Grappling with Great Power Competition

Following the end of the Cold War, Pentagon war planners shifted to regional conflicts. During Iraq and Afghanistan, strategic planning was replaced by operational and tactical planning even at the level of day-to-day combat. With the reemergence of Great Power Competition (GPC), it is necessary to revert to global planning to set the conditions necessary for peace with peer competitors.

As discussed in Archuleta and Gerson’s “Fight Tonight”[1], war plans depend on three inputs: perceived and capable threats, the desired policy end state, and resource constraints.

Since the "setting of global conditions" must work across the continuum of competition (cooperation, competition below threshold of armed conflict, and armed conflict), it makes sense to consider the desired end state for three types of competition separately.

For lack of better terms, the competitor nation or non-state actor will be called "friend with benefits," "frenemy," or "enemy" depending on their place on the continuum. Actions the US Military takes are designed prevent or address armed conflict, which means moving the relationship with the competitor away from enemy status to frenemy or even friend status.

For each of these three types of relations, interactions we have with them must not only be appropriate for the current relation type, but also relevant to the next step on the continuum of competition.

For example, joint training exercises provide an opportunity to appraise the friendly nation's military capabilities for several reasons: first, this information would be useful if the US and the friendly nation should need to cooperate in a multinational military operation; second, to handle the situation where relations with the friendly nation should decay (so the formerly friendly nation becomes a frenemy). Bonds created by the joint training can help mend any move away from cooperation, however.

This addresses friends and frenemies. For enemies, the goal is to deter or address armed conflict. This is a third purpose for joint training exercises: they are shows of force, and also let the enemy know that we have friends (cooperative nations).

To get a very rough initial draft of a war plan, we run the area of interest through this framework. For example, in the Indo-Pacific Area of Operations, the primary perceived threat is China, with North Korea playing a secondary role. The desired policy end state would be containment. Joint training exercises with partners in the region, like Japan and India, serve as a deterrent to expansion. The resource constraints are the available U. S. military capabilities[2] in the region (U.S. Pacific Fleet and its component parts, Diego Garcia and other bases, etc.) plus the capabilities of friendlies.

B1-B Lancer departing from Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia, 7 October 2021
Photo by Senior Airman Rebeca M. Luquin, U.S. Air Force

These are regional conditions for the Indo-Pacific AO. Extending this to global conditions (as recommended in Archuleta and Gerson[3]) involves doing the same sort of things in other parts of the world, especially for nations that are friendly or potentially friendly with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Does this accomplish GPC containment through deterrence?

China practices "unrestricted warfare" which involves military, economic, diplomatic, propagandistic, and other approaches to control other nations[4]. Meanwhile, Russia often practices “liminal warfare” which means they shape outcomes to their advantage using military and nonmilitary methods while staying below the threshold of armed conflict[5].

Maintaining bases or enacting treaties granting the right of entry into maritime ports raises the standard of living of friendly countries. This leads to trade agreements, mutual assistance, and diplomatic relations. This helps to counter the unusual types of warfare practiced by China and Russia but is perhaps not sufficient since China and Russia aren’t economically contained[6].

Footnotes

[1] Archuleta & Gerson, “Fight Tonight: Reenergizing the Pentagon for Great Power Competition.”
[2] Nicastro, L. “U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the IndoPacific.”
[3] Archuleta & Gerson, “Fight Tonight: Reenergizing the Pentagon for Great Power Competition.”
[4] Qiao & Liang. Unrestricted Warfare.
[5] Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes.
[6] Spalding, R. War Without Rules.

Bibliography

Archuleta, B. & Gerson, J. “Fight Tonight: Reenergizing the Pentagon for Great Power Competition.” Joint Force Quarterly 100. 17 February 2021. Retrieved 29 August 2024 from https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2498193/fight-tonight-reenergizing-the-pentagon-for-great-power-competition/

Kilcullen, D. The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West. Oxford University Press, 2020.

Nicastro, L. “U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the IndoPacific: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service. 6 June 2023. Retrieved 29 August 2024 from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47589

Qiao & Liang. Unrestricted Warfare. Shadow Lawn Press, 1999.

Spalding, R. War Without Rules: China's Playbook for Global Domination. Sentinel Press, 2022.

Review of “The Role of Supply Chain Resilience”

Abstract

This is a review of “The role of supply chain resilience to relationships supply chain risk management culture and firm performance during disruption” by Akbar and Isfianadewi, which examines the relationship between supply chain risk management culture, three approaches to recovering from disruptive events, and the impact of all this on corporate performance. The research by Akbar and Isfianadewi takes the form of a statistical analysis of survey responses by owners or managers of Indonesian apparel manufacturers. It takes place in the context of the COVID-19 plague.

We begin with definitions of needed concepts, then explain the dependencies between those concepts as statistically demonstrated in the paper. We show how supply chain management theory applies, then conclude with managerial implications of the findings in that paper.

 

Authors’ Purpose

Akbar and Isfianadewi seek to examine the relationships between supply chain risk management culture, the various ways a company can successfully respond to adverse events, and overall company performance. After defining the relevant terms and explaining three ways a company can adapt to and overcome extremely unfavorable events, they inquire about the dependencies between supply chain risk management culture and those three ways of recovering from adverse events. To analyze the dependencies, they develop a conceptual model and propose 10 hypotheses that can (partially) test this model. To confirm or reject the hypotheses, the authors surveyed several managers and owners working in a particular segment of the Indonesian apparel industry during the time of COVID-19. The survey responses are analyzed, and the results indeed confirm the conceptual model.

Background Concepts

The authors define supply chain resilience as “the ability of the supply chain to return to its original or more desirable state following a disruption and to avoid failure.” An expanded definition of this term is as follows: supply chain resilience is the ability of a company to prepare for and respond to various types of disruptions and to quickly recover to pre-disruption levels. Methods for doing this include maintaining a buffer inventory, use multiple product suppliers and multiple logistics providers, trace dependencies among relevant suppliers, and so on. (Abeysekara et al, 2019).

Supply chain risk management (SCRM) is the process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating threats to the smooth operation of a supply chain. The immediate goal of SCRM is to improve supply chain resilience, resulting in continuity of operations in the face of disruptions as well as protecting the company’s financial well-being and reputation.

Supply chain risk management culture (SCRMC) is the values and practices a company employs to manage risks to its supply chain, thereby minimizing operational interruptions. A company with a strong SCRMC is not only able to anticipate and face disruptions but also to learn from those disruptions.

Four main activities and processes are necessary for rapid recovery of a company following a disruption: re-engineering, agility, collaboration, and the above-defined SCRMC. (Kumar & Anbanandam, 2019)

Re-engineering a supply chain requires a base understanding of the existing supply chain, supplier risk awareness, and an assessment of the trade-offs between efficiency and redundancy. (Christopher & Peck, 2004). The result of this re-engineering is a more resilient supply chain.

In the context of supply chain resilience, agility is the ability to respond to disruptions promptly, quickly, and efficiently. In the same context, collaboration is the ability to overcome barriers between supply chain partners, including informational barriers.

