Review of “The Military We Have Vs. The Military We Need”

Introduction

In his 2020 paper “The Military We Have Vs. The Military We Need,” Gregory Foster[1] appears to make a reasonable suggestion: that our military should be geared to missions it will be likely to encounter in the next few years instead of fighting highly unlikely conventional conflicts with China or Russia. The missions he envisions do not fall into the military’s purview, however, and the overall future direction he proposes for the military would not pass muster either against contemporary National Defense Strategy documents.

The 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, received 29 M1A2 Abrams tanks, Sept. 26, 2014, at Fort Hood, Texas. Photo by U.S. Army

Summary

Gregory Foster’s "The Military We Have Vs. The Military We Need" begins with his reading of the 2018 National Defense Strategy[2], claiming it represents the "intellectual stagnation that pervades the military." He summarizes it through four points:

1. The U.S. military has been emasculated and "rendered largely impotent by forcing it to focus on frivolous, tangential threats and missions such as countering violent extremism."[3]
2. The U.S. military is in danger of being replaced as the world's premiere fighting force.
3. Our current and future strategic situation is defined by great power competition (GPC).
4. To compete in this era of GPC, our organizational, doctrinal, and technological methods must emphasize lethality.

Foster derides all this as a rehashing of Cold War ideology and is "woefully and dangerously outmoded, outdated, self-serving, self-deluding, and self-perpetuating such received truths are."[4] Our true adversaries are “pandemic disease, cyberattacks, climate-induced natural disasters, and violent, rogue-actor extremism." These choices of "frivolous, tangential threats and missions" fit into a framework for military history that Foster proposes. He divides military history into four phases:

Hot war - practiced since antiquity, the use of force played a significant role in the conduct of statecraft.

Cold war - defining characteristic was detente, the avoidance of using force against a major power. Direct force was replaced by the use of proxies such as in the Korean and Vietnam Wars

New war - this is our current historical state, in which non-military power and non-traditional uses of the military offer the most promise for success but must struggle for legitimacy against the forces of tradition and stagnation. New war carries with it an imperative to redefine what militaries properly do.

The trajectory of all this is a future historical phase which Foster calls "No War" which he insists we should all be seeking. In this future state, militaries as currently conceived are made obsolete. We are prevented from getting this future state by a combination of tradition, the military-industrial complex, and the properties of a well-functioning (conventional) military - it is necessary to add that adjective because Foster imagines a different type of military as described below.

The primary problem we face, Foster insists, is that our military is not adapted to the real threats - the military we have is not the military we need. The wars we face are asymmetric and therefore, Foster asserts, are inherently unwinnable. In addition, "pandemics, natural disasters, cyberattacks, and random acts of violent extremism are very real, very serious, very deadly, and very demanding."

The issue then becomes: should we prepare for conventional wars with Russia or China, which are unlikely, or the "wars" (his quotes) we will face?

Fundamental to this is a question Foster asks: "what the military’s role properly ought to be: to serve itself (in the manner of a self-interested interest group); to serve the regime in power; to serve the state; or to serve society and even humanity (as grandiose as that might sound)?"

Foster concludes with (more) denigration of our current military and describes what the military should be: "The military we need would be quite the opposite: light, constructive, predominantly nonlethal, precise, noncombat-oriented, manpower-dominant, tailored, multilaterally-capable/-dependent, reassuring, de-escalatory, affordable, and sustainable. It would be a strategically effective force, designed to respond to a robust array of complex, most-frequently-occurring emergencies – peacekeeping, nation-building, humanitarian assistance, disaster response – that ultimately contribute most demonstrably to the overarching normative strategic aim of enduring global peace."

Analysis

First, we must address Foster's four criticisms of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS):

1. That the military was emasculated and forced to focus on frivolous missions is true, and Foster goes on to propose more frivolous missions.
2. The U.S. can indeed be replaced as the world's premiere fighting force, but through two methods: spending by a near-peer power or by our own neglect.
3. The NDS is quite flexible in who our military competitors will be and allows for both great powers as well as non-state actors and other competitors acting asymmetrically. It also addresses cyber warfare and the threats posed by hackers.
4. Yes, the NDS focuses on lethality, which is what any good military should be.

While Foster is correct in stating that the military required by the NDS is enormously expensive; he proposes to replace this with an enormously expensive public works project addressing the problems of "pandemics, natural disasters, cyberattacks, and random acts of violent extremism."[5]

One of Foster's criticisms of the U.S. military is that "[u]nilateralism (and the attendant felt need for self-sufficiency) dominates multilateralism (with the attendant imperative for collective decision-making and action)." [6]This is blatantly false, as demonstrated by not only the body of doctrine involving partner nations, annual multinational training operations, and operations where we went out of our way to build coalitions, such as the 2003 Coalition of the Willing built in preparation of the Iraq war. Indeed, strengthening alliances and attracting new partners is one of the goals of the NDS.

Foster describes the wars we face today as "entirely wars of choice. No existing conflict, nor any reasonably to be anticipated, demands our involvement. And the wars we face are far removed from the total wars of the distant past and even farther removed from an idealized state of stable peace we have yet to seriously pursue, much less achieve."[7] How did we get to this condition where we only face wars of choice? Will the changes he proposes allow us to only fight wars of choice? Doesn't Foster know about this thing called "deterrence?" Foster also does not consider the time needed to rebuild the military should the U.S. need to pursue one of these older types of wars.

The idea that "pandemics, natural disasters, cyberattacks, and random acts of violent extremism" necessarily require military solutions is not proven. Further, does this cover pandemics released as biological weapons? What about pandemics or epidemics that seem to follow the election cycle?

Are asymmetric wars inherently unwinnable? Examination of the historical record shows that asymmetrical warfare has been practiced in some form since at least the time of Sun Tzu - his Art of War is applicable to both symmetric and asymmetric forms of warfare. Further, there are numerous examples of asymmetric wars being won by the defending nation. Finally, authors such as Mao Tse-Tung claim that asymmetric war can and should convert to symmetric war, as demonstrated by the Communist Revolution in China.

Is the "No War" historical state achievable? Is it even desirable? Or is it the case, as George Santayana wrote, that “only the dead have seen the end of war.” Foster does not answer these questions.

