Cultural Assumptions of TQM

One aspect of total quality management (TQM) that doesn’t seem to be addressed is the cultural assumptions made by its proponents. By this I don’t mean the quality-focused culture, or the corporate culture that TQM seeks to replace (or at least modify). Instead, I mean national culture.

Both W. Edwards Deming (1900-1993) and Joseph M. Juran (1904-2008) developed their managerial theories over their entire lifespans, based on their experience working at Western Electric and for the U.S. Government, but it was in post-war Japan that they had their first opportunities to implement their theories.

Much later (in the 1980s) did American industrialists begin requesting the services of Deming. According to Goetsch & Davis (2021, p. 12), Deming was not received as warmly by Americans as he was by the Japanese. In fact, “Deming’s attitude toward corporate executives in the United States can be described as cantankerous at best.”

How much of Deming and Juran’s theories of management hinge on their experience in post-war Japan? Japanese culture has a reputation for being hierarchical which implies deference. According to Chara Scroope (2025):

Japanese society is generally collectivistic, whereby people often view themselves and others as members of a collective unit or group (whether it be uchi or soto groups, a family group or a broader social group). In this sense, members of a group hold collective responsibility (rentai sekinin) for the performance and actions of an individual. For instance, if one or a few members of the group indulge in poor behaviour, all others are collectively blamed. In turn, harmony (wa) is an important part of interpersonal relationships. As a cultural concept, harmony implies a sense of unity and conformity within a group, whereby interdependence may be emphasised over independence.

At the time Deming and Juran were teaching the Japanese about TQM, Japan had just lost World War II. They were a beaten people, an occupied nation. In fact, Deming's first visit to Japan was in July 1950, and the Allied occupation wouldn't end until 8 September 1951. Emperor Hirohito, their leader throughout the war, was considered divine in Japanese culture. Following Japan's surrender in World War II, the U.S. pressured Hirohito to renounce his divinity.

This is diametrically opposite to American culture, where rugged individualism reigns. The self-made man is an American invention, and our freedom and independence follow from this.

Does it even make sense to apply a management philosophy to Americans that was developed and tested on a culture so different from ours?

References

Goetsch, D. L., & Davis, S. B. (2021). Quality management for organizational excellence: Introduction to total quality (9^th ed.). Pearson.

Scroope, C. (2025). Japanese Culture – Core Concepts. Cultural Atlas. https://culturalatlas.sbs.com.au/japanese-culture/japanese-culture-core-concepts

Logistics and the Success or Failure of Major Campaigns

Introduction

The relationship between logistics and war fighting is complicated. In fact, unconventional warfare uses no conventional logistics system. This paper examines two major campaigns where military logistics led to success or failure. In Operation Barbarossa, the German logistics system failed; in Operation Overlord, Allied logisticians suffered from “analysis paralysis.” Why did Barbarossa fail despite having enough supplies? Why was Overlord successful even though logisticians were unable to identify appropriate invasion routes? These questions are answered by examining the factors that logistics planners and operations planners must consider.

Operation Barbarossa

The German invasion of Russia during World War II, called Operation Barbarossa, was initially successful: the use of Blitzkrieg tactics caught the Soviets unprepared. As the operation proceeded, however, the vast distances involved and the cold Russian winter were too much for the German’s supply lines, and the invading army experienced shortages of ammunition, fuel, and food. This slowed German progress and allowed the Soviets to regroup and counterattack.

German soldiers fighting in the Soviet Union as part of Operation Barbarossa, 1941.

Why exactly did Operation Barbarossa fail, and at what point should it have been clear to German military leaders that it was a lost cause? The answers to these two questions depend on the sources used.

Castano[1] notes that German generals were interviewed after the war, and that “these generals blamed everyone but themselves when stating why the invasion failed.” These generals blamed “Hitler, the War in the Balkans, the early onset of winter and the strategic debate between Hitler and the OKW [supreme military command] concerning there the primary thrust of the invasion should be directed.”[2]

Castano follows Van Creveld[3] in placing the blame squarely on the logistical planners. The German forces advanced faster than supply could be delivered to them, and ammunition and fuel were in short supply, even early on the invasion. German troops needed to obtain food from Russian and Ukrainian peasants, thus generating animosity. The resupply effort depended on the Soviet railroads, which were in poor repair. The roads turned to mud, leaving panzer and motorized infantry exposed. Finally, by “July 11, after just nineteen days, 25% of German supply vehicles permanently broke down.”[4], preventing ammunition and fuel from reaching where they were needed.

The ground froze in November, which allowed the tanks and other vehicles to resume movement, except that the Germans were lacking winter-weight oils and winter clothing. Castano notes that “troops started gasoline fires under their tanks to warm up the oil sufficiently so that the engines could turn over.”[5] On 4 December, the temperature fell to -25° F, and one regiment reported 300 frostbite casualties. The next day, the Soviet Army started a counter-offensive, and the German line fell apart.

Fenrick[6] analyzes the German defeat differently, using contemporary operational art and design. Hitler had identified Moscow as the operational center of gravity (COG) in that the four instruments of national power – diplomats, Stalin’s propaganda machine, military leaders, and industry – were all based there. Hitler also correctly identified the strategic COG – the Soviet military – but underestimated their strength. However, Hitler became distracted by Leningrad and Kiev, taking his eyes off the COG.

Fenrick notes that Hitler underestimated his own operational reach, the ability to project military capabilities to a specific time and place. Fenrick and Castano agree that German forces outran their logistical support due to the conditions of the roads and railways.

Finally, Fenrick faults Hitler with poor arrangement of operations. Hitler did not phase or sequence operations effectively. Instead of consolidating gains after initial successes, the Germans diluted their strength by engaging in simultaneous offences. For example, the encirclement of Kiev in September 1941 was a success, but it diverted resources from Moscow.

For Fenrick, the failure of Operation Barbarossa was due to multiple operational issues, of which logistics was only one part.

