Just War Analysis of the 2003 American Invasion of Iraq

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the 2003 American Invasion of Iraq according to jus ad bellum criteria – were we in the right to start that war? We begin with the historical context including the faulty information about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. That history is then used to determine whether the invasion passes the jus ad bellum standards of Just War Theory.

Historical Background¹

Official build-up for the invasion began with the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002”, also known as the “Iraq Resolution”, which was passed in October 2002 by the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. It authorized the use of American forces against Iraq in what would be called “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” The factors used to justify the war included:

1. Iraq’s development and possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) as well as operation of mobile weapons labs
2. Their possession of unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver said WMDs
3. Their support for terrorism, including harboring members of al-Qaeda and paying bounties to the families of suicide bombers
4. Saddam Hussein’s repression of the Iraqi people and the Kurds

This was followed by the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 of November 2002 which demanded that Iraq allow weapons inspectors back into the country. Iraq appeared to comply with the resolution.

In early 2003, President George Bush and British PM Tony Blair stated that Iraq was hindering the UN weapons inspectors. Leaders of Germany and France sought extended inspections and wanted to give Iraq more time to comply with the inspectors.

On 5 February 2003 Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a presentation to the UN Security Council claiming that Iraq had maintained its stockpile of WMDs, that it was hiding evidence of its WMDs from UN weapons inspectors, that it silenced its weapons scientists, and that it continued to harbor al-Qaeda terrorists. These were the reasons used to start the war.

On 17 March, President Bush gave Saddam an ultimatum: leave Iraq in 48 hours. He didn’t.

On 20 March 2003 kinetic operations began with precision-guided missile attacks against the suspected location of Saddam Hussain, followed by bombings of government and military buildings. Major operations were completed six weeks later, and the occasion was marked by President Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” speech on 1 May 2003.

On 30 September 2004 the Iraq Survey Group, a multinational group organized by the CIA and the Pentagon, released a report (the Duelfer Report) stating that Iraq had no significant amount of chemical WMDs³. It was believed that the WMDs did exist – and were used against the Kurds – but the weapons were sent to Syria. The idea that Iraq was a state sponsor of terrorism remains unclear.

The justification for the war changed at this point to the plight of the Iraqi and Kurdish people under Saddam, and the goal became removing him and the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party from power.

The war did not end by this time, for once we defeated the Ba’ath Party, the insurgency started. Politics abhors a vacuum, and we began fighting a new enemy.

Just Cause

St. Augustine lists² three jus ad bellum conditions: defending against attack, recapturing things taken, and punishing a nation that has done wrong. According to (faulty) intelligence, Iraq’s people and its neighbors were in immediate danger from WMDs, and according to (accurate) intelligence, Saddam’s regime was actively violating the individual rights of its citizens. Thus, our invasion of was justified because we were defending others against imminent danger and punishing Iraq for doing wrong by the Kurds and other Iraqi people.

Proportionality

Proportionality is a slippery concept in action. The broad idea is that when an enemy destroys one of our ships, we destroy one of theirs, when the enemy downs one of our airplanes, we do the same to one of his airplanes, and so on. The enemy is supposed to remain stationary while we pursue a proportionate response. Nice theory, but in practice things don’t work that way.

The reality is more like this: the enemy destroys one of our vessels, and in our act of responding proportionally, the enemy sends fighters to stop our response, we then use surface-to-air missiles, and so on. Each combatant is starring in his own “Saving Private Ryan” movie, and once the situation escalates it becomes extremely difficult to stop.

An alternative to proportionality is this: does our response not only stop the immediate harm but also removes the capability of performing similar harm in the future? The American forces disabled Iraq’s air defense system, which allowed the ground invasion to go forward unencumbered. We targeted only government and military installations, and the government and military were the ones harming people. We not only stopped them doing harm and we also prevented them from repeating this harm in the future. This theory has plenty of edge cases, and it may not be possible to justify this approach within Just War Theory.

Reasonable Chance of Success

The 2003 invasion of Iraq was a well-designed and well-implemented plan that involved combined use of air and ground forces. Our Air Force, Marines, and Army were far superior to the corresponding Iraqi forces, so we had a very reasonable chance of success.

Legitimate Authority and Public Declaration

Congress has the power to declare war, and while the Iraq Resolution was approved by Congress, it did not declare war. The Resolution only authorized President Bush to use military force against Iraq. However, the Iraq Resolution can be seen as a public declaration announcing America’s intention to initiate military action against that country.

