Cheerful PDCA, OODA, and DOCA Loops

According to Goetsch & Davis, the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle is “a kind of generic, basic format for bringing order and logic to the problem-solving process.” It is not as detailed as a step-by-step process but rather is “a simple cycle that is allowed to continue until a solution’s results match the planned outcome.” (Goetsch & Davis, 2021, p. 274).

Similar cyclic processes are also used in military and local-defense contexts.

One of them is the so-called OODA loop (Boyd, 1995), which stands for observe-orient-decide-act. This is a decision-making framework that consists of the following stages:

• Observe – gather information from the environment
• Orient – analyze this collected information and determine its relevance to one’s mission
• Decide – Choose a course of action based on the orientation
• Act – the chosen action is then executed

So, for example, suppose you see a group of fighters (observe). You analyze the situation to consider whether those fighters are friends or foes (orient). If they’re foes, you decide whether and how to act based on their size, position, and resources and your own size, position, and resources. If you decide to attack, do so with extreme aggression! Wash, rinse, and repeat.

The OODA loop is fundamental to all military action. Defeating the enemy requires either running your OODA loop faster than the bad guy’s loop or obstructing his OODA loop such as through misdirection.

In principle, the PCDA loop is similar to the OODA loop, except that observation happens earlier in the OODA loop than it does in the PCDA loop.

Cheerfully Executing a DOCA Loop
From Reuter's Training with America's Militias

Another loop, performed mostly by local-defense groups and other groups practicing irregular or so-called “4^th Generation” warfare (Lind & Thiele, 2015), is the DOCA loop, which stands for Disperse-Orient-Concentrate-Act. The idea is that in the context of irregular warfare, dispersed groups of fighters are hard to kill because they are… dispersed, and they only become combat-effective when they are close together. The stages are as follows:

• Disperse – spread out
• Orient – analyze the situation and determine its relevance to the mission
• Concentrate – move close to each other (or otherwise work in some coordinated manner)
• Act – execute the previously agreed-upon plan

Because this is a loop, the next stage after the act is to disperse. The neat thing is that the group of fighters is at risk only during the “concentrate” stage when they are close together.

For example, suppose the fighters’ mission is to destroy an enemy’s railroad line. They start out as dispersed. They make observations (orient) about the location of the railway line and how heavily it is defended. If they decide to complete their mission, they converge on the railroad line (concentrate) and sabotage it in some way (act). The loop starts over, so they disperse. Again, wash-rinse-repeat.

The OODA loop is the more fundamental of the two types of loops and works everywhere, even in business situations (D. Brown Management, 2024). Besides explicitly calling-out the “observe” stage, the primary difference between the OODA and DOCA loops is the way they repeat. With OODA, fighters would then return to home base and report their results. With the DOCA loops, the fighters have the option of building upon their success and continue with the mayhem!

Fun stuff!

References

Boyd, J. (1995). The Essence of Winning and Losing. https://web.archive.org/web/20110324054054/http://www.danford.net/boyd/essence.htm

D. Brown Management. (2024). Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (The OODA Loop). https://dbmteam.com/insights/observe-orient-decide-and-act-the-ooda-loop

Goetsch, D. L. & Davis, S. B. (2021). Quality management for organizational excellence: Introduction to total quality (9^th ed.). Pearson.

Lind, W. S. & Thiele, G. A. (2015). 4^th Generation Warfare Handbook. Castalia House. https://ia802901.us.archive.org/27/items/4thGenerationWarfareHandbookWilliamS.Lind28129/4th_Generation_Warfare_Handbook_-_William_S._Lind%25281%2529.pdf

Analyzing the Russo-Georgian War of 2008

Introduction

The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 has the dubious honor of being the first instance where a kinetic attack (land-sea-air) was combined with cyber warfare. This paper starts with a recounting of the war, then describes two approaches to intelligence analysis: a purely academic approach, and a fact-based IT security approach. The intelligence generated by those approaches are then compared.

Map by Andrein at English Wikipedia – 26 August 2008

Background

Russia, along with South Ossetia and the Republic of Abkhazia, invaded parts of Georgia¹ starting on 1 August 2008. When the war "officially" ended on 16 August, the results included the loss of Georgian territory, displacement of Georgians from South Ossetia, the collapse of diplomatic relations, the establishment of Russian military bases in the captured territories, etc.

For purposes of this paper, the important part of the war was the fact that it involved a cyber attack coordinated with the kinetic attack. This was the first war where there was such coordination.

Based upon an after-action review performed by the Georgia Minister of Foreign Affairs², cyber attacks began on 20 July 2008, continued throughout the kinetic component of the war, and the last cyberattack occurred on 27 August. The following sites were targeted:

• Georgian Parliament
• Georgian Supreme Court
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Central Election Commission
• President Mikheil Saakashvili's official website
• US and UK Embassies in Tbilisi
• Various news agencies

The methods of attach included information exfiltration, website defacement, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.

The Georgian response was to create temporary websites on the Google Blogger platform and in general to move them to US servers, knowing that US servers would be difficult for the hackers to target. In addition, the President of Poland, Lech Kaczynski, offered to host Georgian websites.

Academic Analysis

In a 2010 paper³ published in the Small Wars Journal entitled "Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008", David Hollis analyzes the cyber aspect of the Russo-Georgian War. He does this from a very academic standpoint, though, and as a result he is unable to answer crucial questions about the cyber attack. For example, he is unable to correctly identify the perpetrators!

Hollis attributes the cyber attack to hypothetical "cyber militias" or "hacker militias." He proposes these cyber militias exist, but he fails to not only answer but even raise some very fundamental questions about these militias, such as:

• What is this militia's name?
• How many people are in it?
• How long have they been operational?
• What is their physical location?
• Who coordinated the cyber and kinetic components?

Hollis makes the leap to "cyber militia" with no real evidence! From the perspective of philosophy, he's making an unwarranted ontological claim.

At first glance, this doesn't seem to be a major problem: Hollis is just calling hacker groups or cyber criminal organizations by a different name: "cyber militias." The issue is that "cyber militia" is a loaded term, which slants the information analysts' perspective, and forces him to go down the wrong rabbit holes. Terms such as "hacker militia" and "cyber militia" are prejudicial language for two reasons. First, militias have a very specific nature, most importantly their command-and-control structure (this will be expanded upon shortly). Second, there is a potential ambiguity - cyber militias are an active topic in cyberwarfare research – does Hollis mean the same thing?

Hollis is cognizant of the first item, and from this he derives some unusual "lessons learned."

Operational and Intelligence Lessons Learned

From a security analyst's perspective, Hollis committed the error of focusing on one type of information (academic research) to the exclusion of other sources of information. It is worth reviewing the lessons Hollis derived from this approach because they're facinating unto themselves, and it makes for a sharper contrast with the results learned from IT security experts.

Hollis derives four "lessons learned."

Lesson 1: Engage Cyber Militias First

The first lesson is that cyber militias must be engaged. This lesson is both extremely common-sensical as well as radically unusual, for Hollis is stating that a country must make use of ALL the resources available to it, and to do otherwise is to leave "money on the table."

Like all things, militias have a specific nature, and to use militias is to use them according to that nature. Or, like Francis Bacon said, "nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."