Operation Overlord

The Allied invasion of France, called Operation Overlord, involved 18 months of meticulous planning, with the central idea being to deliver troops and equipment into the theater faster than Germany. To this end, the planners developed a large model identifying all factors that would affect this rate of flow[7]. The four most crucial factors were:

1. Number of ships and landing crafts available on D-Day.
2. Size and number of beaches, their gradients, and the prevailing weather conditions.
3. Availability of deep-water ports close to the beaches, needed for ongoing troop and equipment delivery.
4. Feasibility of providing air support.

Examining maps of France, General Frederick Morgan soon discovered that no landing site matched those four factors, and in fact the factors are in some ways self-contradicting[8]. In the parlance of JP 3-0, the logistics planners narrowly focused on operational means (resources used to accomplish some goal). Morgan focused on ends (“the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives”)[9]. In this situation, the end was to establish a presence on the continent from which the German forces could be evicted from western Europe. Morgan then realized that the real constraints were that:

1. The invasion must be launched from somewhere close to the Allies’ main base in Britain.
2. The landing sites had to be within range of the RAF’s Spitfires.

These two constraints instantly eliminated all but north-west France, namely Normandy and the Pas-de-Calais. From the standpoint of operational planning, the logisticians painted themselves into irrelevancy. The four factors the logisticians identified were sure to maximize the flow of troops, equipment, and supplies into the theater of operations – but that theater did not exist! Morgan was able to determine the theater and identify candidate landing zones without 18 months of analysis.

The Operation Overlord logisticians suffered from “analysis paralysis”: they provided schedules for delivering troops and materiel, but those schedules could not by themselves be implemented (operationalized). Their schedules and plans were useful to a certain extent, however.

Once the invasion got underway, the Allies received all the supplies they initially needed, but after the breakout from St. Lo, the U.S. Army spearheads were moving 75 miles per day and required 200 tons of supplies per day. Ensuring the ongoing delivery of fuel to maintain this rate was difficult. The initial plan was to capture Cherbourg and other ports along the British Channel for use for fuel resupply. Those ports were not captured.

According to Williams[10], 7 million long tons of POL (petrol, oil, and lubricants) were stored in the U.K. for use by the Allies, but there was no way of getting that to the forces. The initial plan was to use jerricans to move POL from fuel distribution points to where the POL was needed. Unfortunately, jerricans were in short supply[11]. To partially ameliorate this situation, pipelines were laid under the English Channel as part of Operation PLUTO (Pipeline Underwater Transportation of Oil). These pipelines were slow in coming online, so Normandy beaches continued to be used for offloading.

Williams notes that “Logisticians assured TUSAG [Twelfth U.S. Army Group] and SHAEF [Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force] that they could sustain the attacking armies with only the ports of Brest, Quiberon Bay and Cherbourg.”[12] Brest was captured on 19 September but was too badly damaged by the Germans for it to be usable. Quiberon Bay became irrelevant due to its distance from the Allied armies[13]. Cherbourg was captured six weeks behind schedule, and at the time of the breakout from St. Lo, the only operational harbors were Cherbourg and an artificial harbor called “Mulberry A.”[14]

Conclusions

In considering these two operations, it is clear that logistics alone does not determine the success or failure of a campaign. Poor logistics planning may result in the failure of an operation, but it is no guarantee (for example, the Campaign of 1870 of the Franco-Prussian War had logistical failures but was a success for Von Moltke[15]).

With Operation Barbarossa, logistics problems became apparent 19 days after the start and persisted throughout the campaign. The failure of this operation can be attributed in whole or in part to logistics.

The problems encountered in Operation Overlord were of a different nature. The meticulous planning of the logisticians failed to produce any candidate landing points. It took General Morgan thinking of the operation in a strategic and operational way to identify Normandy. Operation Overlord was certainly a success, but the contribution that the initial logistics plan played in that success is minimal.

A viable logistic plan must involve reliable supply chains, a reliable transportation network, schedules for delivering and allocating resources, and be adaptable to changing campaigns[16]. Both Barbarossa and Overlord lacked a reliable transportation network, but the logistics plan for Operation Overlord was too inflexible. The speed at which the Germans and the Allies moved were faster than the supply chains could deliver, leaving little to no possibility of delivering materiel.

From a planning perspective, operations must involve correct calculation of the enemy’s center of gravity (and the degree to which the enemy is willing to defend that COG). Operational reach is of course important. Operations must be phased, which means that victories must be consolidated. Operation Barbarossa failed to consider those aspects, whereas Overlord did make use of those factors.

Most importantly, logistics and operational planning must be synchronized with tactics and the commander’s strategy for achieving the desired goal[17]. Both Barbarossa and Overlord failed in this, but in different ways. The logistics planning done in preparation of Operation Overlord was detached from the desired end state and the tactics and strategy used to achieve that end state. Once the desired end state was determined (removing German forces from western Europe using an established presence in France), the strategy, operations, tactics, and logistics became aligned. Operation Barbarossa suffered from over-optimistic logistical planning as well as a lack of a clear end state. Hitler chose three targets, but with competing priorities: military and industrial control were both desired, but with no plan for how one would support the other. As such, the operation was detached from logistics and the end state was left unspecified.

Footnotes

[1] Castano, p. 17.
[2] Ibid, p. 23-24.
[3] Van Creveld, p. 148-154.
[4] Castano, p. 26.
[5] Ibid, p. 27.
[6] Fenrick, NCO Journal, 2 May 2022.
[7] Van Creveld, p. 207.
[8] Ibid, p. 207-208.
[9] JP 3-0, GL-9.
[10] Williams, p. 12.
[11] Williams, p. 12.
[12] Ibid, p. 19.
[13] Denny, p. 7-9.
[14] Williams, p. 17.
[15] Von Creveld, p. 103.
[16] JP 5-0, I-7.
[17] Ibid, I-3, I-5, I-6, etc.