Application of Supply Chain Management Theory to the Paper

The most fundamental fact of supply chain management theory is that a company’s operation is initiated and continued because of a functioning supply chain. This fact is demonstrated in the paper by the importance of making a supply chain resilient as well as fallback procedures for when the supply chain fails.

The theory outlined in the paper is applicable to both anticipatory (push) and responsive (pull) business models. By allowing for collaboration among suppliers of goods and services that are part of the supply chain, the theory applies to a generalized supply chain model with extension into the enterprise where there is the very real possibility of competing suppliers of materiel and logistics services, and that these suppliers and services may be outsourced. In fact, this redundancy is part of what makes a supply chain resilient.

The concepts SCRMC and recovery procedures are applicable to each of the four parts of the supply chain value proposition (Quigg, 2022) – effectiveness, efficiency, relevancy, and sustainability. The paper is most concerned with effectiveness and sustainability, and efficiency is tangentially addressed through maintaining competing suppliers of materiel and logistics services. Even relevancy is addressed, for there is nothing more irrelevant to a customer than a product or service that isn’t consistently delivered.

The paper applies to all forms of industry disruptions, not only changes to consumer requirements and technology adoptions, but also disruptions brought about by social and economic factors as well as (more or less) unexpected events such as pandemics.

Summary of the Article

The paper examines the relationship between SCRMC, re-engineering, agility, collaboration, and firm performance. The authors’ research confirms that these five qualities are dependent on each other as shown in the following diagram taken from the paper:

These relations are confirmed by evaluating ten hypotheses, which can be grouped as follows:

H1 – H4: SCRMC has a positive effect on each of firm performance, re-engineering, agility, and collaboration.

H5 – H7: Re-engineering, agility, and collaboration each have a positive impact on firm performance.

H8 – H10: Re-engineering, agility, and collaboration each mediates SCRMC’s impact on firm performance.

These ten hypotheses are not deductively proven but are instead statistically verified by surveying 87 owners and managers in the batik clothing business in the Wedi subdistrict of Klaten, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Conclusion - Managerial Implications

Operational disruptions can come from sources internal or external to a company, and can not only include economic, political, and social events, but also “black swan” events such as COVID-19. To face such adversarial events, a flexible and adaptable supply chain must be established. The authors statistically demonstrate that a robust supply chain risk management culture is crucial for maintaining a resilient supply chain. Companies that are resilient in the face of disruptions are a result of resilient supply chains.

Of course, disruptive events will occur, and companies recover from them by being agile in their response, by building new relationships between their partners (even if that entails some redundancy), and re-engineering their supply chains. The authors demonstrate that agility, collaboration, and the ability to re-engineer supply chains each positively contribute to the company’s performance. Further, they show that a strong supply chain risk management culture is fundamental to a company’s agility, collaboration, and re-engineering abilities.

The most important implication for managers is that a resilient supply chain must be established, and to ensure that the supply chain remains resilient, the company must possess and encourage a strong supply chain risk management culture. Part of this culture requires that managers must learn from disruptions – how and when they occur, and to address any problems the disruptions reveal in our plans for a resilient supply chain.

Other important implications for managers are the ways they must respond to supply chain failures: they must be agile (respond quickly and aggressively), they must shore-up any collaborations between outside companies that are part of the supply chain, and they must be willing to re-engineer their supply chain to restore services. This paper shows that each of these restorative approaches lead to resuming the company’s operations, and that a culture of supply chain risk management is fundamental to this.

Agility, collaboration, willingness to re-engineer the supply chain, and a culture of risk management when it comes to the supply chain together mitigate the impact of calamities upon business continuity. 

References

Abeysekara, N., Wang, H., & Kuruppuarachchi, D. (2019). Effect of supply-chain resilience on firm performance and competitive advantage: A study of the Sri Lankan apparel industry. Business Process Management Journal, 25(7), 1673–1695. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/bpmj-09-2018-0241

Akbar, H.M. & Isfianadewi, D. (2023). The role of supply chain resilience to relationships supply chain risk management culture and firm performance during disruption. International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science, 12(2), 643-652. Retrieved 26 August 2024 from https://www.proquest.com/docview/2800278031/fulltextPDF/9FB3E428B04B48BCPQ/2

Christopher, M., & Peck, H. (2004). Building the Resilient Supply Chain. The International Journal of Logistics Management, 15(2), 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09574090410700275

Kumar, S., & Anbanandam, R. (2019). Impact of risk management culture on supply chain resilience: An empirical study from Indian manufacturing industry. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O: Journal of Risk and Reliability, 234(2), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748006X19886718

Quigg, B. (2022). Supply Chain Management (1st ed). McGraw-Hill Create. https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781307866025

National Security Strategy and Politicizing the Military

What is a National Security Strategy Document?

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a report prepared by the Executive branch and delivered to Congress that describes the major national security threats and how the current administration intends to address those threats. The NSS report can be presented in both classified and unclassified forms. This document is mandated by section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and must describe and discuss the following[1]:

1. “The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.”
2. Foreign policy and national defense capabilities necessary to deter aggression and implement part (1)
3. Proposed short-term and long-term uses of national power to achieve (1)
4. Evaluation of the adequacy of national power to achieve (1)
5. Any other information to help inform Congress related to (1)

Problems with the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance of March 2021

The NSS released in March 2021, entitled “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” (INSSG)[2], lists some of the priorities that the Biden Administration will address[3]: the pandemic, economic downturn, racial justice, and “climate emergency.” Exactly none of these are military threats, and whose gravity depends on a specific political bias. It attributes our current geopolitical situation to changes in the “distribution of power across the world,” which is an explicitly Marxist interpretation of history[4].

Another non-military threat discussed in the INSSG is domestic violent extremism, against which the Biden Administration promises[5] to

work as a coordinated, unified federal government to use the full array of tools at our disposal in concert with state, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign counterparts. Robust law enforcement and intelligence capabilities, as well as strong cooperation and appropriate information sharing, will be critical to understanding and addressing the broad spectrum of violent extremism America confronts today.

This part appears to directly target January 6th Protesters. It is interesting to note that the NSS that was released the year following the Oklahoma City Bombing of 19 April 1995 made no mention of domestic violent extremism[6].

For the national security to be effective[7], “[w]e will enhance diversity, equity, and inclusion, and prioritize flexibility and improve training across our national security workforce.”

Unlike NSS documents released by the George W. Bush and the Trump Administrations, the INSSG explicitly mentions the policies of the previous administration when it comes to immigration, stating that the Biden Administration “ended the previous administration’s family separations policy and discriminatory travel ban.”

Finally, beyond the above mentioned changes to immigration policy, the territorial integrity of the United States is given almost no attention, beyond stating that the administration “will not be able to solve all of the challenges we face at the southern border overnight.[8]”

Overall, many of the supposed threats listed in the INSSG are chosen to match the Biden Administration’s political leaning, and the major threat – the unsecured southern border – is downplayed and no plans to apply national power to counter this threat are given. It is clear proof of the politicization of the military by that administration.