Foster’s Proposed Course of Action

Much like his analysis of military history pointing towards a "No War" end state, his conception of a future military is also pointing towards a course of action, but what? The answer is not in "The Military We Have Vs. The Military We Need" but rather in an earlier paper Foster authored and was published in CounterPunch[8]. During the "No War" phase, traditional militaries will become obsolete, and their main activity will be to "demilitarize the military."[9]

The paper in CounterPunch does not address why asymmetric wars are unwinnable, but Foster does write: "Douglas MacArthur famously said, “There is no substitute for victory.” Today there is no possibility of victory."[10] Another of his papers, published in Salon[11], also does not answer this assertion. The Salon article does explicitly state that demilitarizing would involve both nuclear disarmament as also general and complete non-nuclear disarmament.

Conclusion

Foster, in "The Military We Have Vs. The Military We Need," besides seriously mischaracterizing the NDS, also seems to be unaware of the concepts of deterrence and the doctrine of joint operations. His idea of non-military missions is covered in the March 2021 “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.”[12] His plans for demilitarizing the military will not be possible even in the 2022 "National Defense Strategy,"[13] however.

Footnotes

[1] Foster, "The Military We Have Vs. The Military We Need."
[2] Department of Defense, "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America."
[3] Foster, "The Military We Have Vs. The Military We Need."
[4] All quotes for the remainder of this section are from Foster, "The Military We Have Vs. The Military We Need."
[5] Foster, "The Military We Have Vs. The Military We Need."
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Foster, "Demilitarizing the Military."
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Foster, G. "Let's demilitarize the military.”
[12] The White House, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.”
[13] Department of Defense, "2022 National Defense Strategy."

Bibliography

Department of Defense. "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America." 2018. Last retrieved 4 September 2024 from https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

Department of Defense. "2022 National Defense Strategy." 27 October 2022. Last retrieved 4 September 2024 from https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF

Foster, G. "Demilitarizing the Military." CounterPunch. 19 June 2015. Retrieved 4 September 2024 from https://www.counterpunch.org/2015/06/19/demilitarizing-the-military/

Foster, G. "Let's demilitarize the military: The Pentagon may pose the single greatest threat to our democracy." Salon. 16 March 2016. Retrieved 5 September 2024 from https://www.salon.com/2016/03/16/lets_demilitarize_the_military_partner/

Foster, G. "The Military We Have Vs. The Military We Need." Defense One. 28 June 2020. Retrieved 3 September 2024 from https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/06/military-we-have-vs-military-we-need/166470/

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning. 16 June 2017. Retrieved 3 September 2024 from https://www.airforcespecialtactics.af.mil/Portals/80/prototype/assets/joint-pub-jpub-5-0-joint-planning.pdf

The White House. “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.” March 2021. Last retrieved 3 September 2024 from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf

Review of “A Cloud-Based Supply Chain Management System"

Abstract

This is a review of “A cloud-based supply chain management system: effects on supply chain responsiveness” by Giannakis, Spanaki, and Dubey. Their paper illustrates the shortcomings of traditional enterprise software in the face of modern supply chains, supply chains that involve multiple partners working collaboratively to regularly produce goods and services. To address these deficiencies, they design a cloud-based supply chain management system.

This review begins with an overview of the major concepts used in the paper (supply chain responsiveness and cloud computing), then examines the inadequacies that Giannakis, Spanaki, and Dubey find in traditional enterprise software. We next examine their architecture for a cloud-based alternative and verify that their proposed system does satisfy and enhance the three criteria they claim makes for a responsive supply chain. We demonstrate how supply chain management theory applies, and then conclude with the managerial implications of the findings in that paper.

Authors’ Purpose

Modern supply chains are no longer single-company affairs, and instead frequently involve competing suppliers of materiel and services. Giannakis, Spanaki, and Dubey seek to answer the following two questions about this situation. First, are enterprise IT solutions for supply chain management sufficient to supervise these modern supply chains with extension into the enterprise? Second, can cloud-based supply chain management systems resolve any of the shortcomings of enterprise IT systems?

Their answer to the first question is no: IT solutions that are not usable by external participants in the supply chain do not support the desired goal of a responsive supply chain, the main difficulty being that supply chain participants do not have visibility into the supply chain.

The answer to the second question must be justified by at least a description of a cloud-based supply chain management system. The authors do this by presenting a somewhat detailed architecture of such a system. They then show that their proposed architecture addresses all the criteria for a supply chain to be responsive.

Background Concepts

The goal which Giannakis, Spanaki, and Dubey seek to achieve is supply chain responsiveness (SCR), which can be defined as the speed at which a supply chain can deliver demand and can be measured in terms of the time needed to fulfill orders. (Quigg, 2022).

Software systems available to a single company, such as enterprise resource planning (ERP) software, all fail to satisfy at least one of those qualities. ERP and similar solutions do not allow the multiple participants in a modern supply to be interoperable – the systems fail to make relevant information visible to the participants.

Cloud computing moves the creation and maintenance of computing resources to a specialized department or, more commonly, to a third party. Moving to a third party allows for the commercialization of networks, servers, applications, storage, etc., so that they can be leased and released by users on-demand. Cloud service features include on-demand services, resource pooling, rapid elasticity (change in size or capacity on an as-needed basis), broad network access, and measured and rate-limited service. The benefits of all this include dynamic scalability, outsourced management, and lower total cost of ownership.

The business model of cloud computing involves service providers (owners of the cloud infrastructure such as Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, etc.), customers (users), and brokers (e.g., AWS resellers who provide additional support). Thus, a customer may use a service provider directly, or use a broker for specialized consulting, additional technical support, etc.

The services provided by cloud service providers can be grouped into three broad layers: SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS. Software as a service (SaaS) involves licensing software and making it available via subscription. Platform as a service (PaaS) is a complete development and deployment environment that allows users to execute and manage custom applications. Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) is on-demand cloud-based hosting of servers, network resources, and storage. Cloud service providers can certainly run a wide variety of software applications, but the application type that most interests Giannakis, Spanaki, and Dubey is cloud-based supply chain management (C-SCM).

Summary of Article and its Context

After defining the criteria a responsive supply chain must possess, Giannakis, Spanaki, and Dubey evaluate enterprise software in light of the fact that contemporary supply chains involve multiple suppliers of goods and services. They come to the decision that ERP and other enterprise applications are not up to the task, the primary weakness being that the applications do not provide visibility into the supply chain partners.

The alternative they propose is a cloud-based solution. To demonstrate this, they propose an architecture for this solution. There are six separate modules in their system.