To engage a cyber militia for an operation, they must be SOLD on the concept. One of the characteristics of militias is their unusual style of command-and-control: they operate on persuasion instead of on orders. Another way of looking at this is that a military leader would find commanding a militia to be akin to "herding cats." This shows that Hollis is indeed somewhat aware of the "militia mindset."

Since members of a hacker militia would frequently be self-taught, they have their own ideas on how to proceed, so there must be discussions of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). They must be steered to desired targets ("centers of gravity"), and their actions should be coordinated with traditional operations.

In a cyber conflict, both sides will have their own hacker militias, and the defender's hackers can take steps to track and monitor the opposing county's cyber forces. This includes examining server and internet traffic logs for signs of probing operations. Of course, chat rooms and other forms of comms must be monitored.

Lesson 2: Target Choices

As Hollis described, Russia's hacker militias performed preparatory tasks such as identifying enemy assets, performing reconnaissance activities, as well as probing operations. These probing activities must be practiced "low and slow" – in other words below the enemy's threshold of concern. Hollis is caucious that hacker militias are "eager beavers," which will put their level of activity above the enemy's threshold of concern.

The defender's hacker militias must conduct their own recon operations in collaboration with their intel community. And of course, they must identify, monitor, and protect their valuable assets (key terrain).

Lesson 3: Geographic Targeting

Once their hacker militias were operational, Russia employed them to create a communications blackout of the areas of Georgia that will soon be attacked in real life (IRL). The desired consequences of this blackout are: federal and local govts were unable to contact those under attack; it generated panic; and it created doubts about the competence of the federal government of Georgia.

Notice that this technique of geographic targeting allows for feints and ruses.

For the defender, cyber targeting indicates the location of an upcoming ground or air assault. Again, this could be a feint or ruse!

Lesson 4: Possibility of Hacker vs Hacker Attacks

Since both attacker and defender (supposedly) have hacker militias, these militias will attack each other. The defender's militia will become an early target by aggressor to prevent retaliation. So, the government should monitor their internal hacker community.

This has application to other nations: neutral nations should monitor their own internal hacker community to prevent being pulled into the conflict.

Training Proposal

Hollis' paper concludes with one recommendation: that to best train cyber militias, cyberspace "ranges" should be developed and used for force-on-force activities. These must be air-gapped (computers not connected to each other, either wired or wireless), but somehow integrate with physical domain so as to investigate various attack/defend scenarios.

Concluding Remarks on Hollis' Analysis

Without proof of Russian cyber militias' existence, his lessons learned, and his training proposal, are really ideas for how a hypothetical militia should operate and train.

Notice the lack of actionable information relevant to the Russo-Georgian War: by taking a purely academic approach, Hollis is not able to identify the culprit of the cyber attacks against Georgia, and is unable to propose concrete methods to combat cyber militias above and beyond: get your own militia!

Factual Research by IT Security Analysts

We'll now look at the approach used by IT security firms to analyze the cyber component of the Russo-Georgian War. There are many, many IT security analysts in operation, and their research is frequently put behind pay walls – they are for-profit organizations after all! We'll look at the analysis of one of these security companies: Packet Clearing House. Their analysis⁴ was published in ACM Queue.

Packet Clearing House (PCH) is a well respected business and has been in operation since 1994, and have built major parts of internet infrastructure. They also have experience in state-on-state cyber attacks: they detected and analyzed a similar "cyber skirmish" in Estonia in 2007. Like all good IT security firms, their investigative approach is fact-based: they derived information from server logs and attack methods.

Before looking at the details of Packet Clearing House's analysis, the attack methods used gives information about the perpetrators' abilities.

Data exfiltration is not described in detail in any of the references used, but data scraping implies a fair level of programming ability, whereas system penetration implies a hacking background.

Website defacement definately involved a hacking component in order to break into server a server. The amount of defacement determines the level of programming ability by the perpetrator.

This is somewhat useful information, since the skill levels of the perpetrator limits the list of suspects.

The Culprit

The REAL information comes from the DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks. As background, DDoS uses botnets, which are collection of internet-connected computers. Each computer is infected with a virus. Said virus repeatedly sends requests to a targeted computer, and these requests overwhelm the targeted computer.

Based on the IP addresses of the bots in the botnets, PCH determined that the botnets were located in Russia, China, and United States, and the server that directed the botnet attack was located in the US.

The IP addresses were the smoking gun – they allowed security researchers to identify the culprit: the IP addresses of computers in the botnet match those used by the Russian Business Network (RBN). RBN is based in St. Petersburg and may be state-sponsored. They started as an internet service provider, then moved into website hosting, and have hosted CP, spam, mafia sites, and malware. They have built botnets and rents them for $600/month. At one point in time, they were linked to 60% of all Russian cybercrime.

PCH's Recommendations

Based on the their investigation, PCH made several concrete recommendations:

• Foster a robust physical infrastructure
• Diversify the number of international connections
• Create one of more internet exchange points (IXPs) within Georgia - IXPs permit internet connections between points within country, and no IXPs means that local connections must go outside country
• Ensure domestic availability of domain name servers (DNS) - without DNS, websites cannot be reached using the website's name
• Work with computer emergency response teams (CERTs) to coordinate defense against cyber attacks.

Georgia followed at least one of PCH's recommendations - they now have 3 IXPs

Comparison of Results

Using only an academic research approach, the culprit is something unknown (at the time): cyber militias. The actions were symptoms without known causes, and particular actors were not identified. Finally, only general remedial actions were recommended.

In contrast, by using all available information, PCH determined that the culprit is a known actor type: cybercrime organization. By tracing this organization's actions back to an actor, PCH was able to specify that actor: RBN. Finally, PCH was able to recommend extremely specific remedial actions.

Weaknesses of Georgia's network infrastructure were identified by PCH:

• No domestic internet exchange points
• No domestic domain name servers
• Some reliance on servers located outside Georgia (Turkey and Russia in particular)
• Overall result was to leave Georgia open to cyber attack

Finally, the strengths of Russian hackers were inferred by PCH:

• Russian Business Network are talented hackers with years of experience
• They exploited weaknesses in Georgian internet infrastructure
• RBN began probing attacks prior to launching the DDoS attacks
• Russians coordinated RBN attacks with military action
• RBN continued internet attacks after kinetic component began

Conclusion

David Hollis' analysis of the Russo-Georgian War is extremely academic: it proposed the existence of hypothertical "cyber militias" on both sides of the conflict; it was unable to identify the actual perpetrators; and it provided no concrete remediation plans.

Meanwhile, the PCH used available data (both server logs as well as the histories of known Russian hacker groups) and were able to derive useful information: they identified the specific Russian cyber crime organization responsible for the attack; the devised a concrete plan to solidify Georgia's cyber defenses; and the Georgian government followed some of those recommendations.

The difference can be summarized as follows: what Hollis did not know, he invented. What the PCH did not know, they researched.

This is not to say that the academic approach has no value: Hollis' "cyber militia" concept my have future uses – for example, a research paper⁵ was published in 2023 supporting the idea that Ukraine should get its own cyber militia.