Bibliography

Castano, V. “The Failure of Operation Barbarossa: Truth versus Fiction.” University of North Carolina at Pembroke, 11 April 1997. https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncp/f/Castano,%20Vincent.pdf

Denny, N. “Seduction in Combat: Losing Sight of Logistics After D-Day.” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 2003. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA416387.pdf

Fenrick, P. “Operation Barbarossa: A Lesson in Hubris and Strategy.” NCO Journal, 2 May 2022. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2022/May/Operation-Barbarrosa/

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Operations (JP 3-0). 22 October 2018. https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Planning (JP 5-0). 01 December 2020. https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp5_0.pdf

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Williams, P. “A Marine Corps Logistician Examines Logistics Planning and Execution During Operation Overlord: A Study in Effectiveness and Implications for Today.” Marine Corps University, 20 March 2013. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA601695.pdf

Operation Barbarossa from a Modern Logistics Planning Perspective

Introduction

Before Operation Barbarossa, the German military was in transition. Adolf Hitler prioritized modernization and mechanization, but the German economy struggled to supply needed critical resources, particularly rubber and oil[1]. Further, logistical organization was fragmented between multiple generals: General Gercke oversaw rail and water transport, while General Wagner managed motor transport, creating inefficiencies. Gercke’s lack of authority over the navy and air force further hindered coordination[2]. These unresolved issues persisted as planning for Operation Barbarossa began.

Planning Problems

Planning for Operation Barbarossa started in August 1940, with two commands — OKH (Army High Command) and OKW (Armed Forces High Command) — conducting parallel studies. OKH emphasized road networks and proposed offensives toward Moscow and Kiev, while OKW prioritized railways and targeted the Warsaw-Moscow corridor[3]. These plans were not mutually exclusive, but Hitler’s Directive No. 21, issued in December 1940, introduced a third approach focused on capturing economic resources to sustain the campaign[4].

The operation launched on June 22, 1941, with 144 divisions advancing across an 800-mile front that was the Soviet border. Logistical failures emerged almost immediately, undermining the campaign’s early momentum[5].

Operation Barbarossa, from Santa Clara University Digital Exhibits

Applying Joint Logistics Planning Standards

Operation Barbarossa lacked integrated planning between OKH and OKW, violating modern joint logistics principles like those in Joint Publication 4-0 (JP 4-0). Essential components, such as unified whole-of-government coordination[6], redeployment, and demobilization plans[7], were absent. A Theater Logistics Analysis could have anticipated critical issues[8], including incompatible railroad gauges, fuel shortages, and issues with Soviet rolling stock[9].

Initial and refined logistics estimates[10] were either inadequate or nonexistent. Shortages of railway staff, fuel, food, and ammunition, evident by August 1941, suggest these estimates were grossly inaccurate. The German economy, constrained by its socialist structure, struggled to produce goods flexibly and at scale. A Logistics Supportability Analysis[11] (LSA) could have addressed this by planning for sustained supply and equipment production while the operation was ongoing[12].

The absence of a Theater Distribution Plan[13] (presumably[14]) exacerbated resource allocation issues. With OKH and OKW developing separate large-scale plans and no LSA in place, there was no centralized system to track and distribute finite supplies and equipment across the operation’s components while the operation was ongoing.

Conclusion

While applying JP 4-0 to Operation Barbarossa is anachronistic, the lessons remain relevant. Logistical planning must be integrated with strategic and tactical planning to ensure operational success. Barbarossa’s failures underscore the critical need for unified command, comprehensive analysis, and robust resource distribution systems in military campaigns.

Footnotes

[1] Van Creveld, pp. 142 – 144.
[2] Ibid, p. 145.
[3] Ibid, p. 148 – 149.
[4] Ibid, p. 149.
[5] Ibid, pp. 160 – 166, 168 – 171.
[6] JP 4-0, p. IV-2.
[7] Ibid, p. IV-3.
[8] Ibid, p. xi, IV-4.
[9] Van Creveld, p. 157.
[10] JP 4-0, p. IV-6.
[11] Ibid, IV-5.
[12] Kobren.
[13] JP 4-0, p. IV-5.
[14] Gaines & Snell.

Bibliography

Gaines, K. & Snell, R. “Setting and supporting the theater.” Army Sustainment, November-December 2015. https://www.army.mil/article/157230/setting_and_supporting_the_theater

Joint Publication 4-0. Joint Logistics. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019.

Kobren, B. “The Journey from Logistic Support Analysis to Product Support Analysis” Defense Acquisition Workforce, DAU Blogs. 25 August 2016. https://www.dau.edu/blogs/journey-logistic-support-analysis-product-support-analysis

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Trends in Military Logistics

Introduction

Logistics is a crucial part of military operations; it always has been and will always be. This paper examines both historical and future trends in logistics.

We begin with the major transformation of supply systems: the replacement of living off the land with the “bring your own supply” system used since the time of Napoleon. By the time of World War II, horse-drawn wagons were insufficient and needed to be replaced by motorized transportation, and examples of the types of vehicles that made horses obsolete will be considered. Specialized cargo transport vessels from WWII will also be examined.

Next, future trends in logistics will be investigated, focusing on data-driven analytics and the insights that can be derived from total asset visibility. Predictive logistics and other applications of the data stored in these digitized supply chains will be considered along with the benefits these applications should bring.

We conclude by attempting to answer some questions about data-driven logistics – does embracing supply chain visibility result in more effective combat equipment? What advantages do digitized supply chains bring to joint operations?

Overview of Historical Trends

From the times of the Roman Empire to the 17th Century, militaries were supplied by local resources – they lived off the land (LOTL). As an army moved into a geographic area, troops had to procure local resources by foraging, raiding farms, and looting homes. The effect on the local population was predictable: LOTL inculcated fear and created enemies. This was the inevitable response to any large influx of troops.

There were military disadvantages to LOTL as well: an army would have to wait until the next growing season before travelling through the same geographic area, otherwise there would be nothing to loot. Further, the presence of large uninhabited areas of Central Europe made foraging impossible and thus dictated the path of advancing armies.

This situation began to change in the late 16th and early 17th Century with the “magazine” system of Tellier and Louvois¹. Magazines were prepositioned supply caches containing enough supplies to sustain an army while it either passed through a town or remained stationary, sometimes for as long as six months. Other innovative solutions used by military commanders included purchasing agents that would reimburse townsfolk for their supplies, as well travelling along routes that would delay the convergence of troops until they were outside their country of origin.