Footnotes

[1] Goldwater–Nichols Act
[2] The White House, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.”
[3] Ibid, 6
[4] Sherman, “The ‘How’ and ‘Why’ of Power”
[5] Ibid, 19
[6] The White House, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.”
[7] The White House, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.”, 21
[8] Ibid, 19

Bibliography

Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of October 4, 1986, Pub. L. 99-433 (1986), Retrieved 22 August 2024 from https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/dod_reforms/Goldwater-NicholsDoDReordAct1986.pdf

Sherman, M. “The ‘How’ and ‘Why’ of Power: from Marx to Foucault to Power Today.” 13 April 2015. Retrieved 22 August 2024 from https://melinasherman.com/2015/04/13/the-how-and-why-of-power-from-marx-to-foucault-to-power-today/

The White House. “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.” February 1996. Retrieved 22 August 2024 from https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1996.pdf?ver=4f8riCrLnHIA-H0itYUp6A%3d%3d

The White House. “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.” March 2021. Retrieved 22 August 2024 from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf

Problems with Coalition Assured Autonomous Resupply

The U.S. Army Ground Vehicle Systems Center and the U.K. Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) have been working to use autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles at all points within the supply chain, with one of the goals being to “remove more Soldiers from exposure to direct enemy fire.[1]”

Robot from 2019 Coalition Assured Autonomous Resupply

These technologies were shown in a 2019 demonstration called Coalition Assured Autonomous Resupply (CAAR)[2], which displayed how automated ground vehicles and drones could be used to create semi-autonomous logistics convoys, and how these convoys solve the last-mile problem[3]. The hardware shown is certainly impressive looking, some even having mounted weapon systems, but there are several problems not addressed in the demonstration video.

First, for logistics convoys, the last mile can be in an active combat zone. It is good that troops are not put in danger while delivering supplies, but has the defensibility of these semi-autonomous logistics convoys been considered? Supply chains are valid targets in any type of conflict, and they are the primary target when the enemy is using 4GW tactics.

The second problem is just how "semi-autonomous" are these semi-autonomous logistics convoys? What aspects were automated - movement, weapon control, or both? Are the weapon systems “man-in-the-loop” or “man-on-the-loop” or “man-out-of-the-loop”? Most military ethicists seem to be happy with the first two options, but there is at least one[4] who is against man-out-of-the-loop systems.

The third problem is related to the location of the individuals controlling these robots. The remote-controlled weapon systems used during World War I, the Winter War, and World War II (the German “Ferlenkboot”, the Soviet "teletank", and the Nazi’s “Goliath tracked mine," respectively) all required the pilot to be in somewhat close proximity to the remote-controlled weapon. This is no longer true with contemporary unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). For example, the drone that killed Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen in 2011 was controlled by a CIA pilot located at the Creech Air Force Base outside Los Vegas, Nevada[5].

Where are the pilots of the semi-autonomous robots and drones located? If the pilots are close to the robots they control, then that undermines the goal of keeping them out of active combat zones. Suppose, however, the pilots are located on the other side of the globe, say in Los Vegas…

When faced against these semi-autonomous logistics convoys, an enemy would consider multiple points of attack: the semi-autonomous vehicles themselves while in motion or at rest, the ground upon which the convoy travels, the start and end points of the convoy, the communications system, and the individuals controlling the convoy. If the pilot is in some place like Los Vegas, then the enemy would have a legitimate target within our borders. That’s a problem!

Footnotes

[1] Allotta, “US, UK coordinate autonomous last-mile resupply.”
[2] Dstl, “The Future of Military Logistics | Coalition Assured Autonomous Resupply.”
[3] Allotta, “US, UK coordinate autonomous last-mile resupply.”
[4] Strawser, “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles.”
[5] Zegart, A. Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence.

Bibliography

Allotta, J. “US, UK coordinate autonomous last-mile resupply” U.S. Army, 25 September 2019. Retrieved 16 August 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/227647/us_uk_coordinate_autonomous_last_mile_resupply

Dstl, “The Future of Military Logistics | Coalition Assured Autonomous Resupply,” YouTube, 19 September 2019, 2:17, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8YqJUJby0wg

Strawser, B. “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles.” Journal of Military Ethics 9 no. 4, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2010.536403

Zegart, A. Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence. Princeton University Press, 2022.

Trends in Military Logistics

Introduction

Logistics is a crucial part of military operations; it always has been and will always be. This paper examines both historical and future trends in logistics.

We begin with the major transformation of supply systems: the replacement of living off the land with the “bring your own supply” system used since the time of Napoleon. By the time of World War II, horse-drawn wagons were insufficient and needed to be replaced by motorized transportation, and examples of the types of vehicles that made horses obsolete will be considered. Specialized cargo transport vessels from WWII will also be examined.

Next, future trends in logistics will be investigated, focusing on data-driven analytics and the insights that can be derived from total asset visibility. Predictive logistics and other applications of the data stored in these digitized supply chains will be considered along with the benefits these applications should bring.

We conclude by attempting to answer some questions about data-driven logistics – does embracing supply chain visibility result in more effective combat equipment? What advantages do digitized supply chains bring to joint operations?

Overview of Historical Trends

From the times of the Roman Empire to the 17th Century, militaries were supplied by local resources – they lived off the land (LOTL). As an army moved into a geographic area, troops had to procure local resources by foraging, raiding farms, and looting homes. The effect on the local population was predictable: LOTL inculcated fear and created enemies. This was the inevitable response to any large influx of troops.

There were military disadvantages to LOTL as well: an army would have to wait until the next growing season before travelling through the same geographic area, otherwise there would be nothing to loot. Further, the presence of large uninhabited areas of Central Europe made foraging impossible and thus dictated the path of advancing armies.

This situation began to change in the late 16th and early 17th Century with the “magazine” system of Tellier and Louvois¹. Magazines were prepositioned supply caches containing enough supplies to sustain an army while it either passed through a town or remained stationary, sometimes for as long as six months. Other innovative solutions used by military commanders included purchasing agents that would reimburse townsfolk for their supplies, as well travelling along routes that would delay the convergence of troops until they were outside their country of origin.

The greatest historical change to military supply was the transition from LOTL to “bring your own supplies" (BYOS). With BYOS, not only was the stress on the friendly local populace greatly reduced, but it also permitted the local population to become part of the economy created by the arrival of the troops. In addition, troop movement necessitated the construction of infrastructure that could be open to use by the locals. These factors raised their standard of living and constituted an early approach to “winning hearts and minds."

Foreign locals were not the only beneficiaries of military supply systems: in modern-day times, various domestic bases established by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) have certainly contributed to local economies. Take for example the DLA's presence in Susquehanna, Pennsylvania. The DLA maintains a CONUS Distribution Center and a Document Services center there as well as in nearby Mechanicsburg and New Cumberland. The DLA is the major employer in that area.

Advances of Transportation Logistics from World War II

BYOS required improved means of transportation, as existing cargo vessels and horse-drawn wagons were insufficient for the scale of America’s involvement in World War II. Two of the many advances in transportation logistics from that era were the Liberty ships, the 2½-ton 6×6 trucks, and the ¼-ton Jeeps.