Right Intentions

If Iraq possessed WMDs and weapons labs, and if Iraq possessed the capability to deliver the WMDs, and if Saddam had plans of using these weapons on the Iraqis or other people, then we had the right intentions for invading Iraq with the goal of removing those weapons and delivery capabilities.

As it goes, Iraq didn’t have WMDs, but the treatment of the Iraqis and Kurds under Saddam and the Ba’ath Party was still an issue. Our intentions to drive Saddam from power and to De-Ba’athify the government were good intentions, and our actions were in support of those intentions.

Does this mean America must topple oppressive governments all over the world? It does not, for doing so does not further any pressing national interest. National interest does not play a direct role in Just War Theory, however.

Last Resort

At the time of the 2003 invasion, economic sanctions against Iraq were still in place. These sanctions were in response to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Further economic pressure could not be applied.

Multiple diplomatic solutions (the Iraq Resolution, Resolution 1441, Colin Powell’s presentation to the UN Security Council, and finally the 48 hour demand of Saddam to leave the country) were attempted but each proved unsuccessful. All non-violent options were exhausted, and so the war was indeed one of last resort.

Conclusion

Based on all the usual criteria of jus ad bellum - principles of just cause, proportionality, reasonable chance of success, legitimate authority and public declaration, right intention, and last resort – it can be concluded that we were justified in this military action according to Just War Tradition. This conclusion holds regardless of the existence of WMDs.

From a “realist war theory” perspective, the invasion cannot be justified. If anything, the invasion violates the realpolitik “Pottery Barn rule” – you break it, you buy it. By eliminating Saddam Hussein’s regime, we metaphorically broke Iraq, dysfunctional that it was, and we ended up buying it over the next 8 years.

References

1. Draper, R. (2020). To Start a War: How the Bush Administration Took America into Iraq. Penguin Books.

2. Holmes, A. F. (2005). War and Christian Ethics. Baker Academic.

3. Ricks, T. E. (2006). Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. Penguin Press.

The Most Dangerous Form of Warfare

Introduction

Both symmetric and asymmetric warfare are dangerous, but to answer the question “what is the most dangerous form of warfare?” it is necessary to examine asymmetric warfare and its tactics. Once this is complete, a comprehensive and valid comparison can be made between symmetric and asymmetric warfare.

Characteristics

Asymmetric warfare is one where the two opponents have incomparable military strengths. Freedman¹ lists several qualities of the weaker party (guerrillas, insurgents, etc.): they are involved in a defensive war, fighting on home territory; they depend on popular support and use local knowledge of the terrain and other geographic factors; the insurgents employ a strategy of exhaustion, “gaining time on the hope that the enemy would tire or that something else would turn up.”

To all this it must be added that insurgents replace a traditional logistic system with popular support as well as “living off the enemy.”

Relation with Conventional Forces

None of the writers on asymmetric warfare – from theoreticians such as Clausewitz and Jomini, to practitioners such as von Lettow-Vorbeck, T.E. Lawrence, and Mao Tse-Tung – view an insurgency as effective by itself.

Tse-Tung saw⁶ guerrilla warfare as a “stop gap” until conventional forces could be stood-up: “during the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army.”

T.E. Lawrence described³ guerrilla warfare as “…a war that might be won without fighting battles” and that the role of the Arab Revolt in WWI was a “side-show of a side-show”. He summarized the lack of conventional support by noting that “we had no base machinery, no formal staff, no clerks, no government, no telegraphs, no public opinion, no troops of British nationality, no honour, no conventions.”

Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, in using guerrilla warfare in German East Africa during WWI, asked⁴ whether “it was possible for us in our subsidiary theatre of war to exercise any influence on the great decision at home.” His plan was to draw Allied forces away from Europe, and to do that “it was necessary, not to split up our small available forces in local defense, but, on the contrary, to keep them together, to grip the enemy by the throat and force him to employ his forces for self-defense.” He was able to do this for the duration of that war.

Asymmetrical Warfare Tactics

The tactics used by insurgents follow from their relative weakness: they do not have comparable weapon systems, nor do they have a stable base of operations. The general tactic used has been described⁵ by William S. Lind as the "DOCA loop” - disperse, orient, concentrate, act. Being dispersed except when executing an operation gives the guerrilla force survivability, whereas concentration gives the force the ability to focus its power on a target which a single insurgent cannot alone bring to bear.