The greatest historical change to military supply was the transition from LOTL to “bring your own supplies" (BYOS). With BYOS, not only was the stress on the friendly local populace greatly reduced, but it also permitted the local population to become part of the economy created by the arrival of the troops. In addition, troop movement necessitated the construction of infrastructure that could be open to use by the locals. These factors raised their standard of living and constituted an early approach to “winning hearts and minds."

Foreign locals were not the only beneficiaries of military supply systems: in modern-day times, various domestic bases established by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) have certainly contributed to local economies. Take for example the DLA's presence in Susquehanna, Pennsylvania. The DLA maintains a CONUS Distribution Center and a Document Services center there as well as in nearby Mechanicsburg and New Cumberland. The DLA is the major employer in that area.

Advances of Transportation Logistics from World War II

BYOS required improved means of transportation, as existing cargo vessels and horse-drawn wagons were insufficient for the scale of America’s involvement in World War II. Two of the many advances in transportation logistics from that era were the Liberty ships, the 2½-ton 6×6 trucks, and the ¼-ton Jeeps.

Historical Trend I: Special-Purpose Cargo Vessels

Delivering supplies by sea to all theaters of WWII required a new class of cargo ships. In response, the United States developed the Liberty ships², with the goal of operating them as “seatrains for Army use”³. These ships had a length of 441.5 ft, a beam of approximately 56.75 ft, and a draft of approximately 27.75 ft. The oil-fired boilers allowed for a speed of 11 - 11.5 knots.

SS John W. Brown, one of the few remaining WWII Liberty ships, on the Great Lakes in 2000.

A total of 2,710 of these ships were mass produced by 18 different American shipyards. Each ship required 39 days to build, but the large number of shipyards combined to produce approximately 1.5 ships per day. One of the ways the construction time was minimized was to replace riveting by welding wherever possible.

Most of the Liberty ships were tasked with carrying supplies - they had a carrying capacity of 10,800 deadweight tons - but 225 were converted for use as troop transports.

To replace Liberty ships lost due to U-boat attacks, the United States constructed a new class of cargo ship, the Victory ship⁴. Victory ships were slightly larger than the Liberty ships and had a similar carrying capacity. The primary improvement over the Liberty ships was the speed: Victory ships travelled at a speed of anywhere from 15 to 17 knots.

The Liberty and Victory ships demonstrated a trend of rapidly building special purpose ocean vehicles. These vehicles served the war effort well, but the rapid construction entailed a shortened lifetime: the Liberty ships were expected to last only five years, and even though more than 2,700 were constructed, only about six remain as museum ships.

Historical Trend II: Mass-Produced Land Vehicles

Perhaps the most useful small vehicle of World War II was the ¼-ton Jeep. Jeeps replaced horses for transport and reconnaissance. Indeed,

In the United States, the Army was interested in a vehicle that could replace both the horse and the motorcycle in the scout, reconnaissance, communication, and liaison roles as well as a vehicle large enough to carry the heavy weapons and ammunition required by infantry companies⁵.

The Jeep was a staple of WWII land transportation with over 647,000 of them manufactured during the war. It was a four-wheel drive car that could travel 300 miles on 15 gallons of gasoline with a top speed of 65 mph. It’s main strength was its versatility: it could operate both on-road and off-road, be configured with armaments mounted between seats, tow anti-tank guns, etc.

Bantam jeep towing a 37mm antitank gun, in mid-air
- U.S. Army Signal Corps, 1941.

The Jeeps of WWII demonstrated another trend: the mass production of very versatile land vehicles. Their versatility was described above. They could be modified to act as field ambulances, but their primary purpose was general ground transportation. In terms of logistics, Jeeps served the exact same role as horses: they allowed for “last mile” delivery of relatively small amounts of supplies, carrying smaller pieces of artillery, and the delivery of wounded soldiers to nearby field hospitals.

Other, larger, vehicles such as the 2½-ton 6×6 truck were also mass produced. Over 560,000 of these “deuce and a half” trucks were built during WWII and were used in a wide variety of environments. Like the Jeeps, and unlike the Liberty ships, the deuce and half trucks were durable enough to be used into the Korean and Vietnam Wars and were even in use during Desert Storm. They were slowly replaced with 5-, 7-, and 10-ton 8×8 HEMTTs (Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks) which remain in service to this day.

These two historical trends demonstrate how military operations and transportation logistics co-evolved: the vehicles allowed for faster and deeper advancement of the front lines, while the vehicles’ fuel and service requirements required fuel depots, standard part inventories, and the creation and enforcement of periodic maintenance schedules.

Introduction to Future Trends

When examining the available literature on the future of military logistics, one cannot help but be impressed at the range and ingenuity of ideas that the U.S. military are considering. For example, additive manufacturing (e.g. 3-D printing) is being evaluated for building construction. For this idea to be practiced, traditional construction material would be augmented or replaced by whatever is used to print buildings, e.g., the amount of lumber and steel would be reduced and replaced by concrete, say. With this change, the methods for delivering the new material would have to adapt.

Another possible change in military logistics is the use of pick-and-place robots inside supply depots. Such robots are commonly used in commercial distribution centers like those operated by Amazon, and their adoption by the military would augment or possibly replace manual labor in those supply depots.

For the remainder of this section, some of the future trends that involve data-driven analytics will be examined. These trends all require significant IT infrastructure and will partially replace some logistic personnel.

Future Trend I: Total Asset Visibility

Fundamental to data-driven analytics in military logistics is the process of building a digital model of inventory and storage depots. Once this model is created and reliably updated, statistical analysis can be performed on the data. The result is total asset visibility.

Total asset visibility (TAV) – also called supply chain visibility (SCV) - is the ability to track items in a supply chain, from procurement to delivery at the final customer, and to make that data available to appropriate parties⁶. Implementing this involves asset tracking technology, procedural changes, IT integration, and certain follow-on changes.

Asset tracking technologies can be anything from barcodes to RFID (radio frequency identification) tags. A problem that must be addresses is the desired tracking resolution: for example, should missiles be tracked individually or by the case?

Procedural changes would at the very least involve scanning the asset as it moves through the supply chain - it is necessary to scan the asset’s bar code or RFID tag as it is procured, stored, issued, etc. One advantage of RFID tags is that there are bulk tag readers that can read multiple RFID tags simultaneously, which would speed asset scanning. Automated RFID scanning is also available, is used in the commercial transportation sector, and would be adopted for military applications.