Historical Trend I: Special-Purpose Cargo Vessels

Delivering supplies by sea to all theaters of WWII required a new class of cargo ships. In response, the United States developed the Liberty ships², with the goal of operating them as “seatrains for Army use”³. These ships had a length of 441.5 ft, a beam of approximately 56.75 ft, and a draft of approximately 27.75 ft. The oil-fired boilers allowed for a speed of 11 - 11.5 knots.

SS John W. Brown, one of the few remaining WWII Liberty ships, on the Great Lakes in 2000.

A total of 2,710 of these ships were mass produced by 18 different American shipyards. Each ship required 39 days to build, but the large number of shipyards combined to produce approximately 1.5 ships per day. One of the ways the construction time was minimized was to replace riveting by welding wherever possible.

Most of the Liberty ships were tasked with carrying supplies - they had a carrying capacity of 10,800 deadweight tons - but 225 were converted for use as troop transports.

To replace Liberty ships lost due to U-boat attacks, the United States constructed a new class of cargo ship, the Victory ship⁴. Victory ships were slightly larger than the Liberty ships and had a similar carrying capacity. The primary improvement over the Liberty ships was the speed: Victory ships travelled at a speed of anywhere from 15 to 17 knots.

The Liberty and Victory ships demonstrated a trend of rapidly building special purpose ocean vehicles. These vehicles served the war effort well, but the rapid construction entailed a shortened lifetime: the Liberty ships were expected to last only five years, and even though more than 2,700 were constructed, only about six remain as museum ships.

Historical Trend II: Mass-Produced Land Vehicles

Perhaps the most useful small vehicle of World War II was the ¼-ton Jeep. Jeeps replaced horses for transport and reconnaissance. Indeed,

In the United States, the Army was interested in a vehicle that could replace both the horse and the motorcycle in the scout, reconnaissance, communication, and liaison roles as well as a vehicle large enough to carry the heavy weapons and ammunition required by infantry companies⁵.

The Jeep was a staple of WWII land transportation with over 647,000 of them manufactured during the war. It was a four-wheel drive car that could travel 300 miles on 15 gallons of gasoline with a top speed of 65 mph. It’s main strength was its versatility: it could operate both on-road and off-road, be configured with armaments mounted between seats, tow anti-tank guns, etc.

Bantam jeep towing a 37mm antitank gun, in mid-air
- U.S. Army Signal Corps, 1941.

The Jeeps of WWII demonstrated another trend: the mass production of very versatile land vehicles. Their versatility was described above. They could be modified to act as field ambulances, but their primary purpose was general ground transportation. In terms of logistics, Jeeps served the exact same role as horses: they allowed for “last mile” delivery of relatively small amounts of supplies, carrying smaller pieces of artillery, and the delivery of wounded soldiers to nearby field hospitals.

Other, larger, vehicles such as the 2½-ton 6×6 truck were also mass produced. Over 560,000 of these “deuce and a half” trucks were built during WWII and were used in a wide variety of environments. Like the Jeeps, and unlike the Liberty ships, the deuce and half trucks were durable enough to be used into the Korean and Vietnam Wars and were even in use during Desert Storm. They were slowly replaced with 5-, 7-, and 10-ton 8×8 HEMTTs (Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks) which remain in service to this day.

These two historical trends demonstrate how military operations and transportation logistics co-evolved: the vehicles allowed for faster and deeper advancement of the front lines, while the vehicles’ fuel and service requirements required fuel depots, standard part inventories, and the creation and enforcement of periodic maintenance schedules.

Introduction to Future Trends

When examining the available literature on the future of military logistics, one cannot help but be impressed at the range and ingenuity of ideas that the U.S. military are considering. For example, additive manufacturing (e.g. 3-D printing) is being evaluated for building construction. For this idea to be practiced, traditional construction material would be augmented or replaced by whatever is used to print buildings, e.g., the amount of lumber and steel would be reduced and replaced by concrete, say. With this change, the methods for delivering the new material would have to adapt.

Another possible change in military logistics is the use of pick-and-place robots inside supply depots. Such robots are commonly used in commercial distribution centers like those operated by Amazon, and their adoption by the military would augment or possibly replace manual labor in those supply depots.

For the remainder of this section, some of the future trends that involve data-driven analytics will be examined. These trends all require significant IT infrastructure and will partially replace some logistic personnel.

Future Trend I: Total Asset Visibility

Fundamental to data-driven analytics in military logistics is the process of building a digital model of inventory and storage depots. Once this model is created and reliably updated, statistical analysis can be performed on the data. The result is total asset visibility.

Total asset visibility (TAV) – also called supply chain visibility (SCV) - is the ability to track items in a supply chain, from procurement to delivery at the final customer, and to make that data available to appropriate parties⁶. Implementing this involves asset tracking technology, procedural changes, IT integration, and certain follow-on changes.

Asset tracking technologies can be anything from barcodes to RFID (radio frequency identification) tags. A problem that must be addresses is the desired tracking resolution: for example, should missiles be tracked individually or by the case?

Procedural changes would at the very least involve scanning the asset as it moves through the supply chain - it is necessary to scan the asset’s bar code or RFID tag as it is procured, stored, issued, etc. One advantage of RFID tags is that there are bulk tag readers that can read multiple RFID tags simultaneously, which would speed asset scanning. Automated RFID scanning is also available, is used in the commercial transportation sector, and would be adopted for military applications.

The tracked items and their location must be stored in some way, which would require an IT system that not only allows the modification of the time and place an asset was scanned, but also to be able to retrieve this information and present it to relevant personnel in the form of dashboards and reports. The asset’s arrival time can be predicted, and this would also allow loss detection. Various metrics can also be calculated, such as average delivery time, current inventory at a given supply depot, etc.

Because of the level of IT integration used in TAV systems, the computer systems involved would be high value targets for the enemy, as well as for friendly competitors. The overall system must be defended both in the physical and IT security sense, starting with the RFID tags. Attacks by hackers must also be anticipated and prevented.

Future Trend II: Predictive Maintenance

Predictive analytics – the use of statistical modeling techniques to predict future events or quantities based on historical and current data – is being implemented in military logistics for forecasting maintenance requirements and lifespans of various types of equipment.

The goal of predictive maintenance is to estimate when equipment is likely to fail, and then schedule preventative maintenance before failures occur. It is expected that this will extend the lifespan of equipment, improve availability, and reduce cost of maintenance⁷. This is implemented by placing sensors on and in vehicles and other forms of equipment; the real-time data these sensors collect is sent to a central repository where it is collected and combined with records of preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS). The data will then be analyzed using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) algorithms to predict when equipment will fail. The results will be presented to appropriate individuals as dashboards, allowing them to act upon that data, such as scheduling maintenance or ordering replacements.

Predictive maintenance builds upon TAV’s IT infrastructure, with maintenance information stored along with location-date-status information. Additional dashboards and report generating software would be needed above and beyond what is required for TAV.

Future Trend III: Predictive Logistics

The goal of predictive logistics is to anticipate the military’s materiel needs, so that either supplies are located when and where they are needed, or supplies can be most quickly transported where they are needed⁸. This is accomplished through two approaches: forecasting demand and correctly pre-positioning materiel.

