is used politically must be considered.
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