The tracked items and their location must be stored in some way, which would require an IT system that not only allows the modification of the time and place an asset was scanned, but also to be able to retrieve this information and present it to relevant personnel in the form of dashboards and reports. The asset’s arrival time can be predicted, and this would also allow loss detection. Various metrics can also be calculated, such as average delivery time, current inventory at a given supply depot, etc.

Because of the level of IT integration used in TAV systems, the computer systems involved would be high value targets for the enemy, as well as for friendly competitors. The overall system must be defended both in the physical and IT security sense, starting with the RFID tags. Attacks by hackers must also be anticipated and prevented.

Future Trend II: Predictive Maintenance

Predictive analytics – the use of statistical modeling techniques to predict future events or quantities based on historical and current data – is being implemented in military logistics for forecasting maintenance requirements and lifespans of various types of equipment.

The goal of predictive maintenance is to estimate when equipment is likely to fail, and then schedule preventative maintenance before failures occur. It is expected that this will extend the lifespan of equipment, improve availability, and reduce cost of maintenance⁷. This is implemented by placing sensors on and in vehicles and other forms of equipment; the real-time data these sensors collect is sent to a central repository where it is collected and combined with records of preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS). The data will then be analyzed using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) algorithms to predict when equipment will fail. The results will be presented to appropriate individuals as dashboards, allowing them to act upon that data, such as scheduling maintenance or ordering replacements.

Predictive maintenance builds upon TAV’s IT infrastructure, with maintenance information stored along with location-date-status information. Additional dashboards and report generating software would be needed above and beyond what is required for TAV.

Future Trend III: Predictive Logistics

The goal of predictive logistics is to anticipate the military’s materiel needs, so that either supplies are located when and where they are needed, or supplies can be most quickly transported where they are needed⁸. This is accomplished through two approaches: forecasting demand and correctly pre-positioning materiel.

Demand forecasting starts with current and historical consumption rates and applies AI/ML to predict the supply needs of ongoing or future military operations⁹ . There will of course be unexpected changes in demand caused by sudden troop surges, unexpected enemy attacks, etc., but periodic changes caused by seasonal fighting patterns can be predicted. This, together with logistic lead-time, will ensure that the proper types and amounts of supplies will be made available at the right time.

To quickly deliver supplies to where they’re needed, those supplies can be pre-positioned – so instead of leaving supplies at strategic facilities and depots, they can be moved forward, closer to the battlefield. Hamilton and Woo¹⁰ call this “dynamic forward positioning,” and by doing this, material can be moved more rapidly to where it is needed. As the battle evolves, materiel can also be moved about (redistributed or rebalanced) without returning the materiel to the main supply depot.

Dynamic forward positioning can be extended beyond the location of materiel at forward depots. For example, Kress¹¹ gives various models of depots, storage capacities, transportation connections, and transportation capacities, and each of these arrangements can satisfy various desired qualities such as wide vs narrow deployment, flexible vs non-flexible deployment, survivability, etc. Of course, his models are theoretical and do not consider the terrain that these depots and transportation routes would occupy.

As with predictive maintenance, effective predictive logistics requires that TAV be at least partially implemented. Highly specific software is needed to choose the correct configuration of Kress’ logistic model.

Conclusion

As discussed above, military operations and logistics have spurred each other on – transportation logistics allowed for long-distance military operations, and the demands of military operations required the creation of supply and fuel depots to support the various new means of transportation. In this sense, transportation logistics and military operations co-evolved: they were mutually beneficial, and an improvement of one entailed an improvement of the other.

Anticipated advancements in logistics are substantially different from this co-evolution: rather than military operations and logistics benefiting each other, future logistics trends revolve around the collection and analysis of data relevant to supply chain efficiency. Instead of operations and logistics spurring each other on, military operations become just another application of data-driven logistics, not substantially different from commercial applications. Indeed, data-driven logistics has long been practiced in civilian settings, even before the advent of e-commerce.

This is not necessarily a good thing.

By digitizing the supply chain, military logistics can be optimized in the same way that commercial logistics are optimized. Supply chains are made more efficient not only to advance operational success but also to minimize costs. The costs of operating a military are lowered, but cost cutting can result in lower-quality equipment, unreasonable operational timelines, etc.

An advantage to digitized supply chains is that TAV gives participants in joint operations complete insight into the regional availability of military resources. This not only allows partner nations to share the cost of military operations but can significantly reduce the arrival time of a military asset into a theater of operations¹².

Footnotes

1. Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton
2. Larson, H. The Army’s Cargo Fleet in World War II. P.14 - 19.
3. Ibid. pp. 58 - 62.
4. Ibid. pp. 19-20
5. Duddy, “The Jeep at 70: A Defense Acquisition Success Story.”
6. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, Strategy for Improving DoD Asset Visibility.
7. Moyer, “Predictive Logistics Initiative Revolutionizes Equipment Management.”
8. Dilanian & Howard. “Mastering the Deployment Basics”
9. Schwartz, et. al. “How Data Analytics Will Improve Logistics Planning.”
10. Hamilton & Woo. “The Road to Predictive Logistics: Perspectives from the 8th Theater Sustainment Command.”
11. Kress, M. Operational Logistics.
12. Lyons, “Sustaining Military Operations in the Emerging Joint Operating Environment.”

Bibliography

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness. Strategy for Improving DoD Asset Visibility 3rd Ed. August 2017. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/LOG_SD/.policy_vault.html/Strategy_for_Improving_DoD_AV.pdf

Dilanian, A. & Howard, M. “Mastering the Deployment Basics: An Interview with Retired Lt. Gen. Patricia McQuistion.” Army Sustainment. March-April 2018. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://alu.army.mil/alog/2018/MARAPR18/PDF/MARAPR2018.pdf

Duddy, B. “The Jeep at 70: A Defense Acquisition Success Story.” Defense ARJ 19 (No. 4), October 2012. Retrieved 14 August 2024 from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA582717.pdf

Hamilton, C. & Woo, E. “The Road to Predictive Logistics: Perspectives from the 8th Theater Sustainment Command.” U.S. Army. 4 November 2019. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/227933/the_road_to_predictive_logistics_perspectives_from_the_8th_theater_sustainment_command

Kress, M. Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations (2nd ed.). Springer, 2016.