Demand forecasting starts with current and historical consumption rates and applies AI/ML to predict the supply needs of ongoing or future military operations⁹ . There will of course be unexpected changes in demand caused by sudden troop surges, unexpected enemy attacks, etc., but periodic changes caused by seasonal fighting patterns can be predicted. This, together with logistic lead-time, will ensure that the proper types and amounts of supplies will be made available at the right time.

To quickly deliver supplies to where they’re needed, those supplies can be pre-positioned – so instead of leaving supplies at strategic facilities and depots, they can be moved forward, closer to the battlefield. Hamilton and Woo¹⁰ call this “dynamic forward positioning,” and by doing this, material can be moved more rapidly to where it is needed. As the battle evolves, materiel can also be moved about (redistributed or rebalanced) without returning the materiel to the main supply depot.

Dynamic forward positioning can be extended beyond the location of materiel at forward depots. For example, Kress¹¹ gives various models of depots, storage capacities, transportation connections, and transportation capacities, and each of these arrangements can satisfy various desired qualities such as wide vs narrow deployment, flexible vs non-flexible deployment, survivability, etc. Of course, his models are theoretical and do not consider the terrain that these depots and transportation routes would occupy.

As with predictive maintenance, effective predictive logistics requires that TAV be at least partially implemented. Highly specific software is needed to choose the correct configuration of Kress’ logistic model.

Conclusion

As discussed above, military operations and logistics have spurred each other on – transportation logistics allowed for long-distance military operations, and the demands of military operations required the creation of supply and fuel depots to support the various new means of transportation. In this sense, transportation logistics and military operations co-evolved: they were mutually beneficial, and an improvement of one entailed an improvement of the other.

Anticipated advancements in logistics are substantially different from this co-evolution: rather than military operations and logistics benefiting each other, future logistics trends revolve around the collection and analysis of data relevant to supply chain efficiency. Instead of operations and logistics spurring each other on, military operations become just another application of data-driven logistics, not substantially different from commercial applications. Indeed, data-driven logistics has long been practiced in civilian settings, even before the advent of e-commerce.

This is not necessarily a good thing.

By digitizing the supply chain, military logistics can be optimized in the same way that commercial logistics are optimized. Supply chains are made more efficient not only to advance operational success but also to minimize costs. The costs of operating a military are lowered, but cost cutting can result in lower-quality equipment, unreasonable operational timelines, etc.

An advantage to digitized supply chains is that TAV gives participants in joint operations complete insight into the regional availability of military resources. This not only allows partner nations to share the cost of military operations but can significantly reduce the arrival time of a military asset into a theater of operations¹².

Footnotes

1. Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton
2. Larson, H. The Army’s Cargo Fleet in World War II. P.14 - 19.
3. Ibid. pp. 58 - 62.
4. Ibid. pp. 19-20
5. Duddy, “The Jeep at 70: A Defense Acquisition Success Story.”
6. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, Strategy for Improving DoD Asset Visibility.
7. Moyer, “Predictive Logistics Initiative Revolutionizes Equipment Management.”
8. Dilanian & Howard. “Mastering the Deployment Basics”
9. Schwartz, et. al. “How Data Analytics Will Improve Logistics Planning.”
10. Hamilton & Woo. “The Road to Predictive Logistics: Perspectives from the 8th Theater Sustainment Command.”
11. Kress, M. Operational Logistics.
12. Lyons, “Sustaining Military Operations in the Emerging Joint Operating Environment.”

Bibliography

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness. Strategy for Improving DoD Asset Visibility 3rd Ed. August 2017. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/LOG_SD/.policy_vault.html/Strategy_for_Improving_DoD_AV.pdf

Dilanian, A. & Howard, M. “Mastering the Deployment Basics: An Interview with Retired Lt. Gen. Patricia McQuistion.” Army Sustainment. March-April 2018. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://alu.army.mil/alog/2018/MARAPR18/PDF/MARAPR2018.pdf

Duddy, B. “The Jeep at 70: A Defense Acquisition Success Story.” Defense ARJ 19 (No. 4), October 2012. Retrieved 14 August 2024 from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA582717.pdf

Hamilton, C. & Woo, E. “The Road to Predictive Logistics: Perspectives from the 8th Theater Sustainment Command.” U.S. Army. 4 November 2019. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/227933/the_road_to_predictive_logistics_perspectives_from_the_8th_theater_sustainment_command

Kress, M. Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations (2nd ed.). Springer, 2016.

Larson, H. The Army’s Cargo Fleet in World War II. Army Center of Military History, May 1945. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA438107.pdf

Lyons, S. “Sustaining Military Operations in the Emerging Joint Operating Environment.” Army Sustainment. July-August 2017. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://alu.army.mil/alog/2017/JULAUG17/pdf/JULAUG2017.pdf

Moyer, B. “Predictive Logistics Initiative Revolutionizes Equipment Management.” U.S. Army. 2 May 2023. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/265899/predictive_logistics_initiative_revolutionizes_equipment_management

Schwartz, B., McConnell, B. & Parlier, G. “How Data Analytics Will Improve Logistics Planning.” U.S. Army. 4 November 2019. Retrieved 13 August 2024 from https://www.army.mil/article/223842/how_data_analytics_will_improve_logistics_planning

Van Creveld, M. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 2nd Edition. Cambridge, 2004.

Military Leadership: A Conceptual Model

Definitions of Leadership

Here are some partial definitions of leadership:

1. "Leadership is to give purpose" - very broad, and the connection to goal or mission is not clear.
2. “I need living companions, who will follow me because they want to follow themselves — and to the place where I will”. This is from Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The part about "following themselves" means that those being lead have certain abilities they want to exercise - a painter wants to paint, a boxer wants to box, warrior wants to fight. Following a leader allows them to exercise that ability.
3. "To influence or direct others to accomplish a goal that set before you." This is better but requires the leader to accomplish only one goal.
4. To correct this deficiency, this can be modified as follows: "To influence or direct others to accomplish a goal that set before you, and then build upon the results of that accomplishment."

Conceptual Model

Major characteristics of military leadership include:

• Character - these are virtues that a leader must possess. The USMC lists 14 leadership traits in their "JJ DID TIE BUCKLE" acronym: justice, judgement, dependability, initiative, decisiveness, tact, integrity, enthusiasm, bearing, unselfishness, courage, knowledge, loyalty, and endurance.
• Competency - this is covered under USMC's traits of knowledge, judgement, integrity, bearing, decisiveness, and initiative.
• Communication - the ability to clearly and concisely express intent to those being lead, and convince them of the importance of a goal or mission.
• Conviction - this is a firmly held belief or faith that a goal or mission is just and that your team can accomplish it. This would maybe fall under the USMC's courage, justice, knowledge, and endurance traits.

Those virtues are necessary but not sufficient for a complete conceptual model military leadership, I believe.

Consider Teddy Roosevelt's "man in the arena" metaphor. Character and competency are necessary to inspire men to follow you. Communication is what is needed to tell them they're about to enter the arena and what their mission is. Conviction is the belief that that there's a reasonable chance of success in that arena.