What should these targets be? “The enemy’s rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points,” Tse-Tung writes⁶, “and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted, and annihilated.” The insurgency must thus compensate for his lack of firepower with ingenuity in attacking the enemy’s communication and supply lines, as well as other weaknesses.

What is the Most Dangerous Form of Warfare?

Several metrics can be used to determine how dangerous a particular form warfare is:

• Number of combatant casualties
• Number of civilian casualties
• Infrastructure damage
• Economic cost
• Loss of freedoms
• Loss of political will or even destabilization of political system
• Prolongation of the war
• Reputation of the country doing the conventional fighting
• Destructiveness of the weapons used

In conventional warfare, civilian and combatant casualties are always present. Indiscriminate civilian deaths have decreased considerably with the recent availability of precision-guided weapons. Still there are non-combatant casualties. With asymmetric warfare, the primary targets of the insurgents are enemy soldiers and collaborators. The number of deaths is far fewer, to the point where the taking of a life by an insurgent is closer to targeted assassination than to indiscriminate killing.

Infrastructure has been a target in both symmetric and asymmetric warfare. In asymmetric warfare, when an attack on infrastructure fails, the insurgents either try again or move to the next target. Compare this with how failed infrastructure attacks evolve in conventional war. The “Bomber Mafia”² (a group of USAAF commanders who advocated using long-range heavy bombers to defeat Nazi Germany) wanted to use precision bombing against German industries and military targets; when this plan proved unworkable, they switched to using area incendiary weapons against cities in Japan.

The loss of freedom through conscription, taxation, inward-pointing intelligence services, propaganda, and media manipulation have always been higher in conventional warfare. This damages the reputation of the country doing conventional fighting, weakening its presence on the international stage as well as damaging the political will (the consent) of the populace. Propaganda is also part of asymmetrical warfare, but it is aimed only against the conventional opponent.

While the longest wars in American history were asymmetric wars - the War in Afghanistan and the Vietnam War (lasting just under 20 years each) - there have been conventional wars that lasted far longer, such as the Roman-Germanic Wars (708 years). The most prolonged conventional war was the Reconquista, which lasted for 781 years.

Finally, the destructive power of the weapons used must be compared. Nuclear weapons have been used in conventional wars, as has mustard gas and other chemical agents. There are no analogs in asymmetric warfare.

For these reasons, conventional wars are the most dangerous. They are the costliest in terms of life, treasury, and political freedoms.

References

1. Freedman, L. (2013). Strategy: A History. Oxford University Press.

2. Gladwell, M. (2021). The Bomber Mafia: A Dream, a Temptation, and the Longest Night of the Second World War. Little, Brown, and Company.

3. Lawrence, T.E., (1920) The Evolution of a Revolt. Praetorian Press.

4. Lettow-Vorbeck, P. v. (2022). My Reminiscences of East Africa. Good Press.

5. Lind, W. S. & Thiele, G. A. (2015). 4th Generation Warfare Handbook. Castalia House. Retrieved 28 March 2024 from https://ia802901.us.archive.org/27/items/4thGenerationWarfareHandbookWilliamS.Lind28129/4th_Generation_Warfare_Handbook_-_William_S._Lind%25281%2529.pdf

6. Tse-Tung, M. (2015). Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare, Samuel B. Griffith, trans. Hauraki Publishing.

Thomas Aquinas’ Just War Theory

Introduction

This post recites Thomas Aquinas’ just war theory as described in Summa Theologica I-II Q. 91 and 94, and II-II Q. 40-42. His jus ad bellum is explained as well as his tentative steps in developing jus in bello criteria. A psychological interpretation of the “good intentions” criteria is given, and finally a comparison with Aristotle’s “bottom up” approach to the ethics of warfare is made. All quotations from the Summa Theologica are taken from Holmes (2005).

Grounding JWT in Terms of Divine, Natural, and Human Laws

Thomas Aquinas sets up a “hierarchy of laws” as the foundation for the ethical evaluation of warfare. This hierarchy moves from the divine (Eternal Law), through natural laws, finally ending with concrete human laws.

The Eternal Law, also called Divine Reason or Divine Law, is the operation of Divine providence. Everything is subject to such law, and it is unchangeable and eternal. (ST I-II, Q. 91, Art 1)

Natural laws are the way rational creatures participate in the Eternal Law (ST I-II, Q. 91, Art 2). Natural laws are specifically applicable to rational animals, unlike Eternal Law which has universal applicability.