Footnotes

1. Details on the kinetic aspects of the war can be found in Kofman, "Russian Performance in the Russo-Georgisn War Revisited."
2. Georgia Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russian Cyberwar on Georgia.
3. Hollis, "Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008."
4. Stapleton-Gray & Woodcock, "National Internet Defense – Small States on the Skirmish Line."
5. Svantesson, "Regulating a “Cyber Militia” – Some Lessons from Ukraine, and Thoughts about the Future."

Bibliography

Georgia Minister of Foreign Affairs. Russian Cyberwar on Georgia. 10 November 2008. Retrieved 26 July 2024 from https://web.archive.org/web/20111117042929/http://www.mfa.gov.ge/files/556_10535_798405_Annex87_CyberAttacks.pdf

Hollis, D. "Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008." Small Wars Journal, 2010. Retrieved 18 July 2024 from https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf

Kofman, M. "Russian Performance in the Russo-Georgisn War Revisited." War on the Rocks, 4 September 2018. Retrieved 3 August 2024 from https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/russian-performance-in-the-russo-georgian-war-revisited/

Stapleton-Gray, R. & Woodcock, B. "National Internet Defense – Small States on the Skirmish Line." ACM Queue 9 (Issue 1), 19 January 2011. https://doi.org/10.1145/1922539.1929325

Svantesson, D. "Regulating a “Cyber Militia” – Some Lessons from Ukraine, and Thoughts about the Future." Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 6 (No. 1) 11 July 2023. Retrieved 25 July 2024 from https://sjms.nu/articles/10.31374/sjms.195

Some Lessons from Napoleon’s Russian and Italian Campaigns

Introduction and Background

Geography plays a role in all military operations, either allowing or hindering the movement of troops and supplies. Due to the wide area covered by Napoleon’s various campaigns, he encountered a wide variety of topographies, including variations in population density, rivers, unimproved Russian roads, and mountainous terrain. The sheer size of Russia itself becomes another factor. Together with the available logistics systems, these terrains presented Napoleon with numerous challenges and his enemies with numerous opportunities. This paper examines some of the terrains he encountered, considers the success to which various logistics systems worked, and how his enemies exploited weaknesses when the logistics systems failed in specific geographic contexts. We conclude with some hypotheses about why, when Napoleon’s logistics systems failed, his enemies’ succeeded.

As background, the primary means of supplying the Grande Armée were the magazine system, the use of purchasing agents, plunder and foraging, water courses, and carrying supplies either by individual soldiers or by horse drawn wagons . Magazines were inapplicable when campaigning into new territories, and depending on the terrain, the other means of supply would also become inapplicable, leaving the army dependent on what could be carried by troops and horse drawn wagons.

Retreat of the French Grand Army from Moscow, Intercepted by Russian Cossacks, 1812
- John Augustus Atkinson (1813)

Varying Population Density

Both purchasing agents and plunder assume that the army's area of operation was populated to some extent: purchasing agents must haggle with the local population to acquire the needed supplies, and plundering requires towns and farms from which to loot. The long march undertaken by Napoleon during the Russian Campaign crossed areas with varying population densities, some where the population was dispersed, and others that were densely populated - here, “densely populated” meant any place having from 70 to 120 people per square mile In the sparsely-populated areas, using the supplies carried by the troops or by horse were the only options for sustainment.

Foraging requires a suitable geographic environment from which foragers can hunt or gather food, wood, fodder, and other naturally-available goods. This became a problem during the march to Moscow since there were vast areas unsuitable for foraging . For example, large wastelands in Central Europe simply did not have the food to supply the troops and fodder to feed the horses.

Another aspect of purchasing agents, plunder, and foraging is that the large armies of the time would strip the area bare of all usable goods if it was stationary or slowly moving. To avoid “burning out” an area, the army must be kept on the march.

The Russians realized that the Grande Armée survival depended on agents, plunder, and foraging, and so they responded by evacuating and burning the towns and farms that Napoleon would encounter on his march to Moscow. By doing this, the Russians forced Napoleon to rely only upon his supply wagons and what could be personally carried.

Rivers

Rivers, if sufficiently broad and deep, can be used to deliver goods, but crossing them requires the construction of bridges. During the Battle of Berezina, the retreating French army needed to construct pontoon bridges – the existing bridges over the Berezina River having been destroyed. The battle occurred on 26 - 29 November 1812, and the river was not frozen. Napoleon ordered the construction of one bridge for the infantry . Once constructed, he dispatched a force of 7000 men across it to defend the far end . He then constructed a separate bridge for artillery. Once his army and most of the stragglers had crossed, he ordered the two pontoon bridges destroyed. This delayed the Cossacks and Russian Army in their pursuit of the trailing edge of Napoleon’s army. Unfortunately, those same forces were also located on the opposite side of the Berezina River – the side to which Napoleon just crossed.

Condition of Russia’s Roads

A man-made geographic aspect of Russian terrain were the unimproved roads. Unlike the roads of France and other western European countries, Russian roads were frequently just unpaved dirt tracks . These roads became quagmires during thunderstorms and winter thaws, and considerably slowed the movement of Napoleon’s troops and horse drawn wagons.

Except in cities such as Moscow, the roads weren’t sophisticated networks, and this limited the options Napoleon had for either reaching or retreating from Moscow. To avoid the resource-stripped areas caused by the French Army’s approach into Moscow, Napoleon wanted to take an alternative route out of Russia. At the Battle of Maloyaroslavets on 24 October 1812, Napoleon was forced by the Russians to retrace the path he took into Moscow.

Geographic Scale and Weather Variability

Another geographic feature of Russia that worked against Napoleon was its sheer size. Taking Warsaw as the starting point of the Russian Campaign, the distance between Warsaw and Moscow is approximately 715 miles, and the French army crossed that distance, carrying what they couldn’t forage, loot, or purchase. What worked against Napoleon worked for the armies of Tsar Alexander I: the Russians exploited this great distance by retreating before Napoleon, drawing the Grande Armée deep into Russian territory. This not only stretched-out their supply lines but also made Napoleon subject to attack by the Cossacks and the Russian Army.

The Russian Campaign lasted for over 5 months, from late summer to winter, and so the temperatures and weather conditions would change drastically over that time. As such, Napoleon’s army had to carry clothing and gear for multiple seasons.

Mountains

The Russian Campaign did not involve traversing mountainous terrain, though it would have if Napoleon went beyond Moscow. The Italian Campaigns of 1792 - 1801 required the French army to navigate through the Alps’ rugged terrain, and the steep and narrow passes made moving supplies and artillery difficult. For example, getting relief troops to the Siege of Genoa (19 April – 4 June 1800) required moving Napoleon’s Reserve Army through the Great St. Bernard Pass , which is the third highest pass in the Swiss Alps. Genoa fell before he could arrive, so Napoleon instead targeted the Austrians.

Conclusions

As shown here, the methods for supplying the Grande Armée were sometimes insufficient for the terrains Napoleon encountered. When they worked, they worked well, but when they failed, they frequently allowed Napoleon's enemies to exploit those failures. This sounds paradoxical at first: the Russians had to solve the same logistical problems as did Napoleon - why did Napoleon fail but Russia and the Cossacks succeed? This can be attributed to home-field advantage, but there were at least two other factors in play.

