The Red Ball Express

In preparation for the D-Day Invasion, the Allies coordinated with the French Resistance to sabotage railways and bridges, along with electrical systems, telephone cables, etc. The purpose of this was to either halt or slow the movement of German troops and supplies into Normandy.

The Normandy Landings occurred on 6 June 1944 and by that time, Normandy was effectively isolated from the Germans. Thus, the only German resistance to the Allies had to come from forces already in place.

After the Landings, the Allies established a lodgment. To begin capturing territory, British forces conducted several operations to fix German forces on the eastern side of the Allied bridgehead. This allowed America's Operation Cobra to create a gap in the German line on the western side of the bridgehead, to break out of Normandy, and this allowed American forces to roll-up German forces as they poured into France starting on 1 August 1944.

How to supply the Allies as they penetrated the French interior? None of the available options seemed workable:

• The bridges and railways taken out couldn't be repaired fast enough
• Supply by air was impractical because airspace was not completely under control of the Allies
• Use of waterways was also impractical because the barges that would be used required rivers with sufficient width and depth. Also, the barges would need docks and cranes for loading and unloading
• Finally, the French roads were not wide enough to support the two-way traffic of large military vehicles.

Another option was needed!

What was the Red Ball Express?

That other option was a motor transportation operation called the Red Ball Express (RBE). Service began on 25 August 1944 in support of the First and Third Armies. One-way roads were used to solve the problem of narrow roads; these roads were dedicated to RBE traffic and operated on a 24-hour basis.

It was called the "Red Ball Express" because expedited rail freight was marked by red circles. RBE vehicles were also marked in this way.

RBE roads were closed loops that started in St. Lô in Normandy, but sometimes the drivers had to go north to the harbor at Cherbourg.

A variety of trucks used, including flatbeds and 2.5-ton cargo trucks ("deuce and a half"). There were two drivers per truck, and 73% of them were African-Americans. The convoys consisted of a minimum of 25 trucks spaced at 60-yard intervals. At the start and end of the convoy were jeeps that set pace, provided navigation, and (for the trailing jeep) acted as "cleanup."

The convoy's speed limit was set at 25 MPH, though convoys frequently exceeded that speed. While passing through villages, speed was reduced to 10 MPH. The drivers took 10-minute breaks every hour, but those were often skipped. They also took food breaks every 6 hours, lasting 30 minutes.

Once the convoy reached its destination, cargo was often transferred to other trucks for movement to the front.

Besides drivers and truck mechanics, military police were stationed along the route to guide traffic and prevent theft.

Road-Side Maintenance

Becasue of the operational tempo, regular maintenance schedules had to be abandoned. Instead, maintenance was provided in an ad-hoc manner using road-side maintenance stops, offering specialized services such as:

• Check battery
• Check wiring
• Check tires
• Check oil filters
• Check fuel filters

• Clean spark plugs
• Clean air cleaner
• Tighten bolts
• Clean windshield
• Etc.

This list was from a 1944 film produced by the Army Pictorial Service Signal Corps called "Rolling to the Rhine." Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PKRNYKoIEj0

When trucks broke-down, they were moved to the side of the road, allowing the rest of the convoy to pass. Wreckers were dispatched to move the truck to nearest repair station.

Wrecker pulling an overturned truck back on its wheels for hauling to a maintenance depot.
- Photo by Lawrence Riordan/U.S. Army, circa 1944.

Expanded Misison and Security Issues

As the Germans were being evicted from France, the front moved eastward, and it was necessary to extend the RBE's routes to Soissons and Verdun. RBE was also instrumental in providing aid to the now-liberated Paris.

Map from Bykofsky & Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas shows this expanded mission, with the solid lines representing the final route starting on 10 September 1944.

Cargo theft was common, with local French stealing cargo, and sometimes the drivers would sell their freight. German POWs were one of the things carried on the return trip, and they would commit sabotage by adding water to the gas cans (jerricans). For these reasons, police were stationed in towns, at maintenance shops, along routes, and at depots.

Statistics

The maximum daily amount of cargo moved was reached on the 4th-5th day of the operation, when 12,300 long tons were delivered, carried by 6000 vehicles. Over the lifetime of the operation, 412,193 long tons were moved forward.

Diagram from Dunham, U.S. Army Transportation in the European Theater of Operations, 1942-1945.
Dunham notes the wide variability of daily shipment.

Comparing RBE with Contemporary Commercial Drivers

Similarities

• Team drivers were used for the same reason: longer distances could be crossed in a single day.
• Both took scheduled food breaks
• Drove predetermined, regular routes, though with commercial drivers it is frequently possible to use alternative routes depending on road conditions.
• Both have on-the-road maintenance shops. For civilian vehicles these are primarily for emergency maintenance, but for RBE vehicles these were often routine maintenance.
• On the return trip, RBE trucks were not necessarily deadheading (backhauling an empty cargo container back to the point of origin.) Instead, they carried POWs, expended artillery casings, empty gas cans (jerricans), and bodies of Americans killed in action.
• Finally, both used escort or pilot vehicles. In civilian sector, these are ordinarily used to flag a wide load, but for RBE there is a security aspect.

Differences

• The primary difference between RBE and professional drivers is that RBE operated in a war zone, which meant higher stress levels and higher caloric expenditure.
• RBE used roads that were dedicated to RBE traffic which were exclusively one-way.
• The quality of the roads that RBE operated upon were significantly lower than what is found on typical modern freeways. This resulted in RBE vehicles being stuck in mud, slipping off road, etc.
• RBE took hourly breaks, which is to be expected when operaring as a driver in a war zone.
• As described above, there was no regular maintenance schedule for RBE vehicles, whereas commercial fleets have in-house maintenance shops that adhere to regular maintenance schedules.
• RBE drivers operated in convoys. This means that vehicles arrived at destination in a particular order, the overall speed of the convoy was determined by the slowest vehicle, etc.
• Finally, the "company" that RBE worked for was the same as the "customer" they supplied – both being the US military. With commercial drivers, the freight company is often different from the owner of the freight being carried. The primary exception to this is Amazon.

End of the Red Ball Express

As Allies consolidated their victory, more efficient logistics systems became available:

• Railways and bridges were repaired
• Ports closer to front were captured, like Antwerp
• POL (petroleum, oils and lubricants) pipeline constructed
• Control of airspace solidified

As these transport modes became available, RBE proved to be cost-prohibitive, and service was ended 16 November 1944. RBE-like operations continued in other parts of France, however.

The XYZ Express

Lessons learned from the RBE were incorporated into similar motor transport operations, the most successful of which was the XYZ Express.

Lasting from 25 March - 31 May 1945, the XYZ Express moved freight from France and Belgium to Allied forces deep inside Germany near the end of the war, sustaining the U.S. Ninth, First, Third, and Seventh Armies. The average daily lift was 12,895 tons, and a total of 871,895 tons of freight were moved over 63 days.

The XYZ Express. Map from Bykofsky & Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Conclusion

The Red Ball Express was the first use of long-range motor transport to solve the problem of moving supplies to a rapidly advancing front. Subsequent operations later in WWII (and beyond) incorporated some of the lessons learned from the RBE:

• Use shorter routes
• Utilize multiple routes to avoid congestion
• Use Experienced drivers
• More centralized command and control allowed for better scheduling

Bibliography

Atkinson, R. "Operation COBRA and the Breakout at Normandy." U.S. Army, 22 July 2010. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/42658/operation_cobra_and_the_breakout_at_normandy

Bykofsky, J. & Larson, H. The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas. Center for Military History, United States Army, 1990. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://history.army.mil/html/books/010/10-21/CMH_Pub_10-21.pdf

Carey, C. "The Red Ball Express: Past Lessons for Future Wars." Military Review, March-April 2021. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2021/Carey-Red-Ball-Express/

Dunham, E. U.S. Army Transportation in the European Theater of Operations, 1942-1945. Combined Arms Research Library, June 1946. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/5777/

Medford, E. & Frazier, M. ""Keep 'em Rolling" African American Participation in the Red Ball Express." U.S. Army Transportation Corps, December 1993. Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://transportation.army.mil/history/studies/red_ball_express.html

Some Lessons from Napoleon’s Russian and Italian Campaigns

Introduction and Background

Geography plays a role in all military operations, either allowing or hindering the movement of troops and supplies. Due to the wide area covered by Napoleon’s various campaigns, he encountered a wide variety of topographies, including variations in population density, rivers, unimproved Russian roads, and mountainous terrain. The sheer size of Russia itself becomes another factor. Together with the available logistics systems, these terrains presented Napoleon with numerous challenges and his enemies with numerous opportunities. This paper examines some of the terrains he encountered, considers the success to which various logistics systems worked, and how his enemies exploited weaknesses when the logistics systems failed in specific geographic contexts. We conclude with some hypotheses about why, when Napoleon’s logistics systems failed, his enemies’ succeeded.