Human laws are needed because we do not fully participate in the dictates of Divine Reason (ST I-II, Q. 91, Art 3). Further, human laws do not have the inerrancy possessed by the demonstrated conclusions of the natural sciences.

Why then do we even need an Eternal Law? The Eternal law directs man towards his last end, eternal happiness, but this end is inproportionate to man’s rational faculty (ST I-II, Q. 91, Art 4). Further, conflicts in human law can and do occur, because of errors in judgement. Such conflicts cannot occur within Eternal Law. Finally, human law can neither forbid or punish all evil deeds; Divine Law fills this gap and is thus needed to forbid all sins.

Statement of Just Reasons to Go to War

It is not always sinful to initiate or wage war, according to Aquinas, and he posits three conditions that must be met to initiate a just war. (ST II-II, Q. 40, Art 1)

First, war must be called for by sovereign authority. “It is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior.”

Second, just cause is required – “those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.” Aquinas uses specific examples given by Augustine – to avenge wrongs, to punish a nation for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore that which has been seized unjustly.

Third, belligerents must have good intentions. They must seek to advance the good, or to avoid evil at least. Examples of ill intentions include aggrandizement or cruelty.

Interlude: the “Dispassionate Warrior”

This third jus ad bellum criterion is a claim about the psychology of a justly acting warfighter: his goal is to “uplift the good,” perhaps in a dispassionate manner. Aquinas quotes Augustine who notes that “passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war” (ST II-II, Q. 40, Art 1). Aquinas continues, removing agency from the warfighter, stating that “to have recourse to the sword… by the authority, so to speak, of God, is not to take the sword, but to use it as commissioned by another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment.”

Compare this (Kaurin, 2017) with the stance taken by one of the soldiers in Shakespeare’s Henry V: “If his cause be wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us.” Aquinas goes further, replacing relief of moral responsibility with a form of technocratic detachment.

Does the concept of a dispassionate warrior make sense? To successfully prosecute a war, a certain joie de guerre is required, a passion needed for accomplishing what must be done - and a source of distress for the warfighter when he realizes he has trouble turning it off. This is the very opposite of dispassion.

Just Conduct in War

Compared to his jus ad bellum, Aquinas’s jus in bello is considerably less developed. He addresses only a few aspects of what constitutes just conduct in war: the role of religious personnel, the use of ambushes, and the ethics of strife and sedition.

Is it lawful for priests and clerics to fight in a war? Aquinas answers (ST II-II, Q. 40, Art 2) in the negative, but in defense of this position, he quotes Gregory who uses a shepherd/wolf/sheepdog analogy: “The wolf comes upon the sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and was not, leaveth the sheep, and flieth, for he fears lest the wolf hurt him, and dares not stand up against his injustice.”

Aquinas rejects this analogy, stating that participation in warfare is incompatible with the duties of priests and clerics, because warlike pursuits are tumultuous, hindering the mind from the contemplation of divine things, prayers for the people, etc. It is unbecoming for religious personnel to slay or shed blood, says Aquinas, and “it is more fitting that they should be ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed what they portray in their ministry.” The proper way to resist an enemy of the flock is through “spiritual weapons”.

The only military tactic Aquinas mentions specifically is that of ambushes, which he states are not a form of deception but rather one of concealment. Thus, laying ambushes is a lawful activity when done in times of war. (ST II-II, Q. 40, Art 3)

Strife is described by Aquinas (ST II-II, Q. 41, Art 1) is a form of private war that is not declared by a sovereign. Because of this, it is unjust. Resistance against strife may however be without sin when it is done in self defense and with due moderation.

Sedition, the act of sewing dissent, is viewed by Aquinas (ST II-II, Q. 42, Art 1) as a sin as it is contrary to the unity of the multitude – the people of a city or kingdom, and it undermines the common good. Taken by itself, this stance would preclude both civil wars and wars of independence.

Conclusion

It is interesting to note how far Aquinas diverges from “the Philosopher” (Aristotle) on the issue of just war. Aristotle holds that it is proper for a man to engage in military training so as not to become the slave of other men, and for the same reason it is proper for the state to defend itself (Aristotle, Politics, Book 7). This is a bottom-up approach similar to what Frowe (2015) calls the “domestic analogy,” and is the opposite of Aquinas who grounds just war on Eternal, natural and human laws, and in which self defense is seen as political resistance against strife.