First, the targets Napoleon and the Russians chose were different: Napoleon was fighting the Russian Army, whereas the Russians were fighting Napoleon’s logistics system, as illustrated by the scorched-earth tactics, the fighting retreats, etc. Second, the Cossacks were fighting a completely different type of war: the Cossacks operated in a distributed manner reminiscent of America’s Colonial Militias after Benjamin Church taught them how to be militiamen. This would imply that the Cossacks were engaging in what would now be called “Fourth Generation Warfare ,” but significant research would be needed to prove or disprove that conjecture.

 

Bibliography

Bennett, L. “The Grand Failure: How Logistics of Supply Defeated Napoleon in 1812.” Primary Source 1 (No. 1). 2011. Retrieved 10 July 2024 from https://psource.sitehost.iu.edu/PDF/Archive%20Articles/Spring2011/LynchBennettArticle.pdf

Burton, R. Napoleon’s Campaigns in Italy: 1796-1797 and 1800. George Allen and Company, 1912. Retrieved 15 July 2024 from https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.241698/page/n1/mode/2up?q=bernard

Clausewitz, C. V. The Campaign if 1812 in Russia. New-Street-Square, 1835. Retrieved 14 July 2024 from https://clausewitzstudies.org/readings/1812/Clausewitz-CampaignOf1812inRussia-EllesmereTranslation.pdf

Jelineo, J. “Napoleon’s Logistics; or How Napoleon Learned to Worry about Supply.” Air Command and Staff College. April 2012. Retrieved 10 July 2024 from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1022125.pdf

Lind, W. & Thiele, G. Fourth Generation Warfare Handbook. Castalia House, 2015.

Mikaberidze, A. Napoleon's Great Escape: The Battle of the Berezina. London: Pen and Sword, 2010.

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (2nd ed). Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Military Geography of the Battle of New Orleans, 8 January 1815

Introduction

The Battle of New Orleans was the last great battle of the War of 1812. The Treaty of Ghent, the treaty that ended that war, was signed on 24 December 1814, but news did not reach the American and British forces until after the completion of the battle.

This post examines that battle from a historical perspective, taking a regional approach, at a tactical and operational scale, in the context of wartime.

Strategic Importance

Capturing New Orleans would have been a major success for the British – it would cripple the United States economically, for it was the port through which the Midwest’s farm produce got to market. Further, its capture would give British forces access to the interior of the former colonies. Finally, it was feared that the Louisiana Purchase would be nullified upon British victory, precluding westward expansion.

Physical Environment

The battle took place at Chalmette Plantation, a flat one-square mile swampy field located 5 miles downriver from New Orleans. Chalmette was bounded on the north by a cypress swamp and on the south by the Mississippi River. At the time, there were many tree trunks entangled along the banks of the Mississippi. Past the cypress swamp were wet marshlands. The western edge was bounded by Rodriguez Canal which was four feet deep by 10 feet wide. The eastern edge was delimited by drainage ditches running perpendicular to the river. (Greene, n.d., pp. 52-84)

Prior to the battle, in response to an earlier British advance, Andrew Jackson widened the Rodriguez Canal and constructed a 7-foot-tall parapet parallel to the canal, on the opposite side of the canal from the field. These ramparts would later be known as Line Jackson. The Line ran approximately one mile from the Mississippi to the cypress swamps. It then hooked westward, and the left flank was protected by Choctaws and Tennessee militiamen.

In anticipation of the battle, America had placed an artillery battery on the opposite (west) bank of the Mississippi within range of the Chalmette Plantation. The river was approximately 800 yards wide at that point.

Cultural Environment

New Orleans was the largest city in the region, and outside of that the area was rural. A network of canals was dug for transport, irrigation, and drainage in support of the agricultural economy. The dominant languages in New Orleans were English and Louisiana Creole, a variant of French.

The people of New Orleans knew that their city was a valuable target for the British, and immediately prior to the Battle there were rumors that the mayor and city council would surrender to the British. The rumors were so persistent that Andrew Jackson locked the town hall to prevent them from voting on the issue.

Composition of the British and American Forces

There were approximately 8000 British troops involved in the battle, all under command of Major General Sir Edward Pakenham. The commanders directly under him, including Pakenham himself, were all veterans of the recently concluded Napoleonic Wars.

The American forces were commanded by Brevet Major General Andrew Jackson of the Tennessee Militia. Under him were approximately 4600 men, 74% of which were from four state militias; the remainder were from the regular Army, Marines, Navy, as well as 52 Choctaw warriors and a number of Jean Lafitte's privateers. (Roosevelt, 1882, p. 341-346)

Prior to the Battle

The Battle of New Orleans was the culmination of the Gulf Campaign, the British plan to capture New Orleans and surrounding parts of Louisiana and Florida. Several earlier events are relevant:

23 Dec 1814 - A British advance was halted by a night attack by Jackson. Both sides fell back, with Jackson moving to the Rodriguez Canal, where he begins construction of Line Jackson.

25 Dec 1814 - Maj. Gen. Pakenham arrives and takes charge of British forces. To flood the ground between the British and the Americans, the Americans breach the Chalmette Levee. The effect is minimal, however. (Roosevelt, 1882, p. 341)

1 Jan 1815 - British and Americans engage in an artillery duel. The British exhaust their ammunition after 3 hours while the Americans continued firing. Pakenham withdraws.

The Battle

Pakenham’s strategy was to attack Line Jackson along two fronts. On the east bank of the Mississippi, he planned to attack the center and both ends of the Line. Meanwhile, British forces under command of Colonel William Thornton would land downriver of Chalmette, advance upriver along the west bank, capture the American artillery placed opposite Chalmette, and use it to shell Line Jackson by firing across the river.

Troop Movement 8 January 1815 (Jean Lafitte National Historical Park and Preserve, n.d.).

The construction of Line Jackson began near the end of the previous month, and behind which Jackson emplaced artillery - two howitzers and thirteen 8-to-24-pound cannons. The British planned to cross Rodriguez Canal and storm the ramparts using ladders, but the ladders never arrived.

The battle began on the morning of 8 Jan 1815, with the British hoping to use the fog to their advantage. Unfortunately, the fog lifted too early. On the west bank, Thornton ran into problems with the soggy ground almost immediately: his movement was slowed considerably, and he was unable to widen a canal to move equipment needed for the assault.

Pakenham began multiple attacks against Line Jackson. On the right flank, the part closest to the river, Col. Robert Rennie’s force attacked, partially collapsing the Line before being repelled. The largest thrust was by Major Generals Sir John Keane and Samuel Gibbs against the middle of the Line - they also had to retreat. Finally, a third force attacked the left flank by crossing the cypress swamp but was repulsed by West Tennessee militiamen and Choctaws.

As all retreat paths led through the field, the British were under constant fire from Jackson’s troops, both while advancing and retreating - apparently the British were unfamiliar with the concept of open danger areas. This long exposure to fire explains the high number of British fatalities and casualties.

Meanwhile, Thornton's troops overran the American artillery on the west bank. There were two problems, however: the retreating Americans sabotaged the artillery, and by the time Thornton arrived, the battle on the opposite bank was over.

The overall battle took no more than two hours.

Outcomes

Jackson’s forces suffered 13 dead, 39 wounded, and 19 missing or captured. Packenham suffered 291 dead, 1262 wounded, and 484 missing or captured. Among the fatalities were three of the British commanders: Gibbs, Rennie, and Pakenham himself. John Keene was wounded. No American commanders were killed.