First is a pool of traditional SCM applications, deployed as loosely coupled services, each designed according to a service-oriented architecture paradigm. Second is one or more databases for storing relevant information about orders, inventories, etc. Next is a business process management system (BPM) that allows business rules to be enforced and reconfigured as needed. Fourth is one or more business intelligence applications which provide visibility into the supply chain in the form of dashboards and reports. All of these are connected using an enterprise service bus (ESB) for signaling low inventory warnings, new orders, etc. Finally, there is an application developer’s kit that allows software developers to modify the code. As shown in the following diagram from (Giannakis, Spanaki, & Dubey, 2019), modules will exist in the three levels of cloud architecture: as software as a service, platform as a service, and infrastructure as a service:

Giannakis, Spanaki, and Dubey then demonstrate that their architecture permits visibility into the supply chain (via SCM applications and business intelligence applications), rapid detection and response to risks (via the database and BPM rules operating on it), and the ability to adapt to demand uncertainties (via SCM applications, the ESB, and ultimately the application developers’ kit). Thus, the three qualities they claim make a supply chain responsive are satisfied.

Application of Relevant Supply Chain Management Theory

As stated above, Giannakis, Spanaki, and Dubey wish to apply cloud computing to bring about supply chain responsiveness (SCR), something they claim ERP solutions have failed to accomplish. SCR can be measured in terms of the rate at which a supply chain allows orders to be fulfilled (Quigg, 2022), but this can be difficult to measure when a supply chain produces products/outcomes of widely varying complexity, or when a statistically insignificant number of products are produced. A different approach is needed.

In the literature reviewed in (Giannakis, Spanaki, & Dubey, 2019), three qualities of a responsive supply chain are identified: visibility of information, rapid detection and response to supply chain risks, and flexibility to adapt to demand uncertainties by altering operations, capabilities, and strategic objectives.

While a single company may have complete visibility into its supply chain, a modern supply chain involves multiple providers of materiel and services, and visibility is not always available to all the participants. Visibility into a supply chain is fundamental to the other two qualities.

For a supply chain to continue operations, a system must be in place to rapidly detect risks and overcome them. Detecting and overcoming risks involves visibility into the supply chains and stock levels of partner companies, at least.

Finally, responding to demand uncertainties can involve increasing or decreasing orders from supply chain participants, increasing or decreasing the number of competing participants, or changing expectations. Visibility into supply chain participants again is crucial.

Conclusion - Managerial Implications

Supply chain responsiveness is crucial to a company’s success, since rapidly and consistently fulfilling customer orders is the determining factor of success. Giannakis, Spanaki, and Dubey show that traditional software solutions such as ERP do not provide visibility into modern supply chains, which involve multiple providers. The alternative they propose, a cloud-based supply chain management (C-SCM) system, addresses the problems of ERP systems that can degrade a supply chain’s responsiveness.

Creating a C-SCM first involves choosing a cloud service provider, which can be either internal to the company or a separate provider dedicated to the task. There are advantages and disadvantages to either approach.

Hosting a C-SCM internally provides the greatest control of the company’s data, since the data is kept within the company’s own servers. The primary disadvantage to internal hosting is that supply chain partners must be granted access to the company’s network, and partner companies must grant access to their own networks as well. Thus, security is a major concern here, and internal controls must be expanded and tightened.

Internal hosting will likely require that new hardware be purchased, because available servers may not be sufficiently powerful to operate a C-SCM system. Using separate servers increases network security because payroll and other systems not part of the C-SCM system will be hosted on different servers.

Using a cloud service provider has the advantages that no hardware need be purchased, and that the service provider has automated security and backup systems in place. The disadvantage is that, depending on the service provider’s terms of service, the company no longer owns its own data, as demonstrated by recent events at Adobe (Kaput, 2024). Also, migrating from cloud to cloud is not an easy task and is actively discouraged by cloud service providers.

The cost of operating a cloud service must also be considered. With an internally hosted C-SCM, the responsibility of maintaining the hardware, network, and software all falls on the company itself. Utilities for performing periodic backups must be configured, periodic security checks must be performed, and any security vulnerabilities must be addressed. Thus, the cost of internal hosting not only involves the initial hardware cost but also the cost of network engineers and security architects, and their salaries are dictated by Amazon, Microsoft, etc. Salaries for network engineers and basic services provided by security architects are either covered in the cloud service provider’s fees or are paid for on an as-needed basis.

A cost that remains the same when either internally hosting or using a cloud service provider is the software development cost. In both cases, software development and QA teams are necessary to write and validate the C-SCM system’s code.

Moving from an enterprise supply chain management system to a C-SCM is a daunting task, fraught with potential security vulnerabilities and cost overruns. The advantages a C-SCM provides to a modern supply chain in terms of insight and visibility into the supply chain can outweigh those difficulties.

 

References

Christopher, M. (2011). Logistics and Supply Chain Management (4th ed). Prentice Hall. Retrieved 1 September 2024 from https://www.ascdegreecollege.ac.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Logistics_and_Supply_Chain_Management.pdf

Giannakis, M., Spanaki, K., & Dubey, R. (2019). “A cloud-based supply chain management system: effects on supply chain responsiveness.” Journal of Enterprise Information Management, 32(4), 585-607. Retrieved 1 September 2024 from https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JEIM-05-2018-0106/full/html

Kaput, M. (2024). “Adobe’s Controversial AI Policy Faces Fierce Backlash.” Marketing Artificial Intelligence Institute. Retrieved 1 September 2024 from https://www.marketingaiinstitute.com/blog/adobe-terms-of-use

Quigg, B. (2022). Supply Chain Management (1st ed). McGraw-Hill Create. https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781307866025

Grappling with Great Power Competition

Following the end of the Cold War, Pentagon war planners shifted to regional conflicts. During Iraq and Afghanistan, strategic planning was replaced by operational and tactical planning even at the level of day-to-day combat. With the reemergence of Great Power Competition (GPC), it is necessary to revert to global planning to set the conditions necessary for peace with peer competitors.

As discussed in Archuleta and Gerson’s “Fight Tonight”[1], war plans depend on three inputs: perceived and capable threats, the desired policy end state, and resource constraints.

Since the "setting of global conditions" must work across the continuum of competition (cooperation, competition below threshold of armed conflict, and armed conflict), it makes sense to consider the desired end state for three types of competition separately.

For lack of better terms, the competitor nation or non-state actor will be called "friend with benefits," "frenemy," or "enemy" depending on their place on the continuum. Actions the US Military takes are designed prevent or address armed conflict, which means moving the relationship with the competitor away from enemy status to frenemy or even friend status.

For each of these three types of relations, interactions we have with them must not only be appropriate for the current relation type, but also relevant to the next step on the continuum of competition.