References

Aristotle (2020). Politics. William Ellis, trans. Independently published

Frowe, H. (2015). The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction. 2nd Edition. Routledge.

Holmes, A. F. (2005). War and Christian Ethics. 2nd Edition. Baker Academic.

Kaurin, P. S. (2017). “Beyond the Band of Brothers: Henry V, Moral Agency, and Obedience”. Last retrieved on 28 March 2024 from https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/3/1/beyond-the-band-of-brothers-henry-v-moral-agency-and-obedience

Starburst Analysis of the PRC’s Treatment of the Uyghurs

Introduction to Starburst Analysis

Starburst analysis is a structured analytic technique (SAT) used to combat “the premature closing of minds,” which Marvin (2013) described as a common pitfall for intelligence analysts. To avoid this, starburst analysis seeks to ensure that analysists have a grasp of the situation they’re investigating. It allows them to enumerate the actors, to handle information overload, and to differentiate and isolate root causes from symptoms. It allows analysts to identify gaps in their intelligence. Using starburst analysis and other SATs, intelligence analysts hope to achieve objectivity, putting aside personal objectives and ethics. This objectivity is attained rapidly.

Starburst analysis requires the analyst to identify essential facts about an operational environment, doing so entails the analyst to answer the following questions:

• Who – who are the key actors?
• What – what are the key activities and operations?
• When – when did they occur? What changes are happening to the participants over time?
• Where – what locations did those activities happen?
• Why – why are the key activities occurring? What are the causes?
• How – details about the activities – how are these activities conducted?

In this post, starburst analysis is applied to the treatment of Uyghurs in China.

Who are the Primary Actors?

The Uyghurs are a Turkic ethnic group living in China. They practice a moderate form of Sunni Islam, speak a Turkic language, and are culturally and historically affiliated with Central Asia.

Within the Chinese Communist Party, the primary actors are Chen Quanguo and Ma Xingrui. Chen was the CCP Secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region from 2016 to 2021, and was also the Political Commissa of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. He oversaw the construction of internment camps used to imprison Uyghurs and established a surveillance system used to monitor Uyghurs and to track escapees from the camps. (Maizland, 2022)

Chin was replaced in 2021 by Ma Zingrui. While he has loosened restrictions on the population, Ma stated in March 2024 that the sinofication of mosques will continue as it is “inevitable”. (Chen, 2024)

Where do the Uyghurs Live?

Uyghurs mostly live in the XUAR (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) located in the northeast of China. This province borders eight countries including several Muslim countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). The province is mineral rich, produces most of China’s cotton, has the largest coal and natural gas reserves in China, and 20% of its oil reserves.

China thus has a vested economic interest in the XUAR, and officials refer to it as a “core hub” for the Belt and Road Initiative. To this end, the PRC has taken steps to eliminate Uyghur culture, or at least replace the Uyghur population in the XUAR with Han Chinese.

What is CCP Policy towards the Uyghurs, and How is it Implemented?

As part of this program, mosques have been demolished or altered to remove motifs and Arabic writings.

There has been internment of 1 to 1.8 million Uyghurs and other Muslims in the re-education camps built by Chen Quanguo. The internees like in barbaric conditions and are made to renounce their Islamic faith. There are also forced labor programs requiring Uyghurs to work in labor-intensive industries including textile and apparel industries, and employment there involves political indoctrination. Refusal to work in such factories may result in detention.

There has also been programs of population replacement, substituting the Uyghurs in the XUAR with Han Chinese. (Lum & Weber, 2023)

One CCP religious affairs official has written (HRW, 2021) that their goal with the Uyghurs is to “break their lineage, break their roots, break their connections, and break their origins. Completely shovel up the roots of ‘two-faced people,’ dig them out, and vow to fight these two-faced people until the end,” where the phrase “two-faced people” refers to party members who are ideologically disloyal to the party.

When Did Key Activities Take Place

Between 1990 and 2001, over 200 acts of terrorism were attributed by the CCP to different Uyghur groups. These groups were primarily acting out of neighboring Turkestan, however, and the main terrorist organization within the XUAR is no longer in existence.