References

Greene, J. (n.d.). The New Orleans Campaign of 1814-1815 in relation to the Chalmette Battlefield. Jean Lafitte National Historical Park and Preserve. Last retrieved 13 February 2024 from https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/jela/lost_riverfront/Part_1.pdf

Jean Lafitte National Historical Park and Preserve. (n.d.) Troop movement map, New Orleans Campaign, 1814-1815: Engagement of January 8, 1815. United States Department of the Interior / National Park Service. Last retrieved 14 February 2024 from https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/jela/images/map7.jpg

Roosevelt, T. (1882). The Naval War of 1812, or the history of the United States Navy during the last war with Great Britain, to which is appended an account of the Battle of New Orleans. G.P. Putnam's Sons.

Comparing Revolutionary War and WWI Soldiers' Experiences

Introduction

Since America’s beginning, we have been defended by both militia forces as well as regular military, but the sharpest contrast between fighters of the Revolutionary War and those of the First World War is made by comparing the militiamen of the War of Independence with the soldiers of World War I. This paper compares the experiences of those two types of warriors, examines the reasons for entering WWI, and how the history of that war and its veterans were erased.

The Militia Experience

The militia predates the independence of the United Stated by more than a century. It was a tradition that came along as part of being colonies of the British Empire, but the militias of the New World rapidly evolved into a distinct, uniquely American, institution. The primary opponent of the militias were the Indians, who conducted raids and ambushes by operating in small, mobile war parties. From Millet, et. al. (2012):

“Warriors would move stealthily, spread out over a considerable distance to avoid being ambushed themselves, and rapidly concentrate for a whirling attack—often at night, during storms, or in dense fog so as to catch their adversaries off guard and confuse them. Then the Indians would vanish into the wilderness.”

The militias, meanwhile, were still practicing European-style battlefield tactics such as close-order formations, loading their muskets using a fifty-six step process, then firing those muskets in unaimed mass volleys. The Indians easily defeated them, as “it was as easy to hit them as to hit a house.” (Millet, et. al, p.34).

The militias were slow to adapt, but adapt they did, for natural selection is a hard teacher. Commanders such as Benjamin Church (c. 1639 – 1718) began incorporating Indians into the ranks, learning from them, emulating them, and soon it was the militias that were using cover and concealment, attacking the enemy’s weakest spots, targeting and firing at individual enemies, conducting hit-and-run raids and ambushes, and avoiding tight formations. In general, the militias were practicing what would later be called the DOCA loop – disperse, orient, concentrate, act – as described by William S. Lind (Lind & Thiele, 2015, p.73).

It wasn’t just the fighting tactics that made the Colonial and Revolutionary War militias unique – the militia was a local institution, organized for local defense, and at least partially self-funded. It evolved naturally from a light infantry (not line infantry) institution to include cavalry and (later) naval components as needs and opportunities presented themselves.

The psychology of militiamen can be inferred from this quote (Millet, et. al., p.30):

“From whatever social class they came, once enlisted for an expedition the men who filled the ranks believed they had a legal contract with the provincial government that could not be breached without the mutual consent of both parties… Once authorities broke the contract, the troops felt no compunction against staging a mutiny or deserting in mass, even in the midst of a campaign. To the colonial soldiers these actions were legal and sensible, but to British regulars serving alongside the provincials during the colonial wars, such violations of military discipline were intolerable.”

Indeed, the attitude of the British regulars was exemplified by British Major General James Abercrombie who described the militiamen as the “rif-raf of the continent” (Millet, et. al., p.30), and to this imperious attitude and sense of entitlement one can only expect the average militiaman to respond, “rif-raf and proud!” Abercrombie’s point is salient, however, and this is one of the reasons the regular Army existed.

Cooperation between regular Army forces and the militia continued past the War of Independence. For example, at the Battle of New Orleans at the conclusion of the War of 1812, the Americans were commanded by a militiaman (Andrew Jackson was a major general in the Tennessee militia) and the American forces were a combination of the Army, Marines, and militias from several states. During the Civil War, militia-like (partisan) warfare was used by both sides, and John Mosby’s Raiders coordinated attacks and performed reconnaissance with the needs of local Army commanders in mind.

Reasons for America’s Entry into World War I

In the run-up to the war, Americans attempted to separate German culture from Prussian militarism, but we also felt kindred for the Allied nations (Neiberg, 2014). German actions soon forced us into the camp of Entente Powers.

First, American banks and businesses made massive loans to the Allied nations. If they didn’t win the war, those loans would not be repaid.

Germany invaded Belgium in 1914, and rumors of German atrocities against civilians began to circulate. This atrocity propaganda swept the U.S. leading to anti-German sentiment.

In 1915, Germany began unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic Ocean, and one of the vessels the U-boats sank was the Lusitania, which caused the death of over one thousand people including 123 Americans. Several American cargo vessels were sunk in 1917.

In January 1917, the British intercepted a telegram sent from German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmerman to the German diplomat to Mexico. In this telegram, Zimmerman proposed an alliance between Germany and Mexico, and if Germany were to win, Mexico would be able to annex Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. The British passed the telegram to the Americans, and it was publicized by the press on March 1st. The United States declared war on Germany on April 6th.

Comparing Wartime Experiences

The most obvious difference between the Revolutionary War and WWI were the weapons and fighting techniques. There was no Revolutionary War equivalent to mustard gas and trench warfare.

The militiamen and WWI soldiers had different views of their respective enemies. For militiamen, the enemy Indians could be depersonalized by race and culture, and the Redcoats could be depersonalized by political philosophy. The enemy of American WWI soldiers was different in language but were of the same race and similar culture. This explains why the American people attempted to separate German education, culture, and industry from the “imperial and military” Prussian state in the American run-up to entry in WWI (Neiberg, 2014).

The circumstances and reasons for hostilities during the colonial era and the Revolutionary War were completely different from those during WWI. For the militiamen, the stakes in the conflict were extremely personal and local, and they were vested in the outcome as the stakes were the militiaman’s home and family. The same cannot be said for the WWI soldiers – the war was distant and the causes were partially economic. Further, America entered the war with little national self-interest, which means the individual soldiers needn’t have any rational value for participating, and the same can be said for individual soldiers of other countries. Although America didn’t participate in them, this explains the Christmas frontline truces on the Western Front during Christmas 1914 as recounted by Wilfred Ewart (Ewart, 1920). These kinds of truces would never have occurred during the colonial era or the Revolutionary War.

There is the level of freedom of militiamen compared to WWI soldiers. The militiamen operated under well-circumscribed contracts, whereas the men under the military were under obligation for “the duration.” There was less local service and more service overseas. There was less local control (or even no local control) and more federal control.

Further, federal control included control over industries and manufacturing, with businesses and factories being nationalized. The economic subtext of the war was not lost on the populace, as American banks and businesses made huge loans to the Allies and thus they had financial interest in victory.

There was also resistance to America’s participation in WWI. To tramp down those protesting involvement, the Wilson administration resorted to propaganda - creating the Committee on Public Information (CPI) and the Creel Committee to fill all communication channels with pro-war and anti-German agitprop. The committee's output was targeted not at the enemy but rather against Americans, and when this propaganda wasn't sufficient, the 1918 Sedition Act was “[e]nforced enthusiastically by Justice Department agents” and “the Sedition Act gave the 1918 mobilization a vicious edge.” (Millet, et. al, p.410).