For example, joint training exercises provide an opportunity to appraise the friendly nation's military capabilities for several reasons: first, this information would be useful if the US and the friendly nation should need to cooperate in a multinational military operation; second, to handle the situation where relations with the friendly nation should decay (so the formerly friendly nation becomes a frenemy). Bonds created by the joint training can help mend any move away from cooperation, however.

This addresses friends and frenemies. For enemies, the goal is to deter or address armed conflict. This is a third purpose for joint training exercises: they are shows of force, and also let the enemy know that we have friends (cooperative nations).

To get a very rough initial draft of a war plan, we run the area of interest through this framework. For example, in the Indo-Pacific Area of Operations, the primary perceived threat is China, with North Korea playing a secondary role. The desired policy end state would be containment. Joint training exercises with partners in the region, like Japan and India, serve as a deterrent to expansion. The resource constraints are the available U. S. military capabilities[2] in the region (U.S. Pacific Fleet and its component parts, Diego Garcia and other bases, etc.) plus the capabilities of friendlies.

B1-B Lancer departing from Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia, 7 October 2021
Photo by Senior Airman Rebeca M. Luquin, U.S. Air Force

These are regional conditions for the Indo-Pacific AO. Extending this to global conditions (as recommended in Archuleta and Gerson[3]) involves doing the same sort of things in other parts of the world, especially for nations that are friendly or potentially friendly with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Does this accomplish GPC containment through deterrence?

China practices "unrestricted warfare" which involves military, economic, diplomatic, propagandistic, and other approaches to control other nations[4]. Meanwhile, Russia often practices “liminal warfare” which means they shape outcomes to their advantage using military and nonmilitary methods while staying below the threshold of armed conflict[5].

Maintaining bases or enacting treaties granting the right of entry into maritime ports raises the standard of living of friendly countries. This leads to trade agreements, mutual assistance, and diplomatic relations. This helps to counter the unusual types of warfare practiced by China and Russia but is perhaps not sufficient since China and Russia aren’t economically contained[6].

Footnotes

[1] Archuleta & Gerson, “Fight Tonight: Reenergizing the Pentagon for Great Power Competition.”
[2] Nicastro, L. “U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the IndoPacific.”
[3] Archuleta & Gerson, “Fight Tonight: Reenergizing the Pentagon for Great Power Competition.”
[4] Qiao & Liang. Unrestricted Warfare.
[5] Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes.
[6] Spalding, R. War Without Rules.

Bibliography

Archuleta, B. & Gerson, J. “Fight Tonight: Reenergizing the Pentagon for Great Power Competition.” Joint Force Quarterly 100. 17 February 2021. Retrieved 29 August 2024 from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2498193/fight-tonight-reenergizing-the-pentagon-for-great-power-competition/

Kilcullen, D. The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West. Oxford University Press, 2020.

Nicastro, L. “U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the IndoPacific: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service. 6 June 2023. Retrieved 29 August 2024 from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47589

Qiao & Liang. Unrestricted Warfare. Shadow Lawn Press, 1999.

Spalding, R. War Without Rules: China's Playbook for Global Domination. Sentinel Press, 2022.

Review of “The Role of Supply Chain Resilience”

Abstract

This is a review of “The role of supply chain resilience to relationships supply chain risk management culture and firm performance during disruption” by Akbar and Isfianadewi, which examines the relationship between supply chain risk management culture, three approaches to recovering from disruptive events, and the impact of all this on corporate performance. The research by Akbar and Isfianadewi takes the form of a statistical analysis of survey responses by owners or managers of Indonesian apparel manufacturers. It takes place in the context of the COVID-19 plague.

We begin with definitions of needed concepts, then explain the dependencies between those concepts as statistically demonstrated in the paper. We show how supply chain management theory applies, then conclude with managerial implications of the findings in that paper.

 

Authors’ Purpose

Akbar and Isfianadewi seek to examine the relationships between supply chain risk management culture, the various ways a company can successfully respond to adverse events, and overall company performance. After defining the relevant terms and explaining three ways a company can adapt to and overcome extremely unfavorable events, they inquire about the dependencies between supply chain risk management culture and those three ways of recovering from adverse events. To analyze the dependencies, they develop a conceptual model and propose 10 hypotheses that can (partially) test this model. To confirm or reject the hypotheses, the authors surveyed several managers and owners working in a particular segment of the Indonesian apparel industry during the time of COVID-19. The survey responses are analyzed, and the results indeed confirm the conceptual model.

Background Concepts

The authors define supply chain resilience as “the ability of the supply chain to return to its original or more desirable state following a disruption and to avoid failure.” An expanded definition of this term is as follows: supply chain resilience is the ability of a company to prepare for and respond to various types of disruptions and to quickly recover to pre-disruption levels. Methods for doing this include maintaining a buffer inventory, use multiple product suppliers and multiple logistics providers, trace dependencies among relevant suppliers, and so on. (Abeysekara et al, 2019).

Supply chain risk management (SCRM) is the process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating threats to the smooth operation of a supply chain. The immediate goal of SCRM is to improve supply chain resilience, resulting in continuity of operations in the face of disruptions as well as protecting the company’s financial well-being and reputation.

Supply chain risk management culture (SCRMC) is the values and practices a company employs to manage risks to its supply chain, thereby minimizing operational interruptions. A company with a strong SCRMC is not only able to anticipate and face disruptions but also to learn from those disruptions.

Four main activities and processes are necessary for rapid recovery of a company following a disruption: re-engineering, agility, collaboration, and the above-defined SCRMC. (Kumar & Anbanandam, 2019)

Re-engineering a supply chain requires a base understanding of the existing supply chain, supplier risk awareness, and an assessment of the trade-offs between efficiency and redundancy. (Christopher & Peck, 2004). The result of this re-engineering is a more resilient supply chain.

In the context of supply chain resilience, agility is the ability to respond to disruptions promptly, quickly, and efficiently. In the same context, collaboration is the ability to overcome barriers between supply chain partners, including informational barriers.

Application of Supply Chain Management Theory to the Paper

The most fundamental fact of supply chain management theory is that a company’s operation is initiated and continued because of a functioning supply chain. This fact is demonstrated in the paper by the importance of making a supply chain resilient as well as fallback procedures for when the supply chain fails.

The theory outlined in the paper is applicable to both anticipatory (push) and responsive (pull) business models. By allowing for collaboration among suppliers of goods and services that are part of the supply chain, the theory applies to a generalized supply chain model with extension into the enterprise where there is the very real possibility of competing suppliers of materiel and logistics services, and that these suppliers and services may be outsourced. In fact, this redundancy is part of what makes a supply chain resilient.