As background, the primary means of supplying the Grande Armée were the magazine system, the use of purchasing agents, plunder and foraging, water courses, and carrying supplies either by individual soldiers or by horse drawn wagons . Magazines were inapplicable when campaigning into new territories, and depending on the terrain, the other means of supply would also become inapplicable, leaving the army dependent on what could be carried by troops and horse drawn wagons.

Retreat of the French Grand Army from Moscow, Intercepted by Russian Cossacks, 1812
- John Augustus Atkinson (1813)

Varying Population Density

Both purchasing agents and plunder assume that the army's area of operation was populated to some extent: purchasing agents must haggle with the local population to acquire the needed supplies, and plundering requires towns and farms from which to loot. The long march undertaken by Napoleon during the Russian Campaign crossed areas with varying population densities, some where the population was dispersed, and others that were densely populated - here, “densely populated” meant any place having from 70 to 120 people per square mile In the sparsely-populated areas, using the supplies carried by the troops or by horse were the only options for sustainment.

Foraging requires a suitable geographic environment from which foragers can hunt or gather food, wood, fodder, and other naturally-available goods. This became a problem during the march to Moscow since there were vast areas unsuitable for foraging . For example, large wastelands in Central Europe simply did not have the food to supply the troops and fodder to feed the horses.

Another aspect of purchasing agents, plunder, and foraging is that the large armies of the time would strip the area bare of all usable goods if it was stationary or slowly moving. To avoid “burning out” an area, the army must be kept on the march.

The Russians realized that the Grande Armée survival depended on agents, plunder, and foraging, and so they responded by evacuating and burning the towns and farms that Napoleon would encounter on his march to Moscow. By doing this, the Russians forced Napoleon to rely only upon his supply wagons and what could be personally carried.

Rivers

Rivers, if sufficiently broad and deep, can be used to deliver goods, but crossing them requires the construction of bridges. During the Battle of Berezina, the retreating French army needed to construct pontoon bridges – the existing bridges over the Berezina River having been destroyed. The battle occurred on 26 - 29 November 1812, and the river was not frozen. Napoleon ordered the construction of one bridge for the infantry . Once constructed, he dispatched a force of 7000 men across it to defend the far end . He then constructed a separate bridge for artillery. Once his army and most of the stragglers had crossed, he ordered the two pontoon bridges destroyed. This delayed the Cossacks and Russian Army in their pursuit of the trailing edge of Napoleon’s army. Unfortunately, those same forces were also located on the opposite side of the Berezina River – the side to which Napoleon just crossed.

Condition of Russia’s Roads

A man-made geographic aspect of Russian terrain were the unimproved roads. Unlike the roads of France and other western European countries, Russian roads were frequently just unpaved dirt tracks . These roads became quagmires during thunderstorms and winter thaws, and considerably slowed the movement of Napoleon’s troops and horse drawn wagons.

Except in cities such as Moscow, the roads weren’t sophisticated networks, and this limited the options Napoleon had for either reaching or retreating from Moscow. To avoid the resource-stripped areas caused by the French Army’s approach into Moscow, Napoleon wanted to take an alternative route out of Russia. At the Battle of Maloyaroslavets on 24 October 1812, Napoleon was forced by the Russians to retrace the path he took into Moscow.

Geographic Scale and Weather Variability

Another geographic feature of Russia that worked against Napoleon was its sheer size. Taking Warsaw as the starting point of the Russian Campaign, the distance between Warsaw and Moscow is approximately 715 miles, and the French army crossed that distance, carrying what they couldn’t forage, loot, or purchase. What worked against Napoleon worked for the armies of Tsar Alexander I: the Russians exploited this great distance by retreating before Napoleon, drawing the Grande Armée deep into Russian territory. This not only stretched-out their supply lines but also made Napoleon subject to attack by the Cossacks and the Russian Army.

The Russian Campaign lasted for over 5 months, from late summer to winter, and so the temperatures and weather conditions would change drastically over that time. As such, Napoleon’s army had to carry clothing and gear for multiple seasons.

Mountains

The Russian Campaign did not involve traversing mountainous terrain, though it would have if Napoleon went beyond Moscow. The Italian Campaigns of 1792 - 1801 required the French army to navigate through the Alps’ rugged terrain, and the steep and narrow passes made moving supplies and artillery difficult. For example, getting relief troops to the Siege of Genoa (19 April – 4 June 1800) required moving Napoleon’s Reserve Army through the Great St. Bernard Pass , which is the third highest pass in the Swiss Alps. Genoa fell before he could arrive, so Napoleon instead targeted the Austrians.

Conclusions

As shown here, the methods for supplying the Grande Armée were sometimes insufficient for the terrains Napoleon encountered. When they worked, they worked well, but when they failed, they frequently allowed Napoleon's enemies to exploit those failures. This sounds paradoxical at first: the Russians had to solve the same logistical problems as did Napoleon - why did Napoleon fail but Russia and the Cossacks succeed? This can be attributed to home-field advantage, but there were at least two other factors in play.

First, the targets Napoleon and the Russians chose were different: Napoleon was fighting the Russian Army, whereas the Russians were fighting Napoleon’s logistics system, as illustrated by the scorched-earth tactics, the fighting retreats, etc. Second, the Cossacks were fighting a completely different type of war: the Cossacks operated in a distributed manner reminiscent of America’s Colonial Militias after Benjamin Church taught them how to be militiamen. This would imply that the Cossacks were engaging in what would now be called “Fourth Generation Warfare ,” but significant research would be needed to prove or disprove that conjecture.

 

Bibliography

Bennett, L. “The Grand Failure: How Logistics of Supply Defeated Napoleon in 1812.” Primary Source 1 (No. 1). 2011. Retrieved 10 July 2024 from https://psource.sitehost.iu.edu/PDF/Archive%20Articles/Spring2011/LynchBennettArticle.pdf

Burton, R. Napoleon’s Campaigns in Italy: 1796-1797 and 1800. George Allen and Company, 1912. Retrieved 15 July 2024 from https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.241698/page/n1/mode/2up?q=bernard

Clausewitz, C. V. The Campaign if 1812 in Russia. New-Street-Square, 1835. Retrieved 14 July 2024 from https://clausewitzstudies.org/readings/1812/Clausewitz-CampaignOf1812inRussia-EllesmereTranslation.pdf

Jelineo, J. “Napoleon’s Logistics; or How Napoleon Learned to Worry about Supply.” Air Command and Staff College. April 2012. Retrieved 10 July 2024 from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1022125.pdf

Lind, W. & Thiele, G. Fourth Generation Warfare Handbook. Castalia House, 2015.

Mikaberidze, A. Napoleon's Great Escape: The Battle of the Berezina. London: Pen and Sword, 2010.