Operating in the background was the rise of Progressivism and Taylorism which minimized the importance of the individual in everything they touched. From the standpoint of a fighter during the Revolutionary War, this would be completely alien and anathema to the American spirit and tradition of freedom. Militiamen were the machine; WWI soldiers were cogs in the machine.

Most important, perhaps, is the sense of completion in their respective battles. If a militiaman survived a battle, he was sure to see not only the end of it but also the end of the campaign and the war as a whole. The same cannot be said for the American soldier in WWI, due in part to our late entry.

The Lost Generation

Gertrude Stein referred to American expatriate writers living in Paris as “a lost generation,” but the term soon expanded to refer to the entire generation of people that came of age during the First World War. The phrase was memorialized at the start of Ernest Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises, and the literature of that era projected hedonism, a disconnection from the previous generation’s values, and a recognition of the inflation that the price of achieving the American Dream was undergoing.

Three of the major authors of that period – Ernest Hemingway, E. E. Cummings, and John Dos Passos – were ambulance drivers during the war, and their works describe not only their wartime experiences (almost to the point of being autobiographical) but also include strong anti-war sentiments. An excellent example of this is found in Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms.

Given the parallels between Hemingway's life (serious drinker, American ambulance driver in the Italian army during WWI, met the love of his life after being injured) and the life of the narrator of A Farewell to Arms (serious drinker, American ambulance driver in the Italian army during WWI, met the love of his life after being injured), we must interpret the following quote from that novel as representing Hemingway's true outlook on the war:

“I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious and sacrifice and the expression in vain. We had heard them, sometimes standing in the rain almost out of earshot, so that only the shouted words came through, and had read them, on proclamations that were slapped up by billposters over other proclamations, now for a long time, and I had seen nothing sacred, and the things that were glorious had no glory and the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago if nothing was done with the meat except to bury it. There were many words that you could not stand to hear and finally only the names of places had dignity. Certain numbers were the same way and certain dates and these with the names of the places were all you could say and have them mean anything. Abstract words such as glory, honour, courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates.” (Hemingway, 1929)

The novel included several harrowing descriptions of what ambulance drivers must have experienced but notice that this quote is a rejection of not only the mechanics of warfare, but of the jingoism that surrounds the war-making process. This anti-war sentiment extended beyond ambulance drivers to the writings of American combat veterans (e.g., William March’s Company K) and to writers from other countries (such as the German Erich Maria Remarque in his All Quiet on the Western Front).

Erasing the Lost Generation

In the time between the end of the First World War and now, the history of the war was belatedly recognized, or the soldier's trust was betrayed, or its history has been outright erased and diluted. For example, no WWI memorial appeared in Washington D.C. until 1931, and that memorial was small in comparison to the Liberty Memorial in Kansas City, Missouri, built in 1926, which commemorated the same war. An elaborate upgrade is planned to the D.C. memorial for 2024.

Something that must have soured veterans of the Great War was the conclusion of the 1932 Bonus March. The Bonus March was a protest on Washington, D.C., in which thousands of WWI veterans and their families demanded early payment for the bonus certificates that were issued to them in 1924 but could not be redeemed until 1945. President Herbert Hoover ordered the U.S. Army to clear the protesters’ campsites, and the list of participants in this operation reads like a who’s who of World War II leadership. Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur had George S. Patton’s 3rd Cavalry advance on the protesters. The Bonus Marchers cheered the troops, believing that they were marching in their honor. The troops turned on their brothers-in-arms and responded with tanks, bayonets, and tear gas. The Bonus Marchers were thus evicted, their camps burned. The official Army incident report was authored by Dwight Eisenhower, then a military aide to MacArthur, and that report endorsed the whole affair. (Dickson & Allen, 2020)

An example of the erasure of WWI history is the story of how Armistice Day became Memorial Day in 1954, as recounted and analyzed by Kurt Vonnegut:

“When I was a boy... all the people of all the nations which had fought in the First World War were silent during the eleventh minute of the eleventh hour of Armistice Day, which was the eleventh day of the eleventh month.

“It was during that minute in nineteen hundred and eighteen, that millions upon millions of human beings stopped butchering one another. I have talked to old men who were on battlefields during that minute. They have told me in one way or another that the sudden silence was the Voice of God. So we still have among us some men who can remember when God spoke clearly to mankind.

“Armistice Day has become Veterans' Day. Armistice Day was sacred. Veterans' Day is not.” (Vonnegut, 1973)

Erected in 1921 and completed in 1931, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Arlington National Cemetery was to be the final resting place for the remains of an unidentified WWI service member, and so in a sense it was a WWI memorial. The purpose of this memorial has been diluted since that time, however.

In 1956, President Eisenhower (of Bonus March fame) approved the addition of the remains of two additional unknown soldiers to the Tomb, and in 1958 the unknown WWI soldier was joined by the remains of unknown soldiers from World War II and the Korean War. (Arlington National Cemetery, n.d.) The Arlington National Cemetery began plans to recognize a Vietnam War unknown even before the end of that war, but by 1984 only one set of American remains from Vietnam had not been identified. President Reagan presided over the internment ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, but the remains were exhumed in 1998 and DNA testing was used to provide a positive identification. To this day, the crypt dedicated to the Vietnam War Unknown is empty, and in 1999 it was rededicated to honor all missing service members from that war. (Arlington National Cemetery, n.d.)

In the span of under 80 years, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier changed from being the resting place of one unknown WWI service member to the resting place of a total of three unknown service members as well as missing service members from the Vietnam War. Its focus has changed to be a “distinctive, multigenerational shrine.” (Arlington National Cemetery History Office, p.207)

Conclusion

The militiamen of the Revolutionary War and the soldiers of World War I were different in fighting techniques, spirit, and relation to the government as a whole. One way they were similar was that both the WWI soldiers and the militiamen had their histories erased. This was described above for WWI soldiers. For the militia, it was the Dick Act of 1903: the Act created the National Guard which assimilated the militia’s symbolism (such as American Revolution Statuary) and the date of formation (according to their website, the National Guard’s official birth date isn’t 1903 but instead is December 13, 1636, when the Massachusetts colonial legislature organized militia regiments). The National Guard didn’t adopt the militia’s maneuver warfare or self-funding model, and most importantly the militia’s independent ethos was completely rejected.

References

Arlington National Cemetery. (n.d.). Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Retrieved from: https://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/Explore/Monuments-and-Memorials/Tomb-of-the-Unknown-Soldier

Arlington National Cemetery History Office. (n.d.). A Century of Honor: A Commemorative Guide to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Retrieved from: https://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/Portals/0/TUS%20Commemorative%20Guide%2020210924.pdf

Dickson, P. & Allen, T. (2020). The Bonus army: An American Epic. Dover Publications.

Ewart, W. (1920). Two Christmas Mornings of the Great War: Personal Accounts of the Christmas Frontline Truces. Harper’s Magazine. Retrieved from: https://harpers.org/archive/1920/12/two-christmas-mornings-of-the-great-war/

Hemingway, E. (1929). A Farewell to Arms. Scribner.