As mentioned above, internment camps were built by Chen Quanguo starting in 2017, and they continue to be in operation. Further, XUAR officials have instituted programs to eliminate the culture and language of the Uyghur. They enacted laws that “prohibits ‘expressions of extremification’ and placed restrictions upon dress and grooming, traditional Uyghur customs, and adherence to Islamic dietary laws (halal).” (Lum & Weber, 2023)

Why is it Being Done?

Past deadly incidents in the XUAR have been attributed by the CCP to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The ETIM, even at its height, was poorly financed and lacked the capacity to carry-out any attacks. The ETIM was declared a terrorist organization in 2002 and added to the Terrorist Exclusion List in 2004. It was removed from the Terrorist Exclusion List in 2020 since there has been no credible evidence that the group continues to exist.

Thus, while the Uyghurs may have had terrorist connections in the past, this was no longer the case by the time the internment camps were created in the XUAR. The CCP’s ultimate goal remains the same: to destroy the Uyghurs, their language, their culture.

As terrorist sympathies is no longer a motivation for their destruction, one is left with two possible explanations for the CCP’s animosity towards the Uyghurs:

• Enforcement of ideological purity
• Economic reasons – to make the XUAR into a hub of the Belt and Road Initiative.

What Actions did the United States Take?

The United States took several steps in response to CCP treatment of the Uyghurs (Lum & Weber, 2023), including:

• The imposition of economic sanctions on specific PRC officials and Chinese companies involved in forced labor
• Protection of Uyghur-Americans from harassment or intimidation by CCP agents
• Import restrictions that block the import of goods (including tomatoes and cotton originating in the XUAR

Conclusion

Starburst analysis allows intelligence analysts to quickly understand their operating environment. It allows them to identify key players and actions and allows the analyst to distinguish the essential from the irrelevant. All this was demonstrated here for the Chinese Uyghurs.

References

Chen, L. (2024). “Top official from China's Xinjiang says 'Sinicisation' of Islam 'inevitable'”. Reuters. Retrieved 28 March 2024 from https://www.reuters.com/world/china/top-official-chinas-xinjiang-says-sinicisation-islam-inevitable-2024-03-07/

Human Rights Watch. (2021). “Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots: China’s Crimes Against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims”. Retrieved 28 March 2024 from https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting

Lum, T. & Weber, M. A. (2023). “China Primer: Uyghurs”. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved on 26 March 2024 from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10281

Maizland, L. (2022). “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang”. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on 28 March 2024 from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights

Marvin, A. (2013). “Dangers of Ethnicity in Analysis”. Small Wars Journal. Retrieved on 27 March 2024 from https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/dangers-of-ethnicity-in-analysis

Introduction to Symmetrical Warfare

To understand asymmetrical warfare, it is necessary to understand symmetrical warfare. Taken at face value, the phrase “symmetrical warfare” is warfare where the opponents have comparable military power and use similar tactics. But this is not what it really means!

Symmetrical warfare is where both sides use conventional tactics and strategies – they follow the “standard way of doing business.” Symmetric warfare is:

• Instigated and directed by sovereign powers (state actors)
• Seen as a “continuation of policy by other means.” (Clausewitz, Book 1 Ch. 1)
• Both sides have some sort of military force already in existence, with sufficient provisions (Tzu, Ch. 2)
• These military forces are hierarchically organized.
• For modern symmetric wars, both sides use supply chain logistic systems.
• Object is to destroy the enemy’s military capability (to win as opposed to “not lose”) at minimal cost. (Clausewitz, Book 3 Ch. 14)
• Lack of serious domestic opposition
• Both have the capability of attacking, invading, and occupying the other’s territory.
• There are clearly defined battle fields (“fronts”)
• There is a (more or less) clear separation between civilians and combatants.
• Targets are the enemy’s combatants, territory, and infrastructure (as opposed to political or psychological “targets,” e.g. “will to fight”)
• Both sides wish to avoid enemy escalation

There are a wide variety of tactics used in symmetrical warfare, broadly:

• Multi-modal attacks (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace)
• Reliance on technological advancements
• Optimized logistic networks.
• Use of frontal offenses (not engaging in “hit and run” attacks)
• Close physical proximity for extended periods of time
• Discretize actions into battles and campaigns.