The concepts SCRMC and recovery procedures are applicable to each of the four parts of the supply chain value proposition (Quigg, 2022) – effectiveness, efficiency, relevancy, and sustainability. The paper is most concerned with effectiveness and sustainability, and efficiency is tangentially addressed through maintaining competing suppliers of materiel and logistics services. Even relevancy is addressed, for there is nothing more irrelevant to a customer than a product or service that isn’t consistently delivered.

The paper applies to all forms of industry disruptions, not only changes to consumer requirements and technology adoptions, but also disruptions brought about by social and economic factors as well as (more or less) unexpected events such as pandemics.

Summary of the Article

The paper examines the relationship between SCRMC, re-engineering, agility, collaboration, and firm performance. The authors’ research confirms that these five qualities are dependent on each other as shown in the following diagram taken from the paper:

These relations are confirmed by evaluating ten hypotheses, which can be grouped as follows:

H1 – H4: SCRMC has a positive effect on each of firm performance, re-engineering, agility, and collaboration.

H5 – H7: Re-engineering, agility, and collaboration each have a positive impact on firm performance.

H8 – H10: Re-engineering, agility, and collaboration each mediates SCRMC’s impact on firm performance.

These ten hypotheses are not deductively proven but are instead statistically verified by surveying 87 owners and managers in the batik clothing business in the Wedi subdistrict of Klaten, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Conclusion - Managerial Implications

Operational disruptions can come from sources internal or external to a company, and can not only include economic, political, and social events, but also “black swan” events such as COVID-19. To face such adversarial events, a flexible and adaptable supply chain must be established. The authors statistically demonstrate that a robust supply chain risk management culture is crucial for maintaining a resilient supply chain. Companies that are resilient in the face of disruptions are a result of resilient supply chains.

Of course, disruptive events will occur, and companies recover from them by being agile in their response, by building new relationships between their partners (even if that entails some redundancy), and re-engineering their supply chains. The authors demonstrate that agility, collaboration, and the ability to re-engineer supply chains each positively contribute to the company’s performance. Further, they show that a strong supply chain risk management culture is fundamental to a company’s agility, collaboration, and re-engineering abilities.

The most important implication for managers is that a resilient supply chain must be established, and to ensure that the supply chain remains resilient, the company must possess and encourage a strong supply chain risk management culture. Part of this culture requires that managers must learn from disruptions – how and when they occur, and to address any problems the disruptions reveal in our plans for a resilient supply chain.

Other important implications for managers are the ways they must respond to supply chain failures: they must be agile (respond quickly and aggressively), they must shore-up any collaborations between outside companies that are part of the supply chain, and they must be willing to re-engineer their supply chain to restore services. This paper shows that each of these restorative approaches lead to resuming the company’s operations, and that a culture of supply chain risk management is fundamental to this.

Agility, collaboration, willingness to re-engineer the supply chain, and a culture of risk management when it comes to the supply chain together mitigate the impact of calamities upon business continuity. 

References

Abeysekara, N., Wang, H., & Kuruppuarachchi, D. (2019). Effect of supply-chain resilience on firm performance and competitive advantage: A study of the Sri Lankan apparel industry. Business Process Management Journal, 25(7), 1673–1695. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/bpmj-09-2018-0241

Akbar, H.M. & Isfianadewi, D. (2023). The role of supply chain resilience to relationships supply chain risk management culture and firm performance during disruption. International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science, 12(2), 643-652. Retrieved 26 August 2024 from https://www.proquest.com/docview/2800278031/fulltextPDF/9FB3E428B04B48BCPQ/2

Christopher, M., & Peck, H. (2004). Building the Resilient Supply Chain. The International Journal of Logistics Management, 15(2), 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09574090410700275

Kumar, S., & Anbanandam, R. (2019). Impact of risk management culture on supply chain resilience: An empirical study from Indian manufacturing industry. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O: Journal of Risk and Reliability, 234(2), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748006X19886718

Quigg, B. (2022). Supply Chain Management (1st ed). McGraw-Hill Create. https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781307866025

National Security Strategy and Politicizing the Military

What is a National Security Strategy Document?

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a report prepared by the Executive branch and delivered to Congress that describes the major national security threats and how the current administration intends to address those threats. The NSS report can be presented in both classified and unclassified forms. This document is mandated by section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and must describe and discuss the following[1]:

1. “The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.”
2. Foreign policy and national defense capabilities necessary to deter aggression and implement part (1)
3. Proposed short-term and long-term uses of national power to achieve (1)
4. Evaluation of the adequacy of national power to achieve (1)
5. Any other information to help inform Congress related to (1)

Problems with the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance of March 2021

The NSS released in March 2021, entitled “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” (INSSG)[2], lists some of the priorities that the Biden Administration will address[3]: the pandemic, economic downturn, racial justice, and “climate emergency.” Exactly none of these are military threats, and whose gravity depends on a specific political bias. It attributes our current geopolitical situation to changes in the “distribution of power across the world,” which is an explicitly Marxist interpretation of history[4].

Another non-military threat discussed in the INSSG is domestic violent extremism, against which the Biden Administration promises[5] to

work as a coordinated, unified federal government to use the full array of tools at our disposal in concert with state, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign counterparts. Robust law enforcement and intelligence capabilities, as well as strong cooperation and appropriate information sharing, will be critical to understanding and addressing the broad spectrum of violent extremism America confronts today.

This part appears to directly target January 6th Protesters. It is interesting to note that the NSS that was released the year following the Oklahoma City Bombing of 19 April 1995 made no mention of domestic violent extremism[6].

For the national security to be effective[7], “[w]e will enhance diversity, equity, and inclusion, and prioritize flexibility and improve training across our national security workforce.”

Unlike NSS documents released by the George W. Bush and the Trump Administrations, the INSSG explicitly mentions the policies of the previous administration when it comes to immigration, stating that the Biden Administration “ended the previous administration’s family separations policy and discriminatory travel ban.”

Finally, beyond the above mentioned changes to immigration policy, the territorial integrity of the United States is given almost no attention, beyond stating that the administration “will not be able to solve all of the challenges we face at the southern border overnight.[8]”

Overall, many of the supposed threats listed in the INSSG are chosen to match the Biden Administration’s political leaning, and the major threat – the unsecured southern border – is downplayed and no plans to apply national power to counter this threat are given. It is clear proof of the politicization of the military by that administration.