Lind, W. S. & Thiele, G. A. (2015). 4th Generation Warfare Handbook. Castalia House.

Millett, A. R., Maslowski, P., & Feis, W. B. (2012). For the Common Defense: A Military History of the Unites States from 1607 to 2012 (3rd ed.). Free Press.

Neiberg, M. (2014). Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917. Diplomatic History, 38(4). https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhu023

Vonnegut, K. (1973). Breakfast of Champions: A Novel. Dial Press.

Photobombing a Tragedy

Certain Christian sects have a proud tradition of "witnessing" - the adherents believe that they are in this world to witness tragedies, to minister to the sick and injured, and to spread the Word, thereby making the world a better place.

There is a secular version of this activity that is extremely relevant today: being an independent journalist. With mainstream media resigning themselves to being propagandists and high-profile agent provocateurs, an alternative is needed. Take for example the MSM coverage of AntiFa: you almost never see photos of them carrying hammer-and-sickle Communist flags, but they do. Without direct witnessing (observation), most people wouldn't know that they indeed fly that flag.

There is an activity that can be confused for witnessing, and that is "photobombing". By this I mean the insertion of oneself or one's group into a situation where they have no purpose being - beyond gathering publicity.

The presence of militias at the riots in Charlottesville, VA, is a perfect example of photobombing.

The primary participants in the riots were AntiFa and various neo-Nazi groups. Any reasonable outsider would have stayed at home and cheered as the two sides tried to kill each other, or they would attend only in order to witness events and spread the words that MSM reporters are loathe to speak.

Certain members of various militias decided to insert themselves into that mess with the stated goal of keeping the two sides apart.

In what situations should a militia or militia-like group take action? Here's some criteria. Action should be taken if one has proper:

• Training
• Equipment
• Manpower
• Mission
• Authority

How many members of the militia had training in urban operations, crowd control, etc? Of the people who went to Charlottesville, few if any.

Did they have the right equipment? None of the photos of the event showed them possessing riot gear, like face protection or shields. But they were "tacticool".

The militia presence consisted of about 32 people, not nearly enough do crowd control.

Then there is the mission: was there a clearly defined mission, carefully planned, with criteria for both success and failure, as well as a timetable? No.

Finally, there's the issue of authority. If Charlottesville law enforcement had deputized the militia members, then perhaps they would have a purpose there. They would be part of a well-organized law enforcement organization that did have proper training, equipment, manpower, mission, and authority. Trouble is, they could borrow the equipment but they could not borrow the training, so again they would be ill-prepared.

Did the police even want the militia there? There may have been a gentlemen's agreement, but nothing in writing.

Yet, there the militia was, where they had no business. They photobombed the riots.

Another disturbing aspect of the militia's participation is the large amount of media coverage it generated. The MSM lumped the militiamen together with the white supremacists. It didn't help that the militia members forgot to scrub their uniforms, and one was photographed wearing a Confederate flag on his uniform.

There was only one seemingly positive report about the militia's presence, a Washington Post article. The writing was so nebulous that it could be read as either a glowing review or a damning condemnation of the militia. An analysis of this article can be found on the Patrick Henry Society website which examines the ambiguity in the WaPo's article, and eviscerates the story as well as the subject of that story.

All this gave the militia a black eye, but other acts made it worse. One militia member created a "Hug a Muslim" video, and he also made overtures to the BLM, despite their explicit racism, in order to prove that militias aren't racist. What happens should the BLM start rioting while the militia is standing next to them? No comment.

Unlike some other people in the patriot community, I do believe that a professional and effective militia is a possibility. It requires eliminating drama and favoring substance over optics. It requires a lot of training from veterans, and the first step is for militiamen to shut up, work hard, and learn from the training. Even then we will never be as good as they are, but that's OK. We just have to be good enough to protect that which we value.

On Ammon Bundy and the Events in Oregon

The occupation started over the Hammonds. You remember the Hammonds, don't you? Dwight Hammond, Jr., and Steve Hammond are two ranchers from Oregon who, in 2006, were charged under the 1996 Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act (!) for accidentally burning 140 acres of BLM land adjacent to their own. They served a year in prison and paid $400,000 in fines. The federal government thought that this wasn’t sufficient, so in October 2015 the Hammonds were re-arrested and resentenced to the full 5-year prison terms.

Can you say “double jeopardy”?

The resentencing of the Hammonds was the primary reason for Ammon Bundy and others to occupy a wildlife refuge in Oregon. Ammon Bundy was under the influence of some thugs, or agent provocateurs, when he decided to be a part of this. They did this with no predefined means of communication with the outside world, no clearly defined goals, no exit strategy. It might has well have been done on a whim, as though it were a sit-in by narcissistic 60s-era campus radicals.

Notice that Bundy and the agent provocateurs became the focus of attention, by both mainstream and alternative medias. The Hammonds' plight was forgotten in all this, as were the concerns of other ranchers, as was the fact that the federal government owns most of the land in the western US.

What's the connection between the occupation of the wildlife refuge and the Hammonds, or the occupation and other ranchers, or the occupation and the BLM? There is none, and that's the problem. The occupation was all about grandstanding, and nothing about getting results.

If they had attempted to free the Hammonds, or gone after the judge or prosecutors who resentenced the Hammonds, or took substantive action directly against the BLM, that would have been different. Instead, Ammon Bundy is in custody, one of the occupiers is dead, and an opportunity has been lost.

There are three lessons to be learned here:

1. Never, ever, trust a man who is willing to die in glory but is unable to live with pride. Ammon Bundy's first mistake was trusting in such men.

2. We must remember our place: we are the flea, and we had better start using that to our advantage. Forget about strut and swagger, this is about taking effective action to regain our rights. Forget any visions of a surrender ceremony on the USS Missouri, it isn't that kind of war. We are surrounded on all sides, politically, economically, and culturally. The situation is dire, and we must give no quarter and take no captives. This doesn't mean that our situation is hopeless: do not forget what Chesty Puller said about similar circumstances.

3. No revolution, no political change, is ever born from immaculate conception. We idolize the Founding Fathers as much as the Left idolizes Che Guevara and Chairman Mao, but those idolizations are possible only because they are historical figures. The events in Oregon are here in the present, and we must act in the present, and we don't have the comfort of hindsight.

We still have time to make a difference, but not much time. We must act with resolve, not react in haste. We can make a difference, individual actions still matter in this time before the storm, but know this: once the thunderstorm starts, raindrops can no longer vote.

Words Unsaid

In October 2014, I asked for command of the PA LF 77th BN in Lehigh County; I went up to the regiment commander and said: "I want Lehigh County", simple as that. The appointment came through a few weeks later.

A few days after that, I got a call from the state commander. After some pleasantries, he said: "So, you refused to register with Selective Service."

"Yes", I said. I make no secret of it. I've had this conversation before, and I knew where it was going.

Several people within LF, upon hearing that I now had responsibility for the 77th, had approached state command about this, believing that it would be inappropriate for me to hold that position. They feared I would be "hating on the military", as they put it.

The state commander told them that he has known me for several years, that he has complete confidence in me, that the last thing I would do is "hate on the military", and that the subject was closed.

About an hour later I realized that this was the first time in my life when I had a conversation that started with "So, you refused to register with Selective Service" and did NOT end in "you're fired", or "you cannot go to school", or "we cannot hire you", or "you cannot get a drivers license", or "you cannot get a court date".