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (2nd ed). Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa: Decomposition of Data Analysis

Introduction

The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa[1] was a 2009 novella authored by Michael L. Burgoyne and Albert "Jim" Marckwardt explaining one way to conduct successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq. Its narrative style was based on Ernest Swinton’s The Defense of Duffer’s Drift[2]: in both, the protagonist repeats the same scenario repeatedly, each time learning from the last. Through each evolution, the protagonist learns from his (sometimes) deadly mistakes, and by the end he succeeds in his mission.

The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa was later converted into six computer animated videos by TRADOC. The goal of this paper is to perform a decomposition of data analysis of the events in the fifth video[3] of that series. The major actors will be described, as well as the actions they take. Then, the targets, objectives, and effects (results or consequences) will be analyzed. The implications of these actions for intelligence analysis are described. Finally, the lessons the protagonist learned in this evolution will be described.

Note: in an earlier post[4], the COIN operarions at al-Doreaa was examined using RAFT (Relationships, Actors, Functions, and Tensions) Analysis.

Actors and Initial Actions

2LT Phil Connors

The main actor is 2LT Phil Connors. He establishes a combat outpost (COP) in the Iraqi town called al-Doreaa with the goal of providing a base of operations for his men as well as providing security and other aid to the town. He obtains humanitarian aid (HA) packages for the townsfolk. He is aware of local customs and follows them, including greeting rituals, eating with the right hand, and not objecting to women wearing burkas.

Mayor Hussein

The town’s mayor, Mayor Hussein, describes the condition of al-Doreaa to 2LT Connors. He has three children: two daughters and one son. He tells Connors about his town's needs which includes medical services, stable electricity, and clean water. He is of the opinion that America’s promises have exceeded the results.

Mohammed the Interpreter

Mohammed, Connors’ interpreter, works with the American forces and interacts with the townsfolk. This puts him in potential danger, so Connors reviews steps he must take to maintain his safety.

Bill White from USAID

Bill White, who works for the USAID, travels with his team to the town to work on the water system. His team carries only rifles. He meets with Connors, but Connors did not know that USAID would be there. Connors believes the USAID team's defensives are insufficient for the town.

Insurgent Groups

There are insurgent groups in the area. For reasons explained below, they will be called Insurgents #1, #2, and #3.

Actions

During the initial meeting with Mayor Hussein, Connors provides some personal info about his life to build rapport. The mayor tells him of some of the town’s problems (no water, intermittent electricity, and no medical clinic). He also lets Connors know about his son’s health. Connors has a medic treat his son, stating that frequent follow-up care will be needed.

On the way back to the COP, Conners meets with Bill White and his USAID team. Connors asks if he has security. He says he has rifles but asks if Connors can provide security while he works on the town’s water system. Throwing shade (Connors thinks of them as “yahoos” and “cowboys or morons”), Connors says he cannot provide security, even though Mayor Hussein expressed the need for water. White protests, stating that he won’t be able to return for another month. Connors again refuses to provide security, and White and the rest of the USAID team drives off.

At the base, Connors believes that the meeting with the mayor went well, and one of his troops stated that the HA packages were popular with the townsfolk, who reciprocated with a little info on the insurgents. Mohammed alerts Connors to the mayor: if the mayor really is in charge, he can’t be trusted since he knows local insurgents. One of Connors’ soldiers, Specialist Wilson, reports that the south side of town is dangerous at night. He says this while sweeping the Americans and Muhammed with his rifle.

At this point, the COP comes under mortar attack from Insurgents #1. They request rotary wing support, and one of Connors’ soldiers is killed. Realizing that if his troops struck out blindly at the population, that would get the townsfolk to side with the insurgents. Connors meets with his sergeants and encourages them to act with restraint.

Connors pays a visit to the mayor the next morning. The mayor heard about the attack but didn’t know of the fatality. Connors asks if he knew who committed the attack. The mayor doesn’t know, but he states that some unemployed young men in town can be persuaded by outsiders. The mayor also provides info about the outsiders’ approximate location (house with a blue gate). He will not help Connors find the exact location because it will put him in danger.

On the way back to the COP, Connors confirms what the mayor says, but cannot narrow down the exact location, as there are three houses with blue gates. At the COP, Connors combines info from his other soldiers to determine the exact house from which Insurgents #2 operates.

Connors establishes an observation post (OP) close to that house to monitor activity. The OP reports five males are transferring items out of a car but cannot confirm that they are weapons. Connors and team raid the house. They kill at least two of the insurgents and capture at least two others. They also capture a weapons cache that includes a mortar.

For several weeks after the raid, no further attacks occurred. Connors arranged for a medical team to work at the town, and he provided the town with cases of bottled water. He also had weekly dinner with Mayor Hussein to plan future improvements.

Because there were no other attacks in al-Doreaa, Conners’ team was repositioned north. He met with the mayor to let him know they were leaving. Connors thought everything would be OK – he believed the insurgency had come to an end in that area.

Several days later, Connors saw a news report stating that al-Doreaa was seized by Insurgents #3. He didn’t believe this happened – the town had been free of insurgents when he departed. Insurgents #3 posted a video online showing them executing several individuals, including the mayor and (maybe) Mohammed the interpreter.

Connors thus arrives at the following lessons:

1. Counterinsurgency requires unity of effort between the military, NGOs, the host nation, and other elements of national power.
2. Established informants must be protected after Coalition forces leave.
3. Operations must be transferred to local security forces and local government officials.

Finis.

Targets, Objectives, and Effects (Consequences) of the Acts

In dismissing the USAID personnel, Conners prevented the town from receiving reliable clean water for at least a month. He did this even though the mayor explicitly stated that this was something the town needed. Supplying the town with cases of bottled water was thus only a stop-gap measure. This also reinforces the mayor’s opinion that American forces were promising more than they were delivering.

By reminding his men not to take broad action in response to his man’s death, Connors avoided creating animosity with the townsfolk. This goodwill allowed him to pinpoint the location of Insurgents #2, and to capture or kill them and their weapons cache, rendering Insurgents #2 inoperative. Since several insurgents were captured alive, this would be an intelligence source that can be used. Finally, it alerted other insurgents that the town was secure, and that they should delay their actions until the Americans leave.

Insurgents #3 captured the town and executed several people including Mayor Hussein and (maybe) Mohammed the Interpreter. This instilled fear into the rest of the town – the lesson being that cooperation with Americans would lead to death. Insurgents #3 also posted video of these executions online. The effects of this were to instill fear in American sympathizers throughout Iraq, to act as a morale booster for other insurgents, and to recruit new insurgents from across the globe. Finally, it led to the demoralization of one 2LT Phil Connors.

Intelligence Implications

The insurgents appeared three times in this story: first, when the COP came under attack; second, when insurgents occupied a house and used it as a weapons cache; third, when the insurgents reentered the town and executed townsfolk who acted as informants or cooperated with the Americans.

It cannot be assumed that these were all the same insurgents. The mayor explicitly stated that outsiders were recruiting locals to work for them. Further, the weapons house insurgents (Insurgents #2) cannot be the same as the ones who executed townsfolk (Insurgents #3), since they were either captured or killed in the raid. Finally, the insurgents who attacked the COP (Insurgents #1) may or may not be the same as the ones captured at the weapons house (Insurgents #2). A mortar was found at the house, along with several shells, so they may have been the same. Only information gathered from the captured insurgents as well as forensic examination of the weapons can determine if the weapons house insurgents (Insurgents #2) were the same ones who attacked the COP (Insurgents #1).

Conclusion

The fifth evolution of The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa demonstrated the need for cooperation between the military, NGOs, and local government to successfully fight insurgents – and that one reason for a lack of cooperation is inter-agency rivalry. It also showed that when American forces leave an area, control must be transferred to local security and local government. In this fictitious example, local security apparently didn’t exist, and the mayor was truly not in charge, as demonstrated by his fear of helping the Americans. Thus, if local security or competent government don’t exist, they must be established before Americans leave the area. If not, then not only are the locals who work for Americans in danger, but also any progress the Americans make will be destroyed.