Footnotes

[1] Goldwater–Nichols Act
[2] The White House, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.”
[3] Ibid, 6
[4] Sherman, “The ‘How’ and ‘Why’ of Power”
[5] Ibid, 19
[6] The White House, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.”
[7] The White House, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.”, 21
[8] Ibid, 19

Bibliography

Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of October 4, 1986, Pub. L. 99-433 (1986), Retrieved 22 August 2024 from https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/dod_reforms/Goldwater-NicholsDoDReordAct1986.pdf

Sherman, M. “The ‘How’ and ‘Why’ of Power: from Marx to Foucault to Power Today.” 13 April 2015. Retrieved 22 August 2024 from https://melinasherman.com/2015/04/13/the-how-and-why-of-power-from-marx-to-foucault-to-power-today/

The White House. “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.” February 1996. Retrieved 22 August 2024 from https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1996.pdf?ver=4f8riCrLnHIA-H0itYUp6A%3d%3d

The White House. “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.” March 2021. Retrieved 22 August 2024 from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf

Problems with Coalition Assured Autonomous Resupply

The U.S. Army Ground Vehicle Systems Center and the U.K. Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) have been working to use autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles at all points within the supply chain, with one of the goals being to “remove more Soldiers from exposure to direct enemy fire.[1]”

Robot from 2019 Coalition Assured Autonomous Resupply

These technologies were shown in a 2019 demonstration called Coalition Assured Autonomous Resupply (CAAR)[2], which displayed how automated ground vehicles and drones could be used to create semi-autonomous logistics convoys, and how these convoys solve the last-mile problem[3]. The hardware shown is certainly impressive looking, some even having mounted weapon systems, but there are several problems not addressed in the demonstration video.

First, for logistics convoys, the last mile can be in an active combat zone. It is good that troops are not put in danger while delivering supplies, but has the defensibility of these semi-autonomous logistics convoys been considered? Supply chains are valid targets in any type of conflict, and they are the primary target when the enemy is using 4GW tactics.

The second problem is just how "semi-autonomous" are these semi-autonomous logistics convoys? What aspects were automated - movement, weapon control, or both? Are the weapon systems “man-in-the-loop” or “man-on-the-loop” or “man-out-of-the-loop”? Most military ethicists seem to be happy with the first two options, but there is at least one[4] who is against man-out-of-the-loop systems.

The third problem is related to the location of the individuals controlling these robots. The remote-controlled weapon systems used during World War I, the Winter War, and World War II (the German “Ferlenkboot”, the Soviet "teletank", and the Nazi’s “Goliath tracked mine," respectively) all required the pilot to be in somewhat close proximity to the remote-controlled weapon. This is no longer true with contemporary unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). For example, the drone that killed Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen in 2011 was controlled by a CIA pilot located at the Creech Air Force Base outside Los Vegas, Nevada[5].

Where are the pilots of the semi-autonomous robots and drones located? If the pilots are close to the robots they control, then that undermines the goal of keeping them out of active combat zones. Suppose, however, the pilots are located on the other side of the globe, say in Los Vegas…

When faced against these semi-autonomous logistics convoys, an enemy would consider multiple points of attack: the semi-autonomous vehicles themselves while in motion or at rest, the ground upon which the convoy travels, the start and end points of the convoy, the communications system, and the individuals controlling the convoy. If the pilot is in some place like Los Vegas, then the enemy would have a legitimate target within our borders. That’s a problem!

Footnotes

[1] Allotta, “US, UK coordinate autonomous last-mile resupply.”
[2] Dstl, “The Future of Military Logistics | Coalition Assured Autonomous Resupply.”
[3] Allotta, “US, UK coordinate autonomous last-mile resupply.”
[4] Strawser, “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles.”
[5] Zegart, A. Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence.

Bibliography

Allotta, J. “US, UK coordinate autonomous last-mile resupply” U.S. Army, 25 September 2019. Retrieved 16 August 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/227647/us_uk_coordinate_autonomous_last_mile_resupply

Dstl, “The Future of Military Logistics | Coalition Assured Autonomous Resupply,” YouTube, 19 September 2019, 2:17, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8YqJUJby0wg

Strawser, B. “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles.” Journal of Military Ethics 9 no. 4, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2010.536403

Zegart, A. Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence. Princeton University Press, 2022.

Trends in Military Logistics

Introduction

Logistics is a crucial part of military operations; it always has been and will always be. This paper examines both historical and future trends in logistics.

We begin with the major transformation of supply systems: the replacement of living off the land with the “bring your own supply” system used since the time of Napoleon. By the time of World War II, horse-drawn wagons were insufficient and needed to be replaced by motorized transportation, and examples of the types of vehicles that made horses obsolete will be considered. Specialized cargo transport vessels from WWII will also be examined.

Next, future trends in logistics will be investigated, focusing on data-driven analytics and the insights that can be derived from total asset visibility. Predictive logistics and other applications of the data stored in these digitized supply chains will be considered along with the benefits these applications should bring.

We conclude by attempting to answer some questions about data-driven logistics – does embracing supply chain visibility result in more effective combat equipment? What advantages do digitized supply chains bring to joint operations?

Overview of Historical Trends

From the times of the Roman Empire to the 17th Century, militaries were supplied by local resources – they lived off the land (LOTL). As an army moved into a geographic area, troops had to procure local resources by foraging, raiding farms, and looting homes. The effect on the local population was predictable: LOTL inculcated fear and created enemies. This was the inevitable response to any large influx of troops.

There were military disadvantages to LOTL as well: an army would have to wait until the next growing season before travelling through the same geographic area, otherwise there would be nothing to loot. Further, the presence of large uninhabited areas of Central Europe made foraging impossible and thus dictated the path of advancing armies.

This situation began to change in the late 16th and early 17th Century with the “magazine” system of Tellier and Louvois¹. Magazines were prepositioned supply caches containing enough supplies to sustain an army while it either passed through a town or remained stationary, sometimes for as long as six months. Other innovative solutions used by military commanders included purchasing agents that would reimburse townsfolk for their supplies, as well travelling along routes that would delay the convergence of troops until they were outside their country of origin.

The greatest historical change to military supply was the transition from LOTL to “bring your own supplies" (BYOS). With BYOS, not only was the stress on the friendly local populace greatly reduced, but it also permitted the local population to become part of the economy created by the arrival of the troops. In addition, troop movement necessitated the construction of infrastructure that could be open to use by the locals. These factors raised their standard of living and constituted an early approach to “winning hearts and minds."

Foreign locals were not the only beneficiaries of military supply systems: in modern-day times, various domestic bases established by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) have certainly contributed to local economies. Take for example the DLA's presence in Susquehanna, Pennsylvania. The DLA maintains a CONUS Distribution Center and a Document Services center there as well as in nearby Mechanicsburg and New Cumberland. The DLA is the major employer in that area.

Advances of Transportation Logistics from World War II

BYOS required improved means of transportation, as existing cargo vessels and horse-drawn wagons were insufficient for the scale of America’s involvement in World War II. Two of the many advances in transportation logistics from that era were the Liberty ships, the 2½-ton 6×6 trucks, and the ¼-ton Jeeps.

Historical Trend I: Special-Purpose Cargo Vessels

Delivering supplies by sea to all theaters of WWII required a new class of cargo ships. In response, the United States developed the Liberty ships², with the goal of operating them as “seatrains for Army use”³. These ships had a length of 441.5 ft, a beam of approximately 56.75 ft, and a draft of approximately 27.75 ft. The oil-fired boilers allowed for a speed of 11 - 11.5 knots.

SS John W. Brown, one of the few remaining WWII Liberty ships, on the Great Lakes in 2000.

A total of 2,710 of these ships were mass produced by 18 different American shipyards. Each ship required 39 days to build, but the large number of shipyards combined to produce approximately 1.5 ships per day. One of the ways the construction time was minimized was to replace riveting by welding wherever possible.

Most of the Liberty ships were tasked with carrying supplies - they had a carrying capacity of 10,800 deadweight tons - but 225 were converted for use as troop transports.

To replace Liberty ships lost due to U-boat attacks, the United States constructed a new class of cargo ship, the Victory ship⁴. Victory ships were slightly larger than the Liberty ships and had a similar carrying capacity. The primary improvement over the Liberty ships was the speed: Victory ships travelled at a speed of anywhere from 15 to 17 knots.

The Liberty and Victory ships demonstrated a trend of rapidly building special purpose ocean vehicles. These vehicles served the war effort well, but the rapid construction entailed a shortened lifetime: the Liberty ships were expected to last only five years, and even though more than 2,700 were constructed, only about six remain as museum ships.

Historical Trend II: Mass-Produced Land Vehicles

Perhaps the most useful small vehicle of World War II was the ¼-ton Jeep. Jeeps replaced horses for transport and reconnaissance. Indeed,

In the United States, the Army was interested in a vehicle that could replace both the horse and the motorcycle in the scout, reconnaissance, communication, and liaison roles as well as a vehicle large enough to carry the heavy weapons and ammunition required by infantry companies⁵.

The Jeep was a staple of WWII land transportation with over 647,000 of them manufactured during the war. It was a four-wheel drive car that could travel 300 miles on 15 gallons of gasoline with a top speed of 65 mph. It’s main strength was its versatility: it could operate both on-road and off-road, be configured with armaments mounted between seats, tow anti-tank guns, etc.

Bantam jeep towing a 37mm antitank gun, in mid-air
- U.S. Army Signal Corps, 1941.

The Jeeps of WWII demonstrated another trend: the mass production of very versatile land vehicles. Their versatility was described above. They could be modified to act as field ambulances, but their primary purpose was general ground transportation. In terms of logistics, Jeeps served the exact same role as horses: they allowed for “last mile” delivery of relatively small amounts of supplies, carrying smaller pieces of artillery, and the delivery of wounded soldiers to nearby field hospitals.

Other, larger, vehicles such as the 2½-ton 6×6 truck were also mass produced. Over 560,000 of these “deuce and a half” trucks were built during WWII and were used in a wide variety of environments. Like the Jeeps, and unlike the Liberty ships, the deuce and half trucks were durable enough to be used into the Korean and Vietnam Wars and were even in use during Desert Storm. They were slowly replaced with 5-, 7-, and 10-ton 8×8 HEMTTs (Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks) which remain in service to this day.

These two historical trends demonstrate how military operations and transportation logistics co-evolved: the vehicles allowed for faster and deeper advancement of the front lines, while the vehicles’ fuel and service requirements required fuel depots, standard part inventories, and the creation and enforcement of periodic maintenance schedules.

Introduction to Future Trends

When examining the available literature on the future of military logistics, one cannot help but be impressed at the range and ingenuity of ideas that the U.S. military are considering. For example, additive manufacturing (e.g. 3-D printing) is being evaluated for building construction. For this idea to be practiced, traditional construction material would be augmented or replaced by whatever is used to print buildings, e.g., the amount of lumber and steel would be reduced and replaced by concrete, say. With this change, the methods for delivering the new material would have to adapt.

Another possible change in military logistics is the use of pick-and-place robots inside supply depots. Such robots are commonly used in commercial distribution centers like those operated by Amazon, and their adoption by the military would augment or possibly replace manual labor in those supply depots.

For the remainder of this section, some of the future trends that involve data-driven analytics will be examined. These trends all require significant IT infrastructure and will partially replace some logistic personnel.

Future Trend I: Total Asset Visibility

Fundamental to data-driven analytics in military logistics is the process of building a digital model of inventory and storage depots. Once this model is created and reliably updated, statistical analysis can be performed on the data. The result is total asset visibility.

Total asset visibility (TAV) – also called supply chain visibility (SCV) - is the ability to track items in a supply chain, from procurement to delivery at the final customer, and to make that data available to appropriate parties⁶. Implementing this involves asset tracking technology, procedural changes, IT integration, and certain follow-on changes.

Asset tracking technologies can be anything from barcodes to RFID (radio frequency identification) tags. A problem that must be addresses is the desired tracking resolution: for example, should missiles be tracked individually or by the case?

Procedural changes would at the very least involve scanning the asset as it moves through the supply chain - it is necessary to scan the asset’s bar code or RFID tag as it is procured, stored, issued, etc. One advantage of RFID tags is that there are bulk tag readers that can read multiple RFID tags simultaneously, which would speed asset scanning. Automated RFID scanning is also available, is used in the commercial transportation sector, and would be adopted for military applications.

The tracked items and their location must be stored in some way, which would require an IT system that not only allows the modification of the time and place an asset was scanned, but also to be able to retrieve this information and present it to relevant personnel in the form of dashboards and reports. The asset’s arrival time can be predicted, and this would also allow loss detection. Various metrics can also be calculated, such as average delivery time, current inventory at a given supply depot, etc.

Because of the level of IT integration used in TAV systems, the computer systems involved would be high value targets for the enemy, as well as for friendly competitors. The overall system must be defended both in the physical and IT security sense, starting with the RFID tags. Attacks by hackers must also be anticipated and prevented.

Future Trend II: Predictive Maintenance

Predictive analytics – the use of statistical modeling techniques to predict future events or quantities based on historical and current data – is being implemented in military logistics for forecasting maintenance requirements and lifespans of various types of equipment.

The goal of predictive maintenance is to estimate when equipment is likely to fail, and then schedule preventative maintenance before failures occur. It is expected that this will extend the lifespan of equipment, improve availability, and reduce cost of maintenance⁷. This is implemented by placing sensors on and in vehicles and other forms of equipment; the real-time data these sensors collect is sent to a central repository where it is collected and combined with records of preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS). The data will then be analyzed using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) algorithms to predict when equipment will fail. The results will be presented to appropriate individuals as dashboards, allowing them to act upon that data, such as scheduling maintenance or ordering replacements.

Predictive maintenance builds upon TAV’s IT infrastructure, with maintenance information stored along with location-date-status information. Additional dashboards and report generating software would be needed above and beyond what is required for TAV.

Future Trend III: Predictive Logistics

The goal of predictive logistics is to anticipate the military’s materiel needs, so that either supplies are located when and where they are needed, or supplies can be most quickly transported where they are needed⁸. This is accomplished through two approaches: forecasting demand and correctly pre-positioning materiel.

Demand forecasting starts with current and historical consumption rates and applies AI/ML to predict the supply needs of ongoing or future military operations⁹ . There will of course be unexpected changes in demand caused by sudden troop surges, unexpected enemy attacks, etc., but periodic changes caused by seasonal fighting patterns can be predicted. This, together with logistic lead-time, will ensure that the proper types and amounts of supplies will be made available at the right time.

To quickly deliver supplies to where they’re needed, those supplies can be pre-positioned – so instead of leaving supplies at strategic facilities and depots, they can be moved forward, closer to the battlefield. Hamilton and Woo¹⁰ call this “dynamic forward positioning,” and by doing this, material can be moved more rapidly to where it is needed. As the battle evolves, materiel can also be moved about (redistributed or rebalanced) without returning the materiel to the main supply depot.

Dynamic forward positioning can be extended beyond the location of materiel at forward depots. For example, Kress¹¹ gives various models of depots, storage capacities, transportation connections, and transportation capacities, and each of these arrangements can satisfy various desired qualities such as wide vs narrow deployment, flexible vs non-flexible deployment, survivability, etc. Of course, his models are theoretical and do not consider the terrain that these depots and transportation routes would occupy.

As with predictive maintenance, effective predictive logistics requires that TAV be at least partially implemented. Highly specific software is needed to choose the correct configuration of Kress’ logistic model.

Conclusion

As discussed above, military operations and logistics have spurred each other on – transportation logistics allowed for long-distance military operations, and the demands of military operations required the creation of supply and fuel depots to support the various new means of transportation. In this sense, transportation logistics and military operations co-evolved: they were mutually beneficial, and an improvement of one entailed an improvement of the other.

Anticipated advancements in logistics are substantially different from this co-evolution: rather than military operations and logistics benefiting each other, future logistics trends revolve around the collection and analysis of data relevant to supply chain efficiency. Instead of operations and logistics spurring each other on, military operations become just another application of data-driven logistics, not substantially different from commercial applications. Indeed, data-driven logistics has long been practiced in civilian settings, even before the advent of e-commerce.

This is not necessarily a good thing.

By digitizing the supply chain, military logistics can be optimized in the same way that commercial logistics are optimized. Supply chains are made more efficient not only to advance operational success but also to minimize costs. The costs of operating a military are lowered, but cost cutting can result in lower-quality equipment, unreasonable operational timelines, etc.

An advantage to digitized supply chains is that TAV gives participants in joint operations complete insight into the regional availability of military resources. This not only allows partner nations to share the cost of military operations but can significantly reduce the arrival time of a military asset into a theater of operations¹².

Footnotes

1. Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton
2. Larson, H. The Army’s Cargo Fleet in World War II. P.14 - 19.
3. Ibid. pp. 58 - 62.
4. Ibid. pp. 19-20
5. Duddy, “The Jeep at 70: A Defense Acquisition Success Story.”
6. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, Strategy for Improving DoD Asset Visibility.
7. Moyer, “Predictive Logistics Initiative Revolutionizes Equipment Management.”
8. Dilanian & Howard. “Mastering the Deployment Basics”
9. Schwartz, et. al. “How Data Analytics Will Improve Logistics Planning.”
10. Hamilton & Woo. “The Road to Predictive Logistics: Perspectives from the 8th Theater Sustainment Command.”
11. Kress, M. Operational Logistics.
12. Lyons, “Sustaining Military Operations in the Emerging Joint Operating Environment.”

Bibliography

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness. Strategy for Improving DoD Asset Visibility 3rd Ed. August 2017. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/LOG_SD/.policy_vault.html/Strategy_for_Improving_DoD_AV.pdf

Dilanian, A. & Howard, M. “Mastering the Deployment Basics: An Interview with Retired Lt. Gen. Patricia McQuistion.” Army Sustainment. March-April 2018. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://alu.army.mil/alog/2018/MARAPR18/PDF/MARAPR2018.pdf

Duddy, B. “The Jeep at 70: A Defense Acquisition Success Story.” Defense ARJ 19 (No. 4), October 2012. Retrieved 14 August 2024 from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA582717.pdf

Hamilton, C. & Woo, E. “The Road to Predictive Logistics: Perspectives from the 8th Theater Sustainment Command.” U.S. Army. 4 November 2019. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/227933/the_road_to_predictive_logistics_perspectives_from_the_8th_theater_sustainment_command

Kress, M. Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations (2nd ed.). Springer, 2016.

Larson, H. The Army’s Cargo Fleet in World War II. Army Center of Military History, May 1945. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA438107.pdf

Lyons, S. “Sustaining Military Operations in the Emerging Joint Operating Environment.” Army Sustainment. July-August 2017. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://alu.army.mil/alog/2017/JULAUG17/pdf/JULAUG2017.pdf

Moyer, B. “Predictive Logistics Initiative Revolutionizes Equipment Management.” U.S. Army. 2 May 2023. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/265899/predictive_logistics_initiative_revolutionizes_equipment_management

Schwartz, B., McConnell, B. & Parlier, G. “How Data Analytics Will Improve Logistics Planning.” U.S. Army. 4 November 2019. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/223842/how_data_analytics_will_improve_logistics_planning

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 2nd Edition. Cambridge, 2004.