Entering the arena requires courage, but what about conduct within that arena?

From limited personal experience it is as if a switch has been flipped, and confidence and habit are replaced by mastery and aggression; the desire for success is replaced by the need for dominate. It's not clear whether or how this joie de guerre fits into the usual list of virtues.

References

N/A. MCRP 6-11B (with Change 1): Marine Corps Values: A User's Guide for Discussion Leaders. 20 October 1998. Retrieved 9 August 2024 from https://www.fitness.marines.mil/Portals/211/Docs/FFI/MCRP%206-11B%20%20W%20CH%201%20Marine%20Corps%20Values_A%20User's%20Guide%20for%20Discussion%20Leaders.pdf

Nietzsche, F. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. (T. Common, tr.) Retrieved 9 August 2024 from https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1998/pg1998-images.html

Roosevelt, T. "Citizenship in a Republic." 23 April 1910. Retrieved 9 August 2024 from https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Learn-About-TR/TR-Encyclopedia/Culture-and-Society/Man-in-the-Arena.aspx

Review of Cal Newport’s “Deep Work”

Cal Newport’s “Deep Work: Rules for Focused Success in a Distracted World” starts with a problem most everybody has encountered: we are not making the best use of the time we have available to us. It analyzes the causes and consequences of this and includes advice on habits and practices to correct this.

The book takes the form of vignettes of the working habits of (mostly) recent scientists, psychiatrists, businessmen, and authors who practice their profession deliberately. Newport calls “deep work,” by which he means the habits “necessary to wring every last drop of value out of your current intellectual capacity.” He uses these accounts to demonstrate how these habits allowed their practitioners become masters of their fields.

The book’s overall thesis is what Newport calls the Deep Work Hypothesis (DWH) which reads:

The ability perform deep work is increasingly rare at exactly the same time it is becoming increasingly valuable in our economy. As a consequence, the few who cultivate this skill, and then make it the core of their working life, will thrive.

The first part of the text attempts to prove the DWH, whereas the second part shows how to adjust one’s work habits to follow the DWH.

Part I: Defending the DWH

Newport takes three approaches to defending the Deep Work Hypothesis: that it is valuable, rare, and meaningful.

The first chapter is devoted to showing that deep work is valuable. The author begins with a description of the economic situation as of around the time of the book’s publication. He calls this period of time “the Great Restructuring,” in which intelligent machines will replace workers and where remote work allows for easier outsourcing. The author was writing in 2016, long before working from home was common and before OpenAI's ChatGPT came on the scene. Three types of workers will come out on top of this Great Restructuring: the owners (those with access to large amounts of capital), high skilled workers, and the superstars (those who are the best at what they do).

All three types must have the ability to perform deep work, and his definition of high skilled workers involves those who can use emerging technology and automation to their advantage. The author notes that the tools used by the experts are not the consumer-facing devices and software packages. In other words, basic computer literacy as taught in public school is not sufficient.

The value of deep work is that it helps one learn and maintain two important skills: the ability to quickly master new skills, and the ability to produce at an elite level, in terms of both quality and speed.

Chapter 2 notes that while deep work is valuable, it is exceedingly rare in part because it is not facilitated by many corporations, either large or small. This is proven by such things as open floor plans, adoption of instant messaging platforms, and the requirement to maintain a social media presence. In each case, the ability to perform extended periods of concentration is impeded.

Why do corporations insist on this? The author gives several explanations. First is what he calls the "metric black hole" - meaning the lack of measurements showing the impact that these ways of impeding deep work have on profitability. The second is what the author calls "busyness as a proxy of productivity." The meaning of this phrase is obvious, and the implication is that busy work takes time away from one being productive.

While both are true, Newport misses three aspects of corporate culture that particularly impacts knowledge workers, including software developers, but is applicable to any individual wishing to do deep work in a business setting.

The first is that software developers are primarily not managed by other software developers, but rather by project managers (PMs). PMs are essentially businessmen, they equate management with leadership, and usually have no coding experience and lack a deep work orientation. Busy work is all they understand about the craft of software development.

The second point Newport misses is that quite frequently, corporations do not want deep workers. From the shallow worker’s standpoint, deep workers are hard to understand, they have unnecessarily high standards, and they will object to being forced into the shallows.

The final point is that managers believe that quality can be replaced by enough shallow work – which is easily enabled by outsourcing. Warren Buffet made the flaw in this line of thinking very clear in his quote: “No matter how great the talent or effort, some things just take time: you can't produce a baby in one month by getting nine women pregnant.”

The thesis of Chapter 3 is that "a deep life is not just economically lucrative, but also a life well lived," in other words, deep work is meaningful. The author begins describing the work habits of a blacksmith that specializes in ancient and medieval metalworking practices. The pride displayed by this blacksmith is obvious: "...it’s the challenge that drives me. I don't need a sword. But I have to make them." The connection between deep work and meaning comes through pride, and this is displayed in the outcome.

Newport takes three approaches to proving that deep work is meaningful. The first argument given involves neurology. The second argument is from psychology: the idea is that deep work is well suited to generate a "flow state.” The phrase “flow state” isn’t exactly defined, but we can take it to mean being “in the zone.” This argument isn’t particularly convincing since it is basically replacing “deep working” with being in a “flow state.”

The most compelling argument that deep work is meaningful comes through philosophy. Newport references Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly's “All Things Shining," which examines how western literature can generate a purposeful life even in a post-Enlightenment age. Those authors argue that “craftsmanship doesn't generate meaning, but rather cultivates within oneself of discerning the meanings that are already there."

Part II: Implementing the DWH

The second part provides practical strategies for fostering deep work habits, through four rules.

Rule #1: Work Deeply – which means simply to extricate oneself from the distractions that prevent one from working deeply, or at least minimize the distractions. The idea is to add routines and rituals that allows one to enter and maintain a state of unbroken concentration. The author provides four philosophies for scheduling deep work into one’s routine, which he calls monastic, bimodal, rhythmic, and journalistic, the latter meaning it is best to fit deep work into one’s schedule whenever possible. All four of these scheduling philosophies depend on the realization that shallow obligations and deep work are mutually exclusive options.

Whatever scheduling method is used, it allows one to build rituals (habits) that emulate the rigor of great thinkers.

The remainder of Rule #1 provides additional guidelines for deep working, such as to collaborate only when it makes sense to do so, to execute as would a business, to use idleness to one’s advantage, etc.

Rule #2: Embrace Boredom – this means we shouldn't take breaks from distraction; instead take breaks from focus. Either use the internet or not, but schedule (time box) that usage.

One guideline for embracing boredom is to “meditate productively.” By this the author means to “take a period of time in which you're occupied physically but not mentally – walking, jogging, driving, showering - and focus your attention on a single well-defined professional problem.”

Rule #3: Quit Social Media – this is the most obvious way to reclaim one’s life. Social media should be used only if there’s a concrete benefit and that benefit outweighs the cost. About any social media service Newport asks the following question: “did people care that I wasn’t using this service?” Looking at it that way, the true value of social media sites becomes clear.