Footnotes

[1] Burgoyne & Marckwardt, The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa.
[2] Swinton, The Defense of Duffer’s Drift..
[3] TRADOC, “The Defense of Jisr Al Doreaa – Dream 5.”
[4] Klepper, “Jasr Al Doreaa: RAFT Analysis.”

Bibliography

Burgoyne, M. & Marckwardt, A. The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa. University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Klepper, M. "Jasr Al Doreaa: RAFT Analysis." The Other Side of History, 19 April 2024. Retrieved 13 July 2024 from https://the-other-side-of-history.blogspot.com/2024/04/jasr-al-doreaa-raft-analysis.html

Swinton, E. The Defense of Duffer’s Drift. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Originally published 1906. Retrieved 13 July 2024 from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/swinton.pdf

TRADOC. “The Defense of Jisr Al Doreaa – Dream 5.” YouTube Video, 17:49. 9 May 2013. Retrieved 13 July 2024 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYFB0zAcZl4

The Russian Winter of 1812 and Napoleon’s Defeat

Why is Napoleon’s loss of the Invasion of Russia so often attributed to the winter weather? Here’s a theory: in the decades following Napoleon’s exit from Russia, artists chose to portray the defeat as occurring in winter because paintings of soldiers bogged-down in snow is simply more visually interesting than paintings of logistics failures. These paintings, each worth at least a thousand words, carried the impression of winter hardship to anyone who has ever seen them.

Napoleon's retreat from Moscow - Adolph Northen (1851)

French Retreat from Russia in 1812 - Illarion Mikhailovich Pryanishnikov (1874)

Night Bivouac of Great Army - Vasilïĭ Vereshchagin (1896-1897)

Épisode de la campagne de Russie - Nicolas-Toussaint Charlet (1836)

The visceral impact of those images is greater than the paintings showing Napoleon arriving at Moscow, finding it burned to prevent him from using it to his advantage.

Napoleon in Burning Moscow - Adam Albrecht (1841)

Before Moscow waiting for the Boyars' Deputation - Vasilïĭ Vereshchagin (1891)

Vasilïĭ Vereshchagin, who in 1891-1897 created a whole series of drawings and paintings about the French Invasion of Russia, was one of the few artists who painted both Napoleon’s arrival at and departure from Moscow. His description of the burning of Moscow was certainly intense, but he was unable to carry that vehemence into his painting of Napoleon overlooking the burning city:

The earth was so hot that it was impossible to touch it. Boots were no protection; the ground scorched the feet even through leather soles. Eye-witnesses assert that molten lead and copper were flowing in streams along the streets. Strangers were astonished to observe that the inhabitants looked upon their burning houses without a trace of emotion. Their religious faith must undoubtedly have sustained them, for they placed ikons before the houses they abandoned, after quietly making the sign of the cross, without lamentation, or weeping, or wringing of hands.

Of course, all this is just a theory. Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture represented the overall Russian defiance during Napoleon’s campaign and can be equally attached to the Battle of Borodino as to the Cossacks’ harassment of the Grand Armée during its retreat from Moscow. Having not read Tolstoy’s War and Peace, I cannot describe how it portrayed the causes of Napoleon’s defeat.

Bibliography

Vereshchagin, V. "1812" Napoleon I in Russia. London: William Heinemann. 1899. Retrieved 11 July 2024 from https://www.gutenberg.org/files/51418/51418-h/51418-h.htm

Logistics in Napoleon’s Campaigns

Introduction

This paper compares the approaches Napoleon took to solve (or attempt to solve) logistics problems involved in the 1805 Austerlitz Campaign and the 1812 Russian Campaign. From a logistics standpoint, the difference between the two campaigns was the distance Napoleon would have to travel outside France’s borders – Moscow is approximately 1,100 miles further away from France than Austerlitz. Napoleon’s solutions for each of these campaigns will be described, and in the conclusion the strengths and weaknesses of each will be listed.

Napoleon Crossing the Alps (painting by Jacques-Louis David, 1805)

Austerlitz Campaign

Prior to the Austerlitz Campaign into Austria, France was using magazines (prepositioned caches) to provide the army with supplies. The problem with magazines was that they limited the movements of the army, and the Austerlitz Campaign would reach far beyond France’s borders.

France had long used a taxation-like system to fund its military, but the increasing size of the French Army made the tax a severe burden on the French people. The Committee of Public Safety provided a solution: they ordered commanders to procure goods from the populace of countries being invaded using the “contribution system” – the military threatened the locals to provide supplies. The military would thus be exporting the French Revolution, and campaigns would be funded by the nations under attack[1].

At the start of the Austerlitz Campaign, Napoleon realized that the contribution system would be unpopular amongst the subjugated people. To compensate for this, he modified the system once he crossed the Rhine on 29 September 1805: Napoleon would give receipts to the suppliers so that they can be later reimbursed[2].

As Napoleon approached the Danube River, his force captured several Austrian supply magazines. These captured magazines would, together with the supplies gathered from the modified contribution system, allow Napoleon to defeat Austria at Austerlitz on 2 December 1805[3].

The Russian Campaign

Napoleon’s planning for the Russian Campaign began in 1810, when Tsar Alexander I left the Continental System, the European blockade of Great Britain. Napoleon’s intention was to capture Moscow and convince Alexander to rejoin the blockade.

Two years prior, Napoleon supplemented civilian transport contractors with a seven-battalion transportation service, the train des équipages, each of these battalions consisting of 600 wagon teams. As the Russian Campaign approached, he increased the size of the train des équipages to 26 battalions, which could carry 9,200 tons of supplies approximately 10 miles per day to the front. To minimize the stress the 600,000+ soldiers in the Grande Armée would place on the local economy, Napoleon established five different supply routes for his army to assemble at Vistula, Poland, the city from which the march to Moscow would begin[4].

The invasion began on 24 June 1812. The campaign ran into problems immediately: the five supply routes to Vistula lacked fodder for the horses, and many of them died. The roads into Russia turned to mud because of thunderstorms, and this slowed the French Army’s progress.

On 14 September, Napoleon arrived in Moscow, but he found it to be burning: the Russians were making sure the Grande Armée had to rely on their own supplies.

He stayed in Moscow a total of five weeks (three weeks longer than planned[5]) in order to negotiate with Alexander. During this time, Russian Cossacks attacked French supply lines and foraging partners.

Alexander refused to negotiate, and on 19 October, the French Army left Moscow. To avoid the resource-stripped area caused by the French Army’s approach into Moscow, Napoleon wanted to take an alternative route out of Russia. At the Battle of Maloyaroslavets on 24 October, the Russians forced Napoleon to retrace the path he took into Moscow. The Cossacks continued harassing the French Army, and on 5 December, Napoleon transferred command of the French Army to an assistant and returned to Paris. The French Army left Russian territory on 14 December.

Conclusion

The time surrounding the two campaigns demonstrate the evolution of logistics under Napoleon. The Austerlitz Campaign saw the introduction of the modified contribution system. An army of any significant size would put considerable strain on the local populace, and the idea of receipts that would be covered by the French Treasury would lessen that strain – assuming the receipts would be honored.

In the years leading up to the Russian Campaign, Napoleon clearly understood that magazines, foraging, and the modified contribution system would be insufficient for the much more extended march to Moscow[6]. This is why he introduced the train des équipages, starting it at seven battalions and later increasing it to 26 battalions. The train des équipages depended on the existence of quality roads, and they were vulnerable to attacks from the Cossacks.

The limits of the train des équipages and modified contribution system were shown in the Russian Campaign, and the French Army did have to resort to foraging. The Russians knew how to combat this: they used scorched-earth tactics. These tactics forced Napoleon to rely on his existing supplies, and Napoleon was thus defeated[7].

Footnotes

[1] Jelineo, “Napoleon’s Logistics.”

[2] Ibid.

[3] Van Creveld, Supplying War, pp. 44-61.