Larson, H. The Army’s Cargo Fleet in World War II. Army Center of Military History, May 1945. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA438107.pdf

Lyons, S. “Sustaining Military Operations in the Emerging Joint Operating Environment.” Army Sustainment. July-August 2017. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://alu.army.mil/alog/2017/JULAUG17/pdf/JULAUG2017.pdf

Moyer, B. “Predictive Logistics Initiative Revolutionizes Equipment Management.” U.S. Army. 2 May 2023. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/265899/predictive_logistics_initiative_revolutionizes_equipment_management

Schwartz, B., McConnell, B. & Parlier, G. “How Data Analytics Will Improve Logistics Planning.” U.S. Army. 4 November 2019. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/223842/how_data_analytics_will_improve_logistics_planning

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 2nd Edition. Cambridge, 2004.

The Red Ball Express

In preparation for the D-Day Invasion, the Allies coordinated with the French Resistance to sabotage railways and bridges, along with electrical systems, telephone cables, etc. The purpose of this was to either halt or slow the movement of German troops and supplies into Normandy.

The Normandy Landings occurred on 6 June 1944 and by that time, Normandy was effectively isolated from the Germans. Thus, the only German resistance to the Allies had to come from forces already in place.

After the Landings, the Allies established a lodgment. To begin capturing territory, British forces conducted several operations to fix German forces on the eastern side of the Allied bridgehead. This allowed America's Operation Cobra to create a gap in the German line on the western side of the bridgehead, to break out of Normandy, and this allowed American forces to roll-up German forces as they poured into France starting on 1 August 1944.

How to supply the Allies as they penetrated the French interior? None of the available options seemed workable:

• The bridges and railways taken out couldn't be repaired fast enough
• Supply by air was impractical because airspace was not completely under control of the Allies
• Use of waterways was also impractical because the barges that would be used required rivers with sufficient width and depth. Also, the barges would need docks and cranes for loading and unloading
• Finally, the French roads were not wide enough to support the two-way traffic of large military vehicles.

Another option was needed!

What was the Red Ball Express?

That other option was a motor transportation operation called the Red Ball Express (RBE). Service began on 25 August 1944 in support of the First and Third Armies. One-way roads were used to solve the problem of narrow roads; these roads were dedicated to RBE traffic and operated on a 24-hour basis.

It was called the "Red Ball Express" because expedited rail freight was marked by red circles. RBE vehicles were also marked in this way.

RBE roads were closed loops that started in St. Lô in Normandy, but sometimes the drivers had to go north to the harbor at Cherbourg.

A variety of trucks used, including flatbeds and 2.5-ton cargo trucks ("deuce and a half"). There were two drivers per truck, and 73% of them were African-Americans. The convoys consisted of a minimum of 25 trucks spaced at 60-yard intervals. At the start and end of the convoy were jeeps that set pace, provided navigation, and (for the trailing jeep) acted as "cleanup."

The convoy's speed limit was set at 25 MPH, though convoys frequently exceeded that speed. While passing through villages, speed was reduced to 10 MPH. The drivers took 10-minute breaks every hour, but those were often skipped. They also took food breaks every 6 hours, lasting 30 minutes.

Once the convoy reached its destination, cargo was often transferred to other trucks for movement to the front.

Besides drivers and truck mechanics, military police were stationed along the route to guide traffic and prevent theft.

Road-Side Maintenance

Becasue of the operational tempo, regular maintenance schedules had to be abandoned. Instead, maintenance was provided in an ad-hoc manner using road-side maintenance stops, offering specialized services such as:

• Check battery
• Check wiring
• Check tires
• Check oil filters
• Check fuel filters

• Clean spark plugs
• Clean air cleaner
• Tighten bolts
• Clean windshield
• Etc.

This list was from a 1944 film produced by the Army Pictorial Service Signal Corps called "Rolling to the Rhine." Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PKRNYKoIEj0

When trucks broke-down, they were moved to the side of the road, allowing the rest of the convoy to pass. Wreckers were dispatched to move the truck to nearest repair station.

Wrecker pulling an overturned truck back on its wheels for hauling to a maintenance depot.
- Photo by Lawrence Riordan/U.S. Army, circa 1944.

Expanded Misison and Security Issues

As the Germans were being evicted from France, the front moved eastward, and it was necessary to extend the RBE's routes to Soissons and Verdun. RBE was also instrumental in providing aid to the now-liberated Paris.

Map from Bykofsky & Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas shows this expanded mission, with the solid lines representing the final route starting on 10 September 1944.

Cargo theft was common, with local French stealing cargo, and sometimes the drivers would sell their freight. German POWs were one of the things carried on the return trip, and they would commit sabotage by adding water to the gas cans (jerricans). For these reasons, police were stationed in towns, at maintenance shops, along routes, and at depots.

Statistics

The maximum daily amount of cargo moved was reached on the 4th-5th day of the operation, when 12,300 long tons were delivered, carried by 6000 vehicles. Over the lifetime of the operation, 412,193 long tons were moved forward.

Diagram from Dunham, U.S. Army Transportation in the European Theater of Operations, 1942-1945.
Dunham notes the wide variability of daily shipment.

Comparing RBE with Contemporary Commercial Drivers

Similarities

• Team drivers were used for the same reason: longer distances could be crossed in a single day.
• Both took scheduled food breaks
• Drove predetermined, regular routes, though with commercial drivers it is frequently possible to use alternative routes depending on road conditions.
• Both have on-the-road maintenance shops. For civilian vehicles these are primarily for emergency maintenance, but for RBE vehicles these were often routine maintenance.
• On the return trip, RBE trucks were not necessarily deadheading (backhauling an empty cargo container back to the point of origin.) Instead, they carried POWs, expended artillery casings, empty gas cans (jerricans), and bodies of Americans killed in action.
• Finally, both used escort or pilot vehicles. In civilian sector, these are ordinarily used to flag a wide load, but for RBE there is a security aspect.