The United States has participated in both symmetric and asymmetric wars, using either conventional or irregular fighting styles. The paragon of symmetric warfare would for the US be World War II. The Korean War is an example of asymmetric warfare where the US used conventional fighting styles against an enemy who used unconventional means. Against the North Vietnamese, the US used both conventional and irregular fighting styles through the Special Forces. Examples where the US used unconventional tactics were the Revolutionary War and parts of the War of 1812.

An example of a war that transitioned from symmetric to asymmetric would be the second Iraq War – it was symmetric for a few months following the invasion in 2003 then became asymmetrical as the insurgency began. There are signs that the Russia-Ukraine War is undergoing a similar transition (Aslan, 2023).

References

Aslan, Murat. (2023). “Symmetric and Asymmetric Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War”. Politics Today. Retrieved 20 March 2024 from https://politicstoday.org/symmetric-and-asymmetric-warfare-russia-ukraine-war/

Clausewitz, Carl von, (1989). On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. Princeton University Press.

Tzu, Sun. (2020). The Art of War: A New Translation by Michael Nylan. W. W. Norton & Company.

Qualities of Military Intelligence Officers

A military intelligence officer must be able to collect and analyze quality information and convert it into a timely and relevant product that can provide guidance to a commander’s decisions. To do this, the officer must possess (beyond technical skills) certain virtues or characteristics.

Allen Dulles, in his “Craft of Intelligence,” lists the following qualities of good intelligence officers (Dulles, Ch. 12):

“Be perceptive about people
Be able to work well with others under difficult conditions
Learn to discern between fact and fiction
Be able to distinguish between essentials and nonessentials
Possess inquisitiveness
Have a large amount of ingenuity
Pay appropriate attention to detail
Be able to express ideas clearly, briefly and, very important, interestingly
Learn when to keep your mouth shut”

He goes on to add a few other qualities to this list, including “an understanding of other points of view, other ways of thinking.” Dulles also posits that the officer must be motivated while not being overambitious.

The ability to differentiate fact from fiction and to distinguish between essentials and inessentials are necessary to sort-through and resolve conflicts in circumstances when vast amounts of information is available. When information is scarce, inquisitiveness, ingenuity, and the ability to pay appropriate attention to detail are needed to “fill in the gaps.” Collaboration is essential here to verify assumptions as well as to utilize additional information that may have been missed. This all falls under the rubric of critical thinking, which is essential for eliminating preconceived notions and biases, allowing objectivity to shine through. Objectivity is best attained when the intelligence officer is motivated to do all this while not being overzealous which could put self above mission.

Once the relevant information is assembled, it has to be communicated, and that requires holding an audience’s attention. This is achieved through clearly expressed ideas as well as the silence to allow feedback and interactivity. To do this, the intelligence officer must be perceptive to others (especially commanders and fellow intelligence officers) and understand their perspectives. He must be able to communicate the information in a concise and interesting manner, even under difficult circumstances.

Another quality an intelligence officer must possess is an impeccable character – he must be above reproach…

Suppose an intelligence officer has a “skeleton in his closet” – some characteristic or past event that would be embarrassing should it be made public. This would count against the officer for two reasons: this could be a character flaw that can lead to future failings, and it could make the officer vulnerable to extortion. One example of a “skeleton” was that an officer candidate who was gay would be denied security clearances, the idea being that his same-sex attraction could be used by foreign agents to manipulate him into revealing important state secrets.

Another “skeleton” is marital infidelity. General David Petraeus resigned as director of the Central Intelligence Agency 9 November 2012 following the discovery by the FBI that he had an affair with his biographer. This came after a 37-year career in the US Army in which he was commander of American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. He wasn’t coerced by a foreign agent, and it’s not clear if there was any coercion at all from Paula Broadwell, his mistress/biographer, who was a US Army Intelligence Officer.

What counts as a “skeleton” is highly complicated – it requires an officer to have a sense of guilt and that society views the characteristic or past event as a stigma. There is more than a sliding Overton Window at play, however: during the years J. Edgar Hoover was director of the FBI (1935 – 1972), cross-dressing was not socially acceptable, but he maintained his position while simultaneously earning the nickname “J. Edna Hoover.”

Reference:

Dulles, Allen. (2006). The Craft of Intelligence, Globe Pequot Press.

Just War Tradition as Compared to Realism

Introduction

This paper outlines at an extremely high level the Just War Theory and the rival realist theory. Both theories broadly describe the conduct of warfare but differ in their details as well as their aims. These differences are enumerated, and finally a cursory analysis of both is presented.