[4] Jelineo, “Napoleon’s Logistics.”

[5] Van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 64.

[6] Hardemon, "General Logistics Paradigm.”

[7] Bennett, “The Grand Failure.”

Bibliography

Bennett, L. “The Grand Failure: How Logistics of Supply Defeated Napoleon in 1812.” Primary Source 1 (No. 1). 2011. Retrieved 10 July 2024 from https://psource.sitehost.iu.edu/PDF/Archive%20Articles/Spring2011/LynchBennettArticle.pdf

Hardemon, R. "General Logistics Paradigm: A Study of the Logistics of Alexander, Napoleon, and Sherman" (1998). Theses and Dissertations. 5650. Retrieved 10 July 2024 from https://scholar.afit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6653≈context=etd

Jelineo, J. “Napoleon’s Logistics; or How Napoleon Learned to Worry about Supply.” Air Command and Staff College. April 2012. Retrieved 10 July 2024 from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1022125.pdf

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (2nd ed). Cambridge University Press, 2004.

The Berlin Airlift: An Example of a Whole-of-Society Operation

Introduction

Whole-of-society operations are ones where not only the militaries of multiple nations jointly act, but also where civilian government agencies as well as individual civilians act in a coordinated manner to achieve some common objective. The goal of these types of operations can involve mutual defense but can also include humanitarian operations.

This paper discusses the Berlin Airlift, the largest humanitarian airlift in history. This airlift countered the starvation that would result from the Soviet Union’s blockade of all ground and waterway goods meant for West Berlin. The Airlift, conducted by the US Air Force and the Royal Air Force along with other nations and several civilian agencies, demonstrated the West’s ability to successfully respond to Soviet expansionism. It was also a proving ground for the capabilities of the USAF, which was established as a separate agency only nine months prior.

We begin with the events that led to the Berlin Blockade, then continue with the history of the Berlin Airlift. The quantitative accomplishments of the Combined Air Lift Task Force are examined. The role that federal agencies and civilians played in this whole-of-society operation are discussed. Finally, the consequences of the Berlin Airlift, which includes the establishment of NATO and the start of the Cold War, are described.

History

At the end of World War II, the Nazi government was replaced by the Allied Control Council, also called the Four Powers Council due to the membership of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. The Council partitioned Germany into four occupied zones: the US, British, French, and Soviet Zones.

The city of Berlin was also divided into four zones¹. However, Berlin was located 100 miles inside Soviet territory. This was a problem for the Soviets: they did not want an island of capitalism within their communist utopia. During this time, food and fuel was delivered from the west by rail, road, and canals, in part funded by the Marshall Plan.

To get West Berlin to acquiesce to the Soviets, the Soviets destabilized the German economy by printing large amounts of Reichsmarks, thereby debasing the currency which led to inflation. This continued for two years and resulted in the average food intake of West Berliners being reduced to 900 calories per day.

The Soviets knew that France, the US, and the UK intended to unify their occupied zones into a single state. To counter this, the Soviet’s intentions were to convert East Germany into a puppet state that would also serve as a buffer between Russia and West Germany. In addition, the Soviets had been stripping natural resources and material wealth, including whole factories, from East Germany in an effort to “control the means of production,” and West Berlin was a great concentration of wealth the Soviets wanted to loot.

The West finally responded by introducing the Deutsche Mark, a stable form of currency that would eventually lead to the “Wirtschaftswunder”, the period of rapid economic development in West Germany that began in the 1950s.

Realizing that the Deutsche Mark was undermining their efforts to force West Berlin into submission, the Soviets left the Allied Control Council. Further, the Soviets implemented the Berlin Blockade - they cut-off every railway, roadway, and canal into the city on 24 June 1948, preventing economic aid from arriving. This was an effort to starve the city into joining the Soviets. In addition, the power stations that supplied West Berlin were shut down. It was estimated that the 2 million residents had only 30 days of food and 45 days of coal.

This left President Harry Truman three options: kinetic warfare with the Soviets, abandoning West Berlin, or delivering food and supplies by air. Truman said to his advisors: “we stay in Berlin, period.” The third option was thus pursued.

At the time, the United States had little experience in calculating the amount of food or supplies the West Berliners would require, so we approached the United Kingdom, which had decades of rationing experience. They responded that to get 1700 calories to each resident of Berlin, 1500 tons of food must be delivered daily. In addition, 2500 tons of coal and fuel would be needed per day. Thus, West Berlin would need 4000 tons of food and supplies per day.

On 26 June 1948, two days after the Berlin Blockade started, we started Operation Vittles². Two days later, the Royal Air Force, began Operation Plane Fare which, in addition to British pilots, included pilots from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The combined operations became known as the Berlin Airlift.

Air Corridors into Berlin (Illustration by Leerlaufprozess)

Initially the operation was haphazard. During its first week, only 90 tons per day were delivered, and by the second week 1000 tons per day arrived.

To improve the operations, Major General William H. Tunner was placed in command by General Lucius D. Clay, the Military Governor of the US Zone. Tunner’s primary experience prior to the Berlin Airlift was the reorganization of “the Hump,” the operation that resupplied the Chinese war effort. His reorganization resulted in doubling the amount of material supplied and the number of hours flown ³.

Tunner’s plan for the Berlin Airlift began with establishing the Combined Air Lift Task Force to control both the American and RAF operations⁴. Tunner also increased the number of cargo planes and required one airplane to arrive every three minutes. Air traffic controllers had been stacking the aircraft at five different altitudes.

As a result of three aircraft crashes on 13 August (called “Black Friday”), Tanner introduced several changes⁵: first, instrument flight rules were to be used at all times, regardless of visibility conditions. Second, the altitude stacking plan was modified. Third, airplanes would have only one chance to land in Berlin – if they missed that opportunity they were to return to their air base. Fourth, he implemented rigorous airplane inspection and maintenance schedules. He also replaced the C-47 airplanes, which could carry 3.5 tons of cargo, with C-54s, which could carry 10 tons of cargo.

On 12 August, the airlift exceeded its goal, delivering with 1500 daily flights delivering 4500 tons of supply. Operations would continue to improve.

The Soviets attempted to interfere with the Berlin Airlift in several ways. Early in the operation, they flew fighter aircraft to harass the cargo planes by air-to-air fire and buzzing. During the night, Soviet forces on the ground shined bright lights at the pilots to obscure their vision⁶.

On 6 September, the Soviet Unity Party of Germany (SED) attempted a coup d’état to control all of Berlin. Elections that December resulted in a West-Berlin-only city government which included no members of the SED.

As Winter 1948 approached, it was clear that the Berlin Airlift would last longer than expected. While the amount of needed food would remain the same (1500 tons per day), the needed amount of coal and fuel would increase to 4500 tons per day, raising the total from 4000 to 6000 tons per day. In anticipation of this, the airport runways were improved as were the radar systems. On 31 December 1948, the goal of 6000 tons per day was met.

For Easter 1949, Tunner wanted to set a new record, and 13000 tons of coal was delivered. As a result of this “stretch goal,” daily tonnage increased⁷.

Following these successes, the Soviets realized that their blockade was futile, and the blockade was ended on 12 May 1949, and cargo trains resumed shipping goods into the city the same day. This marks the official end of the Berlin Airlift, but flights continued until 30 September 1949 in order to build up a surplus of goods should the Soviets go back on their word.

Tunner summarizes the accomplishments of the Combined Airlift Task Force as follows⁸: “A total of 2,231,600 tons of supplies were flown into Berlin between 26 June 1948 and 1 August 1949. This represents an average if 5,579 tons daily throughout the blockade.” These supplies were delivered by over 278,000 flights. The end result was that West Belin remained under control of the Western allies.