Differences

• The primary difference between RBE and professional drivers is that RBE operated in a war zone, which meant higher stress levels and higher caloric expenditure.
• RBE used roads that were dedicated to RBE traffic which were exclusively one-way.
• The quality of the roads that RBE operated upon were significantly lower than what is found on typical modern freeways. This resulted in RBE vehicles being stuck in mud, slipping off road, etc.
• RBE took hourly breaks, which is to be expected when operaring as a driver in a war zone.
• As described above, there was no regular maintenance schedule for RBE vehicles, whereas commercial fleets have in-house maintenance shops that adhere to regular maintenance schedules.
• RBE drivers operated in convoys. This means that vehicles arrived at destination in a particular order, the overall speed of the convoy was determined by the slowest vehicle, etc.
• Finally, the "company" that RBE worked for was the same as the "customer" they supplied – both being the US military. With commercial drivers, the freight company is often different from the owner of the freight being carried. The primary exception to this is Amazon.

End of the Red Ball Express

As Allies consolidated their victory, more efficient logistics systems became available:

• Railways and bridges were repaired
• Ports closer to front were captured, like Antwerp
• POL (petroleum, oils and lubricants) pipeline constructed
• Control of airspace solidified

As these transport modes became available, RBE proved to be cost-prohibitive, and service was ended 16 November 1944. RBE-like operations continued in other parts of France, however.

The XYZ Express

Lessons learned from the RBE were incorporated into similar motor transport operations, the most successful of which was the XYZ Express.

Lasting from 25 March - 31 May 1945, the XYZ Express moved freight from France and Belgium to Allied forces deep inside Germany near the end of the war, sustaining the U.S. Ninth, First, Third, and Seventh Armies. The average daily lift was 12,895 tons, and a total of 871,895 tons of freight were moved over 63 days.

The XYZ Express. Map from Bykofsky & Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Conclusion

The Red Ball Express was the first use of long-range motor transport to solve the problem of moving supplies to a rapidly advancing front. Subsequent operations later in WWII (and beyond) incorporated some of the lessons learned from the RBE:

• Use shorter routes
• Utilize multiple routes to avoid congestion
• Use Experienced drivers
• More centralized command and control allowed for better scheduling

Bibliography

Atkinson, R. "Operation COBRA and the Breakout at Normandy." U.S. Army, 22 July 2010. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/42658/operation_cobra_and_the_breakout_at_normandy

Bykofsky, J. & Larson, H. The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas. Center for Military History, United States Army, 1990. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://history.army.mil/html/books/010/10-21/CMH_Pub_10-21.pdf

Carey, C. "The Red Ball Express: Past Lessons for Future Wars." Military Review, March-April 2021. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2021/Carey-Red-Ball-Express/

Dunham, E. U.S. Army Transportation in the European Theater of Operations, 1942-1945. Combined Arms Research Library, June 1946. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/5777/

Medford, E. & Frazier, M. ""Keep 'em Rolling" African American Participation in the Red Ball Express." U.S. Army Transportation Corps, December 1993. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://transportation.army.mil/history/studies/red_ball_express.html

Another Jus in Bello Evaluation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Just finished responding to a jus in bello analysis of Hiroshima and Nagasaki written by an active-duty Marine. He is a Staff Sergeant who is also an assistant instructor at a Naval ROTC program at a midwestern state university. Said Marine wrote an essay stating that using nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were morally wrong. He was using the same Just War Theory and he sites the exact same facts as I did in my previous post, but he drew the exact opposite conclusion.

Unfortunately his post is private and I don't have permission to republish it here. Below is my hastily-written response. If it wasn't so rushed, I would expand on the "non-combatant vs supporter" theme by writing:

Just War Theorists go through considerable wrangling to determine who is a legitimate target and who isn't. In her text, Frowe talks about how "wide" to cast a net in order to catch the right targets:
     too wide = all combatants plus some non-combatants
     too narrow = some (but not all) combatants plus no non-combatants.
If we do cast too wide, which non-combatants are to be included as targets? The obvious targets, like civilians working in armament plants, makes sense. I would claim that the "journalists" who screeched for war, the politicians who clamored for war, and the defense contractors who profit before, during, and after the war make for far better targets than the actual combatants due to the amount of harm they cause.

An assumption that needs to be checked is the "innocence" of non-combatants. It may be more accurate to call them "supporters" or "enablers," or at least some of them. Their innocence is problematic because of the way the general citizenry frequently get along in a totalitarian country such as Imperial Japan. When Germany was reunited after the fall of the Berlin Wall, lists of collaborators, informants, and other people who worked with the East German Stasi were released, and those were not short lists!

The following is my response to his essay.

Respectfully sir, you are wrong. Here's why...

In Chapter 5, Frowe¹ lays all the cards on the table regarding jus in bello criteria. After giving a straw-man version of "realism," the main part of the chapter begins by saying that jus ad bellum and jus in bello must be kept logically separate. One of the reasons given is that the combatants may be conscripts, therefore the warfighters are tools and cannot be held morally responsible for their leaders. Those who accept that reasoning don't realize that at any point in history where conscription was used, there have always been draft resisters. For those who do volunteer, Frowe states² that "by enlisting, they wave their right not to be killed in battle by the other side. They are therefore not wronged by being killed..." It isn't exactly clear how they give up their right to life, and many would claim that the right to life is one of the reasons why we do fight.

To get the Principle of Discrimination working, Frowe then attempts to distinguish between "combatants" and "non-combatants". A "Realist War Theorist" (the belief system I hold) would instead distinguish between "combatants" and "enablers" or "combatants" and "supporters," but let's continue with her dichotomy. For JWT, this creates a 4-way classification system - friendly combatants, our non-combatants, enemy combatants, and enemy non-combatants. There is much wrangling in Chapter 5 about the "value" assigned to the people in each class. There's nothing wrong with this.