Rule #4: Drain the Shallows – eliminate shallow work whenever possible. This means that one should schedule every minute of the day. It also means becoming hard to reach, which is a natural consequence of quitting social media. One way of draining the swallows is to schedule every minute of one’s day. From this follows the most important lesson: “treat your time with respect.”

Additional Productivity Tips

Here are some missing ideas for maximizing one’s ability to do deep work.

The most important one is to keep various psychological conditions in check. Conditions such as depression and PTSD devour one’s time, and it is crucial for any person who has these conditions to manage them. How this is done varies from man to man, of course, but the three most successful means seems to be counseling/therapy, medications, and strenuous physical activity. As described in the “Embrace Boredom” rule, physical activity can be a time to focus on a problem related to one’s deep work, but in a curious “detached” manner.

Another problem is to keep one’s addictive habits in check. Cal Newport recounts the working and thinking habits of deep workers, and there are numerous examples of individuals who have struggled with addiction but have been extremely successful over their lives, none of whom make it into the text. Examples of this include jazz musicians such as Miles Davis and Bud Powell who were heroin users; numerous 19th Century literary giants were opium addicts, including Charles Dickens, Lord Byron, Elizabeth Barrett-Browning, John Keats, and Percy Shelly. The people listed here certainly performed deep work, despite their addictions.

Conclusion

Cal Newport’s “Deep Work: Rules for Focused Success in a Distracted World” makes a good case for working deep. It uses descriptions of the work habits of famous scientists and businessmen, encouraging readers to emulate their habits. The advice for maximizing deep work and avoiding or minimizing shallow work (and the people who insist we do shallow work) given in the second half is extremely practical.

As mentioned above, the best advice is given in Rule #4 – the last chapter – where Newport writes “treat your time with respect.” Given the importance of minimizing shallow work, this sentence really should read: “treat your time with respect, and do not permit others to do otherwise.”

Analyzing the Russo-Georgian War of 2008

Introduction

The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 has the dubious honor of being the first instance where a kinetic attack (land-sea-air) was combined with cyber warfare. This paper starts with a recounting of the war, then describes two approaches to intelligence analysis: a purely academic approach, and a fact-based IT security approach. The intelligence generated by those approaches are then compared.

Map by Andrein at English Wikipedia – 26 August 2008

Background

Russia, along with South Ossetia and the Republic of Abkhazia, invaded parts of Georgia¹ starting on 1 August 2008. When the war "officially" ended on 16 August, the results included the loss of Georgian territory, displacement of Georgians from South Ossetia, the collapse of diplomatic relations, the establishment of Russian military bases in the captured territories, etc.

For purposes of this paper, the important part of the war was the fact that it involved a cyber attack coordinated with the kinetic attack. This was the first war where there was such coordination.

Based upon an after-action review performed by the Georgia Minister of Foreign Affairs², cyber attacks began on 20 July 2008, continued throughout the kinetic component of the war, and the last cyberattack occurred on 27 August. The following sites were targeted:

• Georgian Parliament
• Georgian Supreme Court
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Central Election Commission
• President Mikheil Saakashvili's official website
• US and UK Embassies in Tbilisi
• Various news agencies

The methods of attach included information exfiltration, website defacement, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.

The Georgian response was to create temporary websites on the Google Blogger platform and in general to move them to US servers, knowing that US servers would be difficult for the hackers to target. In addition, the President of Poland, Lech Kaczynski, offered to host Georgian websites.

Academic Analysis

In a 2010 paper³ published in the Small Wars Journal entitled "Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008", David Hollis analyzes the cyber aspect of the Russo-Georgian War. He does this from a very academic standpoint, though, and as a result he is unable to answer crucial questions about the cyber attack. For example, he is unable to correctly identify the perpetrators!

Hollis attributes the cyber attack to hypothetical "cyber militias" or "hacker militias." He proposes these cyber militias exist, but he fails to not only answer but even raise some very fundamental questions about these militias, such as:

• What is this militia's name?
• How many people are in it?
• How long have they been operational?
• What is their physical location?
• Who coordinated the cyber and kinetic components?

Hollis makes the leap to "cyber militia" with no real evidence! From the perspective of philosophy, he's making an unwarranted ontological claim.

At first glance, this doesn't seem to be a major problem: Hollis is just calling hacker groups or cyber criminal organizations by a different name: "cyber militias." The issue is that "cyber militia" is a loaded term, which slants the information analysts' perspective, and forces him to go down the wrong rabbit holes. Terms such as "hacker militia" and "cyber militia" are prejudicial language for two reasons. First, militias have a very specific nature, most importantly their command-and-control structure (this will be expanded upon shortly). Second, there is a potential ambiguity - cyber militias are an active topic in cyberwarfare research – does Hollis mean the same thing?

Hollis is cognizant of the first item, and from this he derives some unusual "lessons learned."

Operational and Intelligence Lessons Learned

From a security analyst's perspective, Hollis committed the error of focusing on one type of information (academic research) to the exclusion of other sources of information. It is worth reviewing the lessons Hollis derived from this approach because they're facinating unto themselves, and it makes for a sharper contrast with the results learned from IT security experts.

Hollis derives four "lessons learned."

Lesson 1: Engage Cyber Militias First

The first lesson is that cyber militias must be engaged. This lesson is both extremely common-sensical as well as radically unusual, for Hollis is stating that a country must make use of ALL the resources available to it, and to do otherwise is to leave "money on the table."

Like all things, militias have a specific nature, and to use militias is to use them according to that nature. Or, like Francis Bacon said, "nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."

To engage a cyber militia for an operation, they must be SOLD on the concept. One of the characteristics of militias is their unusual style of command-and-control: they operate on persuasion instead of on orders. Another way of looking at this is that a military leader would find commanding a militia to be akin to "herding cats." This shows that Hollis is indeed somewhat aware of the "militia mindset."

Since members of a hacker militia would frequently be self-taught, they have their own ideas on how to proceed, so there must be discussions of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). They must be steered to desired targets ("centers of gravity"), and their actions should be coordinated with traditional operations.

In a cyber conflict, both sides will have their own hacker militias, and the defender's hackers can take steps to track and monitor the opposing county's cyber forces. This includes examining server and internet traffic logs for signs of probing operations. Of course, chat rooms and other forms of comms must be monitored.

Lesson 2: Target Choices

As Hollis described, Russia's hacker militias performed preparatory tasks such as identifying enemy assets, performing reconnaissance activities, as well as probing operations. These probing activities must be practiced "low and slow" – in other words below the enemy's threshold of concern. Hollis is caucious that hacker militias are "eager beavers," which will put their level of activity above the enemy's threshold of concern.

The defender's hacker militias must conduct their own recon operations in collaboration with their intel community. And of course, they must identify, monitor, and protect their valuable assets (key terrain).

Lesson 3: Geographic Targeting

Once their hacker militias were operational, Russia employed them to create a communications blackout of the areas of Georgia that will soon be attacked in real life (IRL). The desired consequences of this blackout are: federal and local govts were unable to contact those under attack; it generated panic; and it created doubts about the competence of the federal government of Georgia.