German children in West Berlin waving to incoming USAF cargo plane (USAF - Bettmann Archive/Getty Images)

Jan Brueghel the Elder's Assault on a Convoy, 1620 - 1625

Joint Operations

The Berlin Airlift began as two separate operations, Operation Vittles of the US and Operation Plane Fare of the UK. Operation Plane Fare included not only RAF pilots, but also service members from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. The two operations were combined when Tunner established the Combined Air Lift Task Force. This would lead to coordinated flights, aircraft inspections and maintenance, as well as combined logistic functions. As will be discussed in the “Civil Society Participation” section, the civilians of West Germany and West Berlin were also involved.

The intention of the Berlin Blockade was to starve the residents of West Berlin into submission. As this became obvious, Western attitudes against the Soviets hardened. The use of starvation as a means of control and warfare was nothing new for Soviet Russia, as demonstrated by their history of famine among their own people as well as the Holodomor, the man-made famine that led to the death of approximately 5 million Ukrainians in 1932-1933. Both these events were sugared-over by the New Your Times, but they could not hide the effects of (and the allied response to) the Berlin Blockade.

Thus, it was during the Blockade and the Airlift that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization⁹ was created on 4 April 1949 to contain and provide collective security against the Soviet Union. The Berlin Blockade proved just how evil the Soviets could be, and the Berlin Airlift proved that western nations could defeat this evil.

Involvement of Intelligence Agencies

In addition to the Department of Defense, several federal agencies were involved in intelligence operations that preceded the Berlin Airlift.

The CIA warned President Truman¹⁰, in a 22 December 1947 Intelligence Memorandum, that the Soviets would force the Western Allies to exit Berlin through “obstructionism and harassment.” Similar reports dated 26 and 30 December from the State Department confirmed the CIA’s report. The CIA also supplied information about the successful overthrow by Czech Communist Party of the coalition government in Prague in February, and the failed 19 March Communist takeover in Helsinki.

Role of the US Treasury

The Nazi Party left Germany’s economy in ruins, and World War II itself did nothing to improve the situation. To destabilize what would later be called West Germany (as well as West Berlin), the Soviets devalued the German Reichsmark. After two years of this, the Germans were resorting to barter. Further, JCS 1067 directed the US military occupation government to “take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany.” Starvation and disease were to be prevented least civil unrest would endanger occupation forces¹¹. The US Treasury supplied officials (who would be called “Morgenthau Boys” after Henry Morgenthau Jr., the Secretary of the Treasury under the Roosevelt Administration) to the occupation government to enforce JCS 1067 as strictly as possible.

The Western Allies were concerned about this (as well as the looting of East Germany), fearing that this would be a repeat of the inflation and other conditions that led to World War I. This led to the Currency Reform of June 1948, where the Reichsmark was replaced by the Deutsche Mark. This prevented the hyperinflation caused by the printing of the Reichsmark, and the Soviets responded with the Berlin Blockade.

Civil Society Participation

Survivors of the German blitzkrieg of London donated care packages to the Airlift, but civil society participated in the Berlin Airlift in other ways.

During the Airlift, a pilot by the name of Gail Halvorsen parachuted a small package of candy to the children watching his aircraft before landing. This continued for three weeks, one drop per week. When Tunner learned of this, he ordered this expanded into “Operation Little Vittles,” officially beginning on 22 September 1948. News of this reached the United States, and children and candymakers began collecting and donating candy for the operation. Halvorsen became a public face for the Berlin Airlift and earned him the name “the Candy Bomber.” Operation Little Vittles continued until the Berlin Blockade was lifted. Over 23 tons of candy were dropped.

Maintenance and inspection of the aircraft were major undertakings, and former RAF and Luftwaffe¹² engineers volunteered to work on airplanes while they were in West Germany or in West Berlin. The airports were improved using civilian volunteers, and their labor resulted in the runways’ Marsden Mats (pierced steel planking) being maintained by dumping sand on them between landings. At one airport, civilian labor constructed an airport runway.

Finally, the unloading of the aircraft was performed by civilians, the record being the unloading of 10 tons of coal by a twelve-man team in 5 minutes and 45 seconds.

Role of the Entertainment Industry

Selling the Berlin Airlift to the American public fell to the US Air Force¹³. They were not only involved Halvorsen’s actions, but also produced an Oscar-nominated documentary about the operation. Later, in 1950, the USAF supported the production of the 20tth Century Fox movie entitled “The Big Lift.”

Conclusion

The Berlin Airlift was a whole-of-society operation in that the armed forces of multiple nations, multiple civilian agencies, and individual citizens cooperated to achieve a common goal: to prevent the starvation of West Berlin as a result of the Soviet blockade.

The consequences of the Berlin Airlift were numerous: the Berlin Blockade demonstrated to the West the steps the Soviets would take to oppress whole nations; it was an early event in the Cold War; and it led to the creation of NATO. The whole affair proved to communist sympathizers just how evil the Soviet Union was, and just how effective the West can be in countering the Soviets.

Whole-of-Society operations leads one to think of the steps taken by the federal government during World War I and World War II, which resulted in the creation of a garrison state. The Berlin Airlift proved that this wasn’t necessarily the case: whole-of-society operations could be effective without curtailing individual freedom.

Footnotes

1. Miller, R. To Save a City.
2. Ibid.
3. Tunner, Over the Hump.
4. Tunner, “A Report on the Airlift Berlin Mission.”
5. Ibid.
6. Air Force Historical Support Division, “1949 – The Berlin Airlift.”
7. Tunner, W. “A Report on the Airlift Berlin Mission.”
8. Ibid.
9. NATO. “The Berlin Airlift” Especially the transcript of the 1962 NATO Documentary titled “Background to Berlin.”
10. CIA History Staff, On the Front Lines of the Cold War. Chapter II directly available from https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/b25274f2d807c2a6e7aef7579a022335/On-the-Front-Lines-of-the-Cold-War-2-Part2-web.pdf
11. JCS 1067, section 5.
12. Miller, R. “Tunner and the Luftwaffe Connection with the Berlin Airlift.”
13. O’Connell, K. “The Berlin Airlift’s Lesson for Today’s Humanitarian Crisis.”

 

Bibliography

Air Force Historical Support Division. “1949 – The Berlin Airlift.” N/D. Retrieved 8 July 2024 from https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458961/1949-the-berlin-airlift/

CIA History Staff, On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents on the Intelligence War in Berlin, 1946 to 1961. Retrieved 8 July 2024 from https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/books-monographs/on-the-front-lines-of-the-cold-war-documents-on-the-intelligence-war-in-berlin-1946-to-1961/

Goldstein, E. “Remembering the epic triumph of the Berlin Airlift: Secretary Kendall, Airlift participants recognize 75th anniversary of greatest humanitarian airlift in history.” Air Force Public Affairs. 26 June 2023. Retrieved 8 July 2024 from https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3439311/remembering-the-epic-triumph-of-the-berlin-airlift-secretary-kendall-airlift-pa/

Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1067: US Directive to General Eisenhower on the Military Rule of Germany. 17 October 1945. Retrieved 8 July 2024 from https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/JCS_1067

Miller, R. “Tunner and the Luftwaffe Connection with the Berlin Airlift.” Air Power History 56 (No. 4), Winter 2009. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26275813

Miller, R. To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift 1948-1949. Air Force History and Museums Program. 2000. Retrieved 8 July 2024 from https://media.defense.gov/2010/Oct/01/2001329741/-1/-1/0/ToSaveCityBerlin.pdf

NATO. “The Berlin Airlift.” N/D. Retrieved 8 July 2024 from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_156163.htm

O’Connell, K. “The Berlin Airlift’s Lesson for Today’s Humanitarian Crisis.” Time Magazine, 22 May 2024. Retrieved 8 July 2024 from https://time.com/6980488/american-humanitarian-aid-history/

Tunner, W. Over the Hump. US Government Printing Office, 1964. Retrieved 8 July 2024 from https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/28/2001329799/-1/-1/0/over_the_hump.pdf

Tunner, W. “A Report on the Airlift Berlin Mission.” Department of the Air Force. 27 June 1975. Retrieved 8 July 2024 from https://media.defense.gov/2012/Jun/27/2001330007/-1/-1/0/Report%20on%20the%20Airlift.pdf

Review of Giuliano and Hanson’s The Geography of Urban Transportation

Introduction

The Geography of Urban Transportation¹ edited by Genevieve Giuliano and Susan Hanson is a collection of 14 papers by different authors, arranged as (mostly) independent chapters, addressing numerous topics in transport geography including freight movement, public transport, transport planning, etc. The writing of this review began with a chapter-by-chapter analysis. This became increasingly pointless since all the chapters were repeating the same themes. Another approach is required.