Just War Tradition

The Just War Theory is fundamentally a list of rules for restraining war - it is a set of criteria that must be satisfied in order for a war to be considered "just." It is founded on the belief that war can be a moral undertaking. JWT is thus a framework or guide for when to resort to force and how use that force. The Just War Tradition is the doctrine tracing the evolution of JWT by Christian thinkers.

The criteria in the JWT are divided into three stages: before (jus ad bellum), during (jus in bello), and after (jus post bellum). Jus ad bellum are the criteria for when a nation-state should resort to war or use military force in general. These criteria include that the leader declaring war have legitimate authority, that is to be waged for just causes and good intentions, and (maybe) that there is a high probability of success. Once war has broken out, conduct should be governed by jus in bello criteria: there should be discrimination between military and civilian targets (principle of non-combatant immunity), attacks should be performed only out of military necessity, and that force be limited by some doctrine of proportionality. Just post bellum is apparently a recent addition to JWT, and it concerns justice once the guns have fallen silent. There doesn't seem to be a short and stable list of criteria. This will be addressed in the conclusion.

Realism

This presentation of realism follows Frowe Ch 5. The core idea of realism is embodied by Cicero's phrase "laws are silent in times of war" (silent enim leges inter arma). This means that war lies outside of both moral and legal boundaries, so the only proper constraints on warfare are that actions should advance national interests.

Realism can be divided into two camps: prescriptive realism and descriptive realism. The former claims that war should not be regulated, the latter that war cannot be regulated. Frowe criticizes descriptive realism by noting that individual combatants do follow strict moral codes - they fight honorably. Prescriptive realism falls short because both sides of a war share common interests in protecting their citizens, their infrastructure, and their heritage, or so Frowe claims.

Comparison

JWT and realism have distinct aims: JWT seeks to reduce the frequency and severity of warfare, whereas realism focuses attention on the successful completion of warfare, with the possible consequence that wars would be shorter in duration but more brutal.

JWT and realism, at this level of abstraction, both accept the reality of violence and that, under certain circumstances, its usage is permissible. Also, both seem isolated from the "domestic analogy" - individual self-defense and national self-defense are treated as independent issues, which they have been historically for most nations. So, on the issues of violence, admissibility of violence, and the "domestic analogy" they are similar.

Neither theory directly address the relation between warfare and the military virtue of courage alluded to by Hegel (Holmes, pp. 286-287). JWT would seem to be more compatible as both justice and courage are moral virtues.

While both theories address conduct during war, neither address the conditions under which war should be ended. What counts as peace, and whether the conditions for peace should set at the beginning or near the end of a war, is left unspecified.

Frowe Ch 5 doesn't mention whether realism has its own jus ad bellum - the inapplicability of rules during warfare does not imply that rules cannot function before a war begins. If there are realist rules governing the initiation of conflict, they would certainly include likelihood of success as well as something to the effect that the war must be in the nation's self-interest. Other than this, we would expect both JWT and realism to have similar criteria for initiating warfare.

Frowe also doesn't mention whether there is a realist jus post bellum.

The primary difference between JWT and realism is in the conduct of war, the jus in bello. JWT posits that rules are needed to restrain the scope of warfare - protect non-combatants, force should be applied according to some scale of proportional response, and actions must serve some military necessity. With realism, the gloves are off - rules are legitimate to the extent that they further successful completion of the war.

Analysis and Conclusions

At this level of abstraction, both JWT and realism come off as "straw man" theories, particularly realism. This is understandable given the source material used. The details of JWT will certainly be fleshed-out, and it would be interesting to see a final form of the doctrine of proportionality. Something sorely missing in JWT at this level is the relation of national interest to the initiation and pursuance of war. Also missing is the targeting of military actions - it is just assumed that that military actions should be aimed at the enemy.

It is also curious that jus post bellum - justice following the conclusion of war - is seen as an afterthought. Even a cursory study of history shows that wars recur frequently, and the reason they repeat is either laid-out in print, such as in Mein Kampf, or can be directly experienced when travelling, like when visiting south of the Mason-Dixon Line. As such, any theory that attempts to limit the scope and severity of warfare cannot afford to ignore jus post bellum.

References

Frowe, H. (2015). The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction. 2nd Edition. Routledge.

Holmes, A. F. (2005). War and Christian Ethics. 2nd Edition. Baker Academic.