Notice that this technique of geographic targeting allows for feints and ruses.

For the defender, cyber targeting indicates the location of an upcoming ground or air assault. Again, this could be a feint or ruse!

Lesson 4: Possibility of Hacker vs Hacker Attacks

Since both attacker and defender (supposedly) have hacker militias, these militias will attack each other. The defender's militia will become an early target by aggressor to prevent retaliation. So, the government should monitor their internal hacker community.

This has application to other nations: neutral nations should monitor their own internal hacker community to prevent being pulled into the conflict.

Training Proposal

Hollis' paper concludes with one recommendation: that to best train cyber militias, cyberspace "ranges" should be developed and used for force-on-force activities. These must be air-gapped (computers not connected to each other, either wired or wireless), but somehow integrate with physical domain so as to investigate various attack/defend scenarios.

Concluding Remarks on Hollis' Analysis

Without proof of Russian cyber militias' existence, his lessons learned, and his training proposal, are really ideas for how a hypothetical militia should operate and train.

Notice the lack of actionable information relevant to the Russo-Georgian War: by taking a purely academic approach, Hollis is not able to identify the culprit of the cyber attacks against Georgia, and is unable to propose concrete methods to combat cyber militias above and beyond: get your own militia!

Factual Research by IT Security Analysts

We'll now look at the approach used by IT security firms to analyze the cyber component of the Russo-Georgian War. There are many, many IT security analysts in operation, and their research is frequently put behind pay walls – they are for-profit organizations after all! We'll look at the analysis of one of these security companies: Packet Clearing House. Their analysis⁴ was published in ACM Queue.

Packet Clearing House (PCH) is a well respected business and has been in operation since 1994, and have built major parts of internet infrastructure. They also have experience in state-on-state cyber attacks: they detected and analyzed a similar "cyber skirmish" in Estonia in 2007. Like all good IT security firms, their investigative approach is fact-based: they derived information from server logs and attack methods.

Before looking at the details of Packet Clearing House's analysis, the attack methods used gives information about the perpetrators' abilities.

Data exfiltration is not described in detail in any of the references used, but data scraping implies a fair level of programming ability, whereas system penetration implies a hacking background.

Website defacement definately involved a hacking component in order to break into server a server. The amount of defacement determines the level of programming ability by the perpetrator.

This is somewhat useful information, since the skill levels of the perpetrator limits the list of suspects.

The Culprit

The REAL information comes from the DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks. As background, DDoS uses botnets, which are collection of internet-connected computers. Each computer is infected with a virus. Said virus repeatedly sends requests to a targeted computer, and these requests overwhelm the targeted computer.

Based on the IP addresses of the bots in the botnets, PCH determined that the botnets were located in Russia, China, and United States, and the server that directed the botnet attack was located in the US.

The IP addresses were the smoking gun – they allowed security researchers to identify the culprit: the IP addresses of computers in the botnet match those used by the Russian Business Network (RBN). RBN is based in St. Petersburg and may be state-sponsored. They started as an internet service provider, then moved into website hosting, and have hosted CP, spam, mafia sites, and malware. They have built botnets and rents them for $600/month. At one point in time, they were linked to 60% of all Russian cybercrime.

PCH's Recommendations

Based on the their investigation, PCH made several concrete recommendations:

• Foster a robust physical infrastructure
• Diversify the number of international connections
• Create one of more internet exchange points (IXPs) within Georgia - IXPs permit internet connections between points within country, and no IXPs means that local connections must go outside country
• Ensure domestic availability of domain name servers (DNS) - without DNS, websites cannot be reached using the website's name
• Work with computer emergency response teams (CERTs) to coordinate defense against cyber attacks.

Georgia followed at least one of PCH's recommendations - they now have 3 IXPs

Comparison of Results

Using only an academic research approach, the culprit is something unknown (at the time): cyber militias. The actions were symptoms without known causes, and particular actors were not identified. Finally, only general remedial actions were recommended.

In contrast, by using all available information, PCH determined that the culprit is a known actor type: cybercrime organization. By tracing this organization's actions back to an actor, PCH was able to specify that actor: RBN. Finally, PCH was able to recommend extremely specific remedial actions.

Weaknesses of Georgia's network infrastructure were identified by PCH:

• No domestic internet exchange points
• No domestic domain name servers
• Some reliance on servers located outside Georgia (Turkey and Russia in particular)
• Overall result was to leave Georgia open to cyber attack

Finally, the strengths of Russian hackers were inferred by PCH:

• Russian Business Network are talented hackers with years of experience
• They exploited weaknesses in Georgian internet infrastructure
• RBN began probing attacks prior to launching the DDoS attacks
• Russians coordinated RBN attacks with military action
• RBN continued internet attacks after kinetic component began

Conclusion

David Hollis' analysis of the Russo-Georgian War is extremely academic: it proposed the existence of hypothertical "cyber militias" on both sides of the conflict; it was unable to identify the actual perpetrators; and it provided no concrete remediation plans.

Meanwhile, the PCH used available data (both server logs as well as the histories of known Russian hacker groups) and were able to derive useful information: they identified the specific Russian cyber crime organization responsible for the attack; the devised a concrete plan to solidify Georgia's cyber defenses; and the Georgian government followed some of those recommendations.

The difference can be summarized as follows: what Hollis did not know, he invented. What the PCH did not know, they researched.

This is not to say that the academic approach has no value: Hollis' "cyber militia" concept my have future uses – for example, a research paper⁵ was published in 2023 supporting the idea that Ukraine should get its own cyber militia.

Footnotes

1. Details on the kinetic aspects of the war can be found in Kofman, "Russian Performance in the Russo-Georgisn War Revisited."
2. Georgia Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russian Cyberwar on Georgia.
3. Hollis, "Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008."
4. Stapleton-Gray & Woodcock, "National Internet Defense – Small States on the Skirmish Line."
5. Svantesson, "Regulating a “Cyber Militia” – Some Lessons from Ukraine, and Thoughts about the Future."

Bibliography

Georgia Minister of Foreign Affairs. Russian Cyberwar on Georgia. 10 November 2008. Retrieved 26 July 2024 from https://web.archive.org/web/20111117042929/http://www.mfa.gov.ge/files/556_10535_798405_Annex87_CyberAttacks.pdf

Hollis, D. "Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008." Small Wars Journal, 2010. Retrieved 18 July 2024 from https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf

Kofman, M. "Russian Performance in the Russo-Georgisn War Revisited." War on the Rocks, 4 September 2018. Retrieved 3 August 2024 from https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/russian-performance-in-the-russo-georgian-war-revisited/

Stapleton-Gray, R. & Woodcock, B. "National Internet Defense – Small States on the Skirmish Line." ACM Queue 9 (Issue 1), 19 January 2011. https://doi.org/10.1145/1922539.1929325

Svantesson, D. "Regulating a “Cyber Militia” – Some Lessons from Ukraine, and Thoughts about the Future." Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 6 (No. 1) 11 July 2023. Retrieved 25 July 2024 from https://sjms.nu/articles/10.31374/sjms.195