In what follows, we start with a list of the common themes present among all the chapters. While twelve themes are identified, a complete analysis of only four are given for sake of brevity. Following this, some topics that should be covered in this text, but aren’t, are listed. Finally, we conclude with an appraisal of the suitability of this text for undergraduate or graduate instruction.

List of Common Themes

The following themes appear in each of the chapters, and many chapters contain more than one of these themes. Here are (sometimes satirical) names of these themes.

1. Transportation systems are necessarily public goods
2. Causal webs make the urban planning racket go around (a/k/a all 15th-order effects deserve consideration)
3. We’re always one regulation away from transportation nirvana
4. Automobiles bad, autonomy bad
5. Personal responsibility does not exist
6. Solving even a single transport problem involves reforming society on a global scale
7. Transport problems can be explored without context
8. We’re always one new technology away from transportation nirvana
9. Act regionally or globally, or else
10. The more available transportation is, the better
11. America should be more like Europe
12. Equity is a relevant criterion

Theme 4: Automobiles Bad, Autonomy Bad

Wherever automobiles are mentioned, they are always shown in a bad light. For example, the author of Chapter 3 claims that years of automotive have intensified the “balkanization of metropolitan society as a whole.” The author quotes a paper explaining what this “balkanization” means:

With massive auto transportation, people have found a way to isolated themselves… a way to privacy among their peer group… they have stratified the urban landscape like a checkerboard, here a place for the young married, there one for health care…

The quote continues, explaining the consequences:

When people move from square to square, they move purposefully, determinately… They see nothing except what they are determined to see. Everything else is shut out from their experience.

So, moving “purposefully, determinately” is a bad thing, and as an alternative we should float around aimless and irresolute? What is being criticized here is the ability for people to associate with those who they want.

Driving in most states requires purchasing insurance, and insurance requirements lead to social inequity².

Automobiles are the source of pollution emergencies³ and greenhouse gas emissions⁴. One way to fix this is to “force”⁵ vehicle manufactures to develop vehicles with more efficient engines. “Technology-forcing regulation has been the policy of choice because it focuses on the vehicle manufacturer rather than the vehicle user, and therefor does not require a change in people’s behavior. Efforts to change behavior… have been quite unsuccessful, as noted earlier, because we as a society have been unwilling to change the relative price of private vehicle travel sufficiently to induce significant changes.” Translation: technology-forcing regulation has been the policy of choice because there are far, far fewer vehicle manufacturers, making them easier to control.

More fuel-efficient vehicles mitigate pollution, but lower the revenue generated by gas taxes⁶. In other words, there is no pleasing these people.

Those who hold beliefs of this form are missing the whole point of automobiles: they are the only mode of transportation that gives individuals the autonomy and power to travel great distances where they choose. Automobiles put drivers into the driver’s seat, literally. This implies those against automobiles are against autonomy – and the alternatives they propose (public transport, rideshare, etc.) all involve centralized control.

Theme 7: Transport Problems can be Explored Without Context

A good example of solving transport problems without context is the discussion of “food deserts” in Chapter 13. Food deserts are defined as “low-income communities where the availability of heathy and affordable food is limited.” It is not stated why being in a “low-income” community is reason to consider this problematic. The author goes on to explain that people who aren’t low income must travel similar distances to obtain food, but those people have modes of transportation that don’t make this a burden. What isn’t explained is why these food deserts exist – is it economics, is it crime? No explanation is given.

Another example of this is in the opening of Chapter 1, where the story of Rosa Parks and the Montgomery Bus Boycott is given. The story is retold not to illustrate Ms. Park’s bravery but rather to show the “power of collective action” - the context is omitted.

Theme 8: We’re Always One New Technology Away from Transportation Nirvana

A wide variety of technologies are discussed, including alternatives to hydrocarbon fuels, such as hydrogen fuel cells, gasohol, “ethanol made from cellulosic biomass rather than corn,” and lithium-ion batteries. Other technologies mentioned in Chapter 14 include breathalyzers, sensors that notice when a driver is falling asleep, night vision enhancements, flashing cross-walks, smart signals, etc. A whole host of ridesharing solutions are listed.

One of the consequences of this is that the text, in places, appears dated. For example, Manhattan’s Via rideshare program⁷ has abandoned direct-to-customer operations and is now attempting to build city-scale “microtransit” systems. Google Cars⁸ has been discontinued. In fact, most of the P2P carsharing services listed in Box 14.2 (Getaround, Go-op, RelayRides, Spride Share, and WhipCar) have either changed their business models or are no longer in operation.

A variant of this theme is the assumption that new technologies always result in better solutions. For example, the use of information and communication technology (ICT) has made carsharing businesses possible, and results are systems where the individual cars have a higher percentage of daily use than non-shared automobiles^{9 10}. The problem with this is that there were (and still are) these things called taxi cabs which costs the riders less than carshares. Experienced taxi drivers rapidly learn to minimize the time their taxis are empty – for example running a circuit that moves people between airports and bus stops in nearby small towns. Besides costing less, taxis operate with little or no central control.

These two problems (dated technology and assumption that tech will always make for a better future) have a common origin: it is is the authors’ confusion of goals with implementation. In the carsharing/ridesharing situation, the goal of carsharing/ridesharing is to make automobile usage more efficient according to some measure. If this is indeed a worthwhile goal, then the methods used to achieve that goal are irrelevant.

Another problem with the wide-ranging discussion of technologies (and wide-ranging discussion of social issues) is that the text has a scattered tone. A good illustration of this is Figure 4.1 which shows the percentage of U.S. households with landline phones, cell phones, home computers, and internet access. Exactly none of these technologies are forms of transportation.

Theme 9: Act Regionally or Globally, or Else

The most egregious example of this is found in Chapter 14, where the authors recount the San Francisco Revolt and give their opinion of the final outcome. A plan for a grid of freeways in San Francisco was proposed in the 1940s. When news of this plan was made public (why weren’t they made public from the start?), communities protested, and in 1959 the San Francisco Board of Supervisors cancelled seven of the 10 planned routes. One mile of the Embarcadero was built in 1959 before the protest went into full swing. This one mile stood until the early 1990s when it was demolished. The authors summarize this sequence of events as follows:

The Embarcadero Freeway revolt demonstrates the potential power of ordinary citizens. If, rather than opposing the freeway, the residents of San Francisco had accepted it as inevitable (given its strong support by the federal and state governments), the Embarcadero would probably have been completed and be standing to this day. Instead, the demolition of the freeway became a model for reclaiming urban spaces in other cities.

This description shows the level of entitlement that transportation planners have, and the level of legal wrangling and thuggery to which they are willing to resort. The people of San Francisco were excluded from deciding the appearance of their own city, and the city was restored only after decades of drawn-out legal disputes. The city planners assumed, or rather usurped, authority for reshaping the city, but they never paid the price for when those plans were rejected.

Omitted Topics

There are several topics that should have been included in this collection, especially given the type and level of political advocacy the authors recommend.

If a transportation-related project is to be justified, the justification must be established through empirical evidence and reasoning. Thus, methods of performing scientific observations and testing should be given more than the brief coverage given in Chapter 5. Any proposed infrastructure change must be justified through traffic counts, simulations, A/B testing when possible, and anything else needed to understand road usage patterns. Chapter 5 does discuss simulation methods only at a superficial level.