Decency is such a rare thing in this world, and it can only be repaid with loyalty, something that doesn't come easily to people like me. I've always had tremendous respect for the state commander, but on that day he earned my loyalty.

The next day, I told this story to Chris Smith, my ex.

Chris: "Well I fired you."
Me: "No, I fired you."
Chris: "I think it was a mutual agreement."

Whenever I'm fed-up with my job, or with events in the world, or with my own shortcomings, I think of all this, and realize that I'm the luckiest man alive.

Eyes on the Prize

We think of militias in terms of what they prevent - government overreach and foreign invasion. While militias can indeed defend against those, that’s a negative description. Think of it like this: a Catholic is a non-Protestant Christian, but being non-Protestant doesn’t tell you much about Catholicism!

So really, what does a militia do? More to the point, what does active membership in a militia do for us, individually? Everybody has their own answers; what follows are mine.

What convinced me to join was the expressions you see in people's eyes.

When you look into a man’s eyes, you sometimes see confusion and apprehension – he is confused by the present and fearful of the future. Other times, you see a sick kind of giddiness, as if he is being pushed off of a cliff, and no amount of his scheming can prevent it. On still other occasions, you cannot look into his eyes at all, for he is always looking at other people – he is trying to determine what to think since he is too lazy to think for himself.

No fire, no passion; no brightness, no eagerness.

Those are not the looks of men; those are the looks of chattel.

I grew tired of seeing that in people's eyes, and what it implies: that they are not men; that they are indeed chattel.

That’s why I joined a militia: the fire and passion in a militiaman’s eyes has not been extinguished; the brightness and eagerness remain. I want to be around such men, for they are the only ones worth knowing.

Now, why I stay in a militia is more about how our society got to this point.

Let’s face it: our popular “culture” and our “education” system do as much damage to our way of life as does the intrusive government. This is especially true of the education system.

We are taught just enough knowledge so that we can barely hold-down jobs we hate, instead of being able to use knowledge as the powerful and elegant tool that it is - and we are left with nothing but superstition, rumor, and opinion. We are taught that we exist for the state, not the other way around. We are taught that we should turn control of our lives and property over to "qualified experts," without questioning why those so-called "experts" are qualified and how they'll be held accountable if they aren't. We are taught that handouts are the way to success, not productivity.

We are taught that confusion, fear, and the lack of control are normal and acceptable – and if we doubt that, just ask what everybody else thinks.

Pop culture distracts the chattel, the government herds them, but it is the education system that produces such helpless people.

That is why I stay in: the militia is a rejection of this learned helplessness. Active members of a militia expand their comfort zone and learn to take care of themselves in that expanded zone. Then they repeat, repeat, and repeat again. Militia members are anything but helpless.

There’s more, though. To quote Nietzsche somewhat out of context: "Free from what? As if that mattered...! But your eyes should tell me brightly: free for what?"

Free for what, indeed!

If we don’t make our own future, it will be made for us. The militia is living proof that we can make our own future. It is human ability made manifest.

Those are my reasons for joining and staying in. Everybody will have their own. Some assembly required, and your mileage may vary. However you approach it, though, the end result is the same: not only freedom, but worthiness of being free.

The Freedom Fighter's Creed

Last Friday, the militia group of which I'm a member attended Operation American Spring in Washington, DC. This essay started out to be an "after action report", but the important details belong in another forum. Instead, this is a "lessons learned" report. I've been to plenty of protests in DC before, but this was the first one I attended as part of a group, wearing a uniform. Those two facts completely altered the dynamics, and the lessons I learned came to me as complete surprises.

Now from day one, people have been predicting that OAS would be a failure. That’s not surprising, especially given the goals as specified by its organizers: millions of protesters? Please. Obama, Boehner, etc., stepping down of their own accord? Whatever, ain’t gonna happen. And, OAS started on a weekday.

Besides all that, there were two very telling criticisms of OAS that came from members of the Conservative and Patriot movements.

1. "It will be a bloodbath"
No, it won’t, and no it wasn’t. The Bundy Ranch was an exception: the means by which government controls us is not through guns, but rather through behavioral psychology ("nudging") and, for those of us who fall through that net of propaganda, administrative sanctions. We who went to OAS were never in any physical danger.

(By the way, the government's reliance on administrative sanctions raises the following question: is the most effective way to combat such sanctions through a militia? This will be addressed in the future.)

2. "Militiamen don’t do protests"
This isn't a critique of OAS per se, but rather of how people participate in OAS. I find this one to be the strongest criticism of all. I have tremendous respect for the man who said this, and I still do: difference in opinion does not imply difference in principle. And, I don’t completely disagree with him.

Does this mean that when soldiers march in the St. Patrick’s Day Parade, they stop being soldiers? Did the WW1 veterans who participated in the Bonus Army march cease to be veterans?

No. What the writer meant by “militiamen don’t do protests” is that when members of a militia attend an organized protest, they aren’t acting in the capacity of militiamen.

But, we who attended OAS as part of a militia weren’t acting strictly in the capacity of protesters, either. What were we, then?

If there is one label that would be applicable, it would be "freedom fighters". Let this, then, be the freedom fighter's creed:

We do whatever it takes to win back our freedom. Period. We speak instead of remaining silent. We speak, we debate, we protest. If we can convince, we recruit. If we cannot convince, we sow the seeds of doubt. If need be, we fight with any available weapon. We don’t complain about “unfair odds” - we turn those into opportunities. If we find ourselves in a “fair fight,” we make it unfair to our opponents, however possible. We capitalize on our successes and we learn from our mistakes. We let the world know of the rightness of our cause through word and deed and example. The only constraints we have are those imposed by the dictates of our conscience and the limits of our ingenuity. 

No, I wouldn't call our participation in OAS a complete mistake. Sometimes, the lessons that are learned by accident, or in the process of failing, are the most lasting.

How History Is Made

The 2014 State Meeting of the Pennsylvania Militias started with a phone call from one of our members. We put him on speakerphone. He was on his way to Nevada to stand with the Bundys and against the Bureau of Land Management. Near the end of the meeting, we learned that the BLM backed down. Perfect bookends for that meeting!

History was made at the Bundy ranch on April 12th, 2014, but not in the way people expected. On that day, the BLM blinked. But they weren't the only ones - we blinked, too:
- Government overstepping its bounds - everyday event, alas
- Americans getting pissed-off at government overreach - that's expected
- Americans getting pissed-off at something other than 2A restrictions - that's rare, unfortunately
- Government flexing its muscle - that's expected, too
- Other Americans showing up in support - also kind of rare, unfortunately, but not surprising
- Government backing down without a shot being fired - now that's "off script"!

That last step is so unexpected, I believe, because we are "educated" to think that the world is shaped by "historical forces" and not individual actions. According to this view, history is something you survive, not something that you make. As such, whatever happens in our country is inevitable, and that we cannot change the world.

News flash: the world is changing all the time. But who does the changing?

On that day, it was the Bundys and their supporters who did the changing. The militiamen and other supporters went there not to make history, but to protect the Bundys from the government, to stand against tyranny. They were there not to be remembered, but because it was the right thing to do.

They made a difference, and that's all that matters. History comes later.