On friendly combatants vs enemy combatants, the Just War Theorist Michael Walzer states³ "the moral status of individual soldiers on both sides is very much the same" and that "they face one another as moral equals." Really? By this, US Marines and soldiers are morally equivalent to the Japanese soldiers who participated in the "rape of Nanking." This was a six week long massacre that started when the Imperial Japanese Army invaded the Chinese city of Nanking⁴ in December 1937, during which 200,000 to 300,000 residents were killed, anywhere from 20,000 to 80,000 women and children raped, and 30,000 to 40,000 POWs executed.

An Imperial Japanese soldier, smiling, prepares to publicly behead a Chinese boy. Bettmann/Getty Images

Combining Walzer's position with the above quote from Frowe means our men are not wronged by being killed. As leaders, the men under our command are the most valuable things in the world. Those who have not been in that position would say "if they were so valuable, you would take them out of the combat zone." That only shows a lack of understanding of what warfighters and leading warfighters are all about: they follow you because they wish to follow themselves through you.

The Principle of Discrimination requires friendly non-combatants and enemy non-combatants to also be morally equal: they are both innocents not to be harmed. Really? When I read that, the following comparison jumped to mind: when 9/11 occurred, there were pictures of New Yorkers running away from the collapsing buildings, and there were pictures of people in the Middle East jumping with joy. People who hold non-combatants on both sides are equal must say that those are the same pictures.

Our combatants are more valuable than enemy combatants, and our non-combatants are more valuable than enemy non-combatants. This is why you fight for the men beside you and those behind you. This is also why you don't change sides. Believing this doesn't make you a “rampaging militiaman” as Frowe dismissively states⁵ (she's obviously never met a militiaman), it just means you have your priorities straight.

Regards,
Mike K

Footnotes

1. Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace.
2. Ibid.
3. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations.
4. Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II.
5. Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace.

Bibliography

Chang, I. The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. Basic Books, 2012.

Frowe, H. The Ethics of War and Peace. Taylor & Francis, 2022.

Walzer, M. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Basic Books, 2015.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a Jus in Bello Evaluation

Introduction

On 6 and 9 August 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, resulting in anywhere from 129,000 to 226,000 deaths[1]. In discussing the ethical status of these events at the conclusion of the War in the Pacific, it is common (perhaps universal?) amongst Just War Theorists to treat the two bombings as a pair, that they were morally equivalent, i.e. the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were both just or both unjust. Two other possibilities are not mentioned: that the bombing of Hiroshima was unjust but the bombing of Nagasaki was just, or the reverse, that Hiroshima was just but Nagasaki was unjust. These two possibilities are not considered here, subtle and interesting that they may be, and these events will be considered morally equivalent as the jus in bello criteria are applied.

Principle of Discrimination

The Principle of Discrimination presupposes that a distinction exists between people who are threats and those that aren’t, or who are combatants and who are non-combatants[2]. The Principle requires that non-combatants are not to be directly targeted by attacks.

At the time, precision guided weapons were decades away. Also, irregular warfare (assuming terrorist mass-casualty tactics are not employed) is capable of targeted killings (very akin to assassinations) and targeted destruction of infrastructure. America could not wait for precision weapons to be developed, and the War in the Pacific was not an asymmetric war (except for Mao Tse-Tsung's guerrillas fighting the Japanese in China).

The effective discrimination between combatants and non-combatants thus depends on the technology available and the type of war being fought. Evaluation of the use of atomic weapons must be based on those factors.

The targets of the use of the atomic bombs were not chosen to maximize the number of non-combatant deaths. Instead, they were chosen by the Target Committee for their military significance[3]: Hiroshima contained a major military base and embarkation port. Naval ordnance was manufactured in Nagasaki, and that city was also the site of major shipbuilding and ship repair facilities. One proposed target, Kyoto, was rejected because of its cultural and religious significance[4].

Because of all this, the Principle of Discrimination was respected in the use of atomic weapons: the targets were chosen so that facilities relevant to the Japanese war machine would be made unavailable.

Principle of Proportionality

The Principle of Proportionality regarding a particular tactic requires that the value gained by the tactic is "worth" the damaged caused.

No doubt playing in the minds of Americans was the recent (1 April - 22 June 1945) Battle of Okinawa[5]. In this battle, over 150,000 – 260,000 military and civilian personnel were killed on both sides[6]. These numbers are larger than the number of deaths at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. Absent use of atomic weapons, the Allies would have to invade the Japanese homeland. That operation, called Operation Downfall, was already under consideration and the number of American deaths were projected to be between 500,000 and one million[7], and that the operation would extend the war at least into February 1947.

It was expected that Emperor Hirohito would surrender following the use of atomic weapons, thus ending the war. If he did not, or if atomic weapons were not used, then the Allied invasion would go forward.

The value gained from the use of atomic weapons was thus the end of the War in the Pacific and the avoidance of what would surely be a costly land invasion. It is reasonable to say that the values gained exceeded the loss of life and damage that the atomic weapons caused.

Conclusion

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were evaluated according to the Principle of Discrimination and the Principle of Proportionality. It is found that while non-combatants were indeed killed, the targets were military in nature. Also, the number of deaths caused by the bombings were less than the number of projected fatalities that would result from a ground invasion of Japan. Thus, the use of atomic weapons to end WWII passes the two jus in bello criteria.

Mushroom Clouds over Hiroshima (left) and Nagasaki (right). Photos by George R. Caron and Charles Levy

Footnotes

1. Clayton Chung, Japan 1945
2. Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace
3. Paul Ham, The Target Committee
4. Ibid.
5. Joseph Alexander, The Final Campaign
6. George Feifer, The Battle of Okinawa
7. D. M. Giangreco, Hell to Pay

Bibliography

Alexander, J. The Final Campaign: Marines in the Victory on Okinawa. U.S. Marine Corps History Division, 1996.

Chung, C. Japan 1945: From Operation Downfall to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Osprey Publishing, 2008.

Feifer, G. The Battle of Okinawa: The Blood and the Bomb. Lyons Press, 2001.

Frowe. H. The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction. Routledge; 3rd edition, August 25, 2022.

Giangreco, D. Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the Invasion of Japan, 1945–1947. Naval Institute Press, 2017.

Ham, P. The Target Committee. Hampress Ltd., 2018.