As observations are made and simulations performed, this data must be analyzed using statistics. The need for analysis to move from “prediction to prescription” is explained in Chapter 7. This chapter that contains descriptions of the types of investigations that traffic planners do, without providing any significant details or examples.

The problems attendant with publicly funded projects – fraud, cost over-runs, delays, regulatory failures, etc. – should be discussed along several axes: how to prevent, how to investigate and detect when they occur, and how claw-back lost funds. It must be made clear that people involved with these types of projects frequently claim the authority to run the projects but never accept responsibility when the projects fail.

Transportation is about moving people and things around. But is this an unlimited good? The lack of transportation can also be a good thing. There are at least three things an absence of transportation can prevent: crime, contagion spread, and invasive species.

High crime in public transit hubs and on buses and light rail is certainly common in cities like Philadelphia, New York, Los Angeles, etc. The real possibility that adding transit hubs, etc., introduces crime must be considered before those projects are budgeted.

Also, does crime follow transit routes? This is an issue that must be investigated.

COVID-19 proved that disease pathogens can indeed be spread by various modes of transportation, but far less destructive diseases, such as colds and flu, are transmittable between people on buses, light rail, and airplanes where riders are packed like sardines. People using modes of transportation that don’t force them into such proximity – automobiles, motorcycles, bicycles, walking, etc. – are far less likely to either transmit contagious diseases or be infected.

Invasive species aren’t a problem of urban transportation per se but are caused by globalization and global-scale transportation. For example, rabbits were carried to Australia in the 19th century where they deplete pasture vegetation and kill young trees in orchards and forests. The destruction of vegetation has resulted in serious erosion.

Florida is now home to Burmese pythons and Indochinese rhesus macaques. Pennsylvania now has spotted lanternflies that travelled on ships from China, Vietnam, or India. They have been a major crop pestilence since their arrival in 2012.

Conclusion

The papers in this text sometimes address legitimate transportation problems, but overwhelmingly the papers are used as platforms to advocate left-wing political issues.

It is true that large cities in America are predominately left-wing, but it should be realized that this has not always been the case and, given the conditions of cities like San Francisco, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Detroit, etc., it could change again. Together with the reliance on tech gadgets, leaves the text open rapidly becoming dated.

Based on this text as well as others, it appears that the field of transport geography is overran with advocacy politics, calling the academic validity of the entire field into question. If we attempt to separate the wheat from the chaff, is there any grain left over?

Because of this lack of objectivity and political neutrality, this text cannot be recommended for use by any university. Education is supposed to produce individuals that can critically examine the world around them, and this text instead requires the reader to accept dogma.

Footnotes

1. Giuliano & Hanson, S, The Geography of Urban Transportation (4th Ed.)
2. Ibid, chapter 13.
3. Ibid, chapter 11.
4. Ibid, chapter 12.
5. Ibid, quotes supplied by the authors of Chapter 14
6. Ibid, chapter 10.
7. Ibid, chapter 4.
8. Ibid, chapter 4.
9. Ibid, chapter 4.
10. Ibid, chapter 14.

 

Bibliography

Giuliano, G. & Hanson, S. The Geography of Urban Transportation (4th Ed.) The Guilford Press, 2017.

Military Logistics of the Late 16th and Early 17th Centuries

Military logistics, as an art, dates to the Romans, who had sophisticated systems of supply chains and roads. Except for them, most armies either carried their own supplies or resorted to pillage and plunder[1]. Two changes in European armies in the period between the late 1500s and early 1600s required methods of supply beyond plunder: the size of the armies, and the reduced need for lines of communication back to nonexistent bases.

Indeed, the size of European armies grew considerably, increasing in size by an order of magnitude during that period. Keeping armies of that size stationary was impractical: if they were concentrated and stationary, that number of men would quickly exhaust the supplies that could be foraged or looted. So, the armies had to be kept in motion. It became necessary to carry large amounts of supplies, which was impractical for long campaigns.

One of the consequences of this was that logistics needs had an oversized influence on strategy: Van Creveld notes that “armies could – and did – follow the call of their stomachs by moving about freely to whatever region promised supplies, while largely indifferent to their own communications with non-existent bases.[2]”

There goes the neighborhood.

Jan Brueghel the Elder's Assault on a Convoy, 1620 - 1625

Van Creveld goes on to note that "logistics were allowed to prevail over strategy,[3]" and that it was food and forage, not the King, which commanded the army[4].

Most armies prior to the late 16th century relied either upon purchasing agents to acquire supplies, or upon plunder and foraging. These two factors indicate that alternative logistics systems were needed, two of them being the use of water courses and the use of magazines.

Water Courses

Water courses meant the use of rivers to move supplies and artillery to locations of battle. There were two factors prompting the development of this: the increasing size of artillery and the increasing carrying capacity of ships. Artillery became enormous during this period: one piece of artillery used by Maurice of Nassau weighted 5 ½ tons and had to be disassembled for travel. Thirty horses were required to move it, of which over 20% were expected to die of exhaustion annually[5].

Compensating for this was the increasing carrying capacity of available ships. Van Creveld notes that 9 ships could carry the same amount of goods as 600 wagons[6].

This is one of the advantages of using rivers to carry supplies: heavy artillery could be moved quickly. A second advantage was that the overall number of horses used to haul supplies was greatly reduced, which meant that horses' supply needs were also reduced.

The conditions of the rivers (were they deep enough to accommodate the ships, did water depth change by season, did they freeze-over, etc.) could be disadvantages, as well as the very existence and course of the rivers: Van Creveld notes that "Spain failed to conquer the Northern Netherlands because there were too many rivers; in their side, the Dutch made no headway in Belgium because there were not enough of them.[7]"

Magazine Systems

Invented by Michel Le Tellier (1603-1685), magazines were stores of materiel that would supply an army as it marched to its destination. They are essentially what the contemporary military would call supply depots or what militias would call defended prepositioned caches. Magazines were established before a campaign began and would supplement the supplies carried by the army, compensating for unexpected shortfalls. In the context of siege warfare, they would supply troops marching to the town they were to capture; once captured, magazines would then be created in that town to prepare for the next campaign[8].

As conceived by Le Tellier, magazines were always temporary arrangements, disbanded at the end of a campaign. The was changed by Le Tellier's son, François Le Tellier, Marquis de Louvois (1647-1691). Commonly called "Louvois," one of the things he accomplished as military advisor to King Louis XIV was to make magazines into permanent depots.

In addition to this, Louvois divided magazines into defensive magazines (places fortes du roi, literally strongholds of the king) and offensive magazines (magasins généraux, general stores). Defensive magazines were frontier towns that were able to maintain a garrison for six months. Offensive magazines were designed to supply armies while operating outside the king's realm; they were dispersed, which meant that an enemy would be less likely to observe a massive buildup of troops.

The magazine system had several advantages: they reduced the quantity of supplies that an army needed to carry; they addressed the problem of unexpected supply shortages, such as caused by looting, theft, rotting, consumption by rats, etc.; and once established, the dispersed nature of offensive magazines obscured impending actions.

There were several disadvantages: magazines must be established either before or during the early stages of a campaign; the setup would alert the enemy of impending action; and the magazines would require their own defenses.

The first and second of these disadvantages were addressed by Louvois' permanent magazines, but their existence and level of surrounding activity would still provide valuable information to an enemy.

By using water courses and magazine systems, the relationship between logistics and strategy started to change: instead of logistics determining strategy, logistics supported strategy.

Footnotes

1. Kress, Operational Logistics
2. Van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 10
3. Ibid. p. 14
4. Ibid. p. 17
5. Ibid. p. 12
6. Ibid. p. 10
7. Ibid. p. 12
8. This section is based on Ibid. p. 17-26

Bibliography

Kress, M. Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations. Springer. 2016.

